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THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 



The Truth about the Treaty 



By 

ANDRE TARDIEU 



Foreword hy 

EDWARD M. HOUSE 

Introduction hy 

GEORGES CLEMENCEAU 



€01 



INDIANAPOLIS 

THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS 



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copykight 1921 
The Bobbs-Merrill. Company 






Printed in the United States of America 



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BRAUNWORTH & CO. 

BOOK MANUFACTURERS 

BROOKLYN. N, V. 



FOREWORD 

There are others who may be able to write as accurately and 
as interestingly concerning events which led up to the "World War 
and the war itself, but there is no Frenchman, save Clemenceau, 
who can write with so much authority concerning the Peace Treaty, 
signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919, as Andre Tardieu. 

M. Tardieu gets nothing second-hand. He was a participant 
in the events of which he writes. As a member of the Chamber of 
Deputies, he knew the currents of French political life, and he 
can write understandingly of the causes leading up to the great 
conflict. As an officer in the French Army, he can speak authori- 
tatively of that glorious page in history of which he was a part. 

This training served him well when he was called to assume a 
foremost role in the making of the peace. No man worked with 
more tireless energy, and none had a better grasp of the delicate 
and complex problems brought before the Congress. He was not 
only invaluable to France, but to his associates from other coun- 
tries as well. He was in all truth the one nearly indispensable 
man at the Conference. 

Therefore, if one would know of those fateful days in Paris 
when the Allies of France had gathered from the ends of the earth 
to have their reckoning with the Central Powers, it would be well 
to read The Truth about the Treaty, for here it is told by him 
who knows. 

Edward M. House. 

New York, March 3, 1921. 



INTRODUCTION 

My Dear Friend : 

It was near your heart, in face of the virulent attacks on our 
Peace Treaty, to set up the truth in print. 

If I applaud, it is not that I think there is need to defend the 
men who made it. For when all the criticism was in, nearly 
every candidate sought their endorsement before going to the polls. 
But what a misery to reduce to personal concern, the immensity 
of the interests at stake. Alas! Nothing is less easily forgiven 
than success, — above all when it touches your critic in a tender 
spot. 

Shall I add that an exact notion of duty, coupled with the pride 
of responsibility borne in the war which the Treaty Avas to close 
in triumph, forbade lis to bring into the negotiations men whose 
views we had thus far never shared. Hence, disappointments 
which sooner or later were to find tongue. 

Then enforcement entrusted to new hands, in the midst of 
grave difficulties, opened the door to recrimination. You know 
the old saying : " It is a bad workman who blames his tools. ' ' 

The common people were quick to see that violence in attack 
is not enough to redeem failures in time of stress. The deadly 
parallel was all that was needed to enlighten those whose least 
excuse was not always that they were blind. 

That is why, dear friend, it cost -me so little — I, who was 
looking on from the bank — to turn away from this turmoil, telling 
you the while that the nation — having seen how great the trial — 
would continue its confidence to those who had won it bravely 
and honestly. 

You agreed with me. But you were in the melee and claiming 
the right and duty to defend our common cause, you justly thought 
that it became you and your comrades to stand and meet the eager 
horde of assailants. It is fair to say that you have not spared 
yourself. This book bears witness to that. 

Without waiting for time to put all things in place, you 



INTRODUCTION 

wanted even now to pave the way for the coming of justice. Well 
may you be proud. You have so well laid the ax — as Demosthenes 
would say — to the heart of the iron thicket that, before the battle 
is well joined, its fate is sealed. 

Soon events — foreseen and unforeseen — were to bring to your 
support the weight of facts made vivid in the full light of day. 

This book prompted by your bold heart is above all an act of 
real wisdom. For nothing presses more at all times than to light 
the path of our Democracy, if it is to be able to govern itself 
instead of merely substituting one abuse of power for another. 

Parliament — Public Opinion! Because the supreme power 
theoretically rests with them, there is great need that the brush- 
wood be cleared from around the things that are done with a 
reason. 

Our institutions are the best in the world. To work them the 
best men in the world are none too good, above all if they are to 
be made of full effect. 

Love of theory has perchance made us too exacting of our 
public bodies, — fallible because merely human. Tossed hither and 
yon, by honest conviction as well as by sordid interest, our 
"rulers," at the mercy of the current, seek the fair way without 
always finding it. To aid them it is enough to bring them light — 
ever more light — and to be without pity for the things that hide. 
But mind you never wait. Be quick with the counter-thrust of 
contradiction. For the will of to-day, as Machiavelli says, is the 
nail on which to-morrow's action hangs. 

It is true. To maintain Parliament in the straight path of a 
power uncertain in its scope a free Press can be of decisive value. 
You have used it to wonderful purpose. And j'et how comes it 
that in our democracies the Press leaves itself open to the suspicion 
that it shuts its eyes to more or less veiled attempts upon pure 
right? The Press has weapons enough for its defense. 

Here — as a supreme safeguard — the inadequately prepared 
exercise of popular sovereignty finds its place. But for its thunder 
to be real and not of the stage, there is need for efficient prepara- 
tion now lacking. If man always acted as he speaks, he would 
seem too near to God. 

But as we now stand — rejoice thereat — when France really 
needs to make herself heard, I doubt not that she will do it with 
a loud voice. 

In the matter of Versailles, any wide-spread misunderstanding 



INTRODUCTION 

may have disastrous consequences before long. So you were more 
than right, dear friend, to wish that no excuse remain to those 
who, not having had things made plain to them, may try to feign 
that they do not understand. You have not left the least cloak to 
ignorance, not even excess of artlessness, if that fault can be 
imputed (especially in assemblies) to our day and generation. 

Behold! You have done that which was near your heart, you 
have done it to the applause of all who are not deterred by private 
passion from the plain quest for the Truth. 

The assailants have fallen back in disorder, some of them giv- 
ing vent to exaggerations which brand them with their habitual 
discredit; others less bold who inspired them have completed the 
rout by the ostentatious appropriation of some of your own views. 

How could I have doubted the issue, I who saw you in the days 
of sore trial bearing bravely — aye, even gaily — the heavy burden 
of your great responsibilities? Happy days when our opponents 
were those provided by the nature of things, days in which we 
gave for the victory of peace the same full measure of effort that 
war had demanded of us. 

All around you, around your co-workers, there was a constant 
search for knowledge, a constant appeal to all sources of light. 
Each of you compiling, questioning, discussing, trying out on me 
and on others the strength of your arguments. You were prepar- 
ing yourself by toil and labour for the arduous debates in which 
your splendid fighting spirit was met by gainsayers worthy of 
3'our cause as of their own. Ever ready for the fray, never down- 
hearted, ill-satisfied with a half success, ever seeking steel, — that 
is what I saw of these much abused negotiators. 

In those days you did not foresee the bitter diatribes even then 
being whetted in silent pent-up rage by men too slow to discover 
that all agreements are reached by compromise, and that a war 
won by four could not end in a peace dictated by one alone. What 
would you? If some to think well of themselves need to think ill 
of others. 

Perhaps what astonishes most is that so many famed opponents 
were forced to confine themselves to criticism of such or such an 
article, each seeking to outbid the other without ever having seemed 
to realize that the question as a whole — a question of political and 
social history — ^had to' be taken up at the place where war had 
broken it off and followed along new lines of international unity 
to permit the Europe of the future to live and prosper. 



INTRODUCTION 

When one confines the field of debate to suit one 's convenience, 
it is easy to wallow in invective but hard to pretend to the under- 
standing of a diplomatic instrument which, renewing as it does 
from the ground up, all questions of world policy, beggars 
description. 

All these Treaties of Peace to which so many famous person- 
ages set their names, without in some cases having laboured on 
tliem overmuch, were studied, drafted, built up free from the 
supervision of the modern Argus, beneath the inspiration of a 
master whose decisions were lauded before he had made them. 

"Whatever resentment the Treaty of Versailles has aroused, at 
least no one has been able to say that its ratification was not 
obtained by full knowledge and consent. 

The ancient struggles for domination had always, till then, been 
settled by conquests of territory. Germany victorious, the Treaty 
could be but a question of her capacity for depradation. Ger- 
many vanquished, right resumed full sway and the victors were 
forced to disentangle themselves from the myriad difficulties that 
might had been unable to overcome. What an undertaking ! And 
however incompletely realized, what audacity to have even 
attempted it! 

The most irreconcilable opposition might have found there food 
for thought. It deemed it easier to raise its demand indiscrimi- 
nately on all clauses, and then finally contented itself with a slack- 
ening of the terms we had succeeded in imposing. Where is this 
to end? I should have thought it inconceivable that a treaty 
could be enforced otherwise than by the fulfillment of the under- 
takings written in the bond. 

Bernhardi it is who said that war is only the continuation of 
the pursuit of peace aims by other means. I can see in that noth- 
ing but the brutal assertion of a fact. After the awful war forced 
upon us, can our peace policy be other than the necessary sequel 
of the policy of forbearance which put all civilized peoples on our 
side the day that the Germans went so far as to try to do away 
with the right of France to live? 

We have won this war not by our worth alone, but by the 
splendid aid of our trusty Allies. This asset must remain to us 
and we must give way a little on both sides in a spirit of friendship, 
not with ill temper that but lessens the price of consent and allows 
mortal hurts to subsist where agreement with good grace would 
have brought fuU measure of achievement. 



INTRODUCTION 

Remember with what joy we hailed the sound of the first 
Allied gun. This does not mean that — after untold sacrifice made 
for ourselves assuredly but no less profitable to our associates who 
fought for their own salvation as well as for ours — we are reduced 
to submit meekly to the law of our friends. No ! We did not save 
our just rights by war, to end by giving them up in peace. 

But the past grips us still. Even at the moment of the Armis- 
tice, we could see arising here and there thoughts different indeed 
from those which filled our minds when, at Doullens or Abbeville, 
our whole energies bent on the next stand, we asked ourselves the 
dread question: Paris or Calais? 

Waterloo and Sedan, to go back no further, forced upon us the 
painful care of a policy of reparation. While others filled with 
the hope of new things might allow themselves to be led away to 
the renewal of the past precautions against a France grown over- 
strong. There could be no greater folly. But is not the return 
to the past always the first impulse of countries whose power is 
founded upon the force of tradition?* 

Nothing is more significant in this respect than the book of 
Mr. Keynes — one of the representatives of Great Britain at the 
Conference of Paris. With some knowledge of economics but 
neither imagination nor character, Mr. Keynes (who was not alone 
in his opinion) unrelentingly opposed "the abusive exactions 
of the Allies" (read: of France and of her delegates whose most 
elementary demands prevailed only with great difficulty) in the 
name of an alleged regard for "the capabilities of Germany." 
One can imagine how Berlin welcomed the aid thus tendered. 
What encouragement for all organized German resistance to the 
Treaty, to read from the pen of a former British delegate that we 
had "shamelessly exaggerated the claims of our devastated 
regions." 

These reproaches and many others as brutally violent, of which 
I should have said nothing if their author without counting the 
cost had not thought to serve his cause by making them public, 
show clearly enough to what pitch certain minds had wrought 
themselves. 



*A tiny instance can give some idea of the difficulties of agreement on 
all points. For France to obtain the right to subject to military service, for 
the exclusive defense of her own territory, the natives of the countries over 
which she obtained a mandate, it was necessary to assert the contrary prin- 
ciple and it was only at the end of a year that (see the texts) a right of 
interpretation was implicitly recognized to us which amounted to nothing 
less than the formal negation of the professed agreement. As to an express 
recognition, it was always energetically refused to us. 



K 



INTRODUCTION 

Perchance our Freneli opponents will have the grace to see 
that we could not have both "betrayed" the Allies to the profit 
of France, as Mr. Keynes says; and France to the profit of the 
Allies as they themselves allege. 

Without entering here into the consequences of theories of 
universal interdependence which, before any satisfaction had been 
given us, would afford the Germans the economic opportunity they 
need to resume their frustrated attempt at domination, I confine 
myself to noting that, though disapproved of by Mr. Keynes as 
excessive and by some Frenchmen as insufficient, the Treaty of 
Versailles is equally binding on all who signed it. 

This is so true that our French opponents, after urging the 
Treaty's rejection or seeking to discredit it, have come by a sudden 
somersault, to demand the rigorous enforcement of the pact they 
so loudly condemned, holding their peace the while when they 
see its terms gradually slackened to our detriment, under German 
bluster. 

I note the fact and none the less maintain according to Bern- 
hardi himself that this Treaty, like all treaties, is and can only be 
a prolongation of war activities until complete fulfillment. This 
cannot be challenged unless it is desired — which no one has ever 
suggested — to wipe out the German defeat. Mr. Keynes himself 
does not go as far as that. 

Our Allies must accept the facts. We are victorious by their 
aid. They are victorious by ours. And our common victory can 
only produce and maintain its full effect in peace by the continua- 
tion of our common undertakings. 

It was not as warriors victorious in any ordinary military 
success that our soldiers appeared in the great war, that triumphal 
arch which — risen out of a great dream of domination now buried 
in the annals of history — gave passage at last to the standards of 
arms' noblest conquest — a peace of justice and of honour. 

If I dare to say it, it was the glamour of hope in presence of 
the miracle of Waterloo reversed: Wellington coming to our aid 
to break the onslaught of Bliicher; while France, by the side of 
America aroused, broke with the spirit of military hegemony 
which had passed from Napoleon to Bismarck and was to be for- 
ever crushed. 

So many cruel mistakes, so many atrocious miseries, so many 
hopes frightfully blasted, the whole whoredom of man's past suf- 
fering stretched out under the gaze of the noble dead along an 



INTRODUCTION 

avenue of heroic splendors blazing with the glory of France radiant 
and redeemed. And the men of France followed the lighted way 
towards the new duties of regenerated mankind. 

However this peace of miracles remained to be fashioned with 
our hands, after we had seen it with our eyes. And for who was 
able to retain this vision, the miracle of the war won demanded 
an even greater miracle — the miracle of peace organized. 

Alas, my dear Tardieu, the only certain miracles are those 
which we can ourselves perform. And if we would perform them, 
we must first get rid of that state of mind in which the past 
struggles instinctively in spite of ourselves to overcome the necessi- 
ties of the present. 

During the war, on the Fourth of July, the anniversary of 
American independence, as the United States troops paraded in 
front of the statue of "Washington, Mr. Lloyd George said to me, 
smiling : 

"Do you realize that you have made me assist in the celebra- 
tion of England's greatest defeat?" 

"And if your national pride still makes you regret the defeat," 
I answered, "I feel sure that you do not regret this day. "What 
harm has come to you from this American independence which I 
see every day becoming more attractive to Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand, who have freely enlisted in the block of the four 
great Allies? There have been heavier accounts by far settled 
between your flag and mine. And yet it is with all my heart that 
every day I salute your flag at the front." 

Thus we taught each other the new spirit of the future while 
waiting for the work of applying it. Let us take care not to begin 
by weaknesses cloaked under acceptable names. Let us beware 
above all of the weaknesses of a policy of procrastination. 

Our beaten enemies have admirable qualities of action which 
they employed, under a master, from Sadowa to Versailles, to the 
most relentless advantage. Scruples are utterly foreign to them 
as was made so clear by the recreant band of their ninety-three 
intellectuals and moral leaders. They thought to grasp the realiza- 
tion of a dream of atrocious brigandage in which victory would 
excuse every crime, and the probabilities are that they would have 
conquered us in peace but for the mad act which forced military 
resistance upon us. Are they any better than their acts? The 
future alone can tell, but the answer may be inferred from the 
acid test of actual beginnings. 



INTRODUCTION 

The start was not a happy one with von Broekdorff-Rantzaii 
who, draped in brutish insolence, came to accuse us of "hating'* 
German}^ because we did not offer our necks to her executioners. 
Since then the policy of Germany has merely been to gather up 
every chance weapon that could enable her to evade the Treaty. 
Audacity and guile naturally increased under the encouragement 
of manifestations like that of Mr. Keynes or of the series of unholy 
concessions from which Germany has been led to deduce that her 
signature at Versailles binds her only subject to further discussions. 

The hour of supreme warning came when the heads of the Allied 
Governments were told to their faces by a German delegate that, 
before they could usefully discuss, they "must cure themselves of 
the siclmess of victory. ' ' And the Conference didn 't break up ! And 
the disavowal of the delirious swine was not even demanded! At 
least may this true Boche receive our thanks for his shameless 
frankness which dispels any illusions about the German case. 

So on which side is there continuity of purpose? On which 
side vacillation? 

Wliat people is it that, abased and divided, having touched the 
bottom of the abyss, and unable to conceive any other ideal than 
the abuse of force — the shattered remnants of which litter the 
earth — still finds within itself a rebound of warped "dignity" — 
of savage insolence to defy its victors and to prepare openly for 
a mad revenge which without saving it, will throw the world into 
a new catastrophe? 

And what people is it that united for the victory of right, 
having displayed the highest virtues in the most extreme peril — 
have allowed themselves to be flouted with impunity by a pros- 
trate foe — without any remedy being offered but exhortation to 
jiatience and kind promises that one day moral courage will come 
into its own? 

And yet each day of dangerous tolerance increases the forces 
of evil, and snatches opportunities from the happy outcome so 
dearly bought. Can one have forgotten what was the stake between 
ourselves and Germany — what defeat would have cost us, and 
what peace must assure to us! 

The crowning or the overthrow of all the hopes aroused by 
victory, that, after all, is the issue which is being decided before 
our very eyes. Must we perhaps to-morrow return to the bloody 
battles whose cycle broken by us may, by our weakness, be 
reformed against us? 



INTRODUCTION 

The country made no mistake about it. Not for a single 
moment did it take the bait of belittlement which would have led 
to the renunciation of the glorious conquests of the present for 
the will-of-the-wisp of words cunningly pieced together. The 
meaning of the elections was plain. The people of France had 
judged. 

And so also the Germans, but in how different a manner. 

If they have as yet been unable to fathom the depth of their 
irredeemable downfall; if they have as yet been unable to discern 
the real meaning of the crowning act of the great tragedy, they 
stiU feel surging within them the deep sources of a life of work and 
of will. Their trouble is that they see the future only through 
the blood-red mists of a civilization grafted upon the survival of 
barbarism. If they can make themselves over, they will, little by 
little, attain the position to which they are justly entitled in the 
world. If they cannot, the victors, whether they realize it or not, 
must continue to mount close guard over lands whose borders have 
become as President Wilson said, "the frontiers of freedom." 

The maintenance of these frontiers which was the constant aim 
of French effort at the Conference, is of no small moment. It 
took the convulsions of a Russia thrown far out of her orbit and 
threatening Warsaw to reveal to minds wilfully closed, the funda- 
mental issues of the Polish question. Once more the historic brav- 
ery of Poland stood the test. It was none the less fortunate that 
the Red Army quickly reached the end of its supplies and found 
itself abandoned by the Allies when its own Government was 
unable to renew them. 

How many European questions are pending, to say nothing of 
the others ! 

First the most urgent. If, in the matter of balance of power, 
some have not sinned by excess of foresight, is not that an added 
reason why public men should keep a watchful eye upon those sec- 
tors whence clouds may arise upon the horizon? 

Watchfulness for a day is not what is wanted. Who can meas- 
ure the convulsions which this war has caused, or predict a time 
limit for the evolution of ever changing world conditions? Con- 
sider for example the century-long efforts to build up this Europe 
of ours which has fallen in ruins. 

But what avails it to discuss the most intricate problems, the 
solution of which, always more or less a matter of chance, may lead 
to cruel mistakes, if personal quarrels magnified by misunder- 



INTRODUCTION 

standings are to decide questions whose dangers are light-heartedly 
to be left to a future pregnant with the unknowable. 

"What avails it, having multiplied the means of prevision, hav- 
ing conquered the right of self-government by skilfully devised 
political adjustments, to shut one's eyes to urgent developments 
through fear of momentary embarrassments. What avails it to 
seek (oh, how keenly) the honour of responsibilities, only to shed 
them at the first encounter whether from faint heart or unavow- 
able parliamentary interest? 

"What avails it to be content with appearances, if we are to see 
in changes of system nothing more than the triumph of mere words ? 

Wliat avails it to have set ourselves up in the places of the 
kings of old, if we are to deny our ideals by our acts ? 

These questions handed down from our fathers, we shall trans- 
mit to our sons who will not fail to pass them on to posterity for 
ends the tangled skein of which will not soon be unravelled. 

And yet we must live and, if all things remain pending in this 
world where naught is completed except by continual evolution, 
the first requisite of life is to make sure in the present day of 
those things whose lawful development is to determine one by one 
the moments of destiny. 

This is the pressing duty of our day. The Treaty signed is 
but a fluttering scrap of paper unless it is enforced. To achieve 
this we put everything in action. For what result ? That is what 
it is time to know. 

"War can lead to the domination of arms, as peace can lead to 
the slackening of our will. Man being wont to oppose himself to 
man by combinations of strength, the natural temptation to 
encroach upon one's neighbor entails a righteous resistance where 
the forces of each are measured. The strongest in this world — ^by 
that I mean the best — will be the most vigilant, the best prepared 
to defend themselves against every evil enterprise, the readiest to 
aid their harassed neighbor who, in turn, will come to their aid. 

"With or without treaty that is our common law; and Boche 
treachery is but a renewed invitation to us to be on our guard. If 
there are sentinels who slumber or allow themselves to be taken 
unawares, the people who have all at stake must react in their own 
defense. When I ask that public opinion be awakened, it is because 
too often those who have wielded power have wielded it only to 
put public opinion to sleep. Would you behold public opinion at 
work and at the same time judge those who are at such pains to 
deter it? Remember the great tragedy of the Second Punic War. 



INTRODUCTION 

"When Varro bowed down by defeat at Caiina found himself 
under the walls of Rome, he was met by the Senate and the people 
came to congratulate him on not having despaired of the Republic. 
In this hour of mortal anguish, everything was great in the city 
of defeat. Some met the extreme peril with dauntless courage, 
others imposing silence on legitimate anger, found in supreme 
responsibility a grand revolt and last great effort; salvation was 
the reward of a miracle, than which none finer has ever been seen. 

Rome knew such greatness that the infinite abjection of its 
decadence has never been able to tarnish the memory thereof. Was 
ever a moment when this people, of which history is so replete, 
gave a more marvelous exhibition of moral splendour and of 
triumphant confidence in the strength of its will power? 

It is at such junctures that hearts are made manifest. The 
weak and the strong are at one. Rome wills it. Not a murmur is 
heard. Of complaints, recriminations, evil insinuations, not a 
whisper. Not a tremour of weakness. Not even an idle word. The 
strong-souled and feeble-hearted alike are proof against the ter- 
rors of disaster. 

The nation which by surfeit of weakness had brought this day 
to pass, is the same which in the midst of the catastrophe suddenly 
found itself again. All that they were and all that they had was 
given to the State. And Fabius, who had seen Varro preferred 
to him, who after having been accused of cowardice because he 
was unwilling to risk battles like that which so nearly wiped Rome 
off the face of the earth, Fabius marched in the parade which 
brought to the vanquished leader the homage of a sublime faith 
that Varro victorious would have awaited in vain. A great wave 
of super-human will-power has swept away all hesitations, all the 
errors, all the miseries and crimes which go to rot in the discard of 
history, leaving behind only the resistless forces of rebirth. The 
episode assumes such grandeur that the halo of Rome melts into 
the apotheosis of mankind. One is proud to be a man, if man no 
matter whence he come, or where he goes, can rise so high. 

Bijt I have strayed far from our critics and from the surly atti- 
tude which it has pleased some of them to adopt. Will it be urged 
that victory accounts for many shortcomings — tempts many to 
depart from "the street called straight" by the assurance it gives 
of the future — whereas the ex:tremity of misfortune may give rise 
to the highest reactions? That is too easy a way out. Far greater 
than the duel between Carthage and Rome, portentous indeed 
though it was, is the drama of domination fought out between 



INTRODUCTION 

modern Germany and the nations who were able to save the inde- 
pendence of the world. An old saying alleges that one is never so 
vanquished nor so victorious as one seems. If Rome took her 
revenge, Hannibal has often been charged with having lent her 
the support of his strategy. 

Who indeed in the hour of victory can say what its scope will 
be? Who indeed when the sun set over Austerlitz could have 
foreseen its rise over Moscow and Waterloo? Victories in them- 
selves are but the brutal crushing of one military force by another. 
The conquerors must show themselves capable of improving their 
victory. For that men and time are needed. 

No one suggests that the discontented have not found weak 
spots in our victory. The underlying causes of all alliances con- 
spire — no matter what one says or does — to rise to the light of day. 
Should this not have been guarded against, more especially as the 
Government was bound to secrecy ? And as the peace of to-morrow 
could be based only on the confidence of the country in the means 
provided by the Government of victory, who could be so blind as 
to undermine it to the point of attempting to ruin in the minds of 
the victors the very means of regeneration, the "rigorous enforce- 
ment ' ' of which is now being clamorously urged ? 

Finally were there not, as to-day, Germans, beaten but not 
crushed, ready by a rare blending of shameless trickery and pug- 
nacity to aspire to hegemony? Could the belittlement of victory, 
could the heightening of the morale of defeat serve any useful pur- 
pose? Alas, the attempt has already borne fruit so abundant that 
I fear to make things worse by casting up the account. To-day, 
as yesterday, as to-morrow, no continuation of success can be 
expected save from the interior discipline of peoples worthy of 
conceiving and of realizing the new order of a just peace of labour. 

Vanquished, our lot under Ludendorff would not have differed 
from that of Rome under Hannibal, Victorious, we have assumed 
our responsibility in the most noble effort to achieve a lasting 
peace by the sole forces of Right. To one and all such a state 
was well worth a general effort of self-restraint instead of the old 
rush to divide the spoils between those who had overcome the 
enemy. 

The future will decide. The mastery rests with him who wills 
most strongly and most enduringly. Ambition is of worth but by 
its aim. The higher the aim, the nobler the character, the stronger 
the will must be. Neither nobility of aspiration nor strength of 



INTRODUCTION 

courage can be lacking to France. Fixity of ideas, method and 
continuity of purpose have been the three things most lacking in 
our history. Can we not derive from the trials of these times the 
strength to enhance the glories of war — inadequate to nourish a 
nation — by a superior use of those attainments of peace which so 
often were the glory of our past? 

To make sure of the future, we must forge it ourselves. Ham- 
mers and anvils are there. How about our brawn? 

These ideals are all your own, my dear friend, and they radiate 
in your pages from the light of well-ordered facts. I thank you 
once again for having served them well. 

Your good friend, 

G. Clemenceau. 

To M. Andre Tardieu, 
Paris 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER 

I German Aggression .... 

II The War and the Armistice 

III The Peace Conference . . •• 

IV The Disarmament of Germany 
V The Left Bank of the Rhine 

VI Treaties of Guarantee . >■ > 

VII Alsace and Lorraine . . •. :■ 

VIII The Sarre Basin ..-..■ i 

IX What Germany Must Pay 

X How the Allies Will Be Paid 

XI German Unity 

XII Reconstruction and the Future of France 

XIII How the Peace is Being Enforced 

XIV France; Great Britain and the United States 



PAGE 
1 

27 
77- 
125/ 
145-^ 
202^ 
233 
250 
280 
320^ 

, 353 

, 376 

, 409 ^ 

, 437 ^ 



The Truth about the Treaty 



CHAPTER I 

GEEMAN AGGKESSION 

Never was an international crime more flagrant tlian 
Germany's attack on France of August 2, 1914; never one 
more deliberately planned. 

I can still see Baron von Sclioen, the Kaiser's Ambassa- 
dor, standing on the steps of the Quai d'Orsay as with 
feigned regret he takes leave of M. de Margerie, now 
French Ambassador at Brussels but then Political Director 
at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The German Repre- 
sentative bows deprecatingly. He seems to say, as his 
Master said a few weeks later, ''I did not will all this." 
Yet at that very moment and without any declaration of 
war, German troops had already (thirty-four hours pre- 
viously) crossed our frontier and invaded our soil. This 
very invasion had been planned for half a century. 

In 1871, Germany had torn from us Alsace-Lorraine, 
the flesh of our flesh, two of the most French of the French 
provinces bound by every tie to all our past ; two provinces 
which for centuries had given us, had given France — the 
oldest, most closely knit and most responsive of nations — 
generals and statesmen, men of science and of letters. 
Germany refused to heed the cry of despair raised at Bor- 
deaux by their representatives. By ''blood and iron," to 
quote Bismarck, she had sealed her victory and welded her 
unity with the rape of our provinces of which she made 
the bulwark of her power at our very door. Five and 
twenty years later, Bismarck cynically boasted: *'We did 
not conquer Alsace and Lorraine because their people 



2 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

loved us, or turned their thought to Germany. That did 
not matter to us. Their annexation was a geographical 
necessity. It is quite presumptuous to ask us to worry 
whether the Alsacians and Lorrainers want or do not want 
to be German. That is none of our business."* Neither 
hesitation before; nor repentance after. 

This unhallowed gain won by sheer might, does not 
suffice to Germany, or rather to retain it she has to have 
something more. Hence the policy which forty-three years 
later led to another war, by a succession of events the very 
logic of which is its most crushing condemnation. Ger- 
many seeks not only to keep the territory stolen from 
France, but to make secure by arms her domination of the 
Continent rendered possible by the Treaty of Frankfort. 
For this it is not enough that France shall be conquered 
and despoiled ; she must be isolated and paralyzed as well. 
It is not enough that Alsace-Lorraine, the piety of whose 
popular attachment for France was unconquerable, shall 
live beneath the Prussian yoke; the political structure of 
Europe must be such that never in any manner or at any 
time shall German domination be challenged. To build up 
this domination, as well as to defend it in case it were ever 
threatened, every means will be employed — not excepting 
war. Half a century of history has here its source. 

As early as 1875, this settled determination reveals 
itself by the threat of a fresh aggression. France is recov- 
ering too rapidly. To complete her ruin is a duty to Ger- 
many and to mankind. The awakening of Russia and 
Great Britain, conscious — too late — of the mistake they 
made in 1870, foils Bismarck who vents his disappointment 
in bitter jests, but sets to work at once to prevent its recur- 
rence. Two Powers exerting their influence in favour of 
France have been able to hold him in check ; against France 
therefore he determines to group forces which will give him 
undisputed control of Europe and cement his victory for 
ever. On October 7, 1879, he signs a Treaty with Austria- 

*Speech at Friedrichsruhe, April 24, 1895. 



GERMAN AGGRESSION 3 

Hungary. On May 20, 1882, one with Italy. Germany is 
now at the head of a coalition of 170,000,000 men which 
from the North Sea to the Mediterranean commands 
Europe and cuts it in two. She is the arbiter of a peace 
which she both imposes and guarantees. From the treaties 
on w^hich it is based this coalition borrows a defensive 
appearance ; as a matter of fact, its aims are offensive and 
it is ready to attack. To render France's isolation more 
complete, supplementary pledges are secured from quarters 
whence they were least to be expected. Russia, defeated at 
the Congress of Berlin by Bismarck's iron will, promises on 
March 21, 1884, and on November 18, 1887, to remain neu- 
tral if Germany is attacked by a third Power. Great 
Britain, losing sight, in her colonial controversies with 
France, of the controlling necessities of her foreign policy, 
signs extra-European agreements in quick succession with 
Germany, and lends a ready ear to inspirations from Ber- 
lin. An unyielding armour is thus encased around the 
Treaty of Frankfort to ensure the retention of its terri- 
torial and political advantages. Germany is the centre of 
Europe and plays off all her other neighbors against the 
one she cannot forgive herself for having spared in 1870. 

Never did France live more bitter years; never did 
country so placed show so much restraint or such calm 
dignity. M. Clemenceau said in 1919: ''Just think, for 
fifty years we were the wounded hero. Wounded heroes 
are all very fine but people go their way and pass by on 
the other side looking on them with pity. ' ' Such was the 
plight of France. Imprudence would have been criminal; 
for we were alone. Surrender would have been infamous ; 
for the future was in our keeping. To realize the ordeals 
through which we passed to win the right to Victory, our 
British and American friends must study this period of 
our history. As our national life revives, Jules Ferry seeks 
an outlet for it and our activity makes itself felt in the 
Colonies. From 1882 to 1888, the Tricolor of peace, order 
and liberty floats over Tunis, South- Algeria, Senegal, the 
Soudan, Dahomey, the Congo, Madagascar, Djibouti, Ton- 



4 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

kin and Annam. At times Bismarck feigns to view our 
colonial advance without offense, even to encourage it. 
But how brutally he reminds us again and again that 
naught is permitted to us without his consent. 

Every year sees Alsace-Lorraine atrociously hazed; 
frontier incidents precipitated by the Imperial police ; mili- 
tary laws ostentatiously passed. Germany, it is declared, 
will enforce the Treaty of Frankfort so long as a single 
German remains. "With that," it is added, ''all is said." 
Bismarck, who in 1870 scorning his Sovereign's reticence 
had openly declared that he was making war not only on 
Napoleon III but on France herself, spares his victim no 
insult: we are envious, turbulent, quarrelsome people; 
worthless; a herd of thirty million Cafers: "Scratch the 
Frenchman," he said, "and you will find the Turco." 
Year by year, we are lectured on "German forbearance" 
as if it were nearly exhausted. The Imperial War budget 
is increased by fifty million marks ; the Army by seventy 
thousand men. "We Germans fear God, and naught else 
in the world!" France and Europe are warned that they 
have a master. It is in vain that, obedient to Gambetta's 
advice, we hide our sorrow deep within our hearts "never 
speaking of it." It is in vain that we bear the cross of 
our country's humiliation silently, — in the oppressive 
peace imposed upon us. Germany is not content with what 
she has conquered; to military victory she is determined 
with proud boasting to add iDolitical supremacy. 

Firm as was her will not to unloose war, it was inevit- 
able that France should aspire to breathe freely once more. 
It was no less inevitable that Europe, while keeping the 
peace, should wish it established on other bases. Follow- 
ing all periods of hegemony, no matter who profited 
thereby — Charles-Quint, Louis XIV, Frederick the Great 
or Napoleon — the same thing has happened: political bal- 
ance has been restored. This law makes itself felt for the 
first time in 1892 with the Franco-Russian alliance. It is 
a precious guarantee for France which thus emerges from 
the solitude nobly endured for twenty years; at the same 



GERMAN AGGRESSION 5 

time, It guarantees the German conquests; for it is con- 
cluded on the basis of territorial status quo and far from 
raising any hopes that our wrongs may be righted, it 
secures Germany's possession of Alsace-Lorraine. It is a 
further proof of France's attachment to peace. It is not 
the only one. During the ensuing years, the same attach- 
ment prompts France to enter into colonial agreements with 
various Powers for the settlement of old disputes and to 
pave the way for friendly agreements in an unchanged 
Europe : conventions with Italy in 1900, with Great Britain 
in 1904, with Spain the same year; conventions of limited 
scope in which France — as in the Russian alliance — found 
proof of the prestige she had regained, but which contained 
neither provocation nor threat against any Power. 

From the first, this rebirth of European political activ- 
ity outside of Germany, directed not against her but 
against her hegemony, found the German Government de- 
termined to dominate or to destroy the forces which were 
regrouping. For Bismarck and his successors it did not 
suffice, as I have already pointed out, to keep the con- 
quered territories; it was essential that German political 
supremacy should remain unchallenged in a divided 
Europe. On the morrow of the Franco-Russian alliance, 
Germany had hoped to gain admittance and events in the 
Far East in 1895 — through the joint action of the three 
Cabinets of Berlin, Paris and St. Petersburg — ^liad justi- 
fied this expectation. But as time passed and other agree- 
ments ensued from which Germany continued to be 
excluded, a policy of reprisals took the place of the concilia- 
tory opportunism hitherto practised. The Kaiser seeks 
*'to safeguard the monument reared by his unforgettable 
grandfather." The Austro-Hungarian alliance is still in 
existence ; as is also the Italian. Germany, no matter what 
she says to justify herself, is not * isolated." But France 
by political honesty and efficiency has regained the initia- 
tive in international affairs, and this initiative in itself is 
an insult to German greatness as conceived by the Hohen- 
zoUerns and their subjects. 



6 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Among all the "opportunities" which presented them- 
selves — I borrow the word from Prince von Bulow — Ger- 
many is henceforth on the look-out for the one which wiU 
enable her to prove that her vaunted supremacy is still 
intact. By ''pressure and counter-pressure" — another of 
Prince von Billow's charming phrases — she strives to 
paralyze or undo that which has been done without her. 
Like a gambler who has won heavily, she will hesitate for 
ten years to stake the sum total of her assets. She will be 
threatening when circumstances seem to favour her; 
cautious when her luck turns. She will speak of war with- 
out declaring it and boast of ''dry powder" and the 
"sharpened sword" so long as she retains hope that her 
ends may be achieved by political manoeuvres. But the 
day she realizes that Europe, even while consenting to the 
heavy sacrifices entailed, is determined to free itself from 
German tutelage and to order its own life without looking 
to Berlin for guidance, then, unhesitating and unswerving, 
she will with cold calculation complete her preparations 
and at her own hour hurl herself — leaders and people of a 
single heart — into the "fresh and joyous" war! 

The plan unfolds in 1904 when Russia, at war with 
Japan, is condemned to inaction in Europe. The surrender 
of Port Arthur on January 1, 1905, deals the first blow to 
Russian power in the Far East; on February 11, Herr 
von Kuhlmann, the German Charge d 'Affaires in Morocco, 
presents his French colleague with a formal protest against 
the Anglo-French agreement of April 8, 1904, though 
Prince von Biilow, the Imperial Chancellor, had twice de- 
clared the year before that "he had no objection to make 
to it as far as German interests were concerned." On 
March 10, 1905, the Russian Armies sustain a bloody defeat 
at Moukden ; on the twelfth of the same month, the Kaiser 
announces his visit to Tangiers which marks the opening 
of the Moroccan controversy with France. On May 27, 
Admiral Rodjestvenski's fleet is annihilated at Tsousima; 
on June 12, the menace to France becomes so acute that 
the French Government by accepting the resignation of 



GERMAN AGGRESSION 7 

M. Deleasse, its Minister of Foreign Affairs, acknowledges 
that Germany has won the first round. For nearly ten 
years, under varying aspects, we shall see the same thing. 
In 1906 Germany drags us to Algeciras. Because of her 
Moroccan interests? No, but to furnish a striking demon- 
stration that, the moment she opposes it, the Anglo-French 
agreement becomes inoperative and sterile. Again in 1908 
she tries to pick a quarrel with us in Morocco, this time 
over three deserters from the Foreign Legion. This same 
year, she threatens Russia in order to detach her from 
Serbia and obliges her to accept, without more ado, the 
Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 
1911, she despatches a war-ship to the Moroccan coast and 
forces upon us a settlement which, if it increases our free- 
dom of action in the Cherifian Empire, costs us part of the 
French Congo. It is the policy of continuous tension and 
of chronic provocation. 

These succeeding outbursts bring Germany little or no 
gain. Neither in 1905, nor in 1906, nor in 1908, nor in 1911, 
does she manage to secure a foothold in Morocco; any 
more than she succeeds in 1908 and 1909 in eliminating 
Russian influence from the Balkans despite concessions 
wrung from St. Petersburg. Likewise, and on each occa- 
sion more signally, she fails in her master design of 
destroying the agreements entered into without her. 
Neither the Franco-Russian alliance, nor the understand- 
ings of France with Great Britain and Italy are dissolved. 
They survive Algeciras as well as Agadir. Moreover 
beneath the German menace certain of the understandings 
grow and change their character. They are not yet alli- 
ances, but they are already much more than mere settle- 
ments of controversies. During the crisis of 1911, one of 
Mr. Lloyd George's speeches quite plainly forecasts the 
possibility of that common action which the aggression of 
1914 is to bring into being three years later and which had 
been rendered more possible by the rapprochement between 
Great Britain and Russia after 1907. Italy does not with- 
draw from the Triple Alliance, but constantly abused and 



8 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

overridden on the strength of a Treaty which had brought 
neither guarantees nor promises to her vital interests in 
the Mediterranean, she cherishes plans for the future which 
the war, in 1915, is to bring to a head. Even the United 
States itself is brought face to face at the Conference of 
Algeciras vnth Germany's insidious efforts towards politi- 
cal domination and sides ^\dtli France against the proposals 
of Berlin which President Roosevelt declares to be 
*'inacceptable." 

In 1911, the general failure of German diplomacy is as 
obvious as her local rebuff in Morocco. The Imperial 
Minister of Colonies resigns as a protest, but he is not the 
only one who is dissatisfied. Germany, the scope and 
rapidity of whose economic development has been marvel- 
ous, is the prey of political disappointment. She has kept 
Alsace-Lorraine. She has maintained the Austro-Hunga- 
rian and the Italian alliances. She is sure of Turkey where 
her Ambassador is the real ruler ; sure of Roumania where 
a Hohenzollern is on the throne; sure of Bulgaria whose 
Czar believes only in Might. Yet despite these formidable 
assets she perceives, in the Franco- Anglo-Russian align- 
ment which she has strengthened with her own hands, the 
visible limitation of her power. On three or four occasions 
when she has raised her voice — and raised it loudly — this 
group has answered her, answered her in moderate and 
conciliatory tones. In 1905, 1906, 1908, 1909, 1911, these 
answers had been invariably pacific and composing. But 
on the one hand, France is no longer alone; on the other, 
Europe is divided into two camps which, however formi- 
dable the German power, might if necessary measure their 
strength. William the First's ''monument" which the 
Kaiser had sworn to maintain, is thus threatened with 
ruin. On all sides and by all means, the latter has sought 
to shore it up and restore it by diplomacy; everywhere he 
finds the road to hegemony blocked. 

Henceforth the die is cast and cast for war. Three 
years are needed to bring to a point of absolute perfection 
the military machine so carefully built up and trained 



GERMAN AGGRESSION 9 

since the victory of 1871: three years to bring in and 
convince the ''junior partners" whose support is indispens- 
able for such an enterprise; three years — as in 1867 — to 
find a favourable opportunity which will make possible the 
overthrow in a few weeks, by a few stunning blows of 
adversaries less well prepared and less well armed; three 
years and Germany returning to what one of her Princes 
called the "national industry" will seek by war to re-estab- 
lish that power which peace had not abolished, but had 
rightly limited. 

II 

This "call to arms" decided upon in cold blood by the 
German Government was to find the adversaries of yester- 
day and of to-morrow in widely divergent postures. The 
one, France, profoundly attached to peace, so long as it no 
longer meant servitude, and confident in its duration ; the 
other, Germany, physically and spiritually intent on war. 
I have roughly sketched the political events of forty years ; 
but the historian is false to his task who does not seek 
beneath the surface for those underlying impulses which 
animate national will. Behind the governments directing 
the moves, where stood the people? 

The France of 1911, faithful guardian of the traditions 
of the race, honest, brave and free, differed somewhat from 
the France that had known defeat. To the generation 
branded by disaster another generation had succeeded 
which, not having suffered directly from defeat, sometimes 
failed to recognize its causes and its consequences. The 
"spirit of revenge," so often invoked by Germany as an 
excuse for her provocation, no longer existed. Had it, in 
the real sense of the word, ever existed? It is doubtful. 
A few noble minds and brave hearts like Paul Deroulede ; 
a few momentary outbursts had at certain hours given 
tangible form to this feeling. But the nation as a whole — 
whether it be praised or blamed therefor — ^was foreign to 
these movements as facts have shown, Boulangism, born 
of internal discontent rather than of great international 



10 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

aspirations, had been but a brief flash in the pan. The 
memory of Alsace-Lorraine lived in our hearts but how 
were the lost provinces to be recovered? Before the Rus- 
sian alliance, we had been too isolated to challenge the 
status quo; afterwards, we were bound to respect it. Years 
had passed without a single act of revenge. Hope remained, 
a religion which no one surrendered. But between hope 
and reality peace endured at first and then, accepted, reared 
a wall. 

The men of my generation who reached maturity about 
1900, faced this painful problem "with the patriotism of 
resignation. Those amongst them who had closely studied 
history had little belief in the efficacy of resignation to 
span the moral abyss created by Bismarck between France 
and Germany. But by far the greater number, allowing 
themselves to live with the times, paid little heed to the 
warnings of the past. The courtesies of the German Em- 
peror in our days of national mourning — the deaths of 
Camot and of Mac-Mahon, the burning of the Charity 
Bazaar — and in the days of our national pride, such as the 
Exhibition of 1900, were not without effect. German pene- 
tration of France, of which the ever rising tide of emigra- 
tion was but a minor means, proceeded everywhere with 
extraordinary thoroughness. Our financiers were becom- 
ing accustomed to sleeping partnerships in which — as in 
the Bagdad matter — French money furnished German 
direction with a bond capital for which the regular pay- 
ment of dividends was but a very inadequate return. Our 
Socialists, hoodwinked by the material and political pros- 
perity of German Socialism, were content after the Congress 
of Amsterdam to be the minor brethren of the Marksist 
order. Our conservatives, to whom imperial diplomacy 
laid assiduous siege in the salons, were not insensible to 
the fascination of social order as exemplified by the Ger- 
man Empire. There was infiltration in every strata of 
French society. 

No one, it is true, would have dared to propose an 
alliance which honour and prudence equally forbade. Not 



GERMAN AGGRESSION 11 

only would such an undertaking, necessarily based upon 
recognition of the fait accompli, have obliged France to 
subscribe anew to the Treaty of Frankfort, — and that 
without the excuse of those who in 1871 had signed be- 
neath the mailed fist. But in addition this surrender would 
have involved a breach of faith which the country would 
have refused to accept ; a breach of faith which would have 
been the negation of forty years of effort and the betrayal 
of that policy of peace and balance which will remain the 
imperishable glory of the Third Republic; a breach of 
faith in proclaiming by an abrupt reversal of our alliances 
the instability of our democracy ; a breach of faith in sub- 
stituting for friends who had treated us as equals an ally 
who, unconsciously perhaps and by sheer historic tradition, 
would sooner or later have become a master. But if no one 
spoke of an alliance, many yielded to the temptation of 
extending special agreements such as those which the desire 
for peace had prompted the French Government to enter 
into in 1905, 1906, 1909 and 1911. As early as 1890 the 
aged Jules Simon under the spell of the young Emperor 
had returned from the Labor Conference of Berlin with 
the hope of such a thing, and in the following years those 
of our fellow country men who at the Kiel regattas and 
elsewhere had fallen beneath the sway of Imperial seduc- 
tion were over ready to recommend this form of morganatic 
Franco-German alliance. Had it not been for the con- 
tinual provocation of Germany in Morocco and the Near 
East from 1905 on, there is little doubt that before long 
the idea of a rapprochement would have made headway. 

Besides the political evolution of our Republic held us 
aloof from all idea of war. Not that the Republic — despite 
the difficulties of its birth in the throes of defeat, despite 
the handicap of a constitution drafted by its enemies — 
would have been incapable of having a foreign or a military 
policy: the war of 1914 furnished a triumphant answer to 
the doubts of reaction on these scores by showing that 
France could count both on the support of free peoples 
and upon the services of an Army which at the Marne single 



,12 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

handed checked the German onslaught. It is none the 
less true that the spirit of democracy — the soul of all our 
laws since 1877 and the practical expression of the individ- 
ualist philosophy of the eighteenth century — is in its very 
essence a spirit of peace. Peace in its highest expression 
which proclaims the right both of individuals and of na- 
tions to live and be respected ; lasting peace because politi- 
cal power entrusted to the majority insures the welfare of 
the greatest number and because legislation inspired 
thereby is repugnant to preparation for war and the 
increase of armaments. 

France, the most warlike of nations on the field of bat- 
tle, had in peace lost her military habit of mind. At the 
top, painful controversies, like the Dreyfus case, had 
brought about a cleavage between the political leaders and 
the military chiefs; at the bottom the easy leisure of na- 
tional existence provoked frequent protests against the 
obligations imposed by the military training of the nation. 
In 1905, at the very moment when Germany was beginning 
to rattle her sabre, the term of compulsory service had 
been reduced by a third. Three years later, in 1908, an 
even worse imprudence had reduced the period of instruc- 
tion of the reserves, a measure in flagrant contradiction 
with the former, as the shorter the time spent in the initial 
training of recruits the more thorough and complete should 
be the instruction given to the reserves. In a word no one 
believed war possible. No one believed it possible because 
its atrocities were repugnant to men's ordinary vision. 
No one believed it possible because no one wanted war, and 
that being the case nobody believed that others wanted it.; 
Not a Frenchman would have supported his Govermnent in 
a war of aggression. Too many Frenchmen made the mis- 
take of judging Germany by what France was, and of sup- 
posing Germany incapable of that which they knew France 
herself to be incapable of. Anyone who recalled the past 
in order to throw light upon the future and to dispel a 
dangerous sense of security met with disapproval. I have 
a right to say this and to recall that for ten years it was 



GEEMAN AGGRESSION 13 

my own experience. It took ten years of German threats 
and blackmail to make the French Government, in 1913, 
take precautionary measures which, being hurriedly impro- 
vised, were naturally imperfect and incomplete. France, 
full of optimism and faith in the progress of mankind, 
would not listen to talk of war. 

France would not listen to talk of war for another rea- 
son. Conscious of her past defeat, and unconscious of her 
present strength, France inclined to the belief that war 
would only bring fresh reverses. At the beginning of the 
Moroccan crisis and in the course of its evolution, there 
were not lacking political men and parties who proclaimed 
that ''France was not ready," dangerous talk in a country 
where the public mind is prone to believe bad news rather 
than good. The Frenchman is not loath to speak ill of 
other peoples, even when they are his friends; but he is 
even readier to speak ill of himself. It has often been 
remarked that in 1914 America and Great Britain knew 
very little about us and did not even suspect the reserves 
of energy and of abnegation which the war called forth. 
If America and Great Britain did not know France, their 
excuse is that France did not know herself. Read the 
French papers from 1900 to 1914 and see if you can find 
the slightest hint of the splendid picture that the following 
months are to present, — it is not there. Petty quarrels of 
politicians and parties, magnified by the Press, distorted 
the view not only of foreigners but of Frenchmen as well. 
The true France was hidden. Ignorance of one's strength 
leads men to seek the path of least resistance. People said 
and economists taught that *'war was impossible." Peo- 
ple also said, ''Of war, we will have none." Thus one sees 
why all our compromises with Germany, painful though 
they were, met with the approval of the great majority, 
both in Parliament and in the country. Thus one sees why 
France, by reason alike of her qualities and of her faults, 
was so deeply attached to peace at the very moment when 
Germany had decided upon war. If, in 1914, Germany 
had wanted peace she would as in previous years have 



14 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

found France ready to enter into the necessary agreements. 
If Germany had wanted peace, France more than any other 
nation would have helped her to preserve it. But Ger- 
many wanted war! 

Germany wanted war and, here again, we must go be- 
neath and beyond the will of Governments to reveal and 
examine the soul of the governed. War is the very basis 
and origin of the intellectual and moral beliefs which go 
to make up modern German patriotism. War created the 
German ideal which proved strong enough to place the 
whole of Germany under Prussian control in less than fifty 
years. Conceived in the imagination of politicians, his- 
torians and poets, it needed the iron hand of a Prussian 
junker to give it practical shape. Then the Hohenzollerns, 
who, thanks to the genius of Bismarck, made themselves 
the servants as well as the beneficiaries of this ideal, 
fashioned it in their own image. There is a German pa- 
triotism; as France knows but too well after 1870 and 
1914. But this German patriotism is essentially different 
from French patriotism. Our patriotism holds France 
sacred as the emblem of traditions many centuries old and 
woven even more of memories of peace than of recollec- 
tions of war. German patriotism holds war sacred. 
Patriotism to them is first and foremost the emblem of 
profit accruing from war and the recognition of war as 
the origin of power and of wealth. Saxons, Hessians and 
Bavarians — ^more particularly their Princes — ^may at times 
have mourned the loss of ancient liberties surrendered to 
Prussia; but when Saxons, Hessians and Bavarians com- 
pared their erstwhile poverty to the prosperity they de- 
rived from the Empire they felt that they were German and 
nothing but German, The spirit of nationality is not, in 
Germany as it is in France, the common faith of men who 
for centuries have lived under a common law; it is an asso- 
ciation of material interests which has passed from bank- 
ruptcy to prosperity and intends to safeguard the main- 
spring of its opulence. German patriotism, which a 
hundred years ago was an ideal conception of its philoso- 



GERMAN AGGRESSION 15 

phers, has since 1870 been based upon materialism. Ger- 
many means, to the people of the South as to those of the 
North, increased well-being, growing markets, rising wages 
and soaring dividends. It means also attachment to the rule 
of Might and remembrance of the sudden appeal to force 
which brought about this change, of the victorious war 
without which success would have been impossible. Thus 
the idea of war is inseparable in the German mind from 
the idea of country. Deep down in the heart of every 
thinking German who knows his history, the * 'fatherland' ' 
stands for war. 

This moral unity pervades every class of society. Con- 
sider the Socialists whose doctrines should make them op- 
posed to war, especially to a war of aggression. The 
prosperity of labour due to the Empire and to war is so 
closely bound to both that, the day the Empire will decide 
on war — the most flagrantly aggressive war — the whole 
Socialist party will follow and it will need our Marne vic- 
tory to remind even a small minority of its tenets. Why? 
Because more than any other party, by reason of its num- 
bers, it is vitally interested in the success of Germany & 
Co., because it has not forgotten the origins of Imperial 
success and because it pins its faith, for the protection and 
development of the acquired assets, upon those who first 
made it great. From German labour let us pass to the 
intellectuals. Here the spirit of military discipline rivals 
that existing in the trade-unions, which in turn is no wit 
less than that flourishing in the barracks. One day in 1905, 
Prince von Biilow, then Imperial Chancellor, said to me: 
<<In France your Universities are schools of debate and of 
political and social criticism. In Germany our Universities 
are the strongholds of fanatical nationalism." Nothing 
could be more accurate. Material advantages which trans- 
formed German Socialism into an Imperial party stamp 
the same character upon German intellectualism. Higher 
education no less than trade-unionism is at the service of 
an ideal born beneath a spiked helmet. 

Turn now to Germany's book-of -hours for 1911, writ- 



16 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

ten by Bernliardi, a soldier save the mark! "It is enough 
to examine with unflinching eyes the function of the sword 
and its terrible effects to see clearly that war is a task 
which divine in itself is as necessary as eating and drink- 
ing." So much for the principle, now for its application: 

**We cannot by any means avoid war and we must by 

no means delay it unduly but on the contrary provoke it in 
the most favourable circumstances." However this soldier 
had invented nothing. As early as 1848, the Parliament of 
Frankfort, the first manifestation of German unity, cheered 
the bombardment of Prague by the Austrians and some 
years later Treitschke, the master of German historical 
science, wrote: *'It is not fitting that Germans should re- 
peat commonplaces of peace apostles nor that they should 
shut their eyes to the harsh necessities of our times. Yes, 
our age is an age of war, an age of iron. The triumph of 
the strong over the weak is the inexorable law of life." 
There is the doctrine. France has never known any such, 
and this in itself suffices to distinguish the two peoples. 

The political spirit thus formed is simply one of raison 
d'etat. It was in 1801 that Metternich, who knew what he 
was talking about, showed Prussia ''emancipated from all 
sense of duty, exploiting the misfortunes of others, without 
the slightest regard for her obligations or her promises." 
Cast your eyes do^\Ti the line of Bismarck's successors. 
Might always placed above Right, with Germany applaud- 
ing. The elegant skepticism of a von Btilow — by far the 
most distinguished of the lot — is but a mask. In Might he 
trusts ! It is upon the presumption that none wdll dare to 
defy German power that he rests his whole diplomacy, all 
the while proclaiming it devoted to peace. But the day 
when the others neither mil nor can give way any further, 
it will be war, and war is thus in fact at the very basis of 
the system, — war and contempt for Right! Biilow, a true 
disciple of Bismarck, declares : ''In the hard world in which 
we live, one must be either anvil or hammer." His choice 
is quickly made. Kuhlmann, — a pupil of von Biilow, 
echoes the same sentiments: "I have waged relentless war 



GEEMAN AGGRESSION 17 

upon principles. They are justifiable in morals, but not 
in politics. Here it is a question of aims, not of means." 
Germany, be it not forgotten, listens to all this and 
applauds. 

And to sum up this cynical profession of faith this 
is how the last Chancellor — Bethmann-Hollweg, a mediocre 
and for that very reason a thoroughly representative offi- 
cial, — expresses himself: ''Necessity knows no law." The 
unanimous approval which this axiom elicited in August, 
1914, shows that Germany, industrious and painstaking but 
wrought up by that ''moral wickedness" of which Nietzsche 
speaks as "flowing in her veins with the blood of her an- 
cestors," the whole of Germany was long since ready to 
accept it. From 1870 on, the German received training for 
war from the cradle up, training for war at his mother's 
knee, training for war at school, in the university, in the 
Army, training for war in every walk of life. Germany 
turned towards war, as flowers turn towards the sun. 

In France there were some who took heart saying, "Ger- 
many is too rich to' make war." A poor understanding 
indeed of the nature and origin of her wealth. Germany 
has accumulated prodigious wealth in less than half of a 
century. But this result too rapidly attained has not been 
unaccompanied by crises. The first had fallen in 1901, 
memorable year of bankruptcies and failures. In 1911 and 
the foUomng months the situation although less critical 
remained tense, so tense indeed that more than one Ger- 
man, familiar with history and remembering the great 
impetus given by victory in 1870, began to believe the 
normal play of competition to be neither the best nor the 
surest means to conquer markets, settle balances and feed 
the Treasury. Such Germans saturated with their national 
traditions looked upon war as business ; just as their Gov- 
ernment conducted business as if it had been war. Thus 
grew up that close union of politics and economics which 
is so typical of the German public mind. Some dreamed of 
dominating an enslaved Europe; others — like Wagner's 
"Nibelung" — lusted for the possession of gold. Both were 



18 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TEEATY 

agreed that, at certain hours of a nation's life, victorious 
war offers the shortest cut both to domination and to gold. 
On the one hand the intellectuals of the Universities — all 
ready to draft — remember the ninety-three and their odious 
manifesto of 1914 — the philosophical justification of a war 
of plunder; on the other the great captains of industry 
equally ready to furnish the military chiefs with the ele- 
ments of the famous plan for the destruction of French 
factories.* Bernhardi's call was answered by the six great 
industrial concerns of Germany who several months later 
demanded "the annexation of all the special iron ore of 
Briey, including the fortresses of Longwy and Verdun, 
without which the mining region could not be protected," as 
well as the coal basins of the North of France. ''For," 
they very frankly added, ''the possession of coal is at least 
as important as that of iron ore. ' ' 

Such the Germany of 1911. She is unanimous. The 
notion of war, rejected by all other nations as the last 
vestige of a bygone age, is ever present in her mind. One 
finds it everywhere associated vaguely but intimately with 
their every conception of national and international life. 
It presents itself to them with all the glamour of the past, 
all the hopeful promise of the future. Whenever the Gov- 
ernment decides to pass from the notion to the act of war, 
the whole people will unhesitatingly follow. This is what 
happened in 1914. Blind indeed must he have been who, 
three years earlier, did not see ! 

Besides where was the risk? "War, Germany's national 
industry, could but be victorious, for France was not an 
adversary to be feared. I said just now that before the 
war France did not know herself; but how much less did 
Germany know France. I know no instance of political 
information so totally and utterly false as that which the 
Imperial German Government collected concerning us dur- 
ing the ten years prior to the war. This lack of under- 
standing appeared in the suggestions which the Emperor 
and his satellites sometimes ventured to let fall in the ears 



*See Chapter IX, page 281. 



GERMAN AGGRESSION 19 

of French visitors: ''Let us be friends. Let us unite your 
graces to our might." Germany, dupe of her desires, 
deeply despised P'rance. She believed France divided, 
weak and corrupt. For Germany the pleasure resorts of 
Paris — mostly frequented by Germans — seemed by com- 
parison with her self-estimated virtue to be typical of 
''Modern Babylon." Our military and other shortcomings 
were exaggerated by the reports of diplomats seeking to 
curry favour by judging us harshly. War appealed to the 
majority of Germans, when they thought of it, as much by 
the profit they expected to derive from it as by the small- 
ness of the risk which attached to it in their eyes. War 
against an ill-armed and misgoverned France would be, 
for a people in partnership with God, nothing more than a 
military parade enhanced by the prospect of much loot. 
Revolution would break out at the first battle. France, 
as everyone knew, was in the hands of the Socialists and 
the Socialists would refuse to fight! A striking example 
indeed of the illusion — both as to the strength of parties 
and as to the innermost thoughts of men — into which blind 
pride had led the most highly-trained, most methodical and 
most self-confident machine the world has ever known. 
The Kaiser — whose uncle Edward VII once dubbed "the 
bold coward" in my hearing — found solace in this illusion 
which stilled his morbid hesitations. It deprived the Ger- 
man people of the only brake which might perhaps have 
checked them on their warlike course. Believing no obstacle 
stood in the path of her conquering destiny, Germany 
thirsted for war and was ready to throw herself into it on 
a sign from above. 

Such the contrast, on the eve of Armageddon, between 
two national characters: France seeking peaceful develop- 
ment by her well-ordered genius for liberty; Germany, to 
use M. Clemenceau's virile words, "enslaving herself to 
enslave." The time was at hand once more for the 
onslaught of the "Alamans" on the "Franks." All Ger- 
many — ^herein lies the magnitude of her crime — was psycho- 



20 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

logically ready for war, even for war of aggression. The 
day its masters called, Germany would rise as one man! 

Ill 

In the autumn of 1911, Germany passes from decisions 
to acts. The Imperial budgets record them. The figures 
throw light upon the facts. 

For twenty months, laws of aggression follow one an- 
other in quick succession. I have told what France did in 
1905 and 1908 to reduce her military charges. Germany 
will reply to this reduction by an increase of her own. Yet 
she is already ahead of us. From 1902 to 1913, she spent 
104 per cent, more on armament than did France : 2,200 mil- 
lions as against 980 millions. Her military expenditures 
always exceeded ours — by 121 millions in 1902, by 306 mil- 
lions in 1906 (they will exceed them by 800 millions in 
1914). From 1900 to 1910, the head of every German 
family has paid 25 per cent, more towards the upkeep of 
the Army than the head of every French family. Taking 
the increase of military expenditure of the six great 
European powers between 1883 and 1913 we find the fol- 
lowing percentages : 

France 70% 

Italy 108% 

Austria 111% 

Russia 114% 

England 153% 

Germany 227% 

It is in these circumstances that a first law is voted in 

1911, under guise of technical improvements, entailing 
however an increase of 20,000 men in the regular Army 
and an expenditure of 167 millions. Ten months later in 

1912, a second law is passed tending to keep the regular 
Army constantly on a footing so nearly that of war that an 
attack can be launched in a few hours, and providing for 
new units, the creation of two new Army Corps, fifty bat- 



GERMAN AGGRESSION 21 

talions of technical troops, an increase of the regular Army 
by 40,000 men and an expenditure of 650 millions. This 
second law is hardly promulgated than a third is introduced 
and passed. This time the increase is 70,000 men a year, or 
for any Army serving two years a total addition of 140,000 
bringing the total effectives of the regular Germany Army 
up to 900,000. This was a costly operation. It meant a 
capital expenditure of 1,250 million francs and an annual 
charge of 275 millions. 

That alone should suffice to demonstrate the plan of 
aggression, but here is proof decisive. These burdens, 
which Germany imposes upon herself, coincide with a 
financial situation which makes them, if not impossible, at 
least very hard to bear. At the very time when within a 
space of thirty months the Imperial Government has bur- 
dened itself with a capital expenditure of nearly 1,500 mil- 
lions and an additional annual expenditure of nearly 1,000 
millions, its budget is in deficit of 550 million marks for 
1911-1912. For three years it has been seeking fresh taxes 
but can find none, this vain seafch having led only to the 
resignation of the Minister of Finance. The pressure is 
so great that it is decided to resort to an exceptional tax 
on capital, justifying it by recalling 1813, the very mention 
of which in itself throws light upon the situation, the 
secret intention and the future plan. Placed side by side 
with its financial policy, the military policy of Germany as- 
sumes its full meaning. To the huge gaps in the budget, 
others are added with no sure means of filling either. Why I 
Because Germany is already determined to throw the sword 
into the balance and call upon her ** national industry" to 
restore her finances. Like the gambler who, when the 
game is up, pulls his gun. 

The hypocritical search for pretexts begins at once. 
France, alarmed at the disparity between her Army of 
450,000 men and that of 900,000 which the laws of 1911, 1912 
and 1913 assure to Germany, votes the three years service 
and a slight increase in armaments. Immediately the Pan- 
German Press denounces this ''provocation." I can still 



22 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

hear Baron von Strnnm, who had been pleased till then to 
play at conciliation, remarking dryly during a dinner at the 
Dutch Legation in July, 1913, that, ''If France presumes to 
challenge Germany's right to be stronger than she is, it 
must be that she desires war." Ludendorff, then a colonel, 
draws up a report on the methods to be pursued in arous- 
ing national enthusiasm and shifting the responsibilities: 
He writes: 

The people must be made to believe that our armaments are an 
answer to the armaments and to the poHcy of France. They must 
be accustomed to the thought that an aggressive war by us is neces- 
sary to meet the provocations of our enemies. We must act with 
prudence to awaken no suspicion. 

Moltke, assuming humanitarian airs, deplores the reign- 
ing spirit of unrest and says to the King of the Belgians 
that "it must be put an end to." Put an end to? And this 
is how according to Ludendorff 's report: 

In the next European war, the small nations must be forced to 
foUow us or they must be crushed. 

Under certain conditions their armies and their fortresses can 
be rapidly reduced or neutralized, — which would probably be the 
case with Belgium and Holland — «o as to shut out our enemy in the 
West from territories which could be used as a base for operations 
against our flank. 

This will be a vital question for us. Our aim must always be to 
take the offensive with greatly superior forces from the very start. 

In order to do so, we shall have to concentrate a great army, 
followed by strong formations of landwehr which would force the 
armies of the small nations to follow us or remain inactive in the 
theatre of war, — or would crush them in case of armed resistance. 

From now on, the military leaders are not alone in the 
secret of this aggressive plan. The Governments of the 
German States are informed that France is to be attacked 
through Belgium. The Bavarian Legation at Berlin, in a 
report which Kurt Eisner made public, wrote: 



GEEMAN AGGEESSION 23 

Germany cannot respect Belgian neutrality. The Chief of the 
General Staff has declared that even English neutrality would be 
too high a price to pay for respecting that of Belgium. For an 
offensive war against France is possible only through Belgium. 

The plan decided upon and the sword ready, there 
remains only an opportunity to find. The assassination of 
the Archdulve Franz Ferdinand furnishes it ; and less than 
five weeks will suffice to bring about the explosion. Every- 
thing is ready and in its place ; everything is prepared so 
that no possibility of averting war remains. Here again 
we have German proofs to present in the opening pages of 
this book on France and Peace. Not forgetting the Kaiser's 
letter to his Chancellor of July 28, 1914, in which William 
II demands the occupation of Belgrade by Austria-Hun- 
gary — war with Russia in other words — here is Bethmann- 
HoUweg's Note of August 3 in which he says: 

We were aware that the eventual acts of hostility by Austria 
against Serbia might bring Russia on the scene and drag us into a 
war in conjunction with our Ally. 

But we could not, knowing that the vital interests of Austria 
were at stake, either advise our Ally to a condescension incompati- 
ble with her dignity, or refuse her our support at this difficult 
juncture. 

The confession is full: it was needless. For events 
speak for themselves and in the fatal week show Germany 
as eager to avoid the maintenance of peace as her future 
adversaries were to safeguard it. Not only Germany does 
nothing that, as Count Brockdorff-Rantzau expresses it in 
bis Memorandum of May 29, 1916, ''would have prevented 
the Austro-Hungarian Government from taking irrevocable 
decisions," but she systematically neglects every oppor- 
tunity of avoiding war which France, Great Britain and 
even Russia offer her. She supports neither M. Sazonow's 
request for an extension of time to Serbia for her answer, 
nor the Czar's suggestion that the controversy should hp 
submitted to the Hague Court of Arbitration ; nor his pr6- 



24 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

posal to refrain from all niilitary acts of a threatening 
nature while the conversations are in progress. Far more 
on July 31, it is Germany who exerts pressure on hesitating 
Austria to precipitate the latter 's action. The same day, it 
is Germany w^ho instructs its Ambassador at St. Peters- 
burg to take the irreparable step which is to plunge the 
world into war. 

Here, once more but no less damning, is the conclusive 
German and Austro-Hungarian evidence^ Prince Lich- 
nowsky, German Ambassador at the Court of St. James, 
referring to his Government, writes: ''The war was helped 
on." Count Szoeggeny, Austrian Ambassador at Berlin, 
as early as July 25 summarizes his information as fol- 
lows: ''Delay in beginning military operations is looked 
upon here as a great danger, on account of the interven- 
tion of other Powers. We are urgently advised to begin 
immediately and to place the world in the presence of a 
fait accompli." The same Ambassador on July 27 declares 
himself charged by the German Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs to acquaint the Austro-Hungarian Government that, 
if Germany is obliged by courtesy to transmit to Vienna 
a British offer of mediation, she is on the other hand 
"absolutely opposed to the consideration of any such 
proposal." 

Finally it is the Bavarian Minister in Berlin who, two 
weeks before the declaration of war, reveals on July 18 
Germany's diabolical plan in all its details: This docu- 
ment demonstrates how an ambition can bring about the 
death of millions of men : 

The step upon which the Cabinet of Vienna has decided at Bel- 
grade and which will consist of the sending of a Note will be taken 
on the 25th inst. 

The postponement of this action to that date is explained by the 
wish to await the departure of MM. Poincare and Viviani from 
St. Petersburg, in order to make it more difficult for the Powers of 
the Entente to agree upon a counter-proposal. 

Until then pacific sentiments will be simulated at Vienna and to 



GERMAN' AGGRESSION 25 

this end the Minister of "War and the Chief of the General Staff 
will both be given leave of absence at the same time. 

An efficacious action has, on the other hand, been exercised on 
the newspapers and on the stock-exchange. 

It is recognized in Berlin that the Austro-Hungarian Govern- 
ment has acted skilfully. The only complaint made is that Count 
Tiza who was probably at first opposed to strong methods has 
partly disclosed the plan in his speech to the Chamber. 

And after summarizing the terms of the ultimatum to 
be sent to Serbia, the Bavarian Minister adds: 

For the acceptance of these demands a delay of forty-eight 
hours will be granted. 

It is clear that Serbia cannot accept these demands which are 
incompatible with her dignity as a Sovereign State. The conse- 
quence will therefore be war. In Berlin they are altogether of 
opinion that Austria should take advantage of the favourable 
moment even if there is danger of ulterior complications. 

They believe that Austria's hour of destiny has struck and in 
consequence to the question presented by the Austro-Hungarian 
Government they replied without hesitation that they agreed upon 
any action which the latter may decide upon, even if a war with 
Russia is to result. 

Bismarck, on a like occasion, had forged the telegram 
from Ems, — child's play compared to this. Furthermore it 
is not the end, and for the carrying out of the plan we shall 
see reproduced the same trickery which marked its prepara- 
tion. France, to avoid any incident, has wdtlidrawn its fron- 
tier forces ten kilometers from the border. Germany, on 
the first and second of August, before any declaration of 
war, takes advantage of this to violate French and Belgian 
territory as she had already violated the territory of Lux- 
emburg. To justify her action she accuses French avia- 
tors of having thrown bombs on the railroad near 
Nuremberg. On April 3, 1916, the municipal authorities 
of that city, in accord with the district military authorities, 
will declare that all reports published on this subject are 
"manifestly false," and three years later Count Brockdorff- 
Rantzau, confessing the lie in turn, will merely express the 



26 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

regret that Germany, in declaring war upon France, 
** should have unwittingly made use of information which 
it had not had time to verify." 

.... The Armies are in contact. I have shown France 
patient and without fault, Germany, eager for the fray, 
prepared to herald the Dawn of Blood. All Germany, on 
August 2, 1914, is up and ready for the work of death. The 
Imperial Chancellor — mediocre though he be — has risen 
without effort to the level of German tradition to lay down 
the principle of ''Necessity" and in consequence to assert: 
*'We were obliged to disregard the justified protests of 
Belgium and Luxemburg." The Reichstag's answer? 
A unanimous vote of approval! Liebknecht himself — 
who will repent only later — is at one with Reventlow. The 
entire Socialdemokratie suddenly discovers on this national 
occasion that it has a Pan-German soul. Nor does it take 
pains to ''verify reports." Light-heartedly it breaks the 
pledge which its envoy Muller had brought to the French 
Socialists on July 31; it wipes away the kiss of Judas 
which in Brussels on the same day Haase had given to 
Jaures. 

Psychological unanimity, the elements of which I have 
analyzed, transforms itself into unanimous action. All, 
conservatives and liberals alike, hope for a quick solution : 
France crushed in three weeks; "nach Paris'^ realized by 
the violation of Belgian neutrality; an easy counter-blow 
against Russia, and then against England who has entered 
into the business for "a scrap of paper." No German 
doubts success, nor questions the means employed. At 
this hour and for this work, national unanimity is com- 
plete. War — brief war, cruel war, fruitful war — is the 
national programme. No one resists the temptation. Col- 
lective hypnosis transforms the crime against Right and 
against Humanity into a duty. Seventy million Germans 
claim from their leaders a full share of their responsibility. 



CHAPTER n 

THE WAE AND THE AKMISTICB 

All her Allies have paid tribute to the greatness of the 
part played by France in the war. Geography and his- 
tory alike ordained it. The violation of Belgian neutrality 
deprived France of the only guarantee which was hers by 
international law. For weeks and months, she was the sole 
protection of the western Powers. Had France been beaten 
at the Marne, the world would have fallen under the Ger- 
man yoke. By her victory she saved it. 

If France was able to play so great a part, it was due to 
the extraordinary union into which the German aggression 
had welded her whole people in a few hours, and to the 
military virtues displayed by her eight million soldiers all 
through the atrocious strain imposed by fifty-two months 
of invasion. When the troop trains left to carry her forces 
to the frontier, men's souls were stirred by passionate love 
for France, passionate longing for justice and passionate 
confidence in victory. War declared by Germany stunned 
France for a moment and then aroused her wrath. The 
whole nation revolted at the thought of its long patience 
so ill rewarded. It rose strong in the justice of its cause. 
The proud spirit of France awoke. Puisqu'il fallait y aller, 
on irait and with how whole a heart. France would for 
ever have shrunk from the responsibility of war. War 
forced by aggression upon a free people, strong in their 
own right — that was something for wliich men could die. 

The troop trains passed bedecked with flowers. On 
them was chalked the slogan ^^d Berlin" and from them 
hung in effigy figures capped with spiked helmets. Be- 
neath the August sun bare-chested artillerymen lovingly 

27 



28 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

caressed their guns and bandied jest and laughter with the 
comely maidens who flocked to the stations to cheer them. 
Thus after a fortnight of concentration we started for Bel- 
gium. We said of the Germans, ''Where are they?" We 
sought the enemy. Surely we should soon find him. In 
the compact villages of the Borinage and in the thickets of 
Belgian Luxemburg the shock came. By evening a great 
silence had fallen over our decimated regiments. We had 
thrown ourselves in the open against an enemy we had not 
yet learned to know. Now we knew. Machine guns con- 
cealed in cellers had mowed down our columns. Heavy 
artillery hidden away in the folds of the Hauts-Faings had 
overwhelmed our lines with murderous high explosives. 
Barbed wire and trenches had proved too much for our 
valour. France's furious onslaught had been broken by 
German stratagems. 

Then came the day of the retreat. Retreat? Whither? 
For what reason ? No one knew. Retreat with all its physi- 
cal strain, with all its moral strain far harder to bear! 
Effort without enthusiasm; weariness of soul added to 
weariness of body. At times the order came for us to stand 
and fight. The old spirit returned. On the Meuse and at 
Guise the enemy paid the price of such awakenings. But 
at nightfall our victorious troops, their confidence re- 
stored, heard once more the order to retire. To win and 
to withdraw. To win and leave the field of battle after 
having driven Germans from it was cruel and refined tor- 
ture, hardest of all for Frenchmen. Not once but again 
and again it was inflicted upon us. We got so that we 
could no longer reason. We felt that we were following 
the funeral of France along endless roads leading drearily 
towards the south. On September 5, an order was read 
calling on us to attack. We listened, but faith was lacking. 
We said to one another. *'We are going to attack to-mor- 
row morning. We shall win, but to-morrow night we shall 
again withdraw." 

We fought furiously nevertheless to vent upon the 
Boche the rage that was in our hearts. We kept it up that 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 29 

evening — then through the night — then through the next 
day ! We were very weary, but we were no longer retreat- 
ing! After two days, we found that we were advancing. 
At first no one believed it. How could the soldier under- 
stand? But soon the joy of making headway spread 
through the ranks — we were advancing. Of that there could 
be no doubt. So we *'had" them. En avant! In fagged 
and silent columns, we passed through villages and over 
plains. Victory was ours! Victory born in pain, in toil, 
in doubt ! It was only later that we understood ! The idea 
of Victory pieced itself together bit by bit, as we pushed 
the enemy back to the north. We had been told to die 
where we stood rather than give way. We had been asked 
nothing more. But of a sudden as we fought we felt within 
our grasp the fickle Goddess of Victory who for three 
weeks had eluded us. We had been the Army of Illusions. 
We had been the Army of Retreat. From now on, we 
were the Army of Confidence. The name of Joffre was in 
the hearts of his soldiers. 

But before reaching the end, we had more than four 
years to wait. At first we had hoped it would be only a 
few weeks. After the Mame, Ypres, a titanic struggle 
less known but not less great, had strengthened our hopes. 
We expected to leave the trenches in the spring. It was 
the first winter. We thought it would be the only one and 
bore it as a short and nasty test of our patience. Four 
winters instead of one passed. As early as 1915, the men 
in the trenches realized that it would go on like this so long 
as strength of material was not added to the strength of 
numbers and courage. The men higher up were slower 
to understand. We attacked often. We never broke 
through. Neither did the enemy. We lived face to face, 
rifle in hand, between attacks. There were local engage- 
ments in 1915. Then came 1916 and Verdun. Verdun, the 
supreme test after so many tests — Verdun, where, as at 
the Marne, France saved the world on land as the British 
fleet saved it on the seas. Once more Germany believed 
she could force the road to Paris. Six months of carnage 



30 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

closed it to her. Our defensive victory made possible 
Italian success in Galicia and Bukowina ; made possible the 
coming in of Roumania, so ill exploited ; made possible the 
counter-offensive on the Sonome, the first which inspired 
Ludendorff with fear of the future. Verdun did some- 
thing more. Verdun won the fight for material and after 
two years hammered into bureaucratic brains the long 
ignored but sovereign-importance of rapid-fire. From 
Verdun dates the beginning of intensive output without 
which final victory would have been impossible. 

Truly was it long! The loophole through which one 
peered at the ragged sandbags of a Boche trench; the fir- 
ing bank where one sat in the mud while a comrade 
watched; the icy water in which one's feet froze; the 
slimy shelter where straw rotted ; the fatigue duty and the 
trench work; the bringing up of grenades and grub; then 
billets in desolated villages; inspections and reviews; all 
the burdens of barrack life, — such with death at the end 
was the lot of all — officers and men alike. In 1917, an 
offensive — ^badly prepared and badly directed, both by 
the High Command and by the Government, — for the first 
time brings discouragement and disquiet into our ranks. 
Petain, the saviour of Verdun, restores order in men's 
souls. He gives back to us that Admirable Army of na- 
tional sacrifice in which officers and men are ready to die 
for one another. Time hangs heavy. But we feel new 
things stirring in the air. A menace ; that of the onslaught 
of enemy troops released by the Russian revolution. A 
hope ; that of a mighty young nation which beyond the seas 
is getting ready to bear its share of battle. Our energies 
grow taut. Our hearts take on new courage. "We feel the 
thrill of moral force added to material force. The year 
1918 begins. Once again, in this last year as in the first 
the French Army is to save the day. Twenty-four of 
Petain 's divisions are hurled into the gap caused by the 
German thrust against Gough's Army. Two months later, 
the French Army in turn, taken by surprise at the Chemin 
des Dames, is thrown back to the Marne. This danger 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 31 

overcome, our troops are at a fighting edge. National in 
spirit as in origin, the French Army has acquired the 
technical qualities of professional armies. It has experi- 
ence, it has self-possession, it has adaptability and it has 
science. It is ready for the war of movement now inaugu- 
rated by the fluctuations of the battle front. The lack of 
training from which so many troops suffered at the start 
has disappeared. "War material is in abundance. Confi- 
dence reigns. The stern and serious spirit of war is at its 
height. It is no longer as in 1914 an army of heroic youth 
rushing light-hearted into danger. It is an army of men — 
for youth matures rapidly in the school of war — who do 
their duty calmly and do it to the end. It is the Army of 
Victory. 

France behind the lines was worthy of fighting France. 
She furnished in full measure that effort without which 
the heroism of her soldiers would have been vain. She too 
did her full duty. When war began — the first great 
European war in forty-three years — both France and Ger- 
many had to face the surprise of fire: our 75 's inflicted 
losses on the Germans which their General Staff had not 
foreseen. Their heavy artillery for months smashed the 
morale of our Armies. To tell the truth no one was really 
ready — France even less than Germany — to meet the de- 
mands a successful war of artillery was going to make. 
Our manual of attack in 1913 said: *' Ground is won by 
infantry." Three years later our experience dearly 
bought proclaimed: ''Ground is won by artillery." Both 
perhaps were exaggerations, but the fact remains none the 
less that the French Army lacked the support in attack 
and the protection in defense which quick-firing heavy 
artillery affords and that its field artillery perfect in 
design was woefully short of ammunition. When we went 
to war, we had 1,300 rounds per gun, later on there were 
days when the expenditure was 4,000 rounds per gun. We 
had counted on a production of 15,000 three-inch shells a 
day and the total expenditure on certain days reached 
400,000. In 1916, to demolish a yard of enemy trench, it 



32 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

took 407 kilogrammes of *'75" shells, 203 kilogrammes of 
trench shells, 704 kilogrammes of heavy shells and 128 
kilogrammes of high explosive shells. The lessons of 
battle obliged us first to keep our field artillery supplied, 
then to create quick firing heavy batteries. A doubly 
onerous task in almost impossible circumstances. All our 
iron and steel plants were near our frontiers, and invasion 
had robbed us of them! The Germans estimated that our 
loss in this way would be 60,000 workmen out of 112,000, 
40 per cent, of our coal, 80 per cent, of our coke, 90 per 
cent, of our iron, 70 per cent, of our pig iron, 80 per cent, 
of our steel, 80 per cent, of our machinery. The estimate 
was correct. What did we do ? 

The story of this prodigious effort has never been writ- 
ten. We had, in 1914, 3,696 pieces of 75. Despite loss and 
destruction, we had 6,555 when hostilities ceased. As to 
heavy artillery, the supply rose from 288 pieces in 1914 to 
5,477 in 1918. In other words, we increased our field artil- 
lery by 77 per cent, and our heavy artillery by 1,943 per 
cent. One-tenth of this latter increase was obtained by 
reconstruction of old pieces, nine-tenths by new construc- 
tion. All our artillery combined in 1914 had less than five 
million shells. The monthly output at the end of the war 
exceeded nine millions. 

So much for round figures. Now for details. In 1914, 
the production of 75 's was negligible and there was no 
regular service of repair. In October, 1918, our workshops 
were turning out, for this caliber alone, 550 new tubes and 
573 repaired, 593 new brakes and 195 repaired, 267 new 
carriages and 114 repaired. To these must be added shells, 
more shells and ever more shells. The battle of Champagne 
and Artois in 1915, lasting two months, cost us seven and 
a half million 75 shells — an average of 121,000 a day. The 
battle of Verdun and the Somme in 1916 — ^lasting ten 
months — cost us more than forty-three million 75 shells — 
an average of 144,000 a day. The offensive of 1918, lasting 
four months, cost us nearly thirty-three million shells, an 
average of 272,500 a day. We met this increasing expendi- 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 33 

ture. The output of 75 shells at the beginning of the war 
was theoretically 13,000 a day, as a matter of fact it was 
6,000. It rose to 150,000 a day in October, 1915,— to 173,000 
in August, 1916, — to 203,000 in the following November, to 
233,000 in May, 1917, which level is maintained and even 
exceeded to the end of the war. This increase of produc- 
tion — 3,782 per cent. — was obtained under almost hopeless 
conditions brought about by invasion. It is to the everlast- 
ing honour of our Government, of our Parliament and of 
our industry that they were able to achieve it, in spite of 
everything. 

But to the first weapon, the 75 — ^the use of which was 
developed so tremendously, — ^it was necessary to add the 
war weapons of modern warfare, the 105, 155 short, 155 
long, 220, 270, 280, 370, 420. Here everything had to be 
built up from the bottom. Up to the very eve of war, 
experts had discussed the question of quick firing heavy 
artillery in scientific papers to no result. When war broke 
out, we had 104 pieces of quick firing 155 's — and that was 
all. But follow the expenditure from battle to battle: 
Champagne and Artois in 1915 (two months) cost us 510,- 
000 rounds of 155, or 8,500 a day, and 5,400 rounds of 220, 
or 900 a day. Verdun and the Somme in 1916 (ten months) 
cost us 5,280,000 rounds of 155, or 17,600 a day, and 413,000 
rounds of 220, or 1,343 a day. The Aisne in 1917 (two 
months) cost us 2,700,000 rounds of 155, or 45,000 a day, 
and 237,000 rounds of 220, or 3,900 a day. For the offen- 
sive of 1918, the expenditure reached 6,530,000 rounds of 
155 or 54,416 a day. I sum up these figures in the fol- 
lowing table. 

DAILY EXPENDITURE OF AMMUNITION 



Champagne and Artois 1915 

Verdun and the Somme 1916 

Aisne 1917 

Offensive of 1918 



75 


155 


220 


121,000 
144,000 
265,000 
272,500 


8,500 
17,600 
45,000 
54,416 


900 
1,343 
3,900 



34 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

This heavy expenditure of heavy shells, as in the case 
of the 75 's, was completely covered by production. The 
daily output of 155 's, which did not even exist in Septem- 
ber, 1914, had grown to 3,600 in September, 1915, to 30,000 
in October, 1916, to 39,000 in July, 1918. The output of 
220 's rose from 460 in September, 1915, to 2,100 in Septem- 
ber, 1916, and to 3,400 in April, 1917. The total increase 
was 3,782 per cent, for the 75 's, was 983 per cent, for the 
155 's, and 639 per cent, for the 220 's. And all this, I re- 
peat and insist, was after invasion had robbed us of about 
85 per cent, of our pre-war iron and steel metallurgic 
resources. 

The following table gives the daily productionsT 

DAILY PRODUCTION OF MUNITIONS 

75 155 220 

Third Quarter of 1914 6,000 

Third Quarter of 1915 150,000 3,600 460 

Last Quarter of 1916 203,000 30,000 2,100 

End of War, June 1917 to Nov. 1918 . 233,000 39,000 3,400 

If we take into account other sizes than the 75, the 155 
and the 220, we have during the last period of the war, a 
total daily production of 330,000 shells, and for the entire 
war a total production of 300 million projectiles. 

I do not want to prolong this enumeration. Let me 
merely add that, in September, 1914, our Armies had 140 
aeroplanes in action and that in October, 1918, they had 
3,609 ; that at the beginning of the war, we were producing 
62 a month and at the end 2,068. I note that in December, 
1916, we had 8 tanks and on the day of the Armistice 3,400. 
Finally, let me emphasize the point that this production 
for the needs of the French Army did not exhaust our 
manufacturing capacity, for we furnished our various 
Allies with 7,000 guns, 10,663 aeroplanes, and 400 tanks. 
Thus, after three and a half years of war and invasion, we 
were able to lend the splendid American Army that assist- 
ance without which their entry into action might have 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 35 

been indefinitely delayed. Not to mention the 2,500 offi- 
cers, the 25 instruction camps, and the 135,000 hospital beds 
placed at their disposal, we furnished the Americans with 
4,000 guns, 4,000 aeroplanes, 240 tanks. On the day of the 
Armistice, of the U. S. Army's war material then in line, 
France had manufactured 100 per cent, of the 75 's, 100 
per cent, of the 155 's, howitzers, 100 per cent, of the tanks, 
81 per cent, of the aeroplanes, 75 per cent, of the long guns. 
All of the 65 million rounds of 75 and 155 shells used by 
the American artillery came from French factories. Of 
the 14 million tons of supplies which they used in Europe, 
half, or 7 millions, came from France. 

Such was our material contribution. What of our con- 
tribution in man power! Despite her low birth rate France 
did not hesitate before the mortality of war and — by means 
of a Spartan system of mobilization — always kept her 
forces up to the maximum. 

3,781,000 men in August, 1914, 
4,978,000 men in July, 1915. 
4,677,000 men in July, 1916. 
4,327,000 men in September, 1917. 
4,143,000 men in November, 1918. 

In November, 1918, we had 362,000 more men in line 
than in 1914, and yet our losses from the beginning had 
been 2,594,000 men— 1,364,000 killed, 740,000 severely 
wounded, and 490,000 prisoners. Throughout the war, we 
bore the brunt of the enemy's attacks on the Western 
front. We held three-fourths of this front up to the spring 
of 1917. At that time the British Army was facing 42 Ger- 
man divisions, the French Army 82. Our line reduced 
about this time by 50 kilometers, was increased by another 
80 kilometers after the German push on General Gough's 
Army in March, 1918. Up to the war of movement in 
1918, the German Army always maintained its maximum 
density on the Western front — 1,293 battalions out of 1,692 
in November, 1914; 1,456 battalions out of 2,316 in Feb- 
ruary, 1917, and it was always the French sector that bore 



36 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

the brunt of the burden on the Western front. If, for 
example, taking the first 35 months of the war (August, 
1914, to August, 1917) and the number of enemy battalions 
in line, we figure the total German strength deployed as 
4 on the Belgian front, it was 8 on the British front, 22 
on the Russian front and 35 on the French front. 

I have told our industrial effort and our human sacri- 
fice. There remains the story of our French genius. I am 
not one of those small-minded Frenchmen who believe that, 
in order to be great, France must needs be ungrateful. I 
have always said that France could not have won without 
her Allies. And I have always counted on our Allies' sense 
of justice to recognize that without France they could not 
have waged the war. Have I not the right to add that 
besides her contribution in war material and her contribu- 
tion in man power, France made the splendid contribution 
of her genius? The war full of surprises was pregnant 
with its own lesson. Success came to those who from this 
lesson were able to unriddle their course of action. No cut- 
and-dried doctrine stood the test of events. The doctrine 
of the war shaped itself from day to day in the turmoil of 
accumulated happenings, reserving the crown of victory to 
him who could coordinate its ever changing demands. But 
whether for artillery — strategic plans, barrage fire, plung- 
ing fire, liaison, range-finding, signalling; whether for 
infantry; transformation of equipment, specialization of 
missions, organization of terrain, accompanying aviation, 
acceleration of reliefs, attacks by infiltration; passage 
through the lines, defense by withdrawal to second line 
positions, — France during the whole war was the laboratory 
of the Powers. Nothing was more natural; for under the 
cruel stress of defeat we had more deeply studied these 
problems. How could one not recall that it was a French 
mind that conceived and carried out the strategic plan 
which led to final victory; that substituted for local and 
intermittent attacks which had wasted both sides for four 
years the general and continuous attack along the whole 
front? How could one not write here the name of Marshal 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 37 

Focli? Von Kluck said in 1914, "I have failed to take 
Paris, but tliey will never take Vouziers. ' ' They continued 
to fail to take Paris. But we took Vouziers. Ludendorff 
notwithstanding, French genius triumphed over German 
brains ! 

French genius triumphed not only on the field of battle 
but in the conception and organization of war. It was 
from France that went forth the first and most pressing 
appeals for that military and economic unity of command 
which, in 1918, turned the long- wavering scales in favour of 
the Allies. From the end of 1916, the French Parliament 
had made insistence upon unity of command the essential 
article of its programme. On October 5, 1917, M. Loucheur, 
Minister of Armament in the Painleve Cabinet, had se- 
cured its endorsement by the French War Committee. 
Several weeks later, not without hesitation on the part of 
Great Britain, the War Council of Versailles was created. 
It was a step forward. But that was not enough. As soon 
as he assumed the reins of government in November, 1917, 
M. Clemenceau set to work to obtain more and better. I 
had informed him that he could count on President Wil- 
son's aid. On the other hand opposition was still manifest 
in London and when during a brief stay in Paris at the end 
of 1917 I publicly declared that the American and French 
Governments were agreed on the necessity of a unity of 
command, several English newspapers protested. On the 
eve of my departure for New York, on December 30, 1917, 
I had a last talk with M. Clemenceau. I said to him: 

''They are going to talk to me again over there about 
unity of command. And no doubt they will ask me, 'Who I ' 
What shall I say?" 

M. Clemenceau replied: *'Foch." 

Three months after, in the last week of March, 1918, 
the British Army commanded by General Gough was 
broken and flung back on Amiens. On March 23, the bom- 
bardment of Paris by long range guns began. The break- 
ing of the Franco-British front brought us back to the 
darkest days of 1914. From the very first moment of the 



38 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

crisis, M. Clemenceau'g mind was made up. From the 
extremity of the danger he would snatch the solution 
sought in vain for so many months. To German unity of 
command he would oppose Allied unity of command. 

I have told above how on March 26, General Petain sent 
up twenty-four divisions to fill the gap created between 
our Allies and ourselves. At four o'clock, the same day 
after a meeting held at Marshal Petain 's headquarters at 
Compiegne between MM. Poincare, Clemenceau and Louch- 
eur who had motored from Paris with General Foch and 
Lord Milner representing Great Britain, it had been 
decided to discuss the question at another conference the 
next day. Who would be present at the conference? M. 
Clemenceau at once designated Marshal Foch. It was 
later decided that General Petain would come also. After 
the meeting M. Clemenceau took Lord Milner aside. He 
begged him insistently to bring to bear on Sir Douglas 
Haig all the pressure of his great authority in support of 
a reorganization of the Allied command. The battle of 
Amiens was at stake. Lord Milner promised his assistance. 

On March 26, everybody met at DouUens. While Gen- 
eral Haig was talking with Generals Byng and Plumer, 
MM. Poincare, Clemenceau and Loucheur were in the 
Place du Marche with General Foch. The latter, in rapid 
and vigorous sentences, outlined the situation and the rea- 
sons for not giving way to despair. He said: 

"We will not mthdraw. We will fight where we are. 
We must not indicate a line of retreat, or everyone will 
take it. We must hang on — ^we must hold fast. We must 
not give up another metre of ground. Eemember 
October, 1914." 

M. Clemenceau listens. He mutters: 

^'C'est un hougre!'* 

Minutes fly, — everyone waits around eating sandwiches 
taken from General Petain 's car. At noon Lord Milner 
arrives. Again very briefly M. Clemenceau talks to him 
— one feels what he is saying — and Milner goes in alone to 
General Haig with whom he talks ten minutes. At twenty 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 39 

minutes past twelve the general conference begins. After 
a statement of the situation in which by his clarity and 
confidence General Foch wins the adixiiration of all, the 
measures to be adopted for the organization of the com- 
mand before Amiens are taken up. It is at this moment 
that General Haig pronounces the following words — I cite 
textually from the notes of one who was present — the echo 
of his conversation with Lord Milner: 

''If General Foch will consent to give his advice, I shall 
be very glad to follow it." 

There is no question yet of unity of command. M. 
Clemenceau is not satisfied. He rises and takes Lord Mil- 
ner off to a comer of the room ; then General Petain ; then 
General Foch. These are brief a parte talks, in which 
short words are exchanged. The idea is suggested to at- 
tach General Foch to General Petain and entrust him with 
liaison with the British. 

M. Clemenceau answers sharply: 

"That's not what we are talking about! What Foch 
needs is an independent post from which he can control.'* 

General Petain, a fine soldier, interjects at once: 

''Everything you decide will be well done." 

Then M. Clemenceau sits down again. He takes pen- 
cil and paper. He writes, and as he writes he reads aloud. 
He uses first the formula which everyone has used since 
the morning to define the battle which had to be won before 
Amiens : 

"General Foch is charged by the British and French Govern- 
ments with coordinating the British and French operations before 
Amiens. ' ' 

Here General Foch stops the President: 
"Better make it on the Western front." 
M. Clemenceau answers: 
"Of course you are right!" 

And he scratches out the last words for which he sub- 
stitutes "on the Western front." Then he goes on: 



40 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY" 

"He (General Foch) will come to an understanding to this 
effect with the two Commanders-in-Chief who are invited to fur- 
nish him with all necessary information. ' ' 

It is now past one o'clock. Everybody goes to lunch 
together at the old Doullens Hotel Les Quatre Fils Aymon. 
On the threshold of the dining-room, M. Loucheur, who sees 
success in sight for the idea he had supported before the 
War Council on the previous fifth of October and who for- 
merly as an artillery lieutenant had served under the 
orders of the new "co-ordinator," meets the latter and 
says laughingly: 

''Well, General, so you have got your paper now?" 

General Foch, laughing back, says: 

*'Yes, and a fine time to give it me." 

Lunch is quickly over, and forty minutes later General 
Foch leaves for British Headquarters at Dury to take up 
his task. His task, the most difficult of all tasks, despite 
the burning desire of all to succeed and to stop the enemy's 
advance. For military life, with its simple formulae of 
command and obedience, lends itself reluctantly to com- 
binations of this kind which are outside its normal sphere. 
For several weeks — as was inevitable — General Foch 
''coordinated more by negotiation than by command." 
Racing from one Headquarters to another — advising — sug- 
gesting — ^insisting — at times even hustling — he gained 
inch by inch the theoretic authority with which, thanks to 
M. Clemenceau, the crisis of March 26 had endowed him. 
More was needed. A few days later M. Clemenceau accom- 
panied by M. Loucheur met Generals Foch, Fayolle, and 
Debeney at Breteuil in the Oise.' It was agreed that the 
situation was improved. Then M. Clemenceau said to 
General Foch. 

"You are doing very good work. But you do not com- 
mand enough. I have just come from Haig. I have talked 
with him. I want you to go the whole hog and give 
orders." 

On April 3, a new conference enabled M. Clemenceau 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 41 

to secure for his point of view the seal of official sanction. 
General Foch carries away from the conference a new 
paper which is an actual brevet of command. There is no 
longer any question of coordination. Henceforth General 
Foch is to have *'the strategic direction of military opera- 
tions on the Western front." The Commanders-in-Chief of 
each of the Allied nations are to retain **the tactical con- 
duct of operations" with the right of appeal to their Gov- 
ernments if they deem it necessary. This clear definition 
despite the restriction mentioned has a most satisfactory 
effect. All the Commanders-in-Chief show the utmost will 
to obey and cooperate. 

The front stiffens and hope again runs high. But on 
May 27, there is a new catastrophe ; the Chemin des Dames. 
The French front had broken. Our troops are thrown back 
to the Marne. It is a bad start for unity of command. On 
June 2, M. Clemenceau in the Chamber defends it abso- 
lutely in the face of the most violent criticism. He says : 

These soldiers, these splendid soldiers have leaders, excellent 
leaders, great leaders — leaders worthy of them in every respect. . . 

I shall reassert this as often as I have to, to make myself heard, 
because it is my duty, because I have seen these leaders at work. 

These men are now fighting the hardest battle of the war and 
are fighting it with a heroism which I can find no words worthy 
to express. 

And shall we — for a mistake which may have been made in 
such or such a sector, or even may not have been made at all — 
shall we, before even knowing, demand explanations! Shall we, 
while the battle is raging, go to a man who is worn out, a man so 
tired that hi.s head droops over his maps as I have seen in awful 
moments, and ask this man why on such and such a day he did such 
or such a thing? 

Drive me from this tributie if that is what you ask — For I will 
not do it. 

Not satisfied with continuing his full support to the man 
he had picked out from the very first months of the war, 
M. Clemenceau continues his effort to increase this man's 
authority. On June 26 he decides that the right given at 



42 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Beauvais to the Allied Commanders-in-Chief to appeal to 
their Governments shall be abolished as far as the French 
Armies are concerned and that their Commander-in-Chief 
shall be purely and simply placed under the orders of Gen- 
eral Foch. On June 30, complying with a desire frequently 
and forcefully expressed by the latter, he removes the Chief 
of Staff of the French Armies and appoints General Buat 
to this post. In August, M. Clemenceau suggests to the 
Cabinet the elevation of the Commander-in-Chief to the 
dignity of Marshal of France. Thus, from the first day 
to the last, a single thought had dominated the actions of 
the French Government. From the first day to the last, 
France and her Prime Minister had willed the unity of 
command realized in the person of the great soldier whose 
unquestioned genius ensured its acceptance. History mil 
tell how great the part played in our common victory by 
this decision to which all our Allies adhered. 

I should be woefully remiss if I did not add one more 
word. I have spoken of French genius. But France is also 
great of heart. This it was that made our brotherhood of 
arms. Forty-three per cent, of all the men of France were 
mobilized. Thus our military commanders governed half 
of our male population. They governed them with tender 
care. They were sparing of their soldiers ' lives. They took 
full advantage of the increasing potentialities of modern 
engines of war. ' At Charleroi and the Mame we lost 5.41 
per cent, of the forces engaged ; during the first six months 
of 1915, 2.39 per cent. ; during the second six months, 1.68 
per cent.; during the first six months of 1916, 1.47 per 
cent., and during the last six months of the same year, 1.28 
per cent. Our losses fell in 1917 to .46 per cent, of the 
forces engaged and in 1918 in our final effort they did not 
exceed .75 per cent. A splendid showing indeed. But this 
is not all. France more than any other country, despite the 
demands of her war industry and thanks to a firm and 
just policy, maintained a high percentage of her fighting 
men in the divisions in line — 86 per cent, in 1914, and 74 
per cent, in 1918. France also had the secret of inspiring 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 43 

mutual affection between her officers and men. France 
understood — and here again in justice I must write the 
name of Marshal Petain — that a democracy in arms fight- 
ing a five-year war is undeserving of the rigid discipline 
that can be imposed upon a professional army fighting a 
five-months war. France understood the inestimable 
value of mutual sacrifice whereby officers and men are 
welded together; of ''that subtle bond which makes of dis- 
cipline a personal and a living thing, consciously or instinc- 
tively accepted out of gratitude or admiration or love — a 
bond the more binding because unforced and forged in the 
heart of the soldier." The French Army — thanks to the 
spiritual union of men and officers; thanks also to her 
admirable non-coms., sprung from the ranks of the nation, 
the epic artisans of the victorious effort planned by their 
leaders — has no need like the German Army of being 
picked over in order to find shock troops. The French 
Army remained itself all through the war, adapting itself 
to successive changes each of which was a fresh test of its 
endurance. 

Just as in 1914, it had been almost the sole bulwark of 
civilization with its 22 Army Corps, its 26 Reserve Divi- 
sions, its 10 Divisions of Cavalry, against the onslaught on 
an Empire of Prey with a man power of fourteen million 
men, so to the very end, by the side of its great Allies, the 
French Army did what it had to do. What praise could be 
higher? Puisqu'il fallait y aller, on irait. This saying 
of our French peasant — whom I like so many others had 
the honour of leading into action — ^magnificently sums up 
our ideal of war. With it I will end this brief sketch of 
what France in arms contributed of her own free will to 
Victory. 

II 

The Armistice of November 11, 1918, was an uncondi- 
tional surrender on the part of Germany. This was clear 
at the time it was signed, in the minds of those who imposed 
it and of those upon whom it was forced. It was the logical 



44 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

outcome of the military and political history of the four 
preceding months. 

In the first week of July, 1918, Admiral von Hintze — 
appointed by the Kaiser to be Secretary of State in the 
Imperial Office of Foreign Affairs — wishing to be accur- 
ately informed as to the military situation before taking 
up his duties, left for the front. 

At Avesnes he met General Ludendorff and asked him: 
*'In the present offensive are you certain to defeat the 
enemy completely and decisively?" 

General Ludendorff replied without hesitation: 
*'My answer to your question is an unqualified *Yes.' " 
At that moment everything seemed to justify the assur- 
ance of the First Quartermaster General of the German 
Army. In March a lightning stroke had broken General 
Gough's Army and thrown the Allies back to the gates of 
Amiens. In May another push had broken the French line 
at the Chemin des Dames and carried the enemy to the 
banks of the Marne. The bombardment of Paris was the 
visible sign of German victory. Thousands of British 
and French prisoners, to say nothing of enormous stores 
of war material, had been captured. The German High 
Command was busy circulating among its troops that this 
was the final offensive, "the peace offensive." The 
enemy was powerfully equipped for it: 1,456 battalions — 
266 more than in 1916 — ^made up a total of 207 divisions. 
Of these 207 divisions, 130 were in line and 77 in reserve. 
Of the latter, only twenty recently withdrawn from battle 
needed refilling. Twenty-six had been reinforced and 
thirty-one were fresh. Before dawn on July 15 the offen- 
sive was launched in the direction of Reims. By the sev- 
enteenth it had been halted between our first and second 
lines. On the eighteenth the Armies of Mangin and 
Degoutte counter-attacked on the German flank. On the 
nineteenth the enemy recrossed the Marne. By August 4 
they had been thrust over the Vesle. On the eighth, farther 
north near Amiens, three German Divisions withdrew in 
<iisorder, almost routed before the Allied attack began. 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 45 

Note well these events. They mark the beginnings of Vic- 
tory and Armistice. 

On August 13 a numerous company arrives at German 
General Headquarters at Spa. Besides the Kaiser, there 
are gathered there the Crown Prince, Field Marshal von 
Hindenburg and General Ludendorff, Count Von Hertling, 
Chancellor of the Empire, and Admiral von Hintze, Minis- 
ter for Foreign Affairs. On the following evening, the 
Emperor of Austria and his IMinister, Count Burian arrive. 
A Crown Council is to be held on the fourteenth. Late on 
the thirteenth von Hintze takes General von Ludendorff 
aside and questions him as he had done a month before on 
the general situation. Ludendorff replies: 

*'In July I told you that I was certain by the present 
offensive of breaking the enemy's will to fight and of 
forcing them to make peace. Now I am no longer certain 
of this.'* 

**In that case," asks the Minister, ''how do you imagine 
the war can be continued ? ' ' 

''We are still able by defensive operations to paralyze 
the enemy's will to fight and thus bring them little by little 
to make Peace." 

In a word, instead of the crushing triumph counted upon 
in July, the German High Command now pins its hope of 
success in the weariness of the Allies, The Crown Council 
meets the next day and General Ludendorff voices the same 
attenuated hope. 

"A major offensive," he declares, "is no longer pos- 
sible. We must confine ourselves to a defensive strategy 
combined with local offensives. Thus we may hope event- 
ually to paralyze the enemy's will to fight." 

The Kaiser gives his opinion. It is "to watch for a 
favourable moment for coming to terms with the enemy." 
His Chancellor agrees with him, recommending that "steps 
be taken at the opportune moment to arrive at an under- 
standing." This moment is to be that of "the first success 
on the Western front." In other words to await develop- 
ments, without undue haste. Von Hintze, less confident in 



46 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

the success of defensive strategy, asks to be given imme- 
diate authority ''to initiate the work of peace by diplo- 
matic means." By this he means "a reduction of the war 
aims heretofore proclaimed." TJiis proposal is unani- 
mously rejected. Marshal Hindenburg declares: 

"We shall succeed in maintaining ourselves upon 
French soil and thus we shall eventually subject the enemy 
to our will." 

So it is no longer a question as it was a month before 
of ^'nach Paris." But successes in France are still hoped 
for. They are confident of remaining on French soil. 
While there they hope to pave the way for negotiations 
which will lead to an advantageous peace. In consequence, 
the powers given to von Hintze for the preparation of 
diplomatic negotiations are strictly limited by "the main- 
tenance of the war aims established in view to victory" 
and by the expectation of the favourable opportunity which 
will be created by the next success.* 

From August 14 to September 20, events both political 
and military were to disturb these hopeful expectations. 
The "local successes" did not come off, on the contrary 
five times in five weeks the Allied forces advanced. The 
Franco-British attack which near Amiens throws back the 
Germans to their old Chaulnes-Ribecourt front. The 
Franco-British attack which from the eighteenth to the 
twenty-sixth of August reaches the Bapeaume-Perrone- 
Nesles-Noyon line. The Franco-British attack which from 
August 30 to September 10 throws back the enemy from 



*The foregoing account makes it unnecessary for me to insist on the 
legend of "Peace was possible as early as 1917." As is well known, M. 
Aristide Briand, formerly French Premier, was approached in the middle of 
1917 by a Belgian, Baron Coppee with so-called Peace proposals from Baron 
von Lancken, who bears so heavy a responsibility for the martyrdom of Bel- 
gium. M. Aristide Briand, in laying these overtures before M. Eibot who had 
succeeded him as Premier, appeared to believe that they were serious and 
would lead to the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine. M. Ribot on the contrary 
thought that ' ' it was a trap. " It is clear from the quotations and facts given 
above that as late as the beginning of July, 1918, Germany intended to make 
only a peace with "the maintenance of the war aims established in view to 
victory," that is to say a peace of annexation and not of restoration. The 
•official evidence of Admiral von Hintze, the Kaiser 's foreign Minister, and the 
documents quoted above settle the question. 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 47 

the Vesle to the Aisne and farther north almost to the 
Hindenburg line. The Franco-British attack which from 
September 18 to 22 pierces this line between Cambrai and 
Saint-Quentin. The Franco-American attack which from 
September 12 to 15 reduces the St. Mihiel salient. By Sep- 
tember 20 the enemy has lost nearly all the ground he had 
gained from March to June. His forces have severely suf- 
fered. He has engaged 163 divisions of which 75 have 
been in line two or three times. He still has 68 divisions 
in reserve which is nine less than in June, but of these only 
21 are fresh divisions — ten less than in June. To keep up 
the effectives of these units in the absence of sufficient 
reinforcements, he has had to break up 16 divisions and use 
them as replacements. 

At the same time political difficulties have begun. On 
the evening of the fourteenth of August and on the 
fifteenth, at Spa, the Emperor Charles of Austria and Count 
Burian, expressed the opinion that direct overtures for 
peace should be made as soon as possible. We have noted 
the decisions arrived at by the German Crown Council on 
the fourteenth. The Kaiser, the Chancellor, the Generals 
protest against the suggestion of their Allies. They hold 
that such a step should only be taken later on and that then 
it should only be taken through neutral channels and not 
directly. The Austrians departed unconvinced and, on the 
twenty-first, telegraphed a plan for a direct appeal to the 
belligerents after having tried to obtain for this plan the 
support of Bulgaria and Turkey. Excitement runs high 
in Berlin and at Spa. The discussion continues three 
weeks. From September 3 to 5, von Hintze and his under 
Secretary of State, von Stumm, go to Vienna to preach 
resistance. They seek delay — at least till the German Army 
shall have finished the strategic withdrawal which is under 
way. Hindenburg intervenes on the tenth with a telegram 
disapproving the Austrian plan for a direct appeal * 'harm- 
ful to our arms and to our peoples." On the other hand 
he accepts ''the intervention of a neutral power with a 
view to an immediate negotiation." Note the change com- 



48 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

pared to the decisions of August 14. Direct proposals of 
peace will not be made, but a neutral will be asked to sug- 
gest it immediately. The Austrians persist nevertheless 
in their idea and on September 13 launch their Note. Ger- 
many, at the same time, seeks the neutral who will under- 
take the mission. The search is long and vain. On Sep- 
tember 21, Ludendorff telegraphs from the great General 
Headquarters that it might be possible to get in touch with 
the United States. It is a confused and anxious period. 
Anxiety and confusion are made worse on the twenty- sixth 
by news that Bulgaria intends to conclude a separate peace. 
Germany decides to send troops there. But it is already 
too late and on the twenty-ninth the Bulgarian Armistice 
is signed at Salonica. Chancellor von Hertling had 
declared on September 3 at the Council of Ministers : 

**We must say to our enemies, 'You see that you cannot 

beat us but we are always ready as we have told you 

unequivocally on several occasions to conclude a peace full 
of honour.' " 

The succession of Allied victories, the Austrian mani- 
festations, the Bulgarian Armistice completely change this 
situation. Is Germany ready to sue for peace — ^not offer 
it? That is how the question now presents itself. Listen 
to the answer. 

This answer comes from a quarter whence even yester- 
day it was the least expected and in a form which aggra- 
vates its astounding nature. It is the first of October. It 
is one o 'clock in the afternoon. General Ludendorff sends 
for the two liaison officers of the Chancellery at Great 
General Headquarters, Baron von Grunau and Baron von 
Lersner, and says to them : 

"I beg you to transmit an urgent request with a view to 
the immediate despatch of our offer of peace. To-day the 
troops are holding, but one cannot foresee what may hap- 
pen to-morrow." 

Half an hour later at 1:30 p. m. Marshal Hindenburg 
intervenes, and referring to the report that a new Chancel- 
lor will be appointed that evening or the next day, says : 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 49 

"If the formation of the Government remains the least 
in doubt and is not certain for this evening between seven 
and eight o'clock, I am of opinion that it is necessary this 
very night to send our declaration to the foreign 
Governments." 

At two o'clock the liaison officers confirm the preced- 
ing declarations. Baron von Grunau adds: 

"My impression is that everyone here has lost his 
* self-control./ " 

He goes off to the Emperor who agrees with liim that, 
in order to take steps for peace, it is necessary to await till 
the new Government has been formed. But General 
Ludendorf f insists : 

"We are still in honourable posture. But our line may 
be broken through at any moment and then our peace offer 
will arrive at the most unfavourable moment. I have the 
sensation of playing a game of Chance. At any moment 
and at any point, a division may fail in its duty." 

At nine o 'clock that night, he demands that to the offer 
of peace shall be added a request for the designation of 
the point of meeting for the negotiation of the Armistice. 
He even goes so far as to give the names of the men who 
will form the Armistice Commission including an Austrian 
and a Turk. At midnight he reiterates: 

"The offer of peace must be transmitted immediately 
from Berne to Washington. The Army cannot wait an- 
other forty-eight hours." 

Panic reigns. Events prove this: for the Army, which 
according to the General "cannot wait another forty-eight 
hours," will continue to fight without let-up till November 
11. This panic seems to be due to three reasons. The first 
is that the military situation, although not hopeless, is bad. 
The second is that the Great General Staff, so overbearing 
three months ago, is anxious to share its responsibility with 
civilians. The third is that like many Germans the Great 
General Staff cherishes extraordinary illusions about the 



50 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

terror Grermany inspires, the weakness of President Wil- 
son, the divisions among the Allies, and the nature of the 
terms it will be possible to obtain. Prince Max of Baden — 
who that very evening had become Chancellor of the Em- 
pire and head of a Cabinet chosen with the approval of the 
Reichstag — receives an avalanche of alarmist telegrams 
on taking up his duties. He becomes indignant and insists 
upon getting information before taking action. A repre- 
sentative of the Great General Staff — Major von dem 
Bussche — explains the situation on October 2. He is less 
pessimistic than his Chief but reserved and embarrassed, 
on the whole far from reassuring. Among other things 
he says : 

''The Entente, by attacking along the whole front, 
obliged us to scatter our reserves. Of the divisions on the 
Eastern front which were intended for the Western front, 
seven were immobilized by the events in Bulgaria. The 
enemy has placed in action a great many more tanks than 
was expected. The German troops have fought well. But 
the strength of our battalions has fallen to 540 men — and 
that despite the breaking up for replacements of 22 divi- 
sions, equal to 66 regiments. No reinforcements are in 
sight. The Allies, on the contrary, thanks to the Ameri- 
cans, are in a position to make good their losses The 

German Army is still strong enough to withstand the enemy 
for months, to win local successes and to force the Entente 
to make fresh sacrifices. But the High Command believes, 
as far as man can judge — there is no longer any possibility 
of forcing the enemy to make peace." 

The Chancellor would like to have at least eight days 
respite. General Ludendorff, for all answer, demands 
twice in succession the text of the peace offer. The Chan- 
cellor asks questions: ''For how long can the Army hold 
the frontiers? Does the great General Staff expect the 
front to give way? If so, when? Does it realize that, if 
peace negotiations are initiated under the pressure of a 
critical military situation, it may lead to the loss of the 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 51 

Colonies, of Alsace-Lorraine and of the Polish provinces?" 
To these questions, there is only one reply made, on Octo- 
ber 3, under the signature of Marshal Hindenburg who in 
Berlin on that day sends the following letter to the 
Chancellor : 

The Supreme Command of the Army maintains its demand, 
formulated on Sunday, September 29, 1918, for an immediate offer 
of peace to our enemies. 

As the result of the breakdown of the Macedonian front and of 
the reduction of reserves it has led to on the Western front, as a 
result also of the impossibility in which we are to make good the 
very losses that have been inflicted on us in the fighting of the past 
ten days, there no longer remains any hope — as far as man can 
judge — of forcing the enemy to make peace. 

The enemy on its side is daily throwing fresh reserves into the 
struggle. Nevertheless the German Army remains firm and vic- 
toriously repulses all attacks. But the situation becomes more 
critical every day and may force the High Command to take 
measures the consequence of which will be very serious. 

Under the circumstances it is better to cease the struggle to save 
the German people and their Allies from useless losses. 

Every day lost costs us thousands of brave soldiers. 

The Chancellor yielded to this pressure, and on October 
5 telegraphs through the Swiss Government to President 
"Wilson to beg him to summon the belligerents to peace 
negotiations upon the basis of the Fourteen Points, and to 
put an end to bloodshed by the immediate conclusion of an 
Armistice. Everybody, except Prince Max von Baden, the 
Vice-Chancellor von Payer, and the Secretary of State 
Solf, seems to believe that by itself this cable will suffice to 
relieve the crisis. As a matter of fact, Germany by send- 
ing this despatch, delivers herself into the hands of the 
Allies. The situation from now on to the eleventh of No- 
vember is to develop with the relentless logic of triumphant 
Fate, 



52 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY" 

III 

On October 6 the Ministers hold a meeting. They would 
like to hear other generals besides General Ludendorff. 
Von Payer says : 

''We must; Ludendorff s nerves are no longer equal to 
the strain." 

It is decided to seek the intervention of the Kaiser — 
for the resignation of the First Quartermaster General is 
feared if an attempt is made to consult his subordinates. 
On October 8 President Wilson replies to the German Note 
of the fifth. It is a brief reply which throws the recipients 
into consternation they cannot conceal. No conversation 
is possible, declares the President, either on peace or on an 
armistice until preliminary guarantees shall have been fur- 
nished. These are the acceptation pure and simple of the 
bases of peace laid down on January 8, 1918, and in the 
President's subsequent addresses; the certainty that the 
Chancellor does not speak only in the name of the consti- 
tuted authorities who so far have been responsible for the 
conduct of the war; the evacuation of all invaded terri- 
tories. The President will transmit no communication to 
his associates before having received full satisfaction on 
these three points. 

The German Ministers hold a council again. There are 
successive conferences on the ninth, the tenth, the eleventh 
and the twelfth. General Ludendorff is present at the 
first. The Ministers make him feel that the responsibility 
for the present situation is his and therefore his also the 
responsibility for the answer which must be prepared. He 
addresses them at length. He begins with a long historical 
disquisition; ends in a profuse and contradictory sea of 
words. At times he is reassuring: 

"I see no immediate danger for the Lorraine frontier. 
The Rhenish provinces can be held for a long time yet. 
Once we are back on our own frontier the Army will be able 
to repulse any enemy attack." 

At times he gives way to alarmist outbursts: 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 53 

"The danger of a break through is always there. I do 
not fear it. But it is possible. Yesterday its success hung 
upon a thread. The Armies must have rest. ' ' 

But of positive conclusions none. He maintains that 
the offer of peace and even more so the Armistice are indis- 
pensable, but as to the attitude to be taken in presence of 
the conditions which are attached to the one and to the 
other by the President of the United States, not a word that 
is clear or plain : 

*'We cannot give up German fortresses. The demand 
for the evacuation of Metz would be contrary to our 
honour. I do not fear a catastrophe. But I am anxious to 
save the Army so as to be able to have it still as a means 
of pressure during the peace negotiations." 

Here perhaps we have the true inwardness of his 
thoughts. To negotiate and gain time to recuperate, so as 
if need be to break off afterwards. As a matter of fact the 
German General Staff, during this period, sought a sus- 
pension of arms rather than a definite peace. On the ninth, 
it still thought that it could obtain it. Hence its interven- 
tions in the preparation of the reply; hence its attempts 
at equivocation and ruse. The reply was sent on the twelfth 
in the name of Germany and of Austria-Hungary. Ger- 
many accepts the Fourteen Points and assumes that its 
Allies will do likewise ; the Chancellor, in full accord with 
the Reichstag, speaks in the name of the Government and 
of the German people; Germany is disposed to ''accede to 
the proposals of evacuation ' ' — that is where the rub comes 
— ^but she thinks they ought to be the object of preliminary 
negotiations and suggests the appointment of a mixed com- 
mission to deal with this matter. If the Allies lend them- 
selves to this, Germany is saved for the time being. She 
will be able to withdraw her material to the rear and 
regroup her forces. Pending the meeting of the mixed 
Commission and during the protracted discussion of 
evacuation, — "methodical evacuation" as Hindenburg said 
— she will have the time to rebuild an army. The Ministers 
agree to this draft. But they are careful to obtain from 



54 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Marshal Hindenburg and General Ludendorff their ap- 
proval in writing. The manoeuvre, unskilled though it be, 
inspires hope in all. 

Then comes the thunderbolt. President "Wilson refuses 
to fall into the trap and crossing swords in earnest presses 
his attack to the utmost in the Note of October 14. A mixed 
Commission for evacuation? No! These are matters 
which like the Armistice itself ''must be left to the judg- 
ment and advice of the military advisers of the Allied and 
Associated Governments." Besides no Armistice is pos- 
sible if it does not furnish ''absolutely satisfactory safe- 
guards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present 
military supremacy of the Armies of the United States and 
of its Allies. ' ' Besides, no Armistice ' ' so long as the armed 
forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhuman prac- 
tices which they still persist in." Finally no Armistice so 
long as the German nation shall be in the hands of the mili- 
tary power which has disturbed the peace of the world. As 
to Austria-Hungary, Germany has no interest therein and 
the President will reply directly. In a single page the 
whole poor scaffolding of the German Great General Staff 
is overthrown. The Armistice and peace are not to be 
means of delaying a disaster and of preparing revenge. 
On the main question itself the reply must be Yes or No ! 
If it is no, war will continue, as it has gone on for the 
last three months, by Allied victories. If it is yes, the mili- 
tary capitulation must be immediate and complete by the 
acceptance pure and simple of terms which will be fixed by 
the military advisers of the Allies alone. 

This time the Germans understand. As Colonel Heye 
of the German General Staff will say a few days later, on 
October 17, "One realizes that it is a question of 'to be or 
not to be,' " and the military shrink back fearful of the 
consequences of their pressing insistence on October 1. 
As soon as Mr. Wilson's answer is known. General Luden- 
dorff has telegraphed to hasten the return of troops from 
the Near East — the usefulness of which had seemed to him 
questionable on the ninth — and has suggested that an ap- 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 55 

peal should be made to the German people — the outcome 
of which he had declared, on the same day, would be 
ridiculous. On the seventeenth, he arrives in Berlin and 
appears before the Government. The Chancellor reminds 
Ludendorff rather sharply that fifteen days previously he 
had been obliged, much against his will, to do the General's 
bidding and demands an explanation. Ludendorff becomes 
overbearing : 

*'I have already said to you, Mr. Chancellor, that I 
consider a break through possible, but not probable. If 
you question me I can conscientiously only give you this 
reply. I do not fear a break through. If I am given rein- 
forcements I look upon the future with confidence. If 
the Army holds for four weeks and winter arrives, we 
shall be out of difficulty. The offensive strength of our 
enemies has recently been very Aveak. If our battalions 
were at normal strength, the situation would be saved. 
Neither aviation nor tanks alarm me. If the Armistice 
negotiations were to begin, the undertaking to evacuate 
occupied territory would alone and in itself constitute a 
real aggravation of our military situation. Already the 
mere fact that it is spoken of has had untoward conse- 
quences. Yesterday and the day before the enemy has 
made little progress. We ought to say to bur enemies be- 
fore accepting conditions which are too hard, 'Come and 
take them by force.' " 

Such glaring contradictions exasperated the Ministers, 
especially Secretary of State Solf who reminds General 
Ludendorff of his appeals of October 1. The reply is: 

<<Why didn't you send me long ago the reinforcements 
about which you are talking to-day?" 

And Colonel Heye adds: 

"When the Great General Headquarters decided to 
make an offer of peace, it believed that an honourable 
peace could be concluded. But we must accept the decisive 
battle if the conditions imposed upon us touch our honour." 

Mr. Solf replies : 



56 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

**If a refusal breaks off the negotiations with Wilson, 
will you take the responsibility?" 

**Yes," answers the General. 

They separate without coming to a decision and on the 
twentieth Ludendorff pushes forward Marshal Hinden- 
burg who writes an embarrassed epistle of which this is 
the essential phrase : 

If we were beaten, our situation which is bad would not be 
appreciably worse than if we now accept the terms it is sought to 
impose upon us . . . We cannot, I insist, give up submarine war- 
fare without compensation. It is better to fight to the last man to 
save our honour. 

These are only words. They are without effect, for the 
High Command has lost its face. It talks, it writes: no 
one believes it. Baron von Lersner, liaison officer at Ger- 
man Headquarters, telephones a few days afterwards : 

The great General Staff is furious. But basing myself upon the 
long experience I have of it I can only place you on your guard ia 
the most pressing manner against the possibility of having faith in 
its promises, and I recommend that you do not allow yourself to be 
turned away from the policy of peace which we have adopted. The 
military situation is to-day every bit as desperate as it was three 
weeks ago. No improvement is to be looked for and the invasion of 
our territory is only a question of weeks or at the very best of a few 
months. 

The truth is that it is Ludendorff who is wrong and 
Lersner who is right. Since September 20, Marshal Foch, 
who had regained the initiative on July 18, has exploited 
his success. Three concentric and uninterrupted attacks 
on a wide front have deeply modified the strategic situa- 
tion. In the north, from September 18 to October 18, the 
enemy has been driven from the Belgian coast, from the 
region of Lille, from the basin of Lens and has been 
forced to establish himself behind the Tervueren Canal, 
the Scheldt and the Northern Canal. In the center from 
September 27 to October 19, the Hindenburg line has 



THE WAR AND THE AEMISTICE 57 

everywhere been broken through and the enemy is thrown 
back beyond the Sambre Canal, the Oise and the Serre. In 
Champagne and in Argonne a hard and arduous battle 
brings us, between September 16 and October 12, up to the 
Aisne and the Aire. On October 20 the German Armies 
from the Sea to the Meuse are everywhere in retreat. In 
four weeks, they have had to engage 139 divisions out of a 
total of 191. They have only seven fresh divisions in 
reserve and forty-four are utterly worn out. The average 
strength of the companies is only fifty men, although 40 
per cent, of the battalions have been reduced from four 
companies to three. Two-thirds of their divisions have 
been almost constantly in line since September 1. They 
are short seventy thousand reinforcements every month, 
although the class of 1920 is already called to the colours. 
War material cannot be renewed. Compared to June 
there are 25 per cent, less machine guns, 17 per cent, less 
field pieces, and 26 per cent, less heavy artillery. The 
lateral railways which from one end of the front to the 
other permit transports of men and material, the voies 
de rocade, of which the German staff made so fruitful a 
use during the war, are no longer at their disposal — four of 
the secondary lines and one principal line are wholly or in 
part in the hands of the Allies. Those which remain are 
almost blocked with supplies and evacuations, so much so 
that in the three first weeks of October it has only been 
possible to displace three divisions laterally, instead of 
nineteen so moved in May. Remember also that an enor- 
mous amount of war material is scattered all along the 
front and behind it. To save this, Germany has abandoned 
the opportunity that a rapid retreat might have afforded. 
Besides, this retreat is difficult for the forces which are 
at a distance from the German frontier, that is to say for 
the group of Armies of the German Crown Prince and of 
the Crown Prince of Bavaria, 130 divisions in all that have 
only a zone of 75 kilometers in width through which to with- 
draw. Finally the morale is low, very low, Hopes had 
run so high in July! The Great General Staff says it is 



58 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

the fault of the Government which has not the interior well 
in hand. The Government is right in replying that it is 
rather the fault of events. 

The Generals have demanded the Armistice, the Minis- 
ters take them at their word because they believe mth von 
Lersner that ''the invasion of German territory is only a 
matter of weeks or at most of a few months. ' ' Invasion : 
A word that for a hundred years Germany has been wont 
to apply only to its adversaries. It becomes the obsession 
of the Government. Capitulation on terms to be fixed by 
the victors alone in accordance w^ith President "Wilson's 
decision. Or invasion with the sole resources of a levee 
en masse peculiarly problematical in a country that has 
already called 14,000,000 men to the colours. But there is 
no other alternative. The Ministers make their choice. 
They will capitulate. 

After a week of consideration, of hesitation, of ex- 
changes with the Great General Staff on which they are 
determined to pin the initial responsibility, the Ministers 
are to reply on October 21 to the American Note of the 
fourteenth. This time there can be no playing on words, 
no talk of negotiation, for it is only a question of submis- 
sion. Evacuation of occupied territory? The demand is 
accepted. Armistice? Germany recognizes that its terms 
must be left to the appreciation of the competent military 
authorities. Illegal acts committed by the German forces ? 
These are destructions necessary in a retreat and per- 
mitted by international law ; strict instructions will never- 
theless be given that private property shall be respected. 
Torpedoings? Not deliberate; orders however have been 
sent to the commanders to spare passenger ships. Sup- 
pression of the arbitrary power? It is already accom- 
plished; the Cabinet is responsible to Parlialment; the 
Constitution will be revised; the Government is free from 
any military or irresponsible influence. This time Ger- 
many bound hand and foot is rivetted to Wilsonian 
dialectics. Since she does not break, she gives herself up. 
The President takes good note thereof on October 23, in 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 59 

announcing tliat having received ^11 the undertakings de- 
manded in his preceding Messages, he has informed his 
Associates. And once again so that there can be no doubt, 
he repeats the fundamental conditions from which Ger- 
many cannot escape. 

1. The Armistice will be concluded only if the military 
advisers of the Allied and Associated Governments deem 
it possible from the military point of view. 

2. The only Armistice which can be suggested to the 
Associated Governments will be an Armistice that will 
render impossible (where are the German hopes of the 
beginning of October?) any resumption of hostilities by 
Germany and leave the Associated Powers in a position 
to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into. 

3. The peoples of the world have and can have no 
confidence in the word of those who have hitherto been 
the masters of Germany. Nothing could be gained by not 
stating these essential conditions. 

On October 21, Germany had admitted her defeat. It 
remained for the Allied Governments to fix the conditions 
of their victory and the bases of their security. 

IV 

On October 23 President Wilson who, since the fifth, 
has remained in daily contact with the European Govern- 
ments and has given out his correspondence with Ger- 
many, day by day, communicates this correspondence 
officially to his associates and asks them two questions : 

1. Regarding the peace, and in view of the assurances 
given by the Chancellor, are the Associated Governments 
ready to conclude peace on the terms and according to the 
principles already made public! 

2. Regarding the Armistice 'and if the reply to the 
previous question is in the affirmative, are the Associated 
Governments ready to ask their military advisers and the 
military advisers of the United States to submit to them 
the necessary conditions which must be fulfilled by au 



60 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Armistice such as will protect absolutely the interests of 
the peoples concerned and to assure to the Associated Gov- 
ernments unlimited power to safeguard and impose the 
details of the peace to which the German Government has 
consented, provided always that the military advisers con- 
sider such an armistice possible from a military point of 
view? 

I do not believe that ever problem was more clearlj^ 
defined. 

First, the question of principle; — do the commanding 
generals believe that from a military point of view hostili- 
ties can be suspended, or do they believe on the contrary 
that they should be continued? 

Second, the question of execution. If the Armistice is 
possible and desirable, what are the conditions necessary 
to prevent Germany from beginning the war again and to 
permit the Allies to impose their terms of peace? 

It is to the military authorities that Mr. Wilson asks 
that these two questions shall be submitted. It is to them 
that he entrusts in this matter the sovereign rights of the 
Governments. M. Clemen ceau is, on this point, in com- 
plete agreement with the President of the United States. 
To stop the hostilities otherwise than on the express advice 
and in the manner fixed by the chiefs who have had the 
responsibility of the military operations would be con- 
trary to all the principles which have inspired his war 
policy. In the name of the Supreme Council of the Allies, 
over which he presides, he therefore transmits the corre- 
spondence to Marshal Foch, the Commander-in-Chief, who 
by virtue of his position and his responsibility is to answer 
the two questions asked. 

On October 25, Marshal Foch summons to Senlis, Gen- 
eral Petain, Marshal Haig, General Pershing and General 
Gillain, Chief of Staff of the Belgian Army. The latter 
however is delayed and does not attend the meeting. The 
Commander-in-Chief reads the correspondence to them and 
asks their advice. None of them proposes to refuse the 
Armistice. On the terms of the Armistice their opinions are 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 61 

divided. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig speaks first. In 
his view the Armistice should be concluded and concluded 
on very moderate terms. The victorious Allied Armies are 
extenuated. The units need to be reorganized. Germany 
is not broken in the military sense. During the last weeks 
her Armies have withdra^vn fighting very bravely and in 
excellent order. Therefore, if it is really desired to con- 
clude an armistice — and this in his view is very desirable — 
it is necessary to grant Germany conditions which she can 
accept. That is to say the evacuation of the invaded ter- 
ritory in France and Belgium as well as Alsace-Lorraine, 
and the restitution of the rolling stock taken at the begin- 
ning of the war from the French and Belgians. If more is 
demanded, there is a risk of prolonging the war, which has 
already cost so much, and of exasperating German national 
feeling, with very doubtful results. For the evacuation of 
all invaded territories and of Alsace-Lorraine is sufficient 
to seal the victory. 

General Pershing says that, as Chief of the American 
Army in France, he desires first to hear what General 
Petain has to say and to give his opinion afterwards. 
General Petain is of opinion, that if an armistice is con- 
cluded, it must be a real armistice complying fully and 
completely with the definition laid down by President Wil- 
son in his Note of October 23; an armistice making it 
impossible for the enemy to resume hostilities and per- 
mitting the Allies to impose their OAvn terms of peace. For 
that, two things are essential: the first is that the German 
Army should return to Germany without a cannon or a 
tank, and with only its carrying arms. To attain this, he 
makes practical suggestions. The specification of a time 
for withdrawal so short that it \vill be materially impos- 
sible for the enemy to carry away his war material. In 
addition to the evacuation by the Germans of all invaded 
territory and of Alsace-Lorraine, the occupation by the 
Allied Armies not only of the left bank of the Rhine but of 
a zone fifty kilometers wide on the right bank ; at the same 
time the delivery of 5,000 locomotives and 100,000 cars 



62 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

should be demanded. General Petain adds however that, 
although these conditions are indispensable in his opinion, 
it is hardly expected that the Germans will accept them. 

General Pershing in a few words, says that he agrees 
with General Petain. Marshal Foch thanks his guests for 
their suggestions which he will consider. The conference 
ends. The next day, October 26, Marshal Foch communi- 
cates his final conclusions to M. Clemenceau by letter. 
Extracts of this letter have been published. It is well to 
quote it here in its entirety as far as the "Western front is 
concerned. 

After haying consulted the Commanders-in-Chief of the Amer- 
ican, British and French Armies,* I have the honour to make 
known to you the military conditions under which can be granted 
an armistice ' ' capable ' ' of protecting absolutely the interests of the 
nations concerned and assuring to the Associated Governments 
unlimited power to safeguard and impose the conditions of Peace 
to which the German Government has consented. 

I. Immediate evacuation of all territory invaded contrary to 
law: Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg. 

Immediate repatriation of their inhabitants. 

Surrender of part of the enemy war material in the evacuated 
regions. 

This evacuation to be effected with a degree of speed that will 
make it impossible for the enemy to remove a large part of the war 
material and supplies of all kinds now there ; that is to say in the 
following delays : 

At the end of four days the German troops must have with- 
drawn beyond the first line on the accompanying map ; 

At the end of four more days they must be beyond the second 
line; 

At the end of a further period of six days they must be beyond 
the third line ; 

Belgium, Luxemburg and Alsace-Lorraine will thus be liberated 
within a total time of fourteen days; 

The time limits will run from the day of the signature of the 
Armistice. 



*The Chief of Staff of the Belgian Army summoned at the same time ns 
the Commanders-in-Chief could not on account of the distance reach my H. Q. 
in time. 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 63 

In any case the total material left behind by the enemy must 
amount to : 

5,000 cannon (half heavy, half field pieces)*. 

30,000 machine gunst. 

3,000 minnenwerfer. 

To be delivered ^here they now are in a manner to be later 
determined. 

The Allied troops will follow up in these regions the progress of 
the evacuation which will be carried out in accordance with reg- 
ulations to be later determined. 

II. Evacuation of the territory on the left bank of the Rhine 
by the enemy Armies. 

The territory on the left bank of the Rhine will continue to be 
administered by the local authorities under the supervision of the 
AUied Armies of occupation. 

The Allied forces will assure the occupation of this territory by 
garrisons holding the principal Rhine crossings (]\Iayence, Co- 
blenz, Strassburg), with at these points bridgeheads of thirty kilo- 
meters radius on the right bank. 

Holding also the strategic points of the region. A neutral zone 
will be established on the right bank on the river running parallel 
to the river and forty kilometers to the east of it from the Swiss to 
the Dutch frontiers. 

The evacuation by the enemy of the Rhine territories must be 
completed within the following time limits : 

Up to the Rhine, eight days over and above the time limits set 
above (that is to say twenty-two days in all from the signature of 
the Armistice). 

Beyond the neutral zone; three additional days (twenty-five 
days in all from the signature of the Armistice). 

III. In all the territories evacuated by the enemy there must 
be no destruction of any kind and no harm must be done to the 
persons or property of the inhabitants. 

rV". The enemy must deliver under conditions to be determined 
5,000 locomotives and 150,000 cars in good running order.J 



*0r about one-third of the artillerj' of the German Army. 

tOr about half the machine guns of the German Army. 

tOf these amounts 2,500 locomotives and 135,000 cars represent the rolling 
Btock carried off from France and Belgium, the surplus is needed for the 
service of the railroads on the left bank of the Ehine. 



64 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

V. The German High. Command must be bound to reveal the 
position of all mines or retarded mines laid in the evacuated ter- 
ritories and to assist in their location and destruction under 
penalty of reprisals. 

VI. The compliance by the enemy with these conditions will 
occupy a total of twenty-five days. In order to guarantee its 
execution, the blockade will be maintained during this period. It 
is only at the expiration of this delay and after these conditions 
have been fulfilled that the sending of food supplies to the enemy 
can be authorized on conditions to be determined by separate 
agreement. 

yil. Allied prisoners to be returned in the shortest possible 
time in a manner to be determined later. 

This letter calls for no comment. Marshal Foch has 
taken counsel and considered. He has put to himself the 
question lie urged upon his pupils at the Ecole de Guerre. 
''What is the object!" To break the fighting strength of 
Germany; to oblige Germany to submit to conditions of 
peace whatever they may be. In order to make sure of this, 
can we confine ourselves to Marshal Haig's suggestions? 
No; for the German Army after evacuating the invaded 
territories, which it would leave with the honours of war, 
would find itself entire and whole inside its own frontiers 
and remain a danger to the Allies. Is it necessary to avert 
this danger to deprive the enemy of all his war material? 
No ; it will be sufficient to take that without which he can- 
not resume hostilities, and in addition to hold the Rhine 
with bridgeheads at its principal crossings. In the absolute 
freedom of judgment which the Allied Governments sol- 
emnly conferred upon him, the Commander-in-Chief 
decides that this is what is necessary and sufficient. The 
opportunity is also to be afforded him within the next few 
days of developing his views and explaining on what his 
decision is based. 

Between October 23 and 26, the heads of the European 
Governments and their Ministers of Foreign Affairs have 
all gathered in Paris. On the twenty-fourth Mr. House 
joins them six weeks ahead of President Wilson. The 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 65 

meetings begin at once. They have not yet the official 
character they will assume on the thirty-first when the 
Supreme Council meets at Versailles. Generally the meet- 
ings are held in the mornings at Mr. House's place in the 
rue de I'Universite; in the afternoons at M. Clemenceau's 
office in the Ministry of War or at Mr. Pichon's at the 
Quay d' Orsay. The position on the various fronts (the 
Armistice with Austria-Hungary is momentarily expected) 
and the terms of the German Armistice are the subject of 
the discussions in which Marshal Foch on several occasions 
takes part. Some do not find these terms severe enough. 
Thus General Tasker H. Bliss, representing the United 
States on the Inter-allied Military Council, would prefer a 
shorter and in some respects a more rigorous text. In his 
opinion two clauses would be sufficient : total disarmament 
and complete demobilization. This would make it quite 
certain that Germany could not resume hostilities. This 
would force her in advance to submit to all peace condi- 
tions. General Bliss, after a remarkable exposition of his 
views, summarizes them as follows in a Note which he 
hands to one of the members of the Supreme Council.* 

For the reasons stated above I suggest : 

I. That the Associated Powers demand the complete disarma- 
ment and demobilization of the military and naval forces of the 
enemy, leaving only to him such internal force as may be con- 
sidered necessary to the maintenance of order in enemy territory. 
This implies the evacuation of all invaded territories and their 
evacuation not by armed or partially armed men but by disarmed 
men. 

The German Army thus deprived of its arms cannot fight, and 
being demobilized cannot again be called together for the objects 
of this war. 

II. That the Associated Powers inform the enemy that there 
will be no diminution of their war aims which will be submitted to 
a full and reasonable discussion between the nations associated in 
the war and that, even if the enemy himself is given a hearing, he 



*Outside of the exchange of views between the military advisers, this 
proposal was not officially submitted by the American delegates to the heads 
of the Governments. 



66 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

will have to submit to everything that the Associated Powers shall 
finally decide to be necessary to assure now and in the future the 
Peace of the World. 

On the other hand, in naval matters the representa- 
tives of Great Britain do not consider sufficient the 
delivery of 150 submarines demanded by Marshal Foch and 
think that nearly all the battle-ships and cruisers ought to 
be surrendered also. It is in these circumstances that the 
final discussion from October 27 to 31, begins. I repro- 
duce its salient passages. 

True to the mission entrusted to him by President AVil- 
son, Mr. House first of all asks Marshal Foch the following 
questions : 

* ' Tell us, M. le Marechal, purely from the military point 
of view and without regard to any other consideration, 
whether you would rather that the Germans should reject 
or accept the Armistice on the lines we have just agreed 
upon." 

Marshal Foch answers: 

* ' The only aim of war is to obtain results. If the Ger- 
mans sign an armistice on the general lines we have just 
determined we shall have obtained the result we seek. 
Our aims being accomplished, no one has the right to shed 
another drop of blood." 

In other words, the Commander-in-Chief is of opinion 
that if the Germans accept the conditions laid down in his 
letter of October 23 — and he still has his doubts upon this 
point — it is necessary to conclude the Armistice and cease 
the war without hesitation. The Commander-in-Chief 
goes even further and, replying to the suggestions of Gen- 
eral Bliss and of Mr. Lloyd George, and to others of the 
same nature, firmly insists on the danger of additional 
demands. He says: 

** Nothing is easier than to propose and even to impose 
conditions on paper. It is simple and logical to demand 
the disarmament of the German Armies in the field. But 
how will you make sure of it? Will you pass through the 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 67 

German Armies and occupy before tlaem the Rhine cross- 
ings? Demobilization? I am willing. But do you intend 
to occupy the whole of Germany ? For if we do not occupy 
the whole of Germany, we shall never be certain that 
demobilization has been carried out. As for the German 
surface fleet, what do you fear from it ? During the whole 
war only a few of its units have ventured from their ports. 
The surrender of these units will be merely a manifesta- 
tion, which will please the public but nothing more. "Why 
make the Armistice harder, for I repeat its sole object is to 
place Germany hors de combat." 

And Marshal Foch adds: 

''What will you do if the Germans after having ac- 
cepted the severe and ample conditions that I propose, 
refuse to subscribe to the additional humiliations you sug- 
gest? Will you on that account run the risk of a renewal 
of hostilities with the useless sacrifice of thousands of 
lives?" 

That was the whole question. Would harsher terms 
prolong the war? For how many months? What would 
be the risks ? Colonel House and Lloyd George were anxious 
— as was also M. Clemenceau — to obtain the maximum, so 
long as the military authorities considered the maximum 
necessary. On October 29 they ask the Commander-in- 
Chief to reply to these points. And Marshal Foch answers : 

*'I am not in a position and no one is in a position to 
give you an accurate forecast. It may last three months, 
perhaps four or five. Who knows? However if I cannot 
fix a date, I can reply to the main question. On the main 
question I say this : the conditions laid down hy your mili- 
tary advisers are the very conditions which we ought to 
and coidd impose after the success of our further opera- 
tions. So if the Germans accept them noiv, it is useless to 
go on fighting.'^ 

On October 31, the heads of Governments, assisted by 
Marshal Foch, decide upon the final text to be submitted 
to the Supreme Council of the Allies which is to meet on 
the afternoon of the same day. This text adopts all the 



68 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

proposals of the Commander-in-Chief with a few additions 
and specifications of details, the foremost of which are: 

The surrender of 2,000 fighting and bombing planes, and firstly 
all the D 7 's and all the night bombing machines. 

In all German territory evacuated by the enemy all military 
installations of whatever nature to be delivered intact. 

Ways and means of communication of all kinds, railways, 
waterways, roads, bridges, telegraphs, telephones, to be left undam- 
aged. All the civilian and military employees actually working 
them to remain. 

The right of requisition shall be exercised by the Allied Armies 
and the United States Armies in all occupied territory. The 
upkeep of all the troops of occupation in the Rhine districts 
(excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Gov- 
ernment. 

German prisoners of war to be returned only after the signature 
of Peace preliminaries. 

Delivery to the Allies of 10,000 motor trucks. 

The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over together 
with all personnel and material. 

On October 31 at three o'clock the Supreme Council 
meets at Versailles. There are present Clemenceau, 
Pichon, Lloyd George, Balfour, Orlando, Sonnino, House, 
Venizelos, Vesnitch, Marshal Foch, Admiral Wemyss, 
Generals Sir Henry Wilson, Bliss and De Robilant. M. 
Clemenceau calls on Marshal Foch who explains the mili- 
tary position created by the victories of the last months. 
He describes the position of the German Army, after hav- 
ing stated its losses. He says : 

*'An Army which for three months has been forced to 
retreat, and which can no longer react is a beaten Army. 
But all the same it persists in methodical destruction, 
accepting battle everywhere. 

''The military disorganization of the enemy is an un- 
doubted fact. But the struggle goes on and continues." 

After the Germans, the Allies. Marshal Foch 
expresses himself thus : 

*'0n our side despite the approach of winter we can 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 69 

continue this battle on its 400 kilometers front. The effec- 
tives of our Army permit this. The British and French 
Armies have certainly suffered but they can go on. The 
American Army is still fresh and its reserves are arriving 
every day. The morale of the troops is excellent. This 
enables us to go on, if the enemy so desires, till complete 
victory is won. ' ' 

No one asking to be heard in discussion of Marshal 
Foch's point of view which is already well known from the 
preceding meetings, the Austrian Armistice is next taken 
up and occupies the remainder of the meeting of October 31. 
On November 1 another meeting is held, followed by two 
others on the second and fourth, the greater part of which 
is devoted to the German Armistice. As a whole, except 
for few aggravations, the plan of the Commander-in-Chief 
is adopted purely and simply, for the Western as for the 
Eastern front. 

On the naval clauses the discussion is more prolonged. 
Despite the objections put forward by Marshal Foch at 
previous meetings the Council of Admirals insists that the 
greater part of the German surface fleet must be sur- 
rendered and interned. It is curious to note that Mr. 
Lloyd George, who had opposed none of the land clauses, 
expresses fear that the demands of the naval experts may 
prolong the war to no purpose. He asks that the decision 
be put off at least till Austria has capitulated. 

*'We must ask ourselves," he says, ''whether we want 
to make peace at once or to continue the war for a year. It 
may be very tempting to take a certain number of ships. 
But that is not the main issue. At present each of our 
Armies is losing more men in a week than at any time dur- 
ing the first four years of war. We must not lose sight of 
that. If Austria gives in, we shall know where we are. By 
Monday we shall be better able to say." 

And so the discussion is resumed on November 4 when 
the following text is adopted: 

The German surface war-ships which shall be designated by the 



70 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATl: 

Allies and the United States shall forthwith be disarmed and there- 
after interned in neutral ports or failing them, Allied ports. 

There remains a grave question put forward by the 
French delegation. The Question of Reparations. At 
the meeting of November 2, M. Clemenceau starts the 
discussion : 

''I would like to return now to the question of Repara- 
tions and of damages. It would not be understood with 
us in France if we did not insert a clause in the Armistice 
to this effect. All I am asking for is the addition of three 
words, 'Reparations for damages' without further 
comment. ' ' 

The following discussion ensues: 

M. Hymans: ''Would that be a condition of armistice?" 

M. Sonnino: "It is rather a condition of peace." 

M. Bonar Law; "It is useless to insert in the conditions 
of armistice a clause that cannot be rapidly fulfilled." 

M. Clemenceau : " I only want to lay down the principle. 
You must not forget that the French people is one of those 
which have suffered most. They would not understand 
if we did not make some allusion to tliis matter." 

Mr. Lloyd George: "If you are going to deal with the 
reparation of damages on land, you must also mention the 
question of reparations for the ships sunk." 

M. Clemenceau: "That is all covered by my three 
words: 'Reparations for damages.' I beg the Council to 
understand the feeling of the French people." 

M. Vesnitch: "And of the Serbian " 

M, Hymans: "And of the Belgian " 

M. Sonnino: "And of the Italian people also " 

Mr. House: "As this is a matter of importance to all, 
I propose the adoption of M. Clemenceau 's addition." 

Mr. Bonar Law: "It is already mentioned in our letter 
to President Wilson. It is useless to repeat it." 

Mr. Orlando: "I accept it in principle although no men- 
tion has been made of it in the conditions of the Austrian 
Armistice." 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 71 

THe addition of *' Reparations for damages" is then 
adopted. M. Klotz suggests that the addition be preceded 
by the words ''with the reservation that any future claims 
by the Allies and the United States remain unaffected." 
This is decided. The Allied Governments, now agreed on 
everything the Armistice is to contain, are in a position to 
reply to President Wilson 's telegram of October 23. They 
therefore request Mr. House to communicate to the Presi- 
dent the conditions which have been agreed upon with two 
reservations. This communication is made in the follow- 
ing terms: 

The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to 
the correspondence which has passed between the President of the 
United States and the German Government. 

Subject to the qualifications which follow they declare their 
willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the 
terms of peace laid down in the Address of the President to Con- 
gress on January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement enun- 
ciated in his subsequent address. 

They must point out, however, that clause 2, relating to what is 
usually described as the ' ' Freedom of the Seas ' ' is open to various 
interpretations some of which they could not accept. They must 
therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject 
when they enter the Peace Conference. 

Furthermore in the conditions of peace laid down in his address 
to Congress on January 8, 1918, the President declared that the 
invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed 
and the Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed 
to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand 
that compensations will be made by Germany for all damage done 
to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the 
aggression of Germany by land, by sea and from the air. 

Mr. Wilson is at the same time asked to notify the Ger- 
man Government that it can send a duly accredited pleni- 
potentiary to Marshal Foch who, assisted by a British 
Admiral, would be authorized to act in the name of the 
Allied and Associated Governments. 



72 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

V 

In what state of mind is this decision to find Germany? 
I have already shown that after her Note of October 21 
and the American reply of October 23 she was bound with- 
out escape to submit to the conditions of the Allies. The 
days which follow make this abundantly clear. The Ger- 
man Great General Staff continues to be exasperated. 
Herr von Payer, who had been there on the twenty-sixth, 
asserts that he was repeatedly told, ''We are not beaten. 
"We must not capitulate." It is true that to his question, 
''What chances shall we have of making a better peace if 
we go on?" he gets no definite answer, unless it is that 
''Clemenceau is in disagreement with Foch about the 
conditions" and that "Foch by urging moderate condi- 
tions shows the high opinion he still has of German power 
of resistance." The Ministers question other Generals, 
Gallwitz, Mudra, who declare themselves confident, but 
furnish no grounds for their hopes. Everything goes to 
smash. On the twenty-sixth, Ludendorff resigns and his 
resignation is accepted. On the twenty- seventh, the Em- 
peror of Austria announces that he is going to make a 
separate peace. On the thirtieth he asks for an armistice, 
announcing it is true that if the conditions are too severe 
*'he will put himself at the head of his Austrian Germans." 
On the twenty-seventh, the German Government had 
already telegraphed to President Wilson that it was await- 
ing his proposals. 

On November 5, General Groner, Ludendorff 's suc- 
cessor, acknowledges that the military situation has grown 
worse. For Marshal Foch is continuing his concentric 
advance; the Armies of the North moving towards Brus- 
sels, the British Armies towards the Ardennes, the French 
Armies towards Givet, the Americans towards Mezieres 
and Sedan. The Germans from November 4 to 9 lose the 
banks of the Scheldt on a wide front and are overwhelmed 
on the right bank of the Meuse. To finish them the Allied 
High Command prepares an offensive in Lorraine which 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 73 

with Sarrebourg for its objective will burl twenty-eight 
divisions of infantry, three divisions of cavalry, six hun- 
dred tanks and an enormous force of artillery against five 
or seven mediocre German divisions. "When on November 
6 the American Note of the fifth arrives announcing that 
in accordance with the conditions stipulated. Marshal Foch 
is ready to receive the German plenipotentiaries, they are 
appointed the same day and set out the next. The Emperor 
abdicates. 

The rest is known. The meeting of the two Armistice 
Commissions at Rethondes on the morning of the eighth 
in the train of the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied 
Armies ; the attempt by Erzberger to transform the capitu- 
lation into a negotiation : 

*'We have come to receive your proposals with a view 
to arriving at the conclusion of an Armistice." 

Marshal Foch cuts him short with : 

*'I have no proposals to make. Do you ask for an 
Armistice 1 ' ' 

*'We ask for an Armistice." 

*'Very well. The conditions decided upon by the Allied 
Governments will be read to you." 

These seventy-two hours of delay passed quickly. On 
November 10, Secretary of State Solf makes known by 
wireless that ''the German Government accepts the condi- 
tions imposed." The eleventh at five o'clock in the morn- 
ing, the protocol is signed. It is the same as the text 
adopted on November 4 by the Supreme Council at Ver- 
sailles. For technical reasons. Marshal Foch has granted 
to Erzberger three slight modifications: 25,000 machine 
guns instead of 30,000; 1,700 aeroplanes instead of 2,000; 
5,000 motor trucks instead of 10,000 ; in addition to a prom- 
ise of prompt measures to insure food supply. On Novem- 
ber 11, at eleven o 'clock in the morning the Armistice takes 
effect on the whole front. The same day all the nations 
which had fought for Liberty and Justice celebrated the 
signature. 

Such in its logical evolution was the origin of the Armis- 



74 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

tice of November 11. Misconception born of ignorance 
cannot withstand the light of facts. Linked together in 
cause and effect the facts throw their critical light upon 
the accumulation of legends and make the truth stand out. 
Absent from France in America from October 17 to Novem- 
ber 20, in place of personal reminiscences I have consulted 
all the written and oral testimony. The Geraian documents 
are taken from the official account published by the Gov- 
ernment of the Reich, the authenticity of which has been 
challenged by none of those concerned. None of the texts 
reproduced here can be disputed. My account is true and 
I believe it to be complete. 

What remains of the fiction believed by so many of an 
Armistice secretly determined upon by an American dic- 
tator ; submitted to by the European Governments ; imposed 
by their weakness upon the victorious Armies despite the 
opposition of the Generals? The Armistice was discussed 
in the open light of day. President Wilson only consented 
to communicate it to his associates on the triple condition 
that its principle be approved by the military authorities 
and its clauses would be drawn up by them; that it be im- 
posed upon the enemy and not discussed with him; that it 
be such as to prevent all resumption of hostilities and 
assure the submission of the vanquished to the terms of 
peace. So it was that the discussion went on with Berlin 
till October 23, and in Paris from that date till November 
5. It was to the Commander-in-Chief that final decision 
was left not only on the principle of the Armistice but upon 
its application. He it was who drew up the text. And it 
was his draft that was adopted. The action of the Govern- 
ments was limited to endorsing it and making it more 
severe. That is the truth: — it is perhaps less picturesque 
but certainly more in accord with common sense. 

May it in truth be said, after what I have just written 
of the German crises in October, that Marshal Foch made 
a mistake in not exacting more than he did— and that no 
matter what we had asked the people in Berlin would have 
accepted everything just as they accepted the surrender of 



THE WAR AND THE ARMISTICE 75 

their Navy? Of course this can always be asserted. I 
Avould point out, however, that criticism foretelling the past 
is not hard to level against action which had to take the 
future into account. To pass judgment on the decisions 
taken in October, 1918, by the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armies of the Entente, and approved afterwards by the 
Governments, it is necessary to place one's self in his posi- 
tion of knowledge. The official German documents which 
I am able to insert in this work had not then been published. 
The facts they relate were not then known. Nothing was 
known of the extraordinary panic which on October 1 
had seized the Great General Staff; nothing was known 
either of its unavoidable consequences. Marshal Foch was 
sure of victory and he said so. He added that the condi- 
tions fixed by him on October 26 were the very conditions 
which we should have been able to dictate after the success 
of further operations. But having done that, he fulfilled 
his duty in refusing to fix an exact date as to the duration 
of German resistance, the strength of which in critical 
junctures continued to be shown — contrary to the provi- 
sions of Ludendorff — up to the very day of the Armistice. 
He also fulfilled his duty in refusing to take chances with 
the morale of the troops and of the peoples, by confining 
himself to what he considered to be necessary and suf- 
ficient. It is easy two years afterwards to decide that the 
war would only have lasted a week longer. Marshal Foch 
could not guarantee that. Nobody even to-day could guar- 
antee it absolutely. A few days before the Armistice one 
of our Army Commanders said to a public man : 

"We are going to take up our positions for another 
winter. ' ' 

The responsible Chief would have none of "another 
winter" which he did not consider essential to the achieve- 
ment of victory. The Governments determined to impose 
everything that the Commander-in-Chief exacted but did 
not feel justified in demanding more. Moreover, the 
problem was to place Germany in a position in which 
she could not begin the war again — she was not able to 



76 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY/ 

begin it again ; the problem was to force Germany to sign 
the Peace, — she signed it. Events have thus shown that 
Marshal Foch was right. The Armistice marked the capitu- 
lation of the enemy, a capitulation which was an uncondi- 
tional surrender. 



CHAPTEE III 

THE PEACE CONFERENCE 

The work which awaited the framers of the Peace was 
as great and as unprecedented as the war which was to be 
brought to a close. 

Great and unprecedented in its scope : for the first time 
in history entire nations had fought. Seventy million men 
had been mobilized, thirty million had been wounded and 
nearly ten million had died. Nothing in the past could 
compare with it. The dead alone outnumbered all the 
Armies of Napoleon. Great and unprecedented in its com- 
plexity: nation having fought nation, there had been 
brought into play the sum total of all national forces : agri- 
cultural, industrial, commercial and financial. All these 
potent factors of international life had to be taken into 
account in making the Treaty. Read over the great peace 
treaties of the past, — for the most part child's play com- 
pared to this! Frontier changes limited to a few frag- 
ments of the map of Europe ; indemnities of a few millions 
— the five thousand millions exacted in 1871 from France 
were looked upon at the time as a financial monstrosity 
and a gross abuse of power ; economic clauses in which the 
victor imposed upon the vanquished the most favoured 
nation clause ! A peace treaty had certain classic outlines 
which were filled in according to more or less settled 
traditions. 

The map of the world had to be remade, and under what 
conditions! Germany's persistent savagery had left more 
ruins in the victorious countries than the invasions of the 
barbarians had ever made in the lands they overran and 
conquered. The resources of all the belligerents had been 

77 



78 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

equally exhausted by the duration of the struggle, and as 
the damages rightly demanded by the creditors rose, the 
capacity for payment of the debtors fell. Mr. Lloyd George 
had said in 1918, "Germany shall pay for everything." 
When the Conference met, it was of necessity obliged to 
ascertain how much and in what manner Germany could 
pay. And ways had to be devised to extend the time of 
payment ; for it was quite evident a country no matter how 
rich could not pay hundreds of millions in a few months 
and no matter how criminal could not have undergone so 
prolonged a strain without diminishing its resources. The 
execution of the peace terms thus became not a matter of 
months but of years. It implied a lasting union of the 
forces which had won the war. Not the victors alone but 
the whole world had to be given the certainty that Germany 
would not repeat her offense. The fundamental aims of 
Liberty and Justice which for fifty-two months had fur- 
nished the moral strength and stimulus of the nations in 
arms had to be realized. Finally the unity of the Allies 
which had led to their victory had to be maintained and 
made closer so that they might be as well prepared for 
common action in the future as they had been in the past. 
Failing this, the Peace would be lacking in the essential 
factor that had won the Victory. 

The history of the war foreshadowed the nature of the 
peace as much by the official acts of Governments as by 
the spontaneous expression of pubhc opinion. When 
France knew that she was being attacked by Germany, she 
proclaimed her war aims with a single voice. They were 
the defense of her frontiers, the redemption of Alsace- 
Lorraine and the maintenance of national liberty as op- 
posed to a policy of aggression and domination. In the 
Parliament and in the Press there was not a discordant 
note. France had bought this unanimity, the essential con- 
dition of success, with forty-three years of anguish. It 
was the memory of those dark days which gave substance 
to France's conception of Peace and War. Attacked once 
more France was once more going to fight for Right. Such 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 79 

is our entry into the war, — now for the other nations. Ser- 
bia, having made every possible concession, cannot tolerate 
the substitution of another Power for her own on her own 
soil. Russia refusing to renounce the Slav gospel by 
abandoning Serbia to Austria's extortion. Belgium spurn- 
ing the cynical offer to betray her word and her friends. 
Great Britain too, accepting the challenge to keep faith 
with a ''scrap of paper." Group these facts, link them to 
the past, compare them with Germany's aggression and her 
methods, "Necessity knows no law." It is a conflict be- 
tween two opposing principles. On one side the nations 
who put their faith in Might, on the other those who believe 
in Right. On one side the peoples who seek to enslave, 
on the other the free peoples who, whether they defend 
themselves against aggression or whether they come to the 
assistance of those attacked, are ready to sacrifice their 
lives to remain independent, masters of their own affairs 
at home and of their destinies abroad. 

The war lasted and grew greater. Each passing hour 
emphasized and confirmed its original character. In 1915 
Italy joins the Allies after laying down the conditions on 
which she leaves the Triple Alliance. Why? Because 
from Trentino to Trieste she has heard the voices of the 
irredenti calling. In 1916 Roumania comes in. Why? Be- 
cause from beyond the plains of Transjivania the lament 
of Magyarized Roumanians had crossed the Carpathian 
Mountains. In 1917, Greece comes in. Why? Because on 
the borders of Macedonia, of Thrace and of Asia Minor 
she had felt — despite the German leanings of her King — 
the soul of ancient Hellas stirring. The breath of liberty 
passes everywhere. For half a century Alsace-Lorraine 
had been the symbol and the flaming torch of the oppressed. 
From East to West all who believed in the liberation of 
the oppressed and in the right of peoples to self-determina- 
tion rallied to the echoes of the Marne and of Verdun. As 
time passed the circle of our supporters widened. And 
then came the democracy of the United States. When she 
entered the struggle, her war aims were indefinite but in 



80 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

a few weeks she too understood and had a clear conception 
of what she was fighting for. From the Atlantic to the 
Pacific the word went forth. We are going to fight in 
Europe. Against what? Against Autocracy and Militar- 
ism. For what? For Justice and the Liberty of Nations. 
Words, mere words, answer the ''realists." Yes, mere 
words, but words for which millions of soldiers stand ready 
to die. Words which are a living force. Words which 
from France have spread to the new world and have mo- 
bilized the hearts of the people without which there can 
be no military mobilization in a democracy. We were fight- 
ing for our ideal and for our frontier. America had no 
frontier to defend but she adopted our ideal and made 
it hers. 

That is why — be it pleasing or not, a cause for congrat- 
ulation or regret — the war of 1914 had a meaning and an 
aim of its own before any Government had made a declara- 
tion. From the first day of the German aggression, it 
was a war of peoples and of nationalities. A war for popu- 
lar and national rights. Such it remained to the very end. 
That was why, in the closing months, Polish Czecho-Slova- 
kian and Croatian regiments sprang from the soil. That is 
why millions of men made the last great sacrifice. That is 
why the Peace was to be the peace of free nations, of 
nations liberated from the forces of oppression. The peo- 
ples had spoken. The Governments in Europe and in 
America did but register their will. All declarations of 
''war aims" — invariably and identically — reflected the 
clear convictions and simple principles which led the Armies 
into battle. 

The first of these declarations dates from the thirtieth 
of December, 1916. It is handed in the name of all the Allies 
to the American Ambassador by M. Aristide Briand in 
reply to a German Note transmitted by the neutrals. What 
does it contain! First of all the principle that "the Allied 
Governments are united for the defense of the liberties of 
peoples." Then the assertion "No peace is possible until 
assurances are given that reparations will be made for the 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 81 

rights and liberties that have been violated : that the prin- 
ciples of nationality and of freedom of small states will 
be recognized and that some settlement definitely eliminat- 
ing the causes that have so long menaced the nations, 
establishes the only effective guarantee for the world's 
safety." The rights of peoples, reparations, League of 
Nations, — such is the Allies' reply in three lines. 

The second declaration was on the tenth of January, 
1917. Again it is a Note, handed in the name of all the 
Allies to the American Ambassador by M. Aristide Briand 
in reply to a question of President Wilson. The principle 
is the same, but it is defined in greater detail. 

1. Restoration of Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro and of the 
damages they have sustained. 

2. Evacuation of the invaded territory of France, Russia and 
Roumania with full reparations. 

3. Reorganization of Europe, guaranteed by a stable regime, 
based upon the respect of nationality and the right of all peoples, 
great and small, to pursue their economic development in full 
security and upon territorial and international conventions guar- 
anteering land and sea frontiers against unwarranted aggression, 

4. Restitution of provinces or territories previously taken 
from the Allies by force or against the will of the inhabitants. 

5. Liberation of Italians, Slavs, Roumanians and Czecho- 
slovaks from foreign domination. 

6. Liberation of the population subjected to the bloody 
tyranny of the Turks; rejection out of Europe of the Ottoman 
Empire as foreign to western civilization. 

7. The intentions of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia 
towards Poland are clearly indicated in the proclamation which he 
has just addressed to his Armies. 

8. The Allies have never aimed at the extermination of the 
German peoples or at their disappearance as a political entity. 

Bear these eight points in mind. "We shall meet them 
again. Six months later, after a long debate, the French 
Parliament in turn deems it necessary to declare its war 
aims in two formal resolutions. On June 5, 1917, the 
Chamber adopts, by 467 votes to 52, the following: 



82 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

The Chamber endorsing the unanimous protest made in 1871 to 
the National Assembly by the representatives of Alsace-Lorraine, 
torn against her will from France, declares that the war, imposed 
on Europe by the aggression of German Imperialism, must lead to 
the liberation of invaded territory, the return of Alsace-Lorraine 
to the mother country and to just reparation of damages. 

Foreign to all thought of conquest or enslavement of foreign 
people, the Chamber trusts that the efforts of the Army of the 
Kepublic and her Allies will permit, after Prussian militarism is 
overthrown, the securing of lasting guarantees of peace and inde- 
pendence from great and small nations alike by association in a 
League of Nations, already in preparation. 

The following day, June 6, 1917, the Senate unanimously 
votes a similar resolution: 

The Senate convinced that lasting peace can be secured only by 
the victory of the Allied Armies ; 

Asserts the will of France, true to her alliances, faithful to her 
ideal of independence and liberty for all peoples, to pursue the war 
until Alsace-Lorraine are restored, crimes are punished, damages 
are repaired and guarantees against further aggression by German 
militarism are secured. 

In England, in Italy, in Belgium, the Parliaments in 
like terms confirmed the declarations of their Governments 
and the instinctive desires of their peoples. All the Euro- 
pean Allies are thus after three years of war absolutely 
agreed on two things: the first that no peace is possible 
until victory has been won; the second, that, victory won, 
the Allies will demand for themselves and for all nations 
the right of self-determination for all peoples, reparations, 
guarantees and a League of Nations. The war aims are 
clear. They are public. Henceforth all men know what 
the peace of victory will be. Those, therefore, who are not 
satisfied with them, can protest. But no protest is raised 
except by a few Socialists who find these terms too severe. 

Have these war aims solemnly proclaimed to the world 
been modified since! Judge for yourself. 

On January 6, 1918, the President of the United 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 83 

States in an address to the Congress lays down *'a pro- 
gramme for world peace," which has since become known 
as the ''fourteen points." Much has been said about them, 
often by those who neither knew when they were first for- 
mulated nor what they meant. It is, therefore, relevant to 
give their substance here, presenting them in the same 
order as the eight points of January, 1917. 

1. Evacuation and restoration of Belgium without any limita- 
tion of her sovereignty. 

2. Evacuation of French territory ; restoration of the invaded 
regions; reparations of the wrong done to France in 1871 in the 
matter of Alsace-Lorraine, 

3. Evacuation of Russian territory and a settlement leaving 
her entirely free to decide her own fate. 

4. Readjustment of the Italian frontier in accordance with the 
principle of nationality. 

5. Opportunity of autonomous development for the peoples of 
Austria-Hungary. 

6. Evacuation and restoration of Roumania, Serbia and Mon- 
tenegro with access to the sea for Serbia. 

7. Limitation of Ottoman sovereignty to regions actually 
Turkish; autonomy for all the other peoples, international guar- 
antees for the freedom of the Dardanelles. 

8. An independent Poland with free access to the sea. 

9. The creation of a League of Nations giving mutual guaran- 
tees of political independence and territorial integrity to great 
and small states alike. 

10. Impartial adjustment of colonial claims. 

11. Exchange of guarantees for the reduction of armaments. 

12. Elimination as far as possible of economic barriers; com- 
mercial equality for all nations. 

13. Freedom of the seas. 

14. Open diplomacy; no secret international agreements of 
any kind. 

When on January 9 this declaration, identical in mean- 
ing — especially as far as France is concerned — ^with the 
previous declarations of the Allies, was known in Europe, 
it met with nothing but approval and support. Parlia- 
ments and Press alike interpreted it as a further pledge of 



84 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

America's unity of purpose, v/hich everyone recognized to 
be essential on the eve of the great battle of the spring. 
French men saw in it also the first public recognition of 
their right to Alsace-Lorraine, without a plebiscite. Thus 
the intervention of the United States, far from modifying 
the war aims of the European Allies, confirmed and de- 
fined them. The divergence which later on it was attempted 
to establish between the former and the latter, vanishes in 
presence of a perusal of the documents. The Fourteen 
Points contain no contradiction of the previous programmes 
of peace. On the contrary they reiterate them. The United 
States did not conceive a peace different from that which 
Europe demanded. She defined in similar terms claims 
that were identical. No modification of the course fol- 
lowed was caused by her declaration. The only result was 
greater and more complete unity. 

On October 6, 1918, Germany sued for peace. After 
three weeks of correspondence, made public day by day. 
President Wilson informed Germany that the Allies were 
ready to conclude peace on the basis of the terms set out 
above. Such the clear straight road which led from the 
formulation of Europe's war aims in 1916 and 1917 and 
their endorsement by the United States in 1918 to the 
Armistice in the beginning of November, 1919, and to peace. 
Never had a policy been clearer, more open, and more 
coherent. Everybody, before even the negotiations began, 
knew the objective sought. The peace, with all its prin- 
ciples and all its consequences, appeared clearly before the 
eyes of the nations, long ere it was drawn up and signed 
by the negotiators. 

In other words, the peace was born of the origin and 
character of the war itself. It was willed by the peoples 
before being formulated by the Governments. It was for- 
mulated by the Governments as early as the end of 1916 
in harmony with the instinct of the peoples and when, at 
the beginning of 1918, the United States in turn declared 
its conception of the peace it only emphasized principles 
which neither America nor anybody else could have varied, 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 85 

for tliey were of the very nature of things and dictated by 
circumstances. Such being its source, the peace could not 
be a peace of conquest and of imperialism. If it was not 
a peace of conquest, it is not because of the Fourteen 
Points, nor because Mr. Wilson forced his will upon 
Europe, nor because the Allied Governments bowed before 
America through weakness or lack of foresight. It is be- 
cause Mr. Wilson in his Fourteen Points, his speeches, like 
the AUies' declarations of 1916 and 1917, like the resolu- 
tions of the French Parliament of the same year, had 
merely obeyed the dictates of history, had merely regis- 
tered the will of the warring peoples; it is because the 
Peace of Victory, offspring of the war, had necessarily to 
confirm and not to repudiate the ideals for which the war 
was fought. 

The peace derives its whole character from this una- 
nimity of purpose. And if in all of its chapters — ^whether 
they deal with frontiers or with new States, whether they 
deal with reparations or the internal affairs of nations — 
this character reappears, one may regret and disapprove, 
if one is of a Bismarckian or of an imperialist turn of mind, 
but nobody has the right to be astonished. For all through 
the war, all the Allies without exception, obedient to the 
peoples' will, had constantly proclaimed that, when victory 
was won, the peace would be made exactly as it was made. 

11 

Agreement on the principles of the peace was com- 
plete, even before the negotiations began; but to what 
extent was there agreement upon their application? In 
other words what had been the technical preparation for 
the peace? 

Here again truth is singularly different from the artifi- 
cial picture which political passion has conjured up to mis- 
lead the people. The peace was prepared as far as it 
possibly could be during the war. But this possibility had 
its limitations which cannot be forgotten. In France pre- 



86 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

liminary studies had been begun by the various depart- 
ments of the Government dealing with the clauses which 
interested them particularly. These studies were then 
coordinated by three special bodies. The first, the Comite 
d 'Etudes, presided over by Ernest Lavisse, the great his- 
torian, and composed of university men and scientists, had 
presented memoranda supported by maps and statistics on 
all territorial questions relating to Europe and the Near 
East. The geographical, ethical, historical and political 
factors of these problems were thus collected and criticized 
in a manner which does honour to French science. An- 
other committee, presided over by Senator Jean Morel, 
had drawn up exhaustive notes on the principal economic 
problems which the Peace Treaty was to solve. Finally, 
from December, 1918, to the end of January, 1919, I was 
entrusted by M. Clemenceau with the task of bringing 
together for the purposes of revision the members of the 
Comite d 'Etudes and the representatives of the various 
Government departments to formulate definite conclusions 
which were reduced to writing and served as a basis for 
the French proposals. Great Britain, which had caused a 
similar study to be made by the General Staff, the Admir- 
alty and the War Trade Intelligence, was in possession 
also of abundant material. For the United States, the 
Inquiry Boards which were under the direction of Mr. 
House, had undertaken from 1917 on, an examination of 
the peace problems with the assistance of distinguished pro- 
fessors, financiers and lawyers. Anxious to insure the 
greatest possible unity between the French and American 
viewpoints during the Conference, I had from the outset 
established a daily liaison between the Inquiry Boards and 
the corresponding services of the French High Commission 
which were under M. Louis Aubert. In addition, as early 
as October, 1918, five weeks before the Armistice, I had 
sent Professor de Martonne, the general secretary of the 
Comite d 'Etudes, to the United States where he had com- 
pared our preparatory documents with those of the Inquiry 
Boards and reached entire agreement on many points. 



THE PE. . ^E CONFERENCE 87 

Could more have been done? To preliminary studies 
made in common, could common conclusions have been 
added? Would it not have been the surest way, when the 
hour of peace struck, to gain time and to hasten the settle- 
ment? This has been asserted with that unruffled disre- 
gard for past realities which too often marks retrospective 
criticism. As long as the war lasted, the Powers, it is 
true, refrained from settling in detail the clauses of the 
Peace Treaty. Mere incuriousness? No, but, impossibil- 
ity. The war almost to the very end was hard to wage 
and of uncertain issue. In July, 1918, with the enemy on 
the Marne and Paris under bombardment, was victory 
really certain? In order to win, the whole effort — and 
what an effort it was — had to be concentrated on turning 
the inter-allied machine which it had taken three years to 
build up and still moved creakily. The public knew noth- 
ing of these daily difficulties in the application of the 
principle of united action — so much talked about and so 
incompletely realized. But those who lived through them 
cannot forget. They know too what caution was neces- 
sary to solve these difficulties as well as to avert them. 

Anyone who took part in the inter-allied discussions of 
July, 1918, on the Salonica expedition, on the transport of 
the American troops or on the number of British divisions 
in France knows full well how risky would have been — 
how dangerous even to victory — a parallel discussion of 
peace terms. It was not easy to get the Allies, even when 
they were bound by a common danger, to pull together for 
an immediate purpose. What would it have been, if at the 
same time one had stirred up and intensified by discussion 
those divergencies of views which the peace was to bring 
out? Never was the truth of the old common sense saying 
that each thing must be done in its turn and that every- 
thing cannot be done at once, more clearly demonstrated. 
By attempting to wage war and make peace at the same 
time, there was no certainty of achieving the peace, but 
there was a very great risk of losing the war. It was not 
attempted, and it is well that it was not. Was it even pes- 



88 THE TRUTH ABOUT . HE TREATY 

sible, working as we were in uncertainty and in circum- 
stances which changed daily and whose course was shaped 
by our pursuit of victory and by that alone? Those who 
from the serene aloofness of their arm-chairs have 
answered the question in the affirmative, merely show their 
ignorance of the real conditions of war. Those on whose 
shoulders lay — at such a heavy hour — the responsibility of 
Government know that the attempt, doomed to failure, 
would have been nothing short of criminal imprudence. 

The Conference meets. The men and the materials are 
gathered. The work awaits. What method shall be fol- 
lowed? In the early part of January, the French delega- 
tion had proposed a general plan of procedure which M. 
Clemenceau had asked me to prepare. This plan was as 
follows : 



PRINCIPLES AND METHODS 

The task of the Conference in bringing the war to an end is to 
prepare the new bases of international relation on the general lines 
laid down in President Wilson's Message of January 8, 1918, and 
in his speech of September 27, 1918, as well as in the reply of the 
Allies of November 5, 1918. 

Under these circumstances the order of discussion might be as 
follows : 
I, Guiding Principles : 

a. Open diplomacy. 

b. Freedom of the seas. 

c. International economic relations. 

d. Guarantees against the return of militarism and limitation 
of armaments. 

e. Responsibilities for the war. 

f . Restitution and reparations. 

g. Solemn repudiation of all violations of international law 
and of the principles of humanity. 

h. The right of nations to self-determination, together with the 
right of minorities. 

i. An international organization for arbitration. 
j. Statutes of the League of Nations. 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 89 

II. Territorial Problems : 

Delimitation of frontier between belligerents — new states cre- 
ated and neutral countries in accordance with : 

a. The right of self-determination of peoples. 

b. The right of nations weak or strong to equality in law. 

c. The rights of ethical and religious minorities, 

d. The right to guarantees agaiust an offensive return of mili- 
tarism, adjustment of frontiers, military neutralization of certain 
zones, internationalization of certain means of communication, 
liberty of the seas, etc . . . 

III. Financial Prollems : 

Determination of the financial responsibility of the enemy in 
accordance with the rights of pillages and devastated regions : 

a. Restitutions. 

b. Reparations. 

c. Guarantees of payment endorsed by an international 
organization. 

IV. Economic Problems : 

Establishment of a system which shall ensure for the time being 
to those nations which have suffered most from the aggression of 
the enemy equitable guarantees to be secured by an international 
control of 

a. Exports. 

b. Imports. 

c. Ocean freights 

and preparing for the future 

a. An economic basis for international relations. 

b. Economic penalties to be enforced by the League of Nations 
for the maintenance of Peace. 

V. Promotion of the League of Nations -. 

Once these three types of problems have been solved in the order 
and in accordance with the principles stated above the two aims to 
be achieved will have been attained together. 

a. The war will have been put an end to. 

b. The principal foundations of the League of Nations will be 
laid. 

It will then remain to : 

a. Provide for the League's maintenance. 

b. Codify such measures resulting from the guiding principles 
stated in the first paragraph, which may not have been covered by 
the treaty clauses dealing with territorial, financial and economic 



90 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

problems (for instance open diplomacy, arbitrary and interna- 
tional organization, etc. , . ) 

II 

PROPOSED ORDER FOR EXAMINATION OF 
TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS 

Among the territorial and political problems, distinction must 
be made between : 

Those which must be solved first. 

Those whose solution is only secondary, because facilitated by 
rulings made on the first. 

Those for the solution of which delay is preferable. 

Taking the above into account, the examination might proceed 
in the following order. 

I. Territorial Settlement with Germany. 

This is the essential problem dominating all others and its solu- 
tion will react upon the entire rulings of the Treaty. 

The French Government has already drawn up a preliminary 
proposal on this matter stating the principles, which might serve 
as a point of departure for the discussions of the powers. 

A general clause will contain Germany's preliminary accept- 
ance of rulings to be fixed later by the Allies and all the other 
states. 

II. Organization of Central Europe : 

Questions presented by the disappearance of Austria-Hungary 
and the Constitution of different States resulting from the former 
double monarchy. 

a. Kecognized States 
Poland 
Bohemia 

b. States in formation 
Jugo Slavia 
Magyars 
German Austria 

III. Oriental Questions: 

a. Liberation of nationalities oppressed by the former Otto- 
man Empire: 

Armenia 
Syria and Cicilia 
Arab States 
Palestine 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 91 

b. The question of Constantinople is a separate matter. 

c. Delimitation of the frontiers of the Ottoman State. 

The maintenance of a Turkish State is justified by the existence 
of a population mostly Turkish in the western and central portions 
of the peninsular of Asia Minor. This population desires to be 
governed by a national government and the principles of the Allies 
oblige them to take into account the expressed wish of the people. 

IV. Status of the Balkan Peoples : 

Frontiers of Bulgaria, Roumania, Greece and Serbia. This is 
one of the most complicated questions and a subject of the keenest 
controversy. It would seem preferable to deal with it after the 
settlement of the great German, Austrian and Oriental problems 
the settlement of which will clear away some of the difficulties and 
give the Powers greater freedom of action. 

V. Russian Problems: 

By dealing with this last, the nationalities will be given time to 
organize at least partially, to make known their wishes under more 
normal conditions and to proceed to the necessary agreements 
between the various ethical groups. 

The variety of subjects calling for the attention of the 
heads of the delegations and the instinctive repugnance of 
the Anglo-Saxons to the systematized constructions of the 
Latin mind prevented the adoption of our proposal which 
only partially served to direct the order of work. The 
Conference created its various organizations one after the 
other instead of building them all up beforehand. Perhaps 
it was a mistake, but in any case France was not to blame. 
At the end of a very few weeks the whole organization was 
moving. I simply indicate its main outlines, 

I. Executive Bodies : 

a. A general Secretariat 

b. A supervising Committee of the Powers 

c. A drafting Committee 

II. Commissions and Committees -. 
League of Nations 

Responsibilities for the war and penalties with three sub- 
committees 

a. Criminal acts 

b. Responsibility for the war 



92 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

c. Responsibility for violations of the rules and customs 
of war * 

Reparations for damages with three sub-committees 

a. Valuation of damages 

b. Capacity" and means of payment 

c. Measures of security and guarantees 
International labour legislation 

International regulation of ports, waterways and railways with 
two sub-committees 

a. Transit problems 

b. River labours and railway regulations 
Financial questions with five sub-committees 

a. Immediate requirements 

b. Currency questions 

c. Enemy debts 

d. Inter-allied problems and plans of the financial section of 
the League of Nations 

e. Payment of Austrian-Hungarian coupons 
Economic question with nine sub-committees 

a. Permanent commercial relations 

b. Customs regulations, taxes and restrictions 

c. Navigation 

d. Unfair competition 

e. Industrial ownership 

f. Pre-war contracts 

g. Liquidation of enemy stocks. 

h. Foreign (former enemy) nations 
i. Abrogation and renewal of treaties. 
Aeronautics with three sub -committees 

a. Military sub -commission 

b. Technical sub-commission 

c. Legal commercial and financial sub-commission 
Central committee on territorial questions 
Committee on Alsace-Lorraine 

Committee on the Sarre Basin 

Commission of Czecho-Slovakian affairs 

Commission of Polish affairs with two sub-committees 

a. Inter-allied mission to Poland 

b. Commission of Teschen 

Commission of Roumanian and Jugo-Slav affairs 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 93 

Commission of Greek and Albanian affairs 

Commission of Belgian and Danish affairs 

Commission of Colonial affairs 

Commission of sub-marine cable matters 

Drafting Committee for military, naval and aerial clauses 

Inter- Allied Military and Naval Committee 

Supreme Economic Council with six sections 

a. Blockade 

b. Finance 

c. Raw materials 

d. Ocean freights 

e. Food supplies 

f. Means of communication 

These fifty-eight groups included in addition to the 
plenipotentiaries and the heads of Government depart- 
ments, men representing every type of human activity, 
lawyers, financiers, historians, manufacturers, business 
men, administrators, professors, journalists, soldiers and 
sailors who brought a wide personal experience to every 
problem along with the results of the preliminary studies 
in which nearly all of them had participated. These com- 
missions, albeit organized as occasion demanded from day 
to day, responded none the less to the requirements of effi- 
cient organization. A very large amount of work, in com- 
mittee meetings and in reports, was furnished by them. On 
every question a scrupulously fair hearing was given to 
all interested parties as often as they desired. More than 
fifteen hundred committee meetings were held, often sup- 
plemented by local investigations. It is the conscientious 
effort of these men that Mr. Keynes has sought to ridicule 
in his book on the Conference. ''The poisonous morass of 
Paris," to cite but one of the least violent of his epithets, 
has naught to fear from his invective. Rarely was a politi- 
cal undertaking more honestly and more scrupulously 
prepared. I may add that despite the heat of certain de- 
bates all those who took part in it have retained one for 
another a great mutual esteem, the esteem of men of good 
faith and good will who in **a great adventure," as Mr. 



94 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

House used to say, had dedicated their minds and their 
hearts to the most difficult of tasks.* 

Complaint has been made, that on some points, and not 
the least important, the recommendations of the Commis- 
sions were not adopted by the heads of Governments. That 
is true. But could it possibly have been otherwise? Here 
again I appeal to realities. The peace was a political 
structure built by political bodies, known as nations. Be- 
sides it was the Peace — that is to say a work of harmony 
following on a period of strife. Two consequences resulted 
therefrom, consequences too easily forgotten now that the 
danger is passed. The first was that technical considera- 
tions had sometimes to give way, when the time came for 
decision, to considerations of general policy over which 
the experts had no control. The second was that to reach 
decision unanimity was necessary. The Peace Conference 
was not a deliberative assembly in which a majority could 
carry disputed points. Its conclusions, whatever they 
were, called for the agreement of all. This agreement 
could only be reached by sacrifices freely consented by 
each. Does anyone realize the immense difficulty of attain- 



*I shall not waste time in this book on the insults addressed by Mr. 
Keynes to France, her representatives and her policy. I confine myself to 
noting once for all that this writer, whose contentions do not withstand exam- 
ination in the light of the facts here set forth, condemns himself both by the 
violence of his words and the contradiction of his acts. The violence of his 
words? Here are a few samples: "Nightmare; empty and arid intrigue; 
puppet-show; Carthaginian peace; the hot and poisoned atmosphere of Paris; 
the treacherous halls of Paris; the moi-ass of Paris; insincerity; systematic 
destruction; Germany's outlawry; spoliation; imperial aggrandisements; 
ridiculous and injurious provisions; the policy of reducing Germany to servi- 
tude for a generation, of degrading the lives of millions of human beings, of 
depriving a whole nation of happiness; a destructive blow at the so-called 
international law; some preach in the name of justice; cavern; sophistry and 
Jesuitical exegesis; dishonourable to the Allies in the light of their professions; 
dishonesty; the grossest spectacle; food for the cynic; imbecile and senseless 
greed; unvcracity; crushing policy; policy of pretence; so contorted, so miser- 
able negotiation; shame; false statement, breach of engagements and of inter- 
national morality comparable with the invasion of Belgium; one of the most 
outrageous acts of a cruel victor in civilised history. ' ' When a man is right he 
does not write thus. As to Mr. Keynes' acts I will merely say this: "Mr. 
Keynes was attached as an expert to the British delegation up to June 9, 1919, 
that is to say for six months. Long before this date the Treaty drawn up with 
his collaboration contained all the features for which he has since criticized it 
so virulently. So he would have been better inspired if he had resigned a few 
months sooner instead of abusing to the end the confidence of those he was 
preparing to insult." 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 95 

ing indispensable agreement? In my district just outside 
Paris there is a bridge built in the days of tolls. To do 
away with this irksome tithe only the consent of the two 
communes interested in the traffic is necessary; and yet 
for twenty years it has been sought in vain. For results 
to be attained from the work of the Conference it was 
necessary that on every question the greatest nations of 
the world should arrive at substantial accord. The mere 
statement of this condition gives the measure of the 
difficulty. 

These men, whose unanimity was demanded by circum- 
stances, represented nations separated by centuries of his- 
tory. Great Britain and France, to mention but these, had 
been at war between 1688 and 1815 for sixty-one years out 
of a hundred and twenty-seven. All the others had each 
in its own country and in its own interest lived different 
lives which had given birth to conflicting interests. Im- 
mediate conflicts reduced to figures in economic and finan- 
cial problems where one could not have more unless the 
other had less. Other conflicts, less immediate but far 
deeper, in public morals where the diversity of traditions 
had given birth to widely divergent conceptions and to 
irreconcilable contradictions of feeling and of thought. It 
was the dead of ages speaking and they did not all speak 
the same language. M. Clemenceau and those who helped 
him direct the negotiations for France had personal expe- 
rience of this dangerous divergence of national tempera- 
ments. He characterized it in these words, which I 
reproduce : 

The state of mind of our Allies is not necessarily the same as 
our own, and when we are not in agreement with them, it is unjust 
to blame those who do not succeed in convincing them or to blame 
them for evil intentions which are not in their hearts. 

What are you going to do about it? Each of us lives encased 
in his own past. Auguste Comte said that we live dead men's lives 
and it is true. 

We are encased by the past which holds us in its grip, and spurs 
us forward to new efforts. Neither an Englishman, nor I, nor 



96 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

anyone will cast off his liistorial way of seeing things and of think- 
ing because he has contracted a temporary alliance with a foreign 
country. 

... I had to do with these difficulties during the war. Take 
unity of command. Unity of command was achieved by several 
stages. Everj^body did his bit. But the difficulty of bringing 
unity of command into being was much less than the difficulty of 
making it work, and that because of the different states of mind I 
have just mentioned. 

The Peace Conference has only inherited states of mind from 
the various conferences of Versailles and from the meetings which 
preceded it. 

How can a man be expected to renounce his past when he is 
sacrificing the blood of his countrymen to uphold it ? 

Men retain their virtues and their faults together. You must 
take them as they are. They are what they are. They have a past 
as we have a past. As far as I am concerned, merely because they 
differ from me even on very serious questions, I do not feel called 
upon to break with them as has been suggested. 

There is the master difficulty. One could not break off. . . or 
only in such a manner that public opinion would immediately and 
unanimously lay the blame on those who broke of f . . . 

... It is said that when one is French, the right thing is to say, 
"I demand," and if the others refuse, to break; it was also said, 
"The right thing is to go before Parliament." 

A fine reception I should have had, and how right Parliament 
would have been to receive me ill. 

There should be no surprise at the resistance we have encoun- 
tered. The one said or thought, "I am English"; the other 
thought, "I am American." Each had as much right to say so as 
we had to say we are French. Sometimes it is true, they made me 
suffer cruelly. But such discussions must be entered into not with 
the idea of breaking off, or smashing the serving tables and the 
china as was Napoleon's wont, but with the idea of making one's 
self understood. 

That is why those who had the responsibility, and there- 
fore the authority, gradually made such concessions as 
were necessary to final agreement. That is why the recom- 
mendations of commissions — some of which besides had 
not succeeded in reaching unanimity — were sometimes 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 97 

brushed aside. France, I have the right to recall it, almost 
always supported the opinions of the experts. At the same 
time no country did more than France to pave the way for 
the necessary agreements. Technical preparations, politi- 
cal unanimity, these were the two poles between which the 
Conference revolved. There were deviations from one to 
the other. The straight line was not always followed. Let 
him who could have done better, cast the first stone ! The 
truth is that on the one hand the essential factors were 
studied with a care not to be found in any of the great 
Congresses of history; and on the other that the decisions 
based thereon, when debated, were dominated by a spirit of 
harmony inherited by peace from war — that the sacrifices 
made were honourable concessions to the common purpose. 
On the one hand the commissions' laborious workshops 
where the materials were produced and stored ; on the other, 
the ''Big Four" — a mysterious Power used to scare popu- 
lar credulity and who only exercised however the legal 
authority mth w^hich the nations had invested them. There 
is the Conference of Paris. 

For the convenience of controversy, the story was widely 
circulated of the most formidable Treaty in history hur- 
riedly improvised and thrown together by four fallible and 
ill-informed men, closeted in a dark room, imposing upon 
the world their w^him as law. The time has come to meet 
this fable with the facts. The Treaty was studied, prepared 
and discussed for six long months by fifty-eight technical 
commissions on which sat the foremost specialists of each 
country which held 1,646 meetings. The conclusions of these 
commissions, verified by twenty-six local investigations, 
were discussed from January 10 to June 28 by three bod- 
ies : the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs which held 
thirty-nine meetings ; the Council of Ten wliich held seventy- 
two meetings and the Council of Four which held one 
hundred and forty-five meetings. These three councils 
also gave hearings to the chairmen of the technical com- 
missions, and all the representatives of Allied or neutral 
countries interested. Finally when at the beginning of 



98 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

May, the texts were settled upon, the cabinets of the varions 
Powers were called into consultation. 

Such were the general conditions of the work of the 
Conference. I come now to the conditions in which its 
decisions were arrived at ; that is to say to the very origin 
of this unprecedented Treaty which, after fifty-two months 
of war, restored peace to the world, 

III 

I have just mentioned the various groups who made 
these decisions: Council of Foreign Ministers, Council of 
Ten, Council of Four. Why so many! Why so interlock- 
ing? The former a question of procedure, the latter a 
question of principle. Both need answer. 

And first of all why did not all the Powers summoned 
to Paris take part in the elaboration of the Peace? There 
were twenty-seven Allied Powers and four Enemy Powers. 
The admission of the latter to the preparatory discussions 
was not even suggested. There remained the Allies. 
Could they all be asked to sit? Evidently not. First be- 
cause it would have been a regular parliament, the debates 
of which would have been interminable ; then also because 
the positions of the various countries were not equal. The 
Big Nations have been accused of thrusting the smaller 
ones aside. But not to mention those who, without any 
act of war, had merely broken off diplomatic relations with 
Germany, nor those who, having declared war, had fur- 
nished no military effort, could it be maintained that, in 
the difficult work of giving expression to victory, the 
right of initiative should not be in some measure dependent 
upon the sacrifices made? Among the victors some had 
given everything, their soil, their blood, their treasure, not 
only to defend their own liberties but to win liberty for 
others. These latter on the contrary, despite the endurance 
of long sufferings, owed their resurrection entirely to 
the former. A classification was thus essential, and how 
can one challenge the justice of the distinction made, by a 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 99 

protocol pregnant with reality, between the Powers of gen- 
eral and those of restricted interest 1 It enhanced the clear- 
ness and moderation of the debates. Moreover it was only 
just. Those who had borne the fearful burden of war were 
entitled to the privilege of determining, in accordance with 
the war aims accepted by all and in the interest of all, the 
general lines of the peace. M. Clemenceau at the second 
plenary sitting of the Conference, January 25, 1919, 
dealt with the question frankly on the occasion of a discus- 
sion on the composition of the commissions. 

''Sir Robert Borden," he said, ''head of the Canadian 
delegation, has in very friendly manner reproached the 
Great Powers Avith having made the decision. Yes, we 
decided in the matter of the commissions; as we decided 
to call the present Conference ; and as we decided to invite 
the representatives of interested nations. 

"I make no secret of it. A Conference of the Great 
Powers is being held in an adjoining room. The Five Great 
Powers whose action it is desired should be justified before 
you to-day, are in a position to furnish that justification. 

"A few moments ago, the Prime Minister of Great 
Britain reminded me that the day the war came to a close, 
the principal Allies had twelve million soldiers fighting on 
the fields of battle. That is a title. 

"We have lost, killed and wounded, by millions, and if 
we had not had present to our minds the great question 
of the League of Nations, we might have been selfishly 
led to consult ourselves alone. Who can say that we should 
not have been justified? 

"Such was not our wish. We called together the en- 
tire assembly of the interested nations. We called them 
together not to impose our will upon them, not to make 
them do that which they do not want, but to ask their 
cooperation. That is why we invited them here. Yet we 
must ascertain how this cooperation is to be organized. 

"Experience has taught me that the more numerous 
committees are, the less chance there is of getting things 
done. Now, behind us stands a very great, very august, 



100 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

and at times very imperious force called public opinion. 
It will not ask us if such or such a state was represented 
on such or such a commission. That is of no interest to 
anybody. Public opinion will ask us what Ave have done. 
It is my duty to direct our work so that we may get things 
done." 

Thus ordered, the Conference deprived no one of the 
right of being heard. All the countries represented, no 
matter how small, participated in the labours of the com- 
missions, either as members or as witnesses. All were 
heard by the Great Powers, and the number of these hear- 
ings exceeds three hundred. But the direction of the work 
remained in the hands of those who had won the war. It 
was thus that on January 12, 1919, the body known as the 
Council of Ten met ; it was composed of the heads of Gov- 
ernments and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the United 
States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan. This 
Council sat twice daily from January 12 to March 24, deal- 
ing both Avith the peace and with such urgent problems 
of world politics as could not be left unsolved : application 
and renewals of the Armistice, food supplies for Europe; 
Russian affairs. The Council listened to the claims of the 
small nations. It settled the clauses of the disarmament of 
Germany. That having been done, it suddenly realized 
that six weeks had passed, that the end was not yet in sight 
and that with its ten members assisted by several dozen 
experts no headway was being made. Little by little every- 
body had got into the habit of making speeches. Matters 
were constantly being adjourned. That perfect frankness 
essential to obtain results was difficult in the presence of 
so large an audience. When anything leaked out, each del- 
egation blamed the other for it. These were the reasons — 
and there was none other — why it was decided to narrow 
the circle. Thus the Council of Four, increased to five when 
the Japanese delegate was present, was formed and it was 
assisted in some of the less important matters by the Coun- 
cil of Five made up of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 
To what obscure manoeuvres has the formation of these 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 101 

two committees not been attributed? I have given the real 
reasons. They are self-sufficient. 

This was the heroic period of the Conference; by rea- 
son both of the importance of the problems under discus- 
sion and of the extraordinary intensity of the effort put 
forth. From March 24 to May 7, the whole Treaty was put 
into shape: territorial, financial, economic and colonial 
clauses alike. Every morning and every afternoon, the 
four men met together, usually on the ground floor of the 
Hotel Bischoffsheim. In the garden an American "dough- 
boy" stood sentry, wearing the insignia of the Conference, 
white scales on a blue ground. At other times the meetings 
were held at the Ministry of War in M. Clemenceau's dark 
and comfortless office. Habit had created its own laws. 
In the afternoon each man took the same seat he had o^u- 
pied in the morning. Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary of 
the British War Cabinet, and Professor Mantoux, head in- 
terpreter of the French delegation, were the only others 
present. The plenipotentiaries and the experts came only 
from time to time. The tone was conversational. Neither 
pomp nor pose. Signor Orlando spoke but little; Italy's 
interest in the Conference was far too much confined to 
the question of Fiume, and her share in the debates was 
too limited as a result. It resolved itself into a three- 
cornered conversation between Wilson, Clemenceau and 
Lloyd George — an amazing contrast of the three most 
widely different natures that it is possible to conceive. 
Always sincere and straightforward, these interviews were 
at times almost tragic in their solemn simplicity and would 
then relax into something approaching gaiety when agree- 
ment was in sight. History will record with approval that 
even in the most difficult hours the **Four" always spoke 
the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. 

I shared their life too closely to be able to judge them. 
Who better than I knows their shortcomings? I have no 
taste to blame them; for I saw them give the very best of 
their great minds to their task, and what more can one ask ? 
I have no right to praise them. I shall but try to redress, 



102 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TEEATY 

in as few words as may be, the wrong done by the out- 
rageous pen of a subordinate and disgruntled employee. I 
shall brush aside the legend that one of these three men 
hoodwinked the others. In France it has been said that 
Clemenceau was the dupe of "Wilson and of Lloyd George ; 
in the United States that Wilson was the plaything of 
Lloyd George, and in England Mr. Keynes has written that 
M. Clemenceau turned the trick alone. This childish and 
contradictory explanation, convenient to politicians, must 
be abandoned. The exaggerated honour or the insult which 
it implies to the three leaders must be repudiated. The 
truth is that from the first day to the last, with a deep 
desire to reach agreement, the discussion proceeded foot 
by foot. I have already explained why. 

The discussion between men whose national and individ- 
ual temperaments were utterly opposed was naturally 
exceedingly keen. President Wilson discussed like a col- 
lege professor criticizing a thesis, sitting bolt upright in 
his armchair, inclining his head at times towards his 
advisers, developing his views with the abundant clearness 
of a didactic logician. Mr. Lloyd George argued like a 
sharp-shooter, with sudden bursts of cordial approval and 
equally frequent gusts of anger, with a wealth of brilliant 
imagination and copious historical reminiscences ; clasping 
his knee in his hands, he sat near the fireplace, wrapped in 
the utmost indifference to technical arguments, irresistibly 
attracted to unlooked-for solutions, but dazzling with elo- 
quence and wit, moved only by higher appeals to perma- 
nent bonds of friendship, and ever fearful of parliamentary 
consequences. As for M. Clemenceau, his part in the discus- 
sion was thoroughly typical and in very many instances 
his views prevailed. His arguments instead of being pre- 
sented by deductive reasoning like those of Mr. Wilson or 
of exploding incidentally like those of Mr. Lloyd George — 
proceeded by assertions weighty, rough-hewn and insistent, 
but clothed with gentle words that did him credit and 
refulgent with emotion which at times was overpowering. 
Mr. Keynes has had the face to find fault with him for 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 103 

seeking first of all to place France beyond the reach of 
German aggression: it is the criticism of a man who has 
understood nothing of the history of Europe during the 
past fifty years and whose insular egoism cannot grasp 
what invasion means. 

This period of history is closed. Most of the men who 
dominated it are retired. This gives me the greater free- 
dom to say that the lesson of the war was not lost upon 
them, that despite their deep differences of opinion they 
were animated by an all-powerful unity of purpose, by a 
spirit of real understanding. "We entered here united," 
M. Clemenceau used to say, **we must leave here brothers." 
France and her spokesman did all they could to bring this 
about. They had a hard time of it. To give effect by 
common agreement to the essential bases of peace — resti- 
tution, reparation and guarantees — what toil and labour 
therein lay! Complete harmony crowned their work with 
success. It is easy to pretend that the policy of France was 
a ''punic" policy: the mark of the beast is upon our devas- 
tated region and tells on which side were the Carthagin- 
ians. It is easy to taunt President Wilson with having 
adapted his principles to the pressing demands of reality, 
although as a matter of fact they were not his principles 
alone but the principles of all of us and not one of them 
was violated : this brand of sarcasm comes from those who 
in the solitary seclusion of their firesides build in their own 
minds an imaginary world from which living, suffering and 
achieving humanity is arbitrarily banished. It is easy to 
make capital out of Mr. Lloyd George 's contradictions : no 
one has suffered more from them than France. But in 
justice it must be added that in the most serious times those 
who knew how to talk to the British Prime Mnister could 
always bring him back to fundamental principles. The 
infinite sensitiveness of his mind, his passionate love of 
success, led him to improvise arguments which did not al- 
ways bear examination or were too exclusively pro-British. 
But when a man who enjoyed his respect answered the 
bold suggestions of his quick brain with those permanent 



104i THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

truths which he had momentarily deserted, he came back 
to them when the time arrived for final decision. These 
three men, for whom needless to say I have not the same 
personal feeling, forced upon me the same conviction about 
them all ; the conviction that in their unheard-of task they 
managed to maintain and make even closer the bonds that 
bind our three countries, the breaking of which would spell 
disaster to civilization. They only did so with great dif- 
ficulty. In their search for essential unanimity, they some- 
times discovered that they neither knew one another well 
nor understood one another fully. Nevertheless they 
reached agreement, and reached it by open, straight and 
honest paths. This I assert, and I assert it because I was 
there and others who have said the contrary were not. 
And then there were minor criticisms. Fault was found 
that the Council of Four had no official secretariat. In 
the first place, all its decisions were minutely recorded. In 
the second, bureaucratic paper-mongers nearly cost us the 
war. Later on, in 1920, they nearly compassed the ' ' sabot- 
age" of the Peace. Thanks are due to those who discussed 
things freely Avithout thought of protecting themselves by 
and with a set of minutes ! Fault has been found with the 
time spent in discussion. The Conference of Paris began 
on January 12, 1919. The Treaty was in the hands of the 
Germans on the seventh of May. It was signed on June 28. 
There is no instance in history of a work of this magnitude 
accomplished so rapidly. The Congress of Vienna lasted 
fifteen months; the Congress of Westphalia five years, — 
and in each case the task was less. If my personal experi- 
ence of the negotiations has left any regret in my mind, it 
is that at times things were done too quickly. Fault has 
been found that, contrary to diplomatic tradition, the 
Treaty of Peace was built without the classic propylaeum 
of a preliminary treaty. Perhaps it would have been bet- 
ter if a summary treaty had followed close upon the Armis- 
tice. This is what the French delegates had at first 
proposed. Circumstances made it impossible. These pre- 
liminaries could have been signed neither before the 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 105 

fifteenth of February when Mr. Wilson left for "Washing- 
ton and Mr. Lloyd George for London, nor during the 
absence of M. Clemenceau who was wounded by an assassin 
on the twenty-first. When everybody met again on March 
15, the progress made by the commissions justified the 
hope that the work would soon be" finished, as it was in 
fact six weeks later when the Treaty was ready, and the 
idea of preliminaries was abandoned. It was also aban- 
doned for two other reasons. The first was that a pre- 
liminary, that is to say a provisional and incomplete Peace 
would have encouraged the already active campaign for 
immediate demobilization which everybody realized was 
both necessary and dangerous. The second was that Pres- 
ident Wilson, anxious to have only one draft and not two 
to submit to the U. S. Senate and desiring also not to 
dissociate the ratification of the Peace from the ratifica- 
tion of the League of Nations, insistently urged the aban- 
donment of preliminaries and the immediate preparation 
of the final Treaty of Peace. The ratification of the Treaty 
by the U. S. Senate was a matter of so many and such 
keen apprehensions to the European Powers, that they did 
not even think of disregarding on a question of procedure 
the formal desire of the President of the United States. 
That is why the preliminaries were abandoned and the 
final treaty prepared. 

Fault has also been found with the four heads of Gov- 
ermnents who have been accused of assuming a task which 
was not theirs, and having thus delayed the settlement. 
''The Armistice was signed on November 11," say these 
critics, ''and the Conference did not begin until January 12, 
two months later. If delegates had been chosen who were 
neither heads of States nor Prime Ministers, if it had not 
been necessary to wait first for Mr. Wilson who was 
obliged to prepare for his departure and then for Mr. Lloyd 
George who was held up by his elections, two months would 
have been gained." Does anyone really believe that the 
private conversations of the month of December were not 



106 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

of importance?* Does anyone really believe that without 
them certain of the French claims which were opposed by 
the British delegation would have found that moral sup- 
port in American quarters which ensured their ultimate 
success? But above all does anyone really believe that it 
would have been possible to do the work that had to be 
done except by those who had full responsibility and 
sovereign power of decision? Would the ablest and most 
distinguished of officials been equal to it? This question 
can be answered by experience. Half of the commissions 
when they really got to the heart of the problems they 
were asked to solve, hesitated to make decisions of principle 
which it was perfectly evident could only be taken by the 
heads of Governments. 

Beyond doubt — and fault was found with them for this 
also — the fact that they were the heads of Government 
obliged the men who made the peace to give part of their 
time to the current affairs of Europe and of the world. 
There was nothing to do about it ; and besides does anyone 
really believe that these current affairs, all closely Knked 



*In connection with these preliminary discussions in December, 1918, it is 
only right to destroy a legend which has found almost as many believers as 
that of "peace was possible in 1917" and which is quite as untrue. I refer to 
the so-called deal said to have been made in London between Mr. Wilson and 
Mr. Lloyd George, the former giving up "Freedom of the Seas" in exchange 
for British support of the League of Nations. It is a fabrication, pure and 
simple. "Eomanciug, " as M. Clemenceau said. There was not in London in 
December, 1918, any deal or negotiation on the subject of the "Freedom of the 
Seas." Mr. Wilson held that with the League of Nations established there 
would be no more neutrals and that the problem of neutrality discussed for 
centuries in connection with the Freedom of the Seas no longer arose and 
could not arise.. The President of the United States moreover made a public 
statement on this subject in the spring of 1919. Besides agreement was com- 
plete between the three heads of the Governments of the United States, of 
France and of Great Britain on the subject of the decisive services rendered 
by the naval power of Great Britain. M. Clemenceau said so plainly on Sep- 
tember 26, 1919, in the Chamber of Deputies in the following words: "Mr. 
Lloyd George said to me: 'Do you admit that without the British fleet you 
could not have continued the war?' And I answered: 'Yes.' Mr. Lloyd 
George had added: 'Are you disposed to prevent us in case of war doing the 
same thing again?' And I answered: 'No.' Well now I repeated this 
conversation to President Wilson. It did not in the least disturb him. Pres- 
ident Wilson answered me: 'I have nothing to ask you which could displease 
or embarrass either of you. ' ' ' Already then Mr. Wilson was convinced that the 
League of Nations by itself sufficed to solve the problem. Mr. House in a 
letter of October, 1920, was so kind as to confirm that no negotiation what- 
ever took place on this subject in Loudon at the end of 1918. 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 107 

with the peace itself, did not gain from being administered 
by the men who were working on the peace ? Europe kept 
on living. Her life was hard indeed, beset with material 
and moral difficulties. These difficulties could not wait. 
The food supply of Europe had to be provided for with- 
out delay; political and national conflicts had to be settled 
forthwith; special bodies to deal with these matters — ^like 
the Armistice Coimnission at Spa, and the Supreme 
Economic Council, — had to be created and directed and 
supervised. No one but the heads of Governments could 
do all this. It took time but it saved time also. What 
would have happened if they had not done it ? What would 
have happened if famine had been allowed to decimate 
Germany and Poland ? Wliat would have happened if revo- 
lution in Hungary, in Bavaria and elsewhere had been 
allowed to run its course unheeded? So really there was 
no alternative. Had these realities been laid aside for the 
exclusive preparation of the Treaty, the peace would have 
been delayed and compromised. Theorists may deplore 
the *' super-government" set up in Paris in 1919 to their 
hearts' content. It was a necessity. 

Such the work of the Four. France may well be proud 
of the part she played, ever firm and friendly. No one 
has ever stated that the methods adopted were all perfect. 
But that they were adequate to a tremendous task, is 
proved by the results. It was cheap and easy to caricature 
this immense undertaking to suit one 's own purposes. The 
truth stands by itself. I am trying to tell it here. 

IV 

I have perhaps waited too long to tell it. It would have 
been better to have spoken earlier. Another of the faults 
found with the Conference of Paris was that it surrounded 
itself with mystery. I am inclined to the belief that, in this 
respect, a mistake was really made. I hold that the Con- 
ference was weakened by its aloofness. Here again I feel 
impelled, even though I might prefer otherwise, to relate 
exactly how this came about. 



108 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TEEATY 

The representatives • of the Powers, great and small, 
arrived in Paris in December, 1919. An impressive array 
of journalists accompanied them; more than three hun- 
dred from the United States alone. The Press, thus 
mobilized, had tremendous expectations. Were not the 
events of yesterday and of to-morrow of unprecedented 
importance; had not the fullest publicity been promised? 
Did not the first of the Fourteen Points explicitly accept- 
ed by all the Powers as the basis of the peace, read: ''Open 
covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there 
shall be no private international understandings of any 
kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in 
the public view." Before negotiations even began, the 
Conference backed water. The President of the United 
States — ^he said it himself — ^had never intended open nego- 
tiations but only open debates upon all decisions arrived 
at before the latter became final. There was no question 
of full publicity of the negotiations. The first care of the 
Conference in organizing its relations with the Press was 
to strike an even balance between the need for silence and 
the need for news. 

At once — as early as January 12 — M. Clemenceau who 
had supported the creation of the Press Club of the 
Champs-Elysees to facilitate the work of the newspaper 
men took his stand. 

''There is a general expectation and wish by the public 
that all the subjects of our discussion shall be published. 
We have the greatest interest in showing the public the 
results of our work." 

Right then and before agreement had even been reached 
on an official text, the difficulties began which for six 
months grew and multiplied as one incident followed an- 
other. The Conference was held in Paris. If it had not 
been, the French Government would have been accused of 
not properly defending our rights. Because it was held 
in Paris, the position of France was singularly delicate. 
A distinguished member of the Allied Press said to me 
one dav: 



THE PEACE CONFEEENCE 109 

*'We are your guests. Whenever the Press is not satis- 
fied, it will put the blame on you." 

This was true of the Press. It was also true of all the 
men who were making the Peace. They felt that the hos- 
pitality extended to them by France entitled them to special 
protection. A hundred times prior to the signature of 
Peace from the greatest to the last, they showed this 
spirit. The Censorship made things worse. M. Clemen- 
ceau on assuming office in November, 1917, had said: *'No 
censorship of articles ; they may attack me as much as they 
like" — a right of which full advantage was taken — *'but 
suppression of news dangerous to the interior and exterior 
security of France." Our Allies never understood this 
distinction. Need I add that, if they were usually indif- 
ferent to false news, items against which we could take 
action, they were unduly sensitive to criticisms and 
malicious attacks against which we were powerless. 

On January 15 the first friction arises. Mr. Lloyd 
George complains of insinuations published in certain 
French newspapers. President Wilson goes even further 
and although representing a country in which censorship 
had been abolished immediately following the Armistice, 
asks that the French censorship should be exercised not 
only over the French newspapers but also over despatches 
sent to foreign papers. M. Clemenceau opposes a friendly 
refusal and the next day, as a hint for forbearance, lays 
upon the table an extract from the New York Tribune even 
more lacking in exactness and courtesy. Such incidents re- 
appeared frequently. Towards the end of March, following 
the publication of articles in VEcho de Paris, le Journal 
and le Temps, Mr. Lloyd George indignantly denounced 
these *4eaks" and demanded condign punishment. He 
added : 

*'If this kind of thing is to go on, I shall cease to take 
part in the work of the Conference." 

M. Clemenceau, it may be contended, had but to take 
him at his word. But what would have been said if, with 
Germany looking on, the head of the French Government 



110 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

had failed to smooth over incidents of this kind, or had 
displayed that *' impulsiveness" for which he was always 
being criticized when he was not being accused of 
"weakness"! 

The reasons which led to the strict limitation of news 
given to the Press during the discussions of January, 1919, 
deserve to be known. The French Government — wliich suf- 
fered most from an ill-informed Press which honestly gave 
currency to the criminal statements of a dishonest Press — 
was the last to underrate the importance of these reasons. 
In the first place the members of the Conference had to 
accomplish their unprecedented task under the very eyes 
of the enemy — for an armistice is not peace. The elabora- 
tion of a treaty after a war which had brought seventy 
million men to grips and cost twelve hundred thousand 
miilions, the elaboration of a treaty between twenty-seven 
nations on one side and four on the other was not so simple 
as it is the fashion to pretend now that the work is done. 
Any false step might have led to disaster, might have in- 
creased the difficulties between the Allies and Germany. 
Any indiscretion might have been made capital of in Berlin 
as in Paris, might have prolonged a task wliich all were 
ready to criticize as too slow, might have jeopardized, if 
not the result, at least the speed of its accomplishment. 
Besides — and Mr. Lloyd George's remarks on this subject 
were irrefutable — the aim of the negotiations was agree- 
ment between the Allies. How many historical differences 
— as M. Clemenceau so clearly explained to the French 
Parliament — made this agreement difficult; not as far as 
principles were concerned but in matters of interpretation 
and application. 

*'If the Press," said Mr. Lloyd George, ** intervenes in 
the early stages of the negotiations, it will crystallize 
opinions and agreement will be made more difficult. ' ' 

This agreement, I repeat, could not be reached by a 
vote of the majority, — unanimity was necessary; as it had 
been in the inter-allied councils of war where final deci- 
sions were reached by gradual adjustment and would have 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 111 

been impossible if the exchange of views had been paralyzed 
by publication from time to time. Unanimity was neces- 
sary so that to the very last moment everyone might re- 
main free to modify or develop his thought without closing 
the door to mutual concessions from which only agreement 
could come. Finally to admit the Press to the development 
of the negotiations would have been to admit politics; it 
would have been to furnish, week by week, materials for 
parliamentary questions on the formative stages of the 
work of the Conference ; it would have been to add the fuel 
of parliamentary controversy to the flame of Conference 
discussions. Mr. Lloyd George, although his majority in 
December had been overwhelming, first called attention to 
this danger. M. Clemenceau, although he had received 
many votes of confidence, knew to what extent national 
problems would be used by some for political ends. Mr; 
Wilson, since the fifth of November, had been in a minority 
in his own Congress. Here again the highest interests of 
the negotiations counselled prudence. This view was 
adopted by the heads of Governments. 

After a few meetings, a line of action was settled upon. 
On January 16, it was decided to consult the newspaper- 
men themselves who very naturally asked to be admitted 
everywhere. But on the seventeenth, it was decided to 
admit them only to the plenary sittings, it being under- 
stood that the discussions between the Great Powers were 
merely conversations and that the sittings in which the 
smaller Powers took part were private. The same day, an 
appeal was made to the patience of the Press in an eloquent 
statement which forcefully epitomized the above argu- 
ments. On the other hand the members of the delega- 
tions were requested not to furnish newspapermen with any 
information. The communique issued by the Secretariat 
would alone be official. The die was cast .... The Confer- 
ence was to continue its weighty task surrounded by the 
indifference or the hostility of the Press. Mr. Balfour, 
Mr. Pichon and I tried to mitigate the impression caused 
by receiving newspaper men at stated hours. When in 



112 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

March the discussions were begun in earnest and attention 
became concentrated on points of capital importance, the 
Supreme Council asked us to abandon these receptions. 
"When one realizes to what extent some of our statements 
had been misinterpreted, and how delicate the negotiations 
had become, this request is easily understood. However 
that may be, the weeks from March 15 to April 30 were 
singularly agitated in Press circles. Mr. Lloyd George 
tried giving out interviews but without avail, for on funda- 
mental matters everyone's lips were sealed by fear of mak- 
ing agreement more difficult. The newspapers were 
discontented and made up for the inadequacy of their infor- 
mation by the prodigality of their criticism. The public, 
ill-informed and distrusted, lost interest and became 
suspicious. This continued till the end of the Conference. 
In April the question arises whether the conditions of 
peace shall be published before being handed to the Ger- 
mans or simultaneously. M. Clemenceau insists upon their 
publication. 

*'It is inadmissible," he said, ''that our countrymen 
should be obliged to read the Treaty in the Berliner 
Tagehlatt." 

Alone of this opinion, M. Clemenceau is obliged to give 
way to the majority and only a resume is pubhshed. In 
May and June, the same question arises. The United 
States Senate first received and then a French newspaper 
published the full text of the Treaty. Nevertheless it is 
decided to await the signature. In July, the parliamentary 
debate begins. M. Clemenceau asks for authority to com- 
municate to the Commission presided over by M. Viviani 
the minutes of the Committee of the League of Nations. 
Again unanimous refusal. Treaties are public property, 
but the preparation of treaties must remain secret. This 
Avill be known to history as the doctrine of the Conference 
of Paris. 

I have stated the facts. What conclusions or lessons 
can be drawn from them? It is necessary first to clear 
^way the objection so frequently put forth that "If the pub- 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 113 

lie had been informed, France would not have been obliged 
always to give way to her Allies." It must be cleared 
away, because it is false that France always gave way ; on 
the contrary her views generally prevailed. But on the 
other hand it is certain that silence did great harm to the 
Treaty in the public mind. It harmed it more in France 
than anywhere, although in the United States the damages 
were at least as apparent. Parliamentary debates were in- 
adequate to enlighten the people. Who reads the Journal 
Officiel or Hansard or the Congressional Record? Besides 
a few speeches were not sufficient to explain in detail the 
continuous effort of six months. Constant publicity would 
have been necessary. Thus the door was opened wide to 
misstatement and to falsehood. The paramount necessity 
— vital to all the Allies but especially vital to France — of 
maintaining in peace the bonds of friendship forged in 
war, the long and laborious efforts to this end, the sacri- 
fices made to it by all without exception, were not under- 
stood. Political campaigns took advantage of this 
ignorance. 

Could more have been done ! No, out of regard for our 
Allies. Neither the conversations exchanged nor the texts 
discussed by the Conference were the exclusive property 
of France. To publish, divulge, repeat these things with- 
out the consent of all concerned would have been improper 
and dangerous. No foreign Parliament has advanced any 
such pretension. The House of Commons asked nothing. 
The United States Senate, despite the heat of its political 
struggles, did not take advantage of its right to send a 
delegation to Paris. And when the French Government 
suggested, in July, that certain records should be com- 
municated to our Parliamentary Commissions, the Allies 
were unanimous in their friendly but formal reminder that 
the common rule must be respected. M. Clemenceau did 
not feel that he could disregard their wishes in the matter. 

This may be regretted. M. Clemenceau told the Cham- 
ber that he regretted it. I regret it as much as he does. 
We are democracies, and democracies must know in order 



114 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

to be able to will. It is certain that our French Democracy, 
because it did not know enough, was the defenseless vic- 
tim of those who preached the failure of the peace. It is 
no less certain that when I go over each item and ask my- 
self, ''Could we have spoken?" I am tempted to reply, 
**No!" The Treaty, had it been more quickly and more 
thoroughly explained, would have been better understood. 
But by multiplying the echoes of dissension the danger 
would have been great that there would be no Treaty at all. 
That is the whole question. 



Thus time passed, from the end of December, 1918, to 
the beginning of July, 1919. A time of complexities and of 
difficulties, a time of overwhelming work and responsi- 
bility but also of inspiring effort and result ; a time often 
dramatic. I have explained the inner workings of the 
machine. I shall now attempt to show the extent of its 
output. 

Something of the wild exhilaration of the Armistice 
which soon sobered down into a tranquil optimism had 
marked the first meeting of the Conference. Excessive 
optimism prevailed as to agreement on the application of 
principles; excessive optimism prevailed as to the power 
of this imposing group of victors to control the actual 
course of events. I have told how France proposed a pro- 
gramme of work which had been rejected as too hard-and- 
fast and systematic. The Anglo-Saxons preferred to deal 
with the most pressing matters first. So the Russian 
question was taken up, with what naive hopes later events 
have shown. Then there was the hopeless failure of Prin- 
kipo, vainly prophesied from the first by M. Clemenceau. 
Then — all the while attempting to disarm Germany and to 
draw up the pact of the League of Nations, — we began to 
hold meetings for information. Interminable statements, 
many of which revealed an alarming Imperialism on the 
part of the most recent beneficiaries of victory, were lis- 
tened to without discussion. About this time the United 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 115 

States and Great Britain both calling for the presence of 
the heads of their respective Governments, Mr. Wilson and 
Mr. Lloyd George had to go away. Five days later, M. 
Clemenceau was struck down by an assassin and had to 
retire temporarily with a bullet in his lung. It was a fal- 
low and discouraging time, a time of difficulties and of 
vain disputes over questions of procedure — ^modified 
Armistice, preliminary terms of Peace or Treaty. How- 
ever, inside progress was being made. The commissions 
were filing their reports in quick succession. By the end 
of March, their work was about completed. It was at this 
moment that the Council of Four which met for the first 
time on March 24, took up this material. In six weeks of 
continuous effort, they were going to clear away the under- 
brush, lay the foundations and build up the Treaty. 

Then discussions began. Cahn and unruffled on most 
points, bitter and stormy on three of the most important 
to France : the left bank of the Rhine, the Sarre Valley and 
the question of reparations. These three points took up 
long sittings and led to fierce debates. Furthermore on 
certain occasions two tendencies began to appear which 
foreshadowed future difficulties. France, usually sup- 
ported by the United States, demanded that the accepted 
principles of the Peace be unwaveringly applied: restitu- 
tions, reparations, guarantees. 

''"We were attacked," said M. Clemenceau, "we are vic- 
torious. "We represent right, and might is ours. This 
might must be used in the service of right. ' ' 

Mr, Lloyd George did not say no. Indeed, he sometimes 
urged exemplary severity, as for the punishment of the 
Kaiser and his accomplices or to force payment of the 
expenses of the war. But at times also his parliamentary 
obsession would come over him. Under the influence of 
some of his assistants — such as General Smuts — or after 
breakfasting with some Labour Leader, he would arrive 
at the meeting looking glum, and announce, ' ' They will not 
sign." That was his great anxiety. It led him to write 



116 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

long Notes in which he laid down for himself and recom- 
mended to his allies a policy of extreme moderation.* 

''We must have," he kept repeating, ''a German 
Government that w^ill sign. The one now in power is but a 
shadow. If our terms are too severe it will fall. And then 
look out for Bolshevism." 

At the end of March this obsession became so threaten- 
ing to the most vital clauses of the Treatyf that M. Cle- 
menceau felt called upon to meet it with uncompromising 
directness w%ich Anglo-Saxons accept, because they con- 
sider it fair and which impresses them far more than 
shifting resistance. On his instructions I drew up a Note 
in which Mr. Lloyd George's point of view was refuted 
step by step. Jt read : 

March 31st. 
I 

The French Government is in complete accord with the general 
aim of Mr. Lloyd George's Note to make a lasting Peace and for 
that a just Peace. 

It does not believe on the other hand that this principle, which 
is its own, really leads to the conclusions deduced from it in this 
Note. 

II 

This Note suggests granting moderate territorial conditions to 
Germany in Europe in order not to leave her after the Peace with 
feelings of deep resentment. 

This method would be of value if the last war had merely been 
for Germany an European war, but this is not the case. 

Germany before the war was a great world power whose ' ' future 
was on the water. ' ' It was in this world power that she took pride. 
It is this world power that she will not console herself for having 
lost. 

Now we have taken away from her — or we are going to take 
away from her — without being deterred by the fear of her resent- 
ment — all her Colonies, all her Navy, a great part of her merchant 



*See specially his Note of Marcli 26, 1919. 
tSee Chapters V, VIII and IX. 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 117 

Marine (on account of Reparations), her foreign markets in which 
she was supreme. 

Thus we are dealing her the blow which she will feel the w^orst 
and it is hoped to soften it by some improvement in territorial 
terms. This is a pure illusion, the remedy is not adequate to the ill. 

If for reasons of general policy, it is desired to give certain 
satisfactions to Germany, it is not in Europe that they must be 
sought. This kind of appeasement will be vain so long as Germany 
is cut off from world politics. 

In order to appease Germany (if such is the desire) we must 
offer her colonial satisfactions, naval satisfactions, satisfactions of 
commercial expansion. But the Note of March 26 merely contem- 
plates giving her European territorial satisfactions. 

Ill 

Mr. Lloyd George's Note fears that if the territorial conditions 
imposed on Germany are too severe, it will give an impetus to 
Bolshevism. Is it not to be feared that this would be precisely the 
result of the action suggested? 

The Conference has decided to call to life a certain number of 
new States. Can it without committing an injustice sacrifice them 
out of regard for Germany by imposing upon them inacceptable 
frontiers? If these peoples — notably Poland and Bohemia — have 
so far resisted Bolshevism, they have done so by the development 
of national spirit. If we do violence to this sentiment, they will 
become the prey of Bolshevism and the only barrier now existing 
between Russian Bolshevism and German Bolshevism will be 
broken down. 

The result will be either a Confederation of Central and Eastern 
Europe under the leadership of Bolshevist Germany or the enslave- 
ment of this same vast territory by Germany swung back to reac- 
tion after a period of general anarchy. In either case, the Allies 
will have lost the war. 

The policy of the French Government is on the contrary to give 
strong support to these young nations with the help of all that is 
liberal in Europe and not to seek at their expense to attenuate — 
which besides would be useless — the colonial, naval and commercial 
disaster which the Peace inflicts on Germany. 

If in order to give to these young nations frontiers which are 
essential to their national life, it is necessary to transfer to their 
sovereignty Germans, the sons of those who enslaved them, one may 



118 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

regret having to do this and do it only with measure, but it cannot 
be avoided. 

Moreover, by depriving Germany totally and definitely of her 
colonies because she has ill-treated the natives, one forfeits the right 
to refuse to Poland or to Bohemia their natural frontiers on the 
ground that Germans have occupied their territory as the fore- 
runners of Pan-Germanism. 

IV 

The Note of March 26 insists — and the French Government is in 
complete agreement — on the necessity of making a Peace that will 
appear to Germany to be a just Peace. 

But it may be remarked that taking German mentality into 
consideration, it is not sure that the Germans will have the same 
idea of what is just as the Allies have. 

Finally it must be retained that this impression of justice must 
be felt not only by the enemy but also, and first of all, by the 
Allies. The Allies who have fought together must conclude a Peace 
which will be fair to all of them. 

But what would bo the result of following the method suggested 
in the Note of March 26 ? 

A certain number of full and final guarantees would be ensured 
to the maritime nations Avhicli have never been invaded. 

Full and final cession of the German colonies. 

Full and final surrender of the German Navy. 

Full and final surrender of a large part of the German mer- 
chant Marine. 

Full and lasting, if not final, exclusion of Germany from 
foreign markets. 

To the continental nations, however, that is to say to those who 
have suffered the most from the war, only partial and deferred 
solutions are offered. 

Partial solutions such as the reduced frontier suggested for 
Poland and Bohemia. 

Deferred solutions such as the defensive undertaking offered to 
France for the protection of her territory. 

Deferred solutions such as the proposed arrangement for the 
Sarre coal. 

There is here an inequality which may well have a disastrous 
influence on the after-war relations between the Allies, which are 
more important than the after-war relations between Germany and 
the Allies. 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 119 

It has been shown in Paragraph I that it would be an illusion to 
hope to find in territorial satisfactions given to Germany a suffi- 
cient compensation for the world-wide disaster she has sustained. 
May it be permitted to add that it would be an injustice to make 
the weight of these compensations fall upon those of the Allied 
nations which have borne the brunt of the war. 

These countries cannot bear the costs of the Peace after having 
borne the cost of the war. It is essential that they too shall have 
the feeling that the Peace is just and equal for all. 

Failing this, it is not only Central Europe in which Bolshevism 
may be feared, for as events have shown, no atmosphere is more 
favourable to Bolshevism than that of national disappointment. 

V 

The French Government desires to confine itself for tlie time 
being to these considerations of general policy. 

It pays full homage to the intentions which inspire Mr. Lloyd 
George's Note, but it believes that the considerations which the 
present Note deduces from it are in accord with justice and the 
general interest. 

It is by these considerations that the French Government will 
be guided in the coming exchange of views during the discussion of 
the terms suggested by the Prime Minister of Great Britain. 

Mr. Lloyd George is ardent; but he has a good heart 
and a keen sense of justice. After a few hard words — face 
to face — the distance between the two points of view grew 
less and that of France made headway. The problem of 
the Sarre was the first to be solved early in April with the 
cordial assistance of the British Prime Minister. That 
of the left bank of the Rhine was solved on April 22, 
despite Ms repeated objections. The agreement on repara- 
tions was reached at about the same time and on the even- 
ing of May 6 the text of the Treaty was delivered by the 
printers. Thanks to steps taken by France, the name of 
Italy appeared upon it although news of the return of her 
plenipotentiaries had been received only the night before. 
On the seventh afternoon the terms of peace were solemnly 
handed to Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau. The German 
made a cold, harsh and insolent speech. As we were leav- 
ing Mr, Lloyd George, exasperated, said to me : 



120 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

*'It is hard to have won the war and to have to listen 
to that." 

A few days passed and the German counter-proposals 
began to come in. The first received were met almost 
without discussion by negative replies couched in firm and 
determined language. Already the Austrian Treaty was 
being taken up. It looked as though everything was set- 
tled with Germany once and for all. 

As a matter of fact, the second and most serious crisis 
of the Conference was at hand. It lasted from May 25 to 
June 16. The British Cabinet held two meetings in the 
last week of May which renewed and redoubled all the 
fears which the Prime Minister had felt in March. These 
fears were not as a matter of fact confined to him alone. 
Even in France many who have since become uncompromis- 
ing then favoured concessions. Men repeated ''Will they 
sign?" And some suggested a general back-down in order 
to induce them to sign. Those were atrocious days. Mr. 
Lloyd George, thoroughly alarmed by the consequences 
either of a refusal to sign or of a crisis in Germany, sug- 
gested unthinkable concessions on almost every point. He 
excused himself for doing it so tardily. He spoke of con- 
sulting the Commons. The work of two months was 
threatened with ruin. M, Clemenceau stood firm. If 
there was to be a break, he would go before the French 
Chamber and resign. 

"We know the Germans better than you," he declared, 
**our concessions will only encourage their resistance while 
depriving our own peoples of their rights. We do not have 
to beg pardon for our victory. ' ' 

President Wilson did not demand any change in the 
political clauses of the Peace and did not insist on the 
changes in the financial clauses which were suggested by 
his experts. Nevertheless no final decision was taken. 
Oppressive hours; exhausting sittings from which men 
emerged broken. On June 10 to force the issue I addressed 
to Mr. House the following letter which he showed the 
same evening to President Wilson: 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 121 

June 10, 1919. 
My dear friend, 

Very grave mistakes have been made during the past week: 
there is only just time to repair them. 

For more than five months the heads of Governments and their 
experts have studied the terms of the Peace to be imposed on Ger- 
many. They have reached an agreement and they have communi- 
cated to the Germans a text which, if it does not yet bind Count 
Brockdorff — in any case unquestionably binds the Allies, 

Could the AUies suppose that this text would be satisfactory to 
Germany? Of course not. However, they adopted it. Germany 
protests, as it was certain she would. Immediately a modification 
of the text is undertaken. I say this is a confession of weakness 
and a confession of lack of seriousness, for which all the Allied 
Governments will pay dearly in terms of public opinion ! Is it an 
impossible Treaty? Is it an unjust Treaty? Count Brockdorff 
believes that it is. If we change it, we admit that we think as he 
does. What a condemnation of the work we have done during the 
past sixteen weeks ! 

Mr. Lloyd George has said, ' ' But they will not sign and we shall 
have a thousand difficulties." It is the argument we heard so 
often during the war — after the battle of the Marne, after Verdun, 
after the German offensive in the spring of 1918, people said in all 
of our countries, "Let us make peace to avoid difficulties." "We 
did not listen to them and we did well. We went on with the war 
and we won it. Shall we have less heart for peace than we had 
for war? 

I add that these public discussions between Allies over a Treaty 
drawn up between Allies weaken us more every day in the eyes of 
an adversary who respects only firmness (see the reports from 
Versailles which arrived to-day). 

Thus on the general principle my opinion is this : a week ago, 
we ought to have answered the Germans, "We will change noth- 
ing." If we had only made this answer, the Treaty would be 
signed to-day. We did not do it. What ought we to do now ? 

As regards the special principles about which amendments are 
being considered, what is the position? 

Keparations? The British who made the first suggestion of 
amendment are with us to-day against any modification and it is 
your delegation which proposes (along with other changes which 
France cannot possibly accept), a total figure of 125 thousand 



122 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

million francs which would barely cover as far as France is con- 
cerned the two-thirds of the specific damages, reparation for which 
is imposed on Germany by a text of May 7. We will not accept it. 

League of Nations? We have laid down after four months of 
study the conditions in which Germany may enter the League. 
Are we going to change them? Are we going to confess that our 
decision falls before the observations of Count Brockdorff ? How 
after that could we defend the Treaty before our respective 
Parliaments ? 

All these vacillations, which were repeated in the matters of the 
Sarre and of the left bank of the Rhine, were the results of the 
initial mistake. But let me add another word. 

No one has the right to ask France to accept such terms. 
France has an unique experience of Germany. No one has suffered 
as she has. It is useless to think of persuading France to accept 
such close cohabitation with Germany in the near future in viola- 
tion of the text of the Covenant, first of all because France will not 
accept it and then because it is not just. 

Wlien the question arose of giving a hearing to the Irish, every 
one gave way to the British objections. When the question arose 
of Japan's status in the League of Nations, every one gave way to 
the American objections. When dealing with Germany it is France 
that must be heard. 

But above all I would not have the moral position of the Allies 
sacrificed to the Brockdorff memorandum. I would not have them 
subjected to the unjustifiable humiliation of admitting that the 
peace built up by them after more than four months of incessant 
labour is, as Germany asserts, an unjust and impossible peace, for 
this is contrary to the truth. 

Signed: Andre Tardieu. 

Towards the end of June the atmosphere began to clear. 
Reason — represented by France — resumed her rights. 
The amendments suggested a fortnight before gradually 
vanished one by one. On the sixteenth the Allied answer 
to the German Notes was handed to Count Brockdorff. 
Drawn up by Mr. Lloyd George 's own secretary — Mr. Philip 
Kerr — ^it was on every essential point the eloquent expres- 
sion of the ideals which France had upheld for five months. 
I will cite only its more salient passages : 



THE PEACE CONFERENCE 123 

In the view of the Allied and Associated Powers the war which 
began on August 1, 1914, was the greatest crime against humanity 
and the freedom of peoples that any nation calling itself civilized 
has ever consciously committed. . . 

Germany's responsibility however is not confined to having 
planned and started the war. She is no less responsible for the 
savage and inhuman manner in which it was conducted. . . 

The conduct of Germany is almost unexampled in human his- 
tory. The terrible responsibility which lies at her door can be seen 
in the fact that no less than seven million dead lie buried in Europe 
while more than twenty million others carry upon them the evi- 
dence of wounds and suffering because Germany saw fit to gratify 
her lust for tyranny by resort to war. 

The Allied and Associated Nations believe that they will be false 
to those who have given their all to save the freedom of the world 
if they consent to treat this war on any other basis than as a crime 
against humanity and right. . . 

Justice, therefore, is the only possible basis for the settlement 
of the accounts of this terrible war. Justice is what the German 
delegation asks for and what Germany has been promised. Justice 
is what Germany shall have. But it must be Justice for all. There 
must be Justice for the dead and wounded and for those who have 
been orphaned and bereaved that Europe might be freed from 
Prussian despotism. There must be Justice for the people who now 
stagger under war debts which exceed thirty thousand million 
pounds, that Liberty might be saved. There must be Justice for 
those millions whose homes and lands, ships and property German 
savagery has spoliated and destroyed. . . 

Not to do justice to all concerned would only leave the world 
open to fresh calamities. The Treaty is frankly not based upon a 
general condonation of the events of 1914-1919, it would not be a 
peace of justice if it were. 

As such the Treaty in its present form must be accepted or 
rejected. 

On June 28, at Versailles, in the Hall of Mirrors, on the 
very spot where Bismarck had proclaimed the German Em- 
pire in 1871, MM. Hermann Muller and Bell, replacing 
Count Brockdorff who had resigned, signed the Treaty- 
identical in all its fundamentals with the text of May 7. 
The fight was won. 



124 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

In the succeeding chapters I shall show what these fun- 
damental principles mean to the future of France and of 
Europe. The foregoing reveals one of the features which 
characterize its importance. It is that the Treaty born of 
long and arduous discussion could not bring to all who 
signed it the realization of all their expectations. The 
victory had been the work of a coalition. The peace which 
ended the war was, like the war itself, the work of a coali- 
tion, that is to say, a compromise in which all made sacri- 
fices and reduced their demands to a minimum, — a minimum 
because the capacity for construction is less than the 
capacity for destruction, a minimum because the very 
origins of the war and the promises made during the war 
in view of peace precluded the possibility of certain tradi- 
tional solutions of annexation and brutality to which the 
experience of centuries had accustomed warring peoples, 
a minimum because between so many Allies justly entitled 
to claim a share in the victory it was inevitable there should 
be in peace as in war divergent and often contradictory 
ideas and tendencies, traditions and hopes, sometimes even 
ambitions. 

Thus in the very hour when every national entity 
wrought up by suffering and by victory aspired to the full 
satisfaction of their every hope, the Treaty could be but 
a compromise, — a compromise not only between conflicting 
claims but a compromise too between principles which are 
plain and facts which are complex — a compromise between 
glories and miseries, between memories and hopes, between 
strength and weakness — an average of security, of justice, 
and of solidarity which doubtless did not realize and could 
not realize complete security, full justice nor absolute soli- 
darity but which nevertheless contained enough of security, 
enough of justice, enough of solidarity to make it the power 
towards which turn all, in their search for peace, both 
those who have most severely criticized it and those who 
have most inadequately enforced it. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE DISARMAMENT OF GERMANY 

All through the war, the Allies proclaimed, as first 
among their war aims, the destruction of German militar- 
ism. The instrument of aggression forged by the elder 
Moltke, increased and strengthened by his successors, had 
filled Germany with that insensate pride which inspired 
her crime of 1914. German militarism was as formidable 
materially as it was morally pernicious. After having 
fashioned its weapons, it built up its faith. Maker of rifles, 
of machine guns and of cannons, it had given birth to a 
philosophy. Defeat had overwhelmed it, but — ^prompt in 
deceit — it had taken pains to hide defeat beneath the 
triumphal arches raised in all German towns in honour of 
the beaten and retreating Army. Had but the instrument 
of aggression survived, in five years — ^in ten years — in 
twenty years, it would have meant certain war. It was 
necessary to break it — to break it in its three essentials : in 
its organization, in its man power, in its armament. It was 
necessary to wrest from Germany both the means and the 
temptation of war ; to reduce in the immediate present her 
military state to the minimum compatible with the necessi- 
ties of her defense and the maintenance of order; to give 
in the future to peaceful nations the means of verifying 
Germany's compliance with the clauses of the Treaty im- 
posed upon her. An immense task, which Napoleon — the 
conqueror of Prussia, occupying all of its territory — ^had 
attempted without success but which, however, it was the 
Allies' duty to undertake and to carry through, if the world 
Was to be saved. 

The Armistice had begun the disarmament of Ger- 
125 



126 ' THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

many. It was far from having completed it. To achieve 
their aim, the negotiators of the peace had a long way to 
go. I have already told why Marshal Foch had not thought 
right to demand either the demobilization of the German 
Army or its total disarmament in the field.* I add that, 
even in the matter of partial disarmament considered suf- 
ficient by the inter-alhed High Command, errors of calcula- 
tion had been made. In the letter of October 26, 1918, the 
Commander-in-Chief had estimated the 5,000 cannon and 
the 30,000 machine guns the surrender of which he demand- 
ed, as respectively one-third and one-half of the enemy 
supplies, which means that at the moment of the Armistice 
Germany was believed to have 15,000 cannon and 60,000 
machine guns. But on January 5, 1920, the German Gov- 
ernment, while asserting that it had destroyed a large 
part of its war material, admitted that it still had 24,625 
cannon or tubes and 41,318 machine guns. However that 
may be, the heads of the Allied Governments in the begin- 
ning of 1918 became alarmed at the force which still re- 
mained at Germany's disposal and — ^in the various renewals 
of the Armistice in January and February, 1919, as well 
as in the elaboration of the Treaty itself — they unanimously 
sought in conjunction with the miUtary authorities the 
means of further disarming Germany. 

By January 15, 1919, the whole war material which 
Germany was to surrender under the Armistice of Novem* 
ber 11, 1918, was in the hands of the victors. But it was 
clear to all that Noske, the Minister of War of the German 
Reich, was endeavoring in a thousand ways to elude the 
clauses which he foresaw would be inserted in the Treaty. 
There were threatening concentrations of troops on the 
Polish frontier. The manufacture of war material con- 
tinued. Innumerable undemobilized units were kept in 
the depots. New formations were created under all sorts 
of pretexts : — ^volunteers, surety police, technical aid corps 
and others galore, who Avith their machine guns and their 
cannon cooperated to a disquieting extent in the mainte- 

*See Chapter II, page 66. 



THE DISARMAMENT OF GERMANY 127 

nance of order. At the meeting of the Conference on Janu- 
ary 23, 1919, Mr. Lloyd George, voicing the unanimous 
feeling, declared that this situation could not be allowed 
to continue : 

''The Germans," he said, ''are demobilizing slowly. 
They have still more than fifty divisions. Why do we not 
make them demobilize quicker? Why was this condition not 
imposed on them in the Armistice of November 11 ? Why 
not introduce it next time when the Armistice is to be 
renewed on February 16? It is essential in some way or 
other not only to oblige Germany to reduce without further 
delay, the number of men she has under arms but also to 
take from her the war material she still has." 

Everyone was of the same opinion. But the formula 
remained to be found. M. Clemenceau recalled the fact 
that, if the demobilization clause did not appear in the 
Armistice of November 11, it was because Marshal Foch 
had declared it to be impossible of execution, as it could 
not be controlled. The following day, January 24, the 
Commander-in-Chief, summoned to the Conference, de- 
clared : 

"We can insert in the next Armistice a clause imposing 
upon Germany a thoroughgoing demobilization of men and 
material. But it will be very different to verify and en- 
force, and the results are more than doubtful. The only 
means of pressure is first of all for us to keep strong forces 
mobilized and as a second and additional means there is 
the blockade." 

Then began a period of laborious effort which lasted 
three wrecks, in which much work was done mthout tangible 
result. Three commissions were appointed one after the 
other to inquire into and report upon this question. The 
first, appointed on January 24, included besides M. 
Loucheur, the Chairman, Mr. Winston Churchill, Marshal 
Foch and Generals Bliss and Diaz. The second, appointed 
on February 8 to simplify the suggestions of the first, was 
composed of Mr. Lansing, Lord Milner and myself. The 
third, presided over by Marshal Foch, included as military 



128 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

members representing the Supreme War Council, Gener- 
als Bliss, Degoutte, Thwaites, Cavallero and Colonel 
Nagai; as civilian members representing the Supreme 
Economic Council, Lord Robert Cecil, Norman Davis, Cle- 
mentel, Crespi and Mori. The Commanders-in-Chief of the 
Armies and Navies were present at the meeting of the latter 
on February 10. 

The object to be accomplished by these various com- 
mittees was the same : to exert on Germany, at the time of 
the renewal of the Armistice, sufficient military and eco- 
nomic pressure to force her to demobilize her forces and 
surrender her war material. But it very quickly appeared 
— and this explains the appointment of three commissions 
in succession — that there was a divergence of view both on 
the means to be employed and on the conditions to be 
imposed. 

The French delegates sought only to disarm Germany 
and to enforce this whether she wished it or not. They 
therefore proposed that the next Armistice should enforce 
the reduction of the number of her divisions, the surrender 
of a further slice of her war material, the Allied control of 
her thirteen principal war factories ; finally and above all, 
as an ultimate penalty for non-compliance, the occupation 
of the industrial region of Essen. These proposals were 
advanced both by M. Loucheur in the first commission 
and by myself in the second. They were simple and self- 
sufficient. 

The state of mind of our Allies was more complex. The 
idea of introducing into a renewal of the Armistice terms 
which were different from those of the initial Armistice, 
was repugnant to some of them, especially to the Ameri- 
cans, — and they made no secret of it. In vain, we replied 
that, if the Armistice had been concluded for one month 
only, it was precisely in order to reserve to the Allies the 
right of changing the conditions. Our contentions found no 
support. Others sought by the demobilization of Germany 
to facilitate the repatriation of their own troops and the 
hastening of their own demobilization. All of them, what- 



THE DISARMAMENT OF GERMANY 129 

ever their reasons, were equally hostile to a further occu- 
pation of German territory and agreed in their conclusions 
which were, it is true, to oblige Germany to demobilize. 
But to add to the military and economic means of pressure 
the bait of certain concessions in the matter of food sup- 
plies and raw material, in order to obtain demobilization, 
would have transformed the renewed Armistice into a 
species of bilateral contract, would have mortgaged the 
future conditions of peace and have left the Allies open to 
German blackmail. 

Thus the difficulties grew. M. Clemenceau, no less 
harassed by Parliament than were his foreign colleagues, 
was as anxious as anybody to accelerate the demobilization 
of the French Armies by immediate disarmament of Ger- 
many. He was as anxious as anybody also that the Allies 
should retain to the very end of the negotiations a military 
force superior to that of Germany and this added to his anx- 
iety to reduce the strength of the German Army. But at no 
price was he willing to consent that this should be at the 
cost of losing, while the war was still on — for an armistice 
is not peace — the advantage of the Allies' position as con- 
querors by a give and take arrangement, which, before their 
peace conditions had been accepted, might undermine their 
authority. 

A difficult time indeed, as I have said above, often a 
painful time, in which the head of the French Government 
was forced, on four or five occasions, to intervene person- 
ally and with all his might to insure that the renewal of 
the Armistice would preserve the character he was anxious 
to give it and avert a dangerous bargaining. After a dozen 
meetings, it was agreed that while pursuing by some other 
means the disarmament of Germany, we would confine 
ourselves in the renewal of the Armistice on February 16 
to making her feel the pressure first by demanding the im- 
mediate halt — ^which was obtained — of her preparations 
against Poland, and then by renewing the Armistice only 
for a short and undefined period with the right for the 
Allies to bring it to an end at any moment on three days' 



130 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

notice. No mention was made of disarmament. Neither 
was any mention made of food supplies. Thus was pre- 
served in the document handed to the Germans the military 
character of the Armistice. 

As to the reduction of the German forces, it was de- 
cided that we should bring it about without further delay 
not by means of the Armistice but by fixing as quickly as 
possible the final military conditions of the peace. Imme- 
diately on his return from Treves, on February 17, Mar- 
shal Foch was asked to hasten the study of these clauses. 
In the last week of February, the work of the Military Com- 
mission was brought to a close. Its report was distributed 
on March the first. 

II 

We appeared to be reaching the end. The desire to 
reach a conclusion was unanimous. And yet so great is 
the difficulty of attuning views based upon conflicting 
traditions, interests and habits of mind that two more 
weeks passed before agreement was reached on a text. I 
lay special stress upon this illuminating incident. If the 
difficulty was so great when no divergence of principle 
separated the Allies, it can be judged what the debates 
were like when they were at variance on the principle. 

On every point and without ill intention on the part of 
anyone, discussions arose over points of detail which had 
to be settled before progress could be made. One day, on 
February 22, — in the absence of M. Clemenceau, grievously 
wounded the day before by an assassin — it was suggested 
that the military clauses as soon as they were ready should 
be handed to Germany mthout waiting for the others. 
From his sick-bed the French Premier answered that this 
was impossible and in his name the French delegation in 
full accord with Marshal Foch showed that the military 
clauses could not be separated from those which would fix 
the frontiers of Germany, the situation of the Rhenish 
Provinces, the occupation, etc . . Another day, on March the 
third, it was maintained that the disarmament of Germany 



THE DISARMAMENT OF GERMANY 131 

should only be of limited duration. An entire meeting was 
necessary to dispose of this suggestion, Marshal Foch very 
pertinently recalling that President Wilson, who was then 
on the high seas, had asserted the ''moral right" of the 
Allies to disarm Germany completely. M. Clemenceau, who 
had resumed his place as President, added: 

''We must know what we want and say it. Otherwise 
we are living in a dream and reality will be avenged." 

On another occasion, the American delegates put for- 
ward the idea of "guaranteeing the neutrality" of a dis- 
armed Germany. Here again M. Clemenceau refused, 
declaring that he was not willing to risk the life of a single 
French soldier to guarantee Germany anything. Some of 
these debates were strenuous, at times even dramatic. No 
progress was being made. At last on March the sixth the 
discussion of the report of the Military Committee presided 
over by Marshal Foch began. The plan presented left Ger- 
many an army of 200,000 men recruited by conscription on 
a one-year service plan, five army corps staffs, fifteen 
divisions, 180 pieces of heavy artillery and 600 field pieces. 
Immediately Mr. Lloyd George, supported by M. Clemen- 
ceau, put the vital question : 

"Germany," he says, "will train 200,000 men a year or 
two million in ten years. Why make her a present of a 
system which in fifteen or twenty years from now will give 
her millions of trained soldiers to mobilize T' 

To the objection of the military experts, who answered 
that an army based upon long term enlistment would be a 
nursery of officers and non-commissioned officers, Mr. 
Lloyd George replied: 

"Officers and non-commissioned-officers'? Germany 
as a result of the war has more than enough for fifteen 
years to come and if she trains 200,000 men a year, you 
may be quite sure that at the end of ten years she will have 
formed a hundred thousand non-commissioned officers." 

It was self-evident. The suppression of compulsory 
service was decided upon ; the military experts were invited 
to resubmit by March 10 a plan thus amended. 



132 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

This plan — the principle of which the Technical Com- 
mission continued to oppose — was submitted on the day 
named to the Supreme Council. No more conscription: 
twelve years engagements: strength of 140,000 men; war 
material reduced in proportion. Immediately and insist- 
ently M. Clemenceau and Marshal Foch demanded a 
further reduction to 100,000 men. 

*'I insist with all the strength at my command," said 
the French Premier, *'for it is France who to-morrow as 
yesterday will be face to face with Germany." 

Agreement was quickly reached. Mr. Lloyd George and 
Mr. House despite certain objections of their technical 
advisers declared: 

''If France expresses a formal opinion in this matter 
neither Great Britain nor the United States has the right 
to oppose her wish." 

The German Army was therefore limited to 96,000 men 
and 4,000 officers and its role restricted to the maintenance 
of internal order and the policing of her borders. At the 
request also of the French delegation, the General Staff 
was suppressed as was also the heavy artillery: the sup- 
plies of munitions diminished by half ; an inter-allied com- 
mission to supervise disannament appointed; time limits 
for compliance with the various clauses fixed as follows : 

1. Within two months after the coming into force of the 
Treaty. 

Art. 167. — Delivery to the Allies for destruction of all the war 
material whatsoever exceeding the authorized quantities, as well as 
all machinery designed for war manufacture, with the exception of 
such as may be recognized as necessary for the arming and equip- 
ment of the German military forces authorized. 

Art. 176. — Suppression of Military Schools. 

Art. 180. — The disarmament of fortifications within the demili- 
tarized zone. 

Art. 198. — Demobilization of all the personnel of the Air 
Services. 

Art. 202. — Surrender of all the aviation material. 



THE DISAEMAMENT OF GERMANY 133 

2. Within three months after the coming into force of the 
Treaty. 

Art. 263.— The reduction of the total effective force to 200,000 
men. 

Art. 168. — Prohibition to manufacture arms or war material of 
any kind elsewhere than in factories authorized by the Allies. 
Suppression of all other factories and arsenals. 

Art. 172. — Revelation of secret processes. 

Art. 221. — Modification of German military legislation in 
accordance with the Treaty. 

3. Within four months after the coming into force of the 
Treaty. 

Art. 180. — Dismantling of the fortifications in the demilitarized 
zone. 

4. Before March 31, 1920.* 

Arts. 160-163. — Complete compliance in all respects of the Ger- 
man Army with the dispositions of the Treaty (reduction to 
100,000 men). 

Art. 166. — Limitation and warehousing of all munition stocks. 

Art. 170. — Prohibition to import or export war material. 

Art. 171. — Prohibition to manufacture poison gases, tanks, etc. 

Art. 173. — Abolition of compulsory service. 

Art. 175. — Status and number of officers. 

Art. 177. — Prohibition for schools and athletic associations to 
concern themselves with military questions o^ to have any connec- 
tion with the Minister of War. 

Art. 213. — Right of the League of Nations to exercise 
supervision. 

Arts. 42 and 43. — Complete demilitarization of the Rhine 
region. 

This was drafted Chapter V of the Peace Treaty. How- 
ever improved it may have been by the debates from March 
3 to 12, this chapter did not yet provide France — ^invaded 
twice in fifty years — with sufficient security. Further- 
more it was necessary that the military, if not the political, 
frontier of Germany be fixed in such a manner that neither 
the left bank of the Rhine, nor the bridges, nor the neigh- 
boring zone of the right bank should ever again be used 



*By decision of the Supreme Council on February 12, 1920, the date was 
extended to July 1, 1920, owing to the delay in the coming into force of the 
Ti-oaty which did not occur until January 10, 1920. 



134 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

against France as the offensive military base it had been 
in the past. It was also necessary that once the military 
clauses had been enforced by the competent Inter-allied 
Commissions, any eventual violations thereof by Germany 
should be made the object, not only of verifications of the 
facts, but also of official inquiries to be provided for by 
the Treaty itself. Finally it was necessary that, so long as 
Germany should dispose of several million men trained to 
war — ^men who had actually fought — the occupation of the 
left bank and of the bridgeheads would provide our country 
a natural guarantee. 

The total demilitarization of the left bank of the Rhine 
and of a zone of fifty kilometers to the east of the river was 
accepted from the first and was not made the object of any 
discussion. The definitive formula thereof was drafted in 
the clearest terms by President Wilson in a Note of March 
28, which the final enactments of the Conference repro- 
duced almost literally. This Note was drawn up as follows : 

Stipulations to Be Embodied in the Treaty 

(1) No fortifications west of a line drawn fifty kilometers 
east of the Kliine (as already provisionally agreed upon in tihe 
military terms). 

(2) The maiatenance or assembling of armed forces, either 
permanently or temporarily, forbidden within that area, as well as 
aU manoeuvres and the maintenance of facilities for mobilization. 

(3) Violation of these conditions to be regarded as hostile 
acts against the signatories to the Treaty and as calculated to dis- 
turb the peace of the world. 

In a separate Treaty with the United States. 

(4) A pledge by the United States, subject to the approval 
of the Executive Council of the League of Nations, to come imme- 
diately to the assistance of France as soon as any unprovoked 
movement of aggression against her is made by Germany, — the 
pledge to continue until it is agreed that the League itself affords 
sufficient protection. 

The question of the further control to be exercised was 
more lengthily discussed. To reduce Germany to the mill- 



THE DISAEMAMENT OF GERMANY 135 

tary status imposed by the Treaty, commissions were pro- 
vided for. But their role was temporary and, the reduction 
of German forces to the figures of the Treaty once 
achieved, these commissions would disappear. For the 
future something else was needed. What ? Not merely the 
ordinary military Intelligence Services possessed by all 
countries, but an official body that would have the specific 
right to make inquiries in Germany and to suggest measures 
based on its investigations. This was a matter which 
aroused the keenest attention of the Anglo-Saxons. Assert- 
ing at every turn their desire not to interfere in any way, 
once peace was signed, in the internal affairs of Germany, 
they considered that a permanent right of control over her 
miUtary institutions would affect her sovereignty.* Such 
was certainly not the object of the French proposal. Still 
it was none the less essential that some kind of a body 
should be provided for, mth power to verify the military 
execution of the peace. On five occasions, M. Clemenceau 
insisted on this necessity without obtaining a decision. On 
March 22, I handed to Colonel House a Note summing up 
the problem. It is proper that it should be published in 
full although up to the present it has remained secret. 

NOTE FOR COLONEL HOUSE 

March 22, 1919. 



The Treaty, in which is incorporated the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, recognizes that the immediate disarmament of 
Germany is necessary and institutes a control to make sure that the 
disarmament clauses will be carried out. 

Germany, once disarmed, is it admitted that she can re-arm? 
That is the question. 

To this question a satisfactory reply can be made only by insert- 
ing in the Treaty the right of the League to assure itself that 
Germany is not re-arming. 



*A proposal to organize a general supervision of armaments, presented in 
February by Mr. Leon Bourgeois at the League of Nations Commission, had 
been rejected by twelve votes to three. 



136 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Failing this, the League would confess to working for only six 
months, or eighteen months, which would be disastrous. 

II 

This truth is easy to prove. 

The League wishes to compass the at least partial disarmament 
of its members. If one subordinates this disarmament of its own 
members to the disarmament of non-member nations without hav- 
ing the right of supervision over these latter, a weak instrument is 
being drawn up, dangerous and absurd, and all the weaker, more 
dangerous and more absurd since the bad faith of Germany has 
been the more clearly established. 

It is said: "The Military Attaches will exercise this super- 
vision." That is not exact. 

In actual practise, to begin with, everyone knows that Military 
Attaches only obtain officially such particulars as it is desired to 
give them or those which are already public property. In 1914 
they were without exact knowledge either as to the number of Ger- 
man Reserve Corps or as to the importance of heavy artillery. 

"Will it be said that the Intelligence Departments could procure 
these particulars? But these services have limited means. Fur- 
thermore one cannot invoke them without making them known, and 
their reports have no official value vis-a-vis those of a Foreign 
Government. 

If, therefore, the League of Nations, having learned in one way 
or another (Military x\ttaches or Intelligence Services) that Ger- 
many is secretly violating the Disarmament clauses, wishes to make 
representations to her on the subject, the German Government will 
be justified in replying, "Your information is false" and her 
denial will be sufficient for the League to be disarmed. 

"Will the League say to Germany, "Prove that my information 
is false," or even, ""We wish to verify." 

But then it is claiming a right of supervision and Germany will 
reply : "By what right ? ' ' 

That is what Germany will reply and she will be justified in so 
replying, if she is not forced by the Treaty to recognize the right of 
verification. 

In' a word, if this right is not given by the Treaty, Germany 
can always re-arm. 

It will be objected perhaps that preparations for war by a great 



THE DISARMAMENT OF GERMANY 137 

nation like Germany cannot pass unnoticed. But between complete 
disarmament and complete preparation there are many intermedi- 
ate stages which are none the less a danger and may more or less 
circumscribe plans to break up the future political status of 
Europe. 

Where will the forbearance of the League end and when will it 
begin to take necessary precautions if the uncertainty about what 
Germany is doing and preparing cannot be officially dispelled f 

III 

This situation, perilous because of Germany, will be dangerous 
also for the members of the League. 

If a right of verification is not given to the League by the cre- 
ation of a body for that purpose, what will happen, in the case 
where the Governments composing the League would not be in 
agreement as to German preparations? 

There may be serious divergencies either between the facts 
reported by their agents or their interpretation thereof. This has 
happened and is constantly happening. 

How can the difficulty be solved ? 

Another danger : the Pacifist element in each of the Nations of 
the League will be quite naturally inclined to deny reports disturb- 
ing to their peace of mind and more or less consciously to espouse 
the cause of the German Government which will deny the said 
reports. Must we recall the opposition of these Pacifist elements 
at the time when Germany armed to the teeth was openly making 
ready for the aggression of 1870 and that of 1914? 

To sum up, the situation will be the following : 

— Germany will deny 

— The governments ivill discuss 

— Public opinion will be divided, alarmed, nervous, and finally, 
the League unarmed will have brought to pass in the world not 
general Peace but general uncertainty which may give birth to all 
kinds of interior and exterior conflicts 

It is important in this matter to lay down the principle and to 
assert the right. 

Let care be taken to avoid vexatious proceedings in the exercise 
of after-war supervision, and let use be made, as agents officially 
recognized by Germany, of military attaches or other agents of the 
League, on which we are agreed : 

But to deny the principle itself of this right of supervision by 



138 THE TKUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

the League of Nations and not to embody it in the Treaty to be 
signed by Germany, this would amount to giving the whole world 
and our enemies of yesterday the very clear impression that noth- 
ing durable has been achieved and that we are ever ready to turn 
back to the past. 

Signed: 'Andre Tardieu. 

Bays passed — without a decision. Sometimes we were 
told that our demand was excessive : sometimes that it was 
useless: always that such a provision of so special a char- 
acter could not find place either in the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, nor in the Franco-British and Franco- 
American Treaties of Guarantee. In a Note of April 2, we 
had presented the draft of a clause worded as follows ; 

If one of the signatory Powers considers that Germany has vio- 
lated any of the above clauses (demilitarization of the left bank of 
the Rhine and of 50 kilometers on the right bank, and the military 
clauses) it will have the right to bring the matter before the Exe- 
cutive Council of the League of Nations which will at once pro- 
ceed to verify the facts stated. Germany undertakes to submit to 
the said verification made in the interest of peace and to facilitate 
its execution. 

On April 12, in a Note of reply, President Wilson 
maintained his refusal and wrote ; 

With regard to the added paragraph concerning the right of the 
signatory Powers to notify the Executive Council of the League of 
any violations of these regulations, which might have been 
observed, it is clear that the right already exists, on the part of 
members of the League, if any action is taken anywhere, which 
threatens to disturb the peace of the world and that it would be 
unwise to connect it with this special agreement and treaty. 

It was once again proof of our failure to agree. But 
for the first time, the door was open to agreement. Leav- 
ing aside the Treaties of Guarantee we asked by a Note of 
April 15 that the article proposed by us should figure in 
the military clauses of the peace. We showed that it was 
a matter of necessary precaution and closely allied to all 
the objects of the Conference. We wrote: 



THE DISARMAMENT OF GERMANY 139 

April 15. 

"What does France demand? That the precision and strength 
added by the special Franco-British- American Treaty to the gen- 
eral clauses of the League of Nations, in case of a German attack 
shall be incorporated in some part of the Peace Treaty in case of 
preparation for such an attack. 

In other words, it is a matter of giving article XIII of the Cov- 
enant, as regards possible preparations by Germany, the same 
complement as the special Treaty gives to article X. 

The British and American Governments which have so justly 
understood that France has need of an additional guarantee 
against the realization of a German attack, will certainly admit 
that the same additional guarantee should appear in the preventa- 
tive methods to be opposed to this attack. 

The President considers that it is not proper to insert this 
clause in the special Treaty with Great Britain and the United 
States. The French Government is quite ready to abide by this 
opinion. 

But it insists that, either in the Covenant of the League or in 
the military clauses of Peace, this provision shall appear. 

The common work of Governments needs the ratification of 
Parliaments and of peoples. The clause asked for will do much 
for this ratification as far as France is concerned. 

In this matter the position of the French Government is identi- 
cal with that which prompted the American Government to 
introduce an amendment to the Covenant touching the Monroe 
Doctrine. This also is a question of public feeling. 

The introduction of such a provision seems particularly easy. 

In fact : 

1° Article X sets forth that the members of the League under- 
take to respect and preserve against external aggression the terri- 
torial integrity and existing political independence of all the 
members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in ease 
of any threat or danger of aggression the Council shall advise upon 
the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled. 

To this general provision the special Treaties of Great Britain 
and of the United States add a precise undertaking, the object 
being, in case of danger, to shorten the formalities and gain time. 

2° Article XIII provides for the right of investigation by the 
Council. The State under suspicion and about which investigation 



140 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

is to be made must submit to it, if not by terms of the article XVI 
it may be outlawed. 

This article might also be supplemented by a precise provision, 

Whal^ is needed indeed in the second case as in the first is to 
gain time, — ^but precision is not less necessary. 

Germany is, of all the nations not members of the League, the 
only one capable of letting loose an irreparable catastrophe — 
irreparable, if not as far as final victory is concerned, at least as 
regards the security of French soil. 

For this reason, we are justified in^ forcing Germany* by the 
Peace Treaty to submit to investigation which alone can prevent 
her from placing France and the League in presence of a fait 
accompli. 

Our argument at last met more favourable reception 
and prevailed on April 17. On that day President Wilson 
offered to us a formula which we accepted immediately. 

As long as the present Treaty (with Germany) remains in force, 
a pledge to be taken by Germany to respond to any inquiry that 
will be deemed necessary by the Council of the League of Nations. 

This was the very object of our proposition. To avoid 
the delay which might have been brought about by the neces- 
sity of a unanimous vote of the Council of the League of 
Nations, we merely asked — and it was consented to without 
discussion — that the Council, in this case, "would act by a 
majority vote." After a month of efforts, we were at the 
goal. The general security of the world gained as much 
thereby as the security of France. 

Ill 

The right of occupation of the left bank of the Rhine 
and the Treaties of Guarantee with Great Britain and the 
United States were to complete the measures taken for the 
common defense of the ''Frontier of Freedom." These 
two problems, by reason of their importance, are dealt mth 
in special chapters,* wherein is written the final upbuild- 



*See Chapters V and VI. 



THE DISARMAMENT OF GERMANY 141 

ing of the work of defense, the necessity of which was 
emphasized by the history of the last century. 

A new work this : to break and bridle the nailitary power i 
of the most military people in the world. The work has I 
been undertaken and accomplished with courage, and in a 
manner worthy of our great soldiers. We have struck at 
the head by suppressing the Army Military Staff, the 
schools, the plans of mobilization. We have struck at the 
base by suppressing conscription and by reducing the effec- 
tives to 100,000 men serving for twelve years. As to war 
material, we have sujipressed the right to retain or to 
manufacture heavy- artiller}-, tanks, a\^ation, gas. We 
have allowed only 288 field cannon manufactured in fac- 
tories chosen by the Allies, supervised by them, and of 
which they can limit the number. Was it possible to go 
further ^dthout affording grounds for the objection often 
put forward by our Allies, ''Then, we must protect and 
safeguard Germany." 

Doubtless a danger remains : fraud, camouflage. Eter- 
nal danger — which Napoleon, occupying all Germany and 
incorporating it in his Armies, did not succeed in doing 
away ^vith. After Jena, Leipzig. To avert it, ever^'thing 
has been done that could be done. Effectives? Articles 
160 to 163 of the Treaty give us arms to put an end to the 
cunning dispersion which, under the names of Reichswehr, 
of Sicherheitspolizei, of Einwohnerwehr, of Nothilfe, has 
reconstituted in Germany at the beginning of 1920 an army 
of nearly a million men. War material? Supervision is, 
and will be, necessary. Article 213 authorizes us to this by 
placing our complaints before the League of Nations, whose 
procedure has been simplified to this end. Furthermore, 
the clauses relating to the Rhineland — neutralization and 
occupation — are not a negligible guarantee. Unless all 
Germany is to be occupied and administered entirely, could 
one, I repeat, go further? 

The effort accomplished may be gauged by figures, and 
I have summed it up in the following table : 



142 



THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 



SITUATION OF THE GERMAN ARMY 



1 


Before 
Armistice 


After 
Armistice 


After 
Project 

of 
March 3 


After 
Project 

of 
March 10 


After 

the 
Treaty 


Reduc- 
tion ef- 
fected 
Columns 
1 & 5 


Men 


5,500,000 

140,000 

218 

17 

71 

7,200 

9,000 


1,300,000 

40,000 

55 

5 

7 

4,700 

6,500 


191,000 

9,000 

15 

1 

5 

180 

600 


134,000 

6,000 

11 

1 

4 

None 

432 


96,000 

4,000 

7 

None 

2 

None 

288 


98 % 


Officers 


97 % 


Infantry Divisions 

Army Hq. Staffs 

Divisional Hq. Staffs... 
Heavy Artillery 


96.7% 
100 % 

97 % 
100 % 


Field Artillery 


96.8% 



Almost all the successive reductions, brought out in this 
table, are the work of the French delegation and particu- 
larly of its chief. It is M. Clemenceau who, from the first 
draft to the final text, reduced the number of men by 50 
per cent., of infantry divisions by 54 per cent,, of officers 
by 56 per cent., of Army Staffs by 60 per cent., of heavy 
guns by 100 per cent., field guns by 54 per cent., and the 
amount of munitions by 50 per cent. He it is who sup- 
pressed the Army Staffs retained by the military experts. 
This progress, slowly realized, was not always easy; not 
indeed that there was not always entire agreement between 
the Allies on the necessity of disarming Germany, but be- 
cause this agreement ever easily reached on negative 
measures was more hesitating in the case of positive action ; 
and also because too often the shibboleths of technique 
were an obstacle to the dictates of common sense. 

It is M. Clemenceau also who, at the end of May, when 
Count Brockdorff-Rantzau put forward his counter-pro- 
posals, prevented their acceptance. Some, out of fear of 
Bolshevism, urged concessions, either on the time limit of 
execution or on stated figures. One day, the military 
experts proposed to grant to Germany 200,000 men instead 
of 100,000. On June 8, a Technical Committee composed of 
Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Generals Bliss, Desticker, 
Cavallero and Naro, suggested to authorize during the first 
three months that would follow the entry of the Treaty in 
force, 300,000 men instead of 200,000. Unswervingly the 
French Govenxment refused, for the good of all, to enter on 



THE DISARMAMENT OF GERMANY 143 

this dangerous path, and at M. Clemenceau 's request the 
reply handed to ihe Germans on June 16 maintained abso- 
lutely the full wording of the military clauses, such as had 
been communicated on May 7 previously. 

However appreciable this result, the value of these guar- 
antees has none the less been discussed — and how bitterly. 
Let us admit that this value cannot be absolute ; it remains 
that, compared to the precedents that history furnishes, the 
situation brought about by the Treaty connotes an advance 
which cannot be over-estimated; it remains that these 
guarantees taken as a whole strengthen and increase the 
importance of each of them. Modern wars — the last has 
only proved it to« well — are waged not by armies alone but 
by whole nations not on *'the front" only, but in ''the 
rear ; " by the entire country ; by the mobilization of all its 
forces — ^man power, material, financial, naval, industrial, 
commercial and moral. The base of security under these 
circumstances is to know whether the Army left to Ger- 
many by the Treaty of Peace and the military status im- 
posed upon her thereby, will enable her unknown to the 
Allies to plan and to accomplish this complete mobilization 
of all the national forces, which is the essential condition 
of modern warfare. If Germany cannot under the cloak of 
her Army of 100,000 men successfully carry out this com- 
plete mobilization essential to success, Germany is not to 
be feared — because she cannot make war. To prepare her- 
self for it, she would be obliged to resort not only to secret 
and isolated infringements of such or such clauses of the 
Treaty, but to infringe them in every direction and on a 
scale so plain, so evident and so glaring that for her con- 
querors of yesterday to close their eyes and see nothing, 
they would have to have a will to suicide. Hindenburg for 
once spoke the truth when he wrote : 

It is useless to speak of the possibility for Germany to under- 
take a new war. . . Remember what a task it was for America to 
raise and equip an army of a million men. . . and yet they had the 
protection of the Ocean, while they prepared their artillery, their 
munitions and their aviation material. 



144 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Germany for her aviation, her heavy artillery, her armament, is 
not separated by the Ocean from her enemies; on the contrary 
these are already firmly established in German territory. Months 
would be necessary to prepare a new war, and do you think that 
the French would look on with their hands in their pockets?. . . 

A modern mobilization demands years of preparation — 
and cannot be carried out in secret. Neither of these essen- 
tials is henceforth in the hands of Germany and if the 
military clauses of the Treaty do not suppress a danger 
which will exist as long as there will be at our gates sixty 
million men who are proud to be called Germans, these 
clauses raise against this danger the greatest obstacles that 
reason can conceive and accumulate guarantees the like of 
which history has never recorded. If these clauses are en- 
forced ; if the suppression of obligatory military service is 
rigorously maintained ; if the aeroplanes, tanks, heavy artil- 
lery disappear; if there remain but 100,000 men mth 288 
field guns, manufactured in factories chosen by the Allies ; 
if the left bank of the Rhine and the zone of 50 kilometers to 
the east of the river remain strictly closed to all German 
preparations ; if the German mobilization instead of taking 
place on the left bank of the Rhine, must be carried out 
between the Elbe and the Weser; if finally the national 
Intelligence Services on whose findings the League of 
Nations will pass and take action, are vigilant, Germany 
mil be — for so long as all this is done mth care — ^incapable 
of preparing and of carrying into effect that fundamental 
act of war which is called the Mobilization. Enforced as 
they should be, the military clauses of the Treaty of Ver- 
sailles make this certain. 

To have demanded less would have been an insult to 
ouj* dead and a betrayal of our living. 



CHAPTER V 

THE LEFT BANK OF THE KHINE 

This was one of the main issues of the Peace Confer- 
ence. It brought out more clearly, more seriously than any 
other, the difference in national psychology, the difficulty 
that governments and peoples have in understanding one 
another, albeit they are loyal Allies, united by victory and 
by sacrifice. The occupation of the left bank of the Rhine 
and of the bridgeheads was for us French both an indis- 
pensable guarantee for the enforcement of the peace, and a 
necessary assurance against invasion such as had occurred 
twice in fifty years. To others, associated though they 
were heart and soul in our perils of the past and future but 
interpreting history in a different light, this occupation, 
no matter what its form or duration, seemed unjustifiable, 
useless and dangerous. 

As early as November, 1918, Marshal Foch on purely 
military grounds had addressed a Note to M. Clemenceau, 
laying stress on the necessity of making the Rhine the 
Western frontier of Germany. On January 10 following, 
in a second Note which he handed to the Commanders-in- 
Chief of the Allied Armies, Marshal Foch had developed 
his arguments and summed them up in the following 
conclusion : 

Marshal von Moltke placed the military frontier of Germany 
at the Rhine, and at the end of one of his papers writes : * ' There 
can be no doubt about the ordinary strength of our theatre of 
operations on the Rhine. One thing only could endanger it — a pre- 
mature offensive by us on the left bank with insufficient forces." 
And elsewhere he states: "The main line of defense of Prussia 

145 



146 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

against France is the Rhine with its fortresses. This line is so 
strong that it is far from requiring all the forces of the monarchy. ' ' 

To-day this situation is reversed in favour of the coalition. The 
coalition cannot renounce its advantages, cannot relinquish its 
buckler of defense in that region — the Rhine — without seriously 
compromising its future. The "Waeht am Rhein" must be its 
slogan. 

Henceforth the Rhine must be the Western frontier of the Ger- 
man peoples. Germany must be deprived of all access to or mili- 
tary utilization of it, that is to say, of all territorial sovereignty on 
the left bank of this River — in a word, of every facility to reach by 
sudden invasion, as in 1914, of Belgium and Luxemburg, the shores 
of the North Sea and threaten England; to move around France's 
natural defenses, the Rhine and the Meuse; to conquer her north- 
ern regions and approach that of Paris. 

This is, for the present and the near future, a guarantee indis- 
pensable for the maintenance of peace, because : 

1. Of Germany's material and moral situation. 

2. Of her numerical superiority over the democratic countries 
of Western Europe. 

The Rhine, a military frontier indispensable for the mainte- 
nance of peace, which is the aim of the coalition, offers no territo- 
rial advantage to any country. There is no question indeed of an- 
nexing the left bank of the Rhine, of increasing tlie territory of 
France or of Belgium but simply one of maintaining on the Rhine 
the common barrier of security essential to the society of dem- 
ocratic nations. There is no question of entrusting the guardian- 
ship of this common barrier to any one Power, but of assuring by 
the moral and material support of all the democratic powers the 
defense of their lives and futures by forbidding Germany, once for 
all, to carry war and her spirit of domination across the river. 

Of course it will be the function of the Peace Treaty to fix the 
status of the inhabitants of the left bank of the Rhine not included 
within the French and Belgian frontiers. 

But this arrangement, whatever it be, must take into considera- 
tion the military necessity set forth above and therefore, 

1. Absolutely forbid to Germany all military access to, or 
political propaganda in, the Rhenish territories of the left bank, 
perhaps even protecting this territory by a neutral zone on the 
right bank. 

2. Assure the military occupation of the Rhenish territories of 
the left bank by Allied forces. 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE EHINE 147 

3. Guarantee to the Rhenish territories of the left bank the 
outlet necessary to their economic activities by bringing them into 
a customs union with the other Western States. 

On these conditions, and in accordance with the universally 
accepted principle of the liberty of peoples, it is possible to conceive 
the establishment, on the left bank of the Rhine, of new autonomous 
States, governing themselves subject to the above reservations, an 
arrangement which with the aid of a strong natural frontier the 
Rhine will alone be capable of assuring Peace to Western Europe. 

M. Clemenceau, after examining these two documents, 
decided to support their conclusions. He was even of the 
opinion that in view of objections which preliminary dis- 
cussions had already foreshadowed it would be necessary 
to reinforce this thesis with historical and political argu- 
ments, and at the same time to dispel the anxiety and 
answer the adverse criticism which it seemed to have 
aroused. I was entrusted, therefore, mth the preparation 
of a general Memorandum in support of our demand. This 
document served as a basis for the whole discussion. It 
seems to me indispensable to publish it in full. 

February 26. 

MEMORANDVM OF TEE FRENCH GOVERNMENT 

On the FIXATION at the RHINE of the WESTERN FRONTIER 

of GERMANY and on INTER-ALLIED OCCUPATION 

of the RHINE BRIDGES. 



THE OBJECTS TO BE ATTAINED 

The considerations which the French Government submits to 
the Conference on the subject of the left bank of the Rhine have no 
selfish character. 

They do not tend towards annexations of territories. They aim 
at the suppression of a common danger and the creation of a com- 
mon protection. 

It is a problem of general interest, a problem which France, the 
first exposed to the danger it is sought to avert, has the right and 



148 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

duty to place before the Conference, but whlcli directly affects all 
the Allied and Associated Nations and can be solved only by them 
conjointly. 

The essential aim which the Conference seeks to attain is to pre- 
vent by all just means that which has been from ever occurring 
again. 

Now, what happened in 1914 was possible only for one reason : 
Germany because of her mastery over offensive preparations made 
by her on the left bank of the river thought herself capable of 
crushing the democracies, France and Belgium, before the latter 
could receive the aid of the Overseas Democracies, Great Britain, 
the Dominions, and the United States. 

It was because this was possible that Germany determined to 
attack. 

It is therefore this possibility which must be done away with, by 
depriving Germany of the means which permitted her to believe in 
the success of her plan. 

In a word there is no question of the aggrandizement of any of 
the Allied Nations ; it is merely a question of placing Germany in a 
position where she can do no harm by imposing upon her conditions 
indispensable to the common security of the Western Democracies 
and of their overseas Allies and associates, as well as to t][ie very 
existence of France. 

There is no question of annexing an inch of German soil ; only 
of depriving Germany of her weapons of offense. 

II 

THE NECESSITY OF INTER-ALLIED OCCUPATION 
OF THE RHINE BRIDGES 

It is necessary first to examine the nature of the danger to be 
averted; to show whom it threatens, in what it consists; by what 
means it can be suppressed. 

1. The danger is common to all the Allies. 

(a) If, in 1914, the Germans, throwing back the Belgians, the 
French and the few British divisions then in line, had taken the 
Channel ports, the aid brought by Great Britain in 1915 to the 
common cause would have been greatly delayed if not entirely 
prevented. 

If, in 1918, the Germans had taken Paris, the concentration of 
the French Armies south of the Loire and the forcing back of our 
war industries would certainly have delayed the landing and move- 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 149 

ment by rail of the American Army, then just beginning to arrive, 
and this delay would have had consequences of the utmost gravity. 

Thus, there is no doubt, on two occasions — and it would be easy 
to furnish other instances — the military assistance of the two great 
overseas Powers came very near being hampered, if not prevented 
entirely, before actually taking shape. 

(b) In order that this may never be so, that is to say, in order 
that the maritime PoAvers may play a useful part on the Continent 
in a defensive war against an aggression coming from the Ea^, 
they must have the assurance that French territory will not be 
overrun in a few days. 

In other words, should there not remain enough French ports 
for the Overseas Armies to debark their troops and war supplies, 
should there not remain enough French territory for them to con- 
centrate and operate from their bases, the Overseas Democracies 
would be debarred from waging a continental war against any 
Power seeking to dominate the Continent. They would be deprived 
of their nearest and most natural battleground. Nothing would be 
left to them but Naval and Economic warfare. 

So, the lesson made plain by the last war is that a strong natural 
protection on the East is a matter of common concern to the West- 
ern and Overseas Democracies. And this lesson is emphasized by 
the fact that Russia to-day no longer exists. 

To decide upon this protection, let us first see whence the 
danger comes. 

2. The danger comes from the possession hy Germany of the 
left hank and the Rhine bridges. 

If Germany was able to plan and execute the sudden attack 
which nearly settled the outcome of the war in five weeks, it was 
because she held the left bank of the Rhine and had made of it 
against her neighbors an offensive military base constantly and 
quickly supplied, thanks to the capacity of the Rhine bridges. 

All military history since 1815 demonstrates this and the plan is 
written out in full in the publications as well as in the acts of the 
German General Staff. 

(a) History first, that of 1870, as of 1914. 

In 1870, despite the then shortcomings of the Prussian system 
of railways, it was on the left bank that the concentration of the 
Prussian troops was carried out. 

This fact is all the more significant because the Prussian Gen- 
eral Staff was still under the impression of the reputation of the 



150 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

French Army in attack and consequently, very cautious. Despite 
this, but on the hypothesis that France would have taken the 
initiative, Prussia had confined itself to the preparation of a plan 
of concentration farther east but always on the left bank. 

In other words, she had no thought of using the river as a pro- 
tection ; and, in any contingency, she looked upon it as the offensive 
base indispensable to the execution of a plan of attack. It is known 
that in fact, thanks to its concentration on the left bank, the Prus- 
sian Army invaded France in less than three weeks. 

In 1914, the same situation produced the same results. But 
things moved faster, thanks to the enormous developments of facili- 
ties. Germany, massed once more on the left bank of the Rhine 
(and much nearer to the French frontier than in 1870, because of 
the perfection of her railway system) was in a few hours able to 
carry the war to Belgium and to France, and in a few weeks to the 
very heart of France. 

Before even the declaration of war Germany invaded a region 
from which France drew 90 per cent, of her iron ore, 86 per cent, 
of her pig iron, 75 per cent, of her steel, while 95 out of the 127 
blast furnaces fell into the hands of the enemy. 

This situation permitted Germany to multiply her war 
resources, while depriving France of her most necessary means of 
defense. It nearly resulted in the taking of Paris in 1914, of Dun- 
kirk, Calais and Boulogne six weeks later. 

All this was possible only because, at our very gates, at a few 
days' march from our capital, Germany had the most formidable 
offensive military base known to history. 

(b) This military base she has had for a century and in pur- 
suit of a policy of aggression which has never varied — and which 
had as its objective the bridgeheads of the Sarre in 1815, of the 
Rhine and of the Moselle in 1870, and of the Meuse in 1914 — has 
constantly reinforced it, openly asserting that the left bank of the 
Rhine was indispensable to her for that purpose. 

During the negotiations at the Conference of Vienna, Gneisenau 
and Grolman already indicated that the "main concentration of 
the Prussian Army must take place between the Rhine and the 
Moselle. ' ' 

"Won over by their insistence, Castlereagh wrote to "Wellington 
on October 1, 1815 : "Mr. Pitt was altogether right when, as early 
as 1805, he wanted to give Prussia more territory on the left bank 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE EHINE 151 

of the Khine, and thus put her in closer military contact with 
France. ' ' 

In 1832, Boyen repeated that the point of concentration must be 
Treves. 

In 1840, Grolman, reiterating the same idea, declared the first 
objective of German concentration to be an offensive in Lorraine 
and in Champagne. 

The same idea prompted Moltke's plan of operations against 
France in 1870. It is this same plan that Germany carried out in 
1914 on an unprecedented scale and with unprecedented violence. 

Finally, need we recall that in November, 1917, Admiral von 
Tirpitz declared in an address to the German Fatherland League, 
that * ' without the possession of the left bank, Germany would have 
been unable to pass her Armies through a neutral Belgium?" 

(e) Such being the doctrine Germany translated into action 
by organizing for military purposes the left bank of the Rhine and 
the bridges which are the key to that organization. 

With this in view she built fortresses, concentration camps, 
finally and above all, a railway system powerfully equipped for 
attack and linked by the Rhine bridges with the whole railway 
system on the right bank, which also was laid out for the same pur- 
poses of attack. The fortifications of the Rhine and of its left bank 
comprised in addition to the fortified districts of Metz-Thionville 
and Strassburg-Molsheim (whose role will disappear with the 
return of Alsace-Lorraine to France) the Rhine fortresses — 
Cologne, Coblenz and Mayence — crossing points for the strategic 
railways, and vast entrenched camps (supplies, equipment, bar- 
racks, and factories and workshops, etc.). 

The training camps, like that of Malmedy, were suitable for 
transformation into concentration camps — an easy way of concen- 
trating troops under pretense of training in the neighborhood of a 
peaceful or even neutral state (France, Belgium, Luxemburg). 

The railway system is of still wider significance. A glance at 
the map of German railways on the right bank of the Rhine, will 
show that nine great independent transportation highways con- 
verge towards the bridges and continue across them to the left 
bank. 

Eight of these nine highways run between Duisburg and Ras- 
tatt, flooding the French frontier with troops and preparing the 
way for aggression. 

It is, therefore, obvious that the plan of aggression, conceived 



152 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

and prepared as early as 1815, and twice executed — in 1870 and 
1914 — was based upon the transportation capacity of the Rhine 
bridges. "Without the left bank, and above all, without the bridges 
— the second feeding the first — aggression would not have been 
possible. 

(d) And this is so true, that, as early as 1909, General von 
Falkenhausen, in his book Der Grosse Krieg der Jetztzeit, 
showed that by her mastery of the bridges, Germany could wage 
war in enemy territory even supposing that the French, British 
and Italian Armies had utilized before the opening of hostilities 
the territories of Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg and the Rhine, and 
had carried out their concentration in front of the Schlestadt- 
Sarreburg-Saint-Avold-Luxemburg-Bastogne line. 

Even in such a contingency, according to the General, if Ger- 
many concentrated on the Rhine and controlled the bridges, the 
transportation capacity of these bridges would enable her, in three 
days to transport half of her forces — more than twenty Army 
Corps — to the line Juliers-Duren-Kochem-Birkenfeld-Kaiserlau- 
tern-Haguenau, without her adversaries having time to prevent it. 

It will be seen that the hypothetical conditions stated by Gen- 
eral von Falkenhausen correspond exactly to the situation which 
would arise if peace were to leave Germany in possession of the 
Rhine bridges. This possession of these bridges, according to the 
General's own demonstration, would suffice, no matter what hap- 
pened, to assure to Germany the advantages of an offensive war. 

This hypothesis proves, in other words, that the danger arises 
from the possession by Germany not only of the left bank but also 
and, above all, of the Rhine bridges. 

Thus, geography, history and the doctrine of the German Gen- 
eral Staff all go to prove that the aggressive power of Germany 
depends upon the strategic railway system she has built on the left 
bank of the Rhine, taken in combination with the river fortresses, 
that is to say, in the last analysis, that her power of aggression is 
measured by the transportation capacity of the Rhine bridges. 

If that power of aggression is to be abolished, it is essential to 
take from Germany not only the left bank, but the Rhine bridges, 
which amounts to the fixation of her Western frontier at the Rhine. 

That is an absolutely essential condition. Is it a sufficient 
safeguard ? 

(3) The safety of the Western and Overseas Democracies 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 153 

makes it imperative, in present circumstances, for them to guard 
the bridges of the Rhine. 

Would the non-occupation by Germany of the left bank and the 
bridges suffice to prevent the renewal of her sudden attacks of 1870 
and 1914 ? Certainly not. 

(a) If indeed the bridges are not guarded against Germany, 
she can easily seize them by reason of her railway system on tihe 
right bank. The railway map shows this. 

Can it be said that in this case it be enough to destroy the sys- 
tem of strategic railways on the left bank? It would either be 
impossible or useless. 

Impossible, because a total destruction cannot be conceived ; for 
the railways respond to economic as well as to strategic demands. 

Useless, because a partial destruction, involving only the mili- 
tary equipment, would be ineffective, for the military and the 
commercial stations are often the same. 

It would always, therefore, be possible for Germany either to 
build new stations on commercial pretexts or to supplement those 
already existing with debarcation sidings along the tracks. 

(b) On the other hand, even dismantled, the Rhine towns, 
with their bridges, railway stations, commercial equipment could 
always constitute splendid points for the detraining and concen- 
tration of troops. 

In other words, the only positive guarantee against a German 
aggression is inter-allied occupation of the bridges, for, if once 
this occupation is effected and Germany were again to plan an 
aggression, it would first be necessary for her to modify her rail- 
way system on the right bank. This would quickly become known. 

Therefore, the occupation of the bridges is the minimum protec- 
tion essential to the Western and Overseas Democracies. 

(e) It is also an indispensable protection for the new States 
which the Allies have called into being to the east and south of 
Germany. 

Let us suppose that Germany, controlling the Rhine, should 
decide to attack the Republic of Poland, or the Republic of 
Bohemia. 

Established defensively on the Rhine, she would hold in check 
for how long nobody knows the Western nations coming to the 
rescue of the young Republics, and the latter would be crushed 
before they could receive aid. 



154 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

(4) Conclusion. 
To sum up : 

(a) The common safety of the Western and Overseas Democ- 
racies makes it essential that Germany should be unable to renew 
her sudden attack of 1870 and 1914. 

(b) To prevent Germany from renewing that attack, it is 
essential to forbid her access to the left bank of the Rhine, and to 
fix her western border at the river. 

(c) To forbid her this access, it is essential that the bridges be 
occupied. 

This is the one and only way : 

(a) To deprive Germany of her offensive base. 

(b) To provide the Western Democracies with a proper and 
reliable defense; first, by the width of the Rhine (preventing any 

sudden attack by means of gases, tanks, etc ) ; second, by its 

straight course (preventing any flanking movement). 

The history of a whole century shows the necessity of this 
defense ! The common safety of the Allies demands that the Rhine 
should become, in President Wilson's words "the frontier of 
freedom. ' ' 

III 

INADEQUACY OF PRESENT GUARANTEES 
FURNISHED BY THE LIMITATIONS OF THE MILITARY 
FORCES OF GERMANY OR BY THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 

Everybody, we believe, will be agreed on the object to be 
attained. But it may be asked whether there is only one way to 
attain it. 

In other words, is the guarantee — Germany and her military 
forces thrust back across the Rhine and the Rhine bridges occupied 
by the Allies — which the French Government deems absolutely 
indispensable, the only one which can possibly attain the object 
sought ? 

Would not sufficient protection be afforded, on the contrary, 
either by limitation of Germany's military forces or by the terms 
of the first draft of the League of Nations ? 

To this question, the French Government for the following rea- 
sons makes a negative reply. 

(1) The limitation of the military forces of Germany is not at 
present an adequate guarantee. 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 155 

(a) Germany's military strength rests upon three basic 
factors. 

Man Power (seventy million inhabitants, furnishing 650,000 
men a year) ; war supplies (existing stocks and potential produc- 
tion) ; General Staff (which constitutes a veritable State within the 
State). 

Measures for limiting Germany's military forces are under con- 
sideration. They must rest upon the three foregoing factors, and 
more especially restrict : 

— the number and composition of divisions, the annual 
contingent, etc. 

— the equipment and supplies. 

— the old military organization (war college, manoeuvres, etc.). 

Suppose Germany accepts these restrictions. Will this be a 
complete safeguard? No. 

(b) First history — though not wishing to lay undue stress 
upon its lessons — teaches the value of skepticism. 

Just one instance ; in September, 1808, Napoleon imposed upon 
Prussia the undertaking that for ten years she would not keep an 
Army of more than 42,000 men or resort to any extraordinary levy 
of militia or national guards or to any other device which might 
give her a military force exceeding* this total of 42,000 men. But 
what actually happened ? 

In spite of Napoleon 's unceasing diplomatic and military super- 
vision, Prussia managed to elude or nullify all the clauses. Know- 
ing that with a population of five millions, she could maintain an 
Army of 150,000 men, she passed all her male population fit for 
service through the Army in the shortest time possible, by reducing 
the term of active service, and she also organized preliminary mili- 
tary instruction in her schools. 

Despite her conqueror 's threats and his power to bring pressure 
to bear upon Prussia, this military reorganization proceeded unin- 
terruptedly and resulted in the creation of the great National Army 
of several hundred thousand men which was mobilized in 1813. 

(c) So much for the past. "Will it be said that we shall have 
in the future more effective means of supervision than Napoleon 
had ? Perhaps. But we answer that the difficulties attending this 
supervision will increase far more than the efficacy of our means of 
supervision. 

Instead of a small country of five million inhabitants, we shall 
have to deal with a country of seventy millions. 



156 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Instead of a country without industries, we shall have to deal 
with a country possessing huge industrial resources. 

For our supervision to be real, it should extend over : 

—the war budget 

— the industrial budget 

— ^the organization of the General Staff and of the Army 

— the size of the Army and the recruiting laws 

— the supplies of war material 

— the manufacturing capacity of the whole German territory 

— the moral influences including schools and education. 

Does anyone believe that this supervision can be established in 
a day ? Does anyone believe that we shall laiow, for many years to 
come, whether or not it is effective ? Assuredly not. 

Can it fail to be recognized, on the other hand, that during the 
next few years Germany will retain through force of circumstances 
a military force, certain elements of which cannot be reduced — viz. : 

— ^highly trained staffs 

— an enormous corps of trained officers (110,500 in August, 
1918, excluding the Bavarian Army) 

— ^millions of soldiers broken to war 

— a man power of military age which will grow for many* years 
in direct ratio to the steady increase in the German birth rate. 

— war supplies and manufacturing potentialities, part of which 
Germany can conceal, since we, ourselves, — the Allies — have not 
yet been able to make an accurate estimate of our own existing war 
material. 

And can one on the other hand rely upon Germany for an 
honest fulfillment of her undertaking, when the so-called German 
Democracy shows in every direction a total lack of morality and 
has placed at its head men who were the most active agents of mili- 
tarism and imperialism: Ebert, Scheidemann, David, Erzberger 
and Brockdorf f-Rantzau, not to mention Hindenburg ? 

Besides as regards their intentions, we have their own state- 
ments. The Ebert Government has declared its intention of adopt- 
ing the Swiss military system. Translated into figures, what does 
this mean ? 

It means that Germany could on the basis of Swiss military law 
mobilize 193 divisions with the corresponding army troops — the 
exact force which she hurled against the Western front in her 
spring offensive of 1918. 

Again in the Miinchner Neveste Nachrichfen of January 25, 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE l57 

1919, was published a statement by the Bavarian war minister, 
estimating at 7,700,000 men the war strength of the future German 
Army, 3,200,000 of them being fighting troops, 

(d) From all this we may draw a conclusion, which all will 
admit to be just and conservative, that, at least for the present and 
for years to come, no limitation of Germany's forces is possible, no 
supervision of this limitation can assure complete safety, either to 
the victims of the German aggression in 1914, or to the new states 
now in process of formation. 

On the seas the total surrender of the German Navy has, to a 
large extent, afforded such a safeguard. On land nothing of the 
kind is possible. 

The result is that whatever improvement the future may bring 
to the general world situation, the limitation of Germany's mili- 
tary power can at present only hold out troops to the Western 
Democracies, but in no wise constitute a certain safeguard ! 

But hopes — without certainty — cannot suffice to those who suf- 
fered the aggression of 1914. 

Hopes — without certainty — cannot suffice Belgium, victim of 
her loyalty to her pledged word, punished for her loyalty by inva- 
sion, fire, pillage, rape and ruin. 

Hopes — without certainty — cannot suffice France, invaded 
before any declaration of war, deprived in a few hours (because 
she had drawn her troops back from the border to avoid incidents) 
of 90 per cent, of her iron ore and 86 per cent, of her pig iron, 
Hopes — without certainty — cannot suffice France whose losses 
were 1,364,000 killed, 790,000 crippled and 3,000,000 wounded, not 
to mention 438,000 prisoners who suffered physical martyrdom in 
German prison camps. Hopes — without certainty — cannot suffice 
France who lost 16 per cent, of her mobilized man power and 57 per 
cent, of her soldiers under 31 years of age — the most productive 
part of the nation, Hopes — without certainty^ — cannot suffice 
France who saw a fourth of her productive capital blotted out by 
the systematic destruction of her industrial districts in the North 
and in the East, who saw taken into captivity — and what captivity 
— her children, her women and her girls. 

To these two countries — Belgium and France — certain safe- 
guards are essential — not only the certainty of never again being 
exposed to what they suffered five years ago, but also the certainty 
that, failing physical guarantees, they will not have to bear over- 
whelming military burdens. But these certain safeguards cannot 



158 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

be furnished France and Belgium by the limitation of German 
military power. 

(2) Nor can the League of Nations, at present, provide an 
adequate guarantee. 

Can this complete security, which is indispensable and which 
cannot now be given either by limiting German military power, 
or by supervising this limitation, be found in the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, as now submitted to the Conference ? 

(a) Eight articles -of the draft Covenant (Articles X to 
XVIII) define the guarantees against aggression assured to the 
members of the League. These guarantees may be said to consist in 
a double interval of time, viz. : 

(1) The longest possible time between the threat of war and 
the act of war (to increase the chances of reaching agreement). 

(2) The shortest possible time between the act of war and the 
concerted action of the League members in aid of the country 
attacked. 

Under such conditions, we believe that this guarantee is inad- 
equate to prevent the recurrence of what took place in 1914, i. e. a 
sudden attack by Germany against France and Belgium and the 
immediate invasion of their territory. 

The reasons for our belief are numerous, principally the 
following : 

(b) First: the measures which determine the interval of time 
between the threat of aggression and the act of aggression (ordi- 
nary diplomatic methods, arbitration, inquiry by the Executive 
Committee, undertakings of the parties not to resort to force before 
arbitration and inquiry, and only three months after a judicial 
decision has been rendered) are applicable only if the dispute 
arises between nations having subscribed to the Covenant of the 
League. 

Now Germany is not and cannot be a member of the League. 

The Covenant provides, it is true, a complete procedure appli- 
cable to States not members. But there is no guarantee whatever 
that this procedure would be accepted by Germany, should she 
again plan a sudden attack. 

On the contrary, we have every reason to believe that she would 
act with the utmost speed. 

In such an hypothesis, it is clear that the Germany of to-day — 
the Germany that is evading the question of responsibilities, — the 
Germany of Scheidemann, Erzberger, Brockdorff-Rantzau — will be 
halted in her plans for aggression, neither by an invitation to join 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 159 

the League, nor by the threat of a financial and commercial block- 
ade. It is clear that Germany — knowing the penalty she would 
have to pay if she gave international forces time to come into play 
— will fall upon France and Belgium with the idea, even more 
firmly implanted than in 1870 or 1914, that time is for her the 
essential factor of success. 

We believe therefore that the provisions of the Covenant which 
enjoin legal steps between the threat of war and the act of war will 
not suffice to stop Germany, should she decide to attack. That is 
our first reason. 

(c) Second. Germany's method is sudden attack. "What 
immediate guarantee does the Covenant furnish? Eemember that 
proposals made by the French delegation with a view to the cre- 
ation of a permanent international force have been rejected. 

If one of the members is attacked, what happens? The Exec- 
utive Committee of the League takes action and specifies the 
strength of the military or naval contingents to be furnished by 
every member of the League. 

Suppose that the Committee takes this action with the utmost 
speed. Only one thing is lacking, the decisions of the Committee 
are not of themselves executory. 

Take, in order to make this clear, the ease of America, for 
instance. What happens ? 

The naval and military forces of the United States cannot be 
used without the assent of the Congress. Suppose Congress is not 
in session. Between a German aggression and the moment when 
American aid could become effective, the following steps would 
have to be taken : 

— a decision by the Executive Committee of the League. 

— a meeting of Congress, with the necessary quorum, which 
might take four or five days. 

— a message from the President of the United States. 

— ^a discussion of the matter before Congress. 

— the mobilization of an American Expeditionary Force and its 
transportation to Europe. 

We have cited the case of America but it is not the only one. 

Consider anew the necessary steps outlined above and apply 
them to the German attack of 1914, 

Suppose that invaded France and invaded Belgium had had to 
set this complicated machinery in motion before obtaining British 
aid and that Great Britain, instead of beginning to ship troops 
within a week, had been obliged (after al meeting of and actioii by 



160 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

the Executive Committee of the League of Nations, communication 
of its decision, discussion of the case by the British Government, 
meeting of Parliament, debate, etc) to delay her actual interven- 
tion till all these various things had been done, the left of the 
French Army would have' been turned at Charleroi, and the war 
lost on August 21, 1911. 

In other words, suppose that instead of the defensive military 
understanding — very limited indeed — which was given effect to 
between Great Britain and France in 1011 there had been no other 
bond between the two coimtries than the general agreements con- 
tained in the Covenant of the League, the British intervention 
would have been less prompt and Germany's victory thereby 
assured. 

So we believe that, under present conditions, the aid provided 
for by the Covenant of the League would arrive too late. That is 
our second reason. 

(d) Our third reason, and it is final, is that because of the 
geographical position of France we have two aims equally 
imperative : 

— the one is Victory 

— the other the protection of our soil. 

It may be accepted as certain that, thanks to the principle of 
solidarity embodied in the Covenant of the League, final victory 
would rest with us in the case of a new Gorman aggression. 

But this is not enough. "We are determined that invasion, the 
sj'stematic destruction of our soil and the suffering of our fellow 
citizens in the North and East, shall not again be endured from the 
time of the aggression to that of final victory. 

It is against this second danger, quite as much as against the 
danger of defeat, that a certain safeguard is necessary. This 
guarantee the League does not provide, but it is provided by the 
proposals put forward by the French Government. 

(e) Summing up here our argument touching the guarantee 
provided by the League, our contention is that : 

On the one hand, Germany will remain outside of the League of 
Nations for an indefinite length of time. 

On the other hand, the decisions of the Executive Committee, 
instead of automatically setting in motion an international force 
ready for action, will have to be submitted to the approval of the 
various Parliaments, which will decide whether or not their 
national forces may join the military forces of the nation attacked. 



THE LEFT BANK* OF THE RHINE 161 

So ^ve obtain neither of the two guarantees on which the peace- 
enforcing action of the League is supposedly based, namely : 

— a very long interval between the idea of war and the act of 
war. 

— a very brief interval between the act of war and the joining 
together of all the military forces of the League members. 

In default of these two guarantees, we ask against a Germany 
whose population is twice that of France, and whose word cannot 
be trusted for a long time to come, another kind of guarantee : a 
physical guarantee. 

This physical guarantee in our mind is not intended to take the 
place of the other, provided by the League, but to give the latter 
time to operate before it is too late. 

This physical guarantee — We have shown that there is such 
guarantee, and onlij one such -. the guard of the Rhine bridges by 
an inter-allied force. 

Let us add that, for the time being, it is to the interest of the 
League of Nations itself that this supplementary guarantee should 
insure the normal and effective working of the dual machinery con- 
ceived by the League for the maintenance of peace. 

IV 

SUPPRESSION BY INTER-ALLIED OCCUPATION OF THE 
RHINE BRIDGES OF SEVERAL CAUSES OF WAR 

"We have established : 

(1) That a common guarantee against the recurrence of any 
sudden attack from Germany is necessary. 

(2) That this guarantee cannot be completely assured either 
by the limitation or the suppression of Germany's military power, 
or by the proposed clauses of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations. 

(3) That this guarantee can be found only in the fixation at 
the Rhine of the Western frontier of Germany, and in the occupa- 
tion of the bridges by an inter-allied force. 

It is easy to show, moreover, that the common guarantee assured 
by, the occupation of the Rhine bridges accords with the common 
interests of the League and with its pacific ideals; it does away 
with a certain number of permanent causes of war which it is at 
once the interest and the duty of the League to eliminate. 

(1) Elimination of a dangerous disproportion in strength. 



162 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Germany (even without Poznan, Schleswig, Alsace-Lorraine 
and the Rhine provinces on the left bank) still has more than fifty- 
nine million inhabitants, to which would probably be added in case 
of war seven million German- Austrians, making a total of sixty-six 
million men. France, Belgium and Luxemburg, on the other hand, 
have not more than forty-nine million. 

Russia no longer exists as a counter-weight and the States 
recently created do not yet count. This was strongly emphasized 
by Mr. Winston Churchill, at a meeting of the Supreme Council of 
the Allies on February 15, 1919 : "There are twice as many Ger- 
mans as French and by reason of the high German birth rate, 
Germany has annually three times as many young men of military 
age as France. That is a tremendous fact." This "tremendous 
fact" is a war factor. If it cannot be eliminated, it is at least use- 
ful to try to reduce it. 

(2) Elimination of one of the economic causes of German 
aggressions. 

It is generally admitted that it is essential that industrial zones 
vital to each nation should be protected. 

For rapid occupation of these vital zones gives a decisive advan- 
tage to the aggressor, who thus adds to his own means of production 
those which he wrests from his adversary. It is thus certain that 
the possibility of securing such an advantage is a cause of war. 

History demonstrates this. In 1815, Germany aimed at the coal 
of the Sarre ; in 1870 at the ores of Lorraine ; in 1914 at the ores of 
Briey. 

Germany herself has explicitly admitted that, if she was able to 
carry on the last war it was because she was able by sudden attack 
to seize the French ores "without which she could never by any 
possibility have waged this war successfully." (Memorandum of 
the German iron and steel manufacturers, December, 1917). 

If the Rhine had separated the two Powers, no such action 
would have been possible. And it is strengthening the peace to 
remove from Germany — in separating her from her historical 
objective — one of the main motives of her past aggressions. 

(3) Protection for the smaller states whose safety the League 
of Nations seeks to secure. 

First to Belgium by removing from her a dangerous neighbor. 
Admiral von Tirpitz, quoted above, made this statement to the 
German Fatherland League (MUnchner Neueste Nachrichten, 
November 11, 1917) : 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 163 

"Realize clearly what would happen if our existing front — now 
resting on the sea, — should be on the eastern border of the Rhine 
country, we could never again succeed in throwing our armies 
through a neutral Belgium. ' ' 

Then to Poland, to Czecho-Slovakia, to Jugo Slavia which, 
should Germany take advantage of their initial difficulties and 
seek to throttle them, must not see the Rhine, held by Germany, cut 
off the aid awaited by them from the Western Democracies. 

(4) Closing the great historic road of invasion. 

The left bank of the Rhine has been for centuries the road of 
invasions. Its natural situation on the one hand, the direction of 
its railway lines on the other, have made of it one of the battle 
grounds of history, where the peoples of the right bank (whenever 
they also controlled the left bank) found potentialities of aggres- 
sion which the interests of peace demand should be done away with. 

(5) Creation of a natural frontier equal for all. 

The Rhine, both on account of its width and of the straightness 
of its course, offers to the peoples of both banks the same natural 
guarantee against aggression. 

(6) Conclusion. 

From the foregoing it is permissible to conclude that the com- 
mon guarantee created by the fixation at the Rhine of the Western 
frontier of Germany and by the occupation of the Rhine bridges 
by an inter-allied force, is not only necessary but in complete 
accord with the principles advocated by the League of Nations for 
the prevention of future wars. 



FRENCH INTERESTS IDENTICAL WITH GENERAL 
INTERESTS 

It is now possible to obtain a bird's-eye view of the problem 
which can be summed up as follows : 

(a) In this matter, France claims nothing for herself, neither 
an inch of territory, nor any right of sovereignty. She does not 
want to annex the left bank of the Rhine. 

What she proposes is the creation in the interest of all of a com- 
mon protection for all the peaceful democracies, of the League of 
Nations, of the cause of Liberty and of Peace. 

But it is France's duty to add that her bequest, which accords 
with the general welfare and is free from any selfish design, is of 



164 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

vital necessity to herself and that on its principle she cannot com- 
promise. France sees in it in fact the only immediate and complete 
guarantee that what she suffered in 1870 and 1914 will not occur 
again and she owes it to her people, to the dead who must not have 
died in vain, to the living who wish to rebuild their country in peace 
and not to stagger beneath overpowering military burdens to obtain 
this guarantee. 

As to the manner of applying this guarantee, the French Gov- 
ernment is ready to consult with its Allies with a view to establish- 
ing under the most favourable conditions the national, political and 
economical system of the regions, access to which it demands shall 
be forbidden to Germany. To this end, the French Government 
will accept any suggestions which are not inconsistent with the 
principle stated. 

This principle may be summed up in three paragraphs. 

1. No German military force on the left bank of the Rhine, and 
fixation at the Rhine of the Western frontier of Germany. 

2. Occupation of the Rhine bridges by an inter-allied force. 

3. No annexation. 

This is what under present circumstances France asks as a 
necessary guarantee of international peace, as the indispensable 
safeguard of her national existence. 

She hopes that all her Allies and Associates will appreciate the 
General Interests of this proposal. 

She counts, on the other hand, that they will acknowledge her 
right and her duty to present and to support this demand for her 
own sake. 

(b) Also this is not the only time that the vital interests of a 
nation have accorded with the general interests of mankind. 

At all times the great naval Powers have asserted — whether the 
issue were Philip II or Napoleon or William II — that their 
strength was the only force capable of offsetting imperialistic 
attempts to control the continent. 

It is on this ground that they have justified the maintenance, 
for their own advantages, of powerful fleets. 

Yet, at the same time, they have never concealed the fact that 
these fleets were a vital necessity to themselves as well. 

Of vital necessity to the British Isles and the British Empire — 
which have made known their refusal to give up any part of that 
naval power which enabled them to hold the seas against Germany. 

Of a vital necessity to the United States, washed by two oceans, 
requiring safeguards for the export of its natural and industrial 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE EHINE 165 

resources, and which despite its peaceful policy has for the above 
reason created a Navy that is even now being further expanded. 

For Great Britain, in fact, as well as for the United States, the 
Navy is a means of pushing away from beyond their coasts the 
frontier which they would have to defend in case of aggression, and 
of creating a safety-zone in front of this frontier, in front of their 
national soil. 

For France, the question is the same with this triple difference : 
that, first, she is not protected from Germany by the seas; that, 
second, she cannot possibly secure on land the complete guarantee 
which Great Britain and the United States secured on the sea by 
the surrender of the German fleet to the Allies, and that finally, 
the **one to two" ratio between her population and Germany's 
precludes the hope that in case of war she may ever enjoy the ad- 
vantage which the naval Powers have always derived from the 
"two power standards. ' ' 

For France, as for Great Britain and the United States, it is 
necessary to create a zone of safety. 

This zone the naval Powers create by their fleets, and by the 
elimination of the German fleet. This zone France, unprotected by 
the ocean, unable to eliminate the millions of German trained to 
war, must create by the Rhine, by an inter-allied occupation of 
that river. 

If she did not do so, she would once more be exposed, if not to 
final defeat, at least to a partial destruction of her soil by an enemy 
invasion. 

It is a danger which she never intends to run again. 

Moreover, as explained above, the guarantee of peace created 
by the existence of the naval Powers, could not be of full effect 
unless the occupation of the Rhine provided a similar guarantee 
for the "Western Democracies. 

At a recent meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allies, Feb- 
ruary 11, 1919, Mr. Winston Churchill and Mr. House showed one 
after the other what the future has to fear from a Russo-German 
rapprochement. 

In such an event it is not with their fleets that the naval Pow- 
ers, capable only of establishing a blockade, could defend the 
continent against an imperialistic aggression. 

The naval Powers would still need the possibility of landing on 
the continent and of fighting there. For that the inter-allied guard 
of the Rhine is indispensable. 



166 THE TKUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

But there is more and one may ask whether, in such case, even 
the blockade established by the fleets would be effective. Of what 
use would it be against Germany, mistress of Russia, colonizing and 
exploiting Russia, if Germany were to strike a successful and de- 
cisive blow against France and Belgium, occupying their ports and 
dominating all the neutral powers of Europe ? 

This fear was expressed by Mr. House at the meeting of Feb- 
ruary 15, when he pointed out the danger of an union "of the 
whole world east of the Rhine." To prevent such an union, or at 
least to avert its consequences, there is only one way: that the 
Rhine, henceforth, instead of serving as in the past Germany 
against the Allies, should protect the Allies against the undertak- 
ings of Germany. 

In commending this viewpoint to the attention of our Allies 
and Associates, and more especially of the two great naval Powers, 
the British Empire and the United States, the French Government 
is deeply conscious that it is working for peace, just as the naval 
Powers are conscious that they serve the cause of peace by main- 
taining or increasing their naval forces. 

And just as the naval Powers, in maintaining or increasing 
their fleets, have no design whatsoever to conquer the seas, so the 
demand of France as to the guard of the Rhine involves neither 
gain nor sovereignty nor annexation of territory. 

France does not demand for herself the left bank of the Rhine : 
she would not know what to do with it, and her interest equally 
with her ideals forbids any such claim. 

France demands one thing only. It is that the necessary and 
only possible and certain measures to prevent the left bank of the 
Rhine from again becoming a base for German aggression, shall be 
taken by the Powers now gathered at the Peace Conference. 

In other words, with no territorial ambitions, hut deeply imbued 
with the necessity of creating a protection hoth national and inter- 
national, France looks to an inter-allied occupation of the Rhine for 
the same results that Great Britain and the United States expect 
from the maintenance of their naval forces ; either more, or less. 

In both cases, a national necessity coincides with an interna- 
tional safeguard. 

In both cases, even if the second be interpreted in different 
ways, the first will remain for the country concerned an obligation 
subject neither to restriction nor reserve. 

Such is the principle that the French Government begs the 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE EHINE 167 

Allied and Associated Governments to confirm and sanction by 
adopting the following decision to be inserted in the provisions of 
the preliminaries of Peace .- 

1. The Western frontier of Germany must he fixed at the 
Rhine. 

2. The Iridges of the Rhine must he occupied hy an inter- 
allied force. 

3. The above measures to imply no annexation of territory to 
the benefit of any Power. 

To this document setting forth the principle of our 
demand I had attached two appendices. One was the out- 
line of a political system applicable to an independent 
Rhineland, the other a study of the economic results of its 
independence, both on the left bank of the Rhine and in 
Germany itself. 

The first of these Notes recalled that during the greater 
part of their history the Rhine provinces of the left bank, 
with their five and a half million inhabitants, had been 
independent of both Prussia and Germany. Since 1815 
they had lived, under Prussian as well as under Bavarian 
rule, as ''crown property" — a legal title abolished by the 
fall of the Hohenzollerns and the Wittelsbachs. Originally 
peopled by Celts and Latinized by Rome, they had in the 
course of centuries been affected quite as strongly by 
French as by German influences. In 1793, they had greeted 
the French as liberators and gratefully accepted the wise 
administration of Napoleon. Since that time, again at- 
tached to Germany, they had persisted in their hatred of 
Prussia and their inhabitants called themselves "must be 
Prussians" (Muspreussen). At present, all the concord- 
ant reports submitted by us to our Allies tended to show 
this rich region in terror of the separatist danger, wanting 
the maintenance of order above all else, distrustful of the 
Prussian officials and, though Gernian in tongue and tradi- 
tion, probably capable of developing politically along liberal 
lines, if it could thereby serve its o^vn interest. The peace 
of Europe demanded, in our view, that the left bank of the 
Rhine should become independent. There was no reason 



168 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

we thought why the left bank itself should not appreciate 
the advantages of this independence. Our Note enumerated 
in support of this contention various measures: suppres- 
sion of military service j relief from war taxes ; facilities of 
food supplies and export ; customs union ; banking reforms ; 
independent government under the protection of the 
League of Nations — all of which seemed likely to help the 
conditions imperative for common safety. 

Our last Note, exhaustive and very detailed, analyzed, 
one by one, the conditions which would prevail both in 
Germany and in a free Rhine State, after the latter had 
been set up. This study dealt in turn with the territories, 
the inhabitants, the large cities, the railroads, river naviga- 
tion, wine, wheat, rye, barley, oats, hay, potatoes, sugar, 
coal mines, lignite, iron ore, cast iron, steel, zinc, lead, cop- 
per and textiles. It was sununarized in a table (see oppo- 
site page) and concluded as follows: 

1. The loss of the left bank of the Rhine, added to that of 
Alsace-Lorraine, deprives Germany of eight per cent, of her terri- 
tory and represents a loss of : 

11% of her population 

15% approximately of her railroad and river traffic 

67% of her wine industry 

12% of her coal mines 

80% of her iron ore 

33% at least of her metallurgy 

30% of her textiles 

Of the important articles, only cereals, sugar and potatoes 
would be slightly diminished by from four per cent, to nine per 
cent. 

2. The left bank of the Rhine, separated from Germany, 
would easily find the products she needs (cereals, iron ore, mineral 
and chemical products). 

Her fuel exports would provide an adequate outlet in France. 

Her mental and textile products would, as before, be obliged to 
find a market outside of Germany. 

Her chemical products (dyestuffs, etc.) would, like those of the 
right bank, have to face the budding competition of the countries 



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170 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

of the Entente. Her wines, however, heretofore consumed in Ger- 
many, would probablj^ have difficulty in finding buyers elsewhere, 
and it might be necessary to force Germany to levy only specified 
duties. 

A customs union between France, Belgium and the Rhine coun- 
try would offer advantages in regard to a large number of products 
and at least would offer no disadvantages. 

It would, however, present four problems: one, easily solved, 
regarding metal products; and three others, more delicate, regard- 
ing wines, textiles and coloring matters. 

The independence of the Rhineland, only effective guar- 
antee that this region would act as barrier and buffer 
between Germany and the Western Democracies — for its 
autonomy as part of the German Reich would merely place 
it in the same position as Bavaria, whose theoretical "lib- 
erty" did not prevent it, in 1870 or 1914, from joining the 
attack against France — the independence of the Rhineland 
and its occupation by Allied forces — essential as a military 
safeguard — appeared to us to be a political and economic 
possibility. It was a solution of Liberty, not of Imperial- 
ism. A certain safeguard against a Germany ever more 
populous than France ; a guarantee of the peaceful enforce- 
ment of the Treaty which was to found a new order of 
things in Europe — thus it was that France presented the 
problem from the beginning. And if only a part of Francois 
proposals prevailed, still it was as a safeguard and as a 
guarantee that the Treaty of Versailles imposed upon 
Germany the occupation by the Allies of the Rhineland left 
under her sovereignty, but forbidden to her Army. 

II 

By the end of December, M. Clemenceau and I had pre- 
sented our arguments to Mr. House who appreciated their 
importance. During the crossing from America, our Am- 
bassador at Washington, M. Jusserand, had talked them 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 171 

over with President Wilson, who had seemed to acknowl- 
edge their weight and who, two months later, at the 
beginning of March, had not yet, according to his most 
intimate collaborators, any definite objection to them. On 
the English side, on the contrary, a strong resistance was 
encountered and the friendly tone in which it was couched 
in no way lessened its firmness. 

The Rhine policy advocated by France had from the 
beginning been misunderstood by the British ministers. 
There where France saw an essential guarantee — a guar- 
antee of execution and of security — Mr. Lloyd George and 
his colleagues, obsessed by memories of Napoleon and by 
the intemperance of part of our Press, feared as early as 
1917 a menace to the peace of Europe. It was in 1917 that 
Mr. Balfour in two speeches energetically repudiated the 
idea of a self-governing Rhine State which M. Aristide 
Briand had suggested the preceding January in a confi- 
dential letter to M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at 
London. The British Minister of Foreign affairs had 
denied that an agreement between the Allies had ever con- 
templated the creation of independent States on the left 
bank of the Rhine. "Such a solution," he added, ''has 
never entered into the policy of the British Government." 
Mr. Lloyd George, for his part, had often repeated: "We 
must not create another Alsace-Lorraine." He also said: 
"The strongest impression made upon me by my first visit 
to Paris was the statue of Strassburg veiled in mourning. 
Do not let us make it possible for Germany to erect a sim- 
ilar statue. ' ' Speeches and remarks revealed, under vary- 
ing forms, a fear from which the British Government had 
never freed itself. 

The first conversations brought us echoes of this fear. 
It was unreservedly admitted that we needed guarantees. 
But the means proposed by us caused alarm. All talk of 
separation between Germany and the left bank, of military 
occupation of the latter, of participation in this occupation, 
was extremely repugnant to our Allies. And, from the 



172 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

outset, they emphasized the fact that other securities were 
possible, such as disarmament of Germany ; the League of 
Nations; if need be, the complete demilitarization of the 
left bank of the Rhine. Our Memorandum, published 
above, had answered these objections. But despite the 
answer, the objections kept reappearing. 

It was towards the beginning of March that the serious 
discussion began. President Wilson is, at the moment, on 
the ocean en route for France. Mr. Lloyd George has just 
returned to Paris. It is decided to prepare the work of 
the heads of Governments by a conference of three. I rep- 
resent France, Mr. Philipp Kerr, Great Britain, and Doctor 
Mezes, the United States. We meet twice, on March 11 and 
12, in Mr. Lloyd George's apartment at 23 rue Nitot. I 
explain verbally, in all its details the proposals of my 
Memorandum of February 25. As my explanation pro- 
ceeds, I become conscious of the psychological barrier just 
mentioned. I am offered a strengthening of the disarma- 
ment clauses. I am offered a reinforcement of those deal- 
ing with demilitarization. As soon as I return to the 
question of occupation, opposition becomes more marked. 

Mr. Mezes says little. These eight hours of discussion 
are a dialogue betAveen Mr. Kerr and myself, and it is 
evident that through the voice of his Chief Secretary it is 
the British Prime Minister himself who — invisible but 
present — speaks with some reserve at the first meeting, 
more emphatically at the second. Is it possible, objects 
my opponent, to occupy a German territory, bridgeheads 
included, inhabitated by seven million Germans ? Is it pos- 
sible, on the other hand, to separate these Germans from 
Germany without consulting them and thus to betray the 
very principles for which the Allies have fought? French 
tradition 1 But years have passed, and the historical argu- 
ment has been too much used and abused by Germany 
against France, for France to be willing to make use of it 
against Germany. Besides, in her official declarations, 
both by her Government and her Parliament (December 30, 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 173 

1916, January 10 and June 5 and 6, 1917, and November 4, 
1918) France made no such demands. So it is impossible 
to participate in such an occupation. So, also, it would 
cause deep regret if France sought to undertake it alone; 
and Mr. Kerr sums up his objection as follows : 

''In a word we quite agree with France as to the object 
to be attained. We are not sure we agree with her as to 
the method to be employed. 

\^''We do not agree to military occupation. England is 
equally opposed both to a permanent Army, and to the use 
of British troops outside of English territory. Further- 
more occupation tends to create a nationalist irritation not 
only on the left bank of the Ehine but throughout all Ger- 
many. It may at the same time foster in Anglo-Saxon 
countries a propaganda unfavourable to the Allies, and 
especially to France. Besides, Germany being disarmed, is 
occupation necessary? 

"Nor do we agree as to the creation of an independent 
State on the left bank of the Rhine. We see in it a source 
of complication and of weakness. If, after a longer or 
shorter period, this independent State asserts its will to 
reunite with Germany, what shall we do? If Press propa- 
ganda or public meetings with this end in view go on within 
its territory, are the troops of occupation to be used to 
prevent it? If local conflicts occur, whither will they lead? 
If war results from these conflicts, neither England nor 
her Dominions will have that deep feeling of solidarity with 
France which animated them in the last war. 

"It is, therefore, impossible for us to accept the solution 
you propose." 

I reply. I recall that the Rhinelanders are not Prus- 
sians. I show that the French proposal excluding annexa- 
tion is the reverse of imperialistic; that the control of the 
League of Nations gives every facility for evolution; that 
France, after such unparalleled sufferings, has a right to 
insist upon the acceptance of the methods of her choice. 
Public opinion is hostile? Public opinion must be enlight- 



174 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

ened. It has already learned much during the war, and 
first of all this, that France is the sentinel of the Overseas 
Democracies. Besides in default of occupation, what 
guarantee is there that the treaty will be fulfilled? And I 
added : 

''You say that England does not like English troops to 
be used away from home. It is a question of fact. England 
has always had troops in India and Egypt. Why? Be- 
cause she knows that her frontier is not at Dover. But, 
the last war has taught her that her European frontier is 
on the Rhine and that the Rhine is more important to her 
than even the Suez Canal or the Himalayas. 

''You say that the British public does not understand 
this question. It is the duty of the British Government to 
make it understand. Neither did the English public under- 
stand in 1914 the necessity of conscription. War has 
taught it many things. 

"You say that there is a danger of provoking nationalist 
irritation in Germany. The German defeat has already 
created this feeling. Wherefore, then, the need of protec- 
tion against a risk which will exist in any case? 

"You say that the Rhineland will revolt. Our answer 
is that fear of Bolshevism and dread of war-taxes dominate 
the Rhinelander, and that, moreover, we are not threaten- 
ing them with annexation. We are offering them independ- 
ence. Other peoples — the Germans of Bohemia, for 
instance — will, under the Treaty, have to accept a foreign 
sovereignty. 

"If you object to a possible resistance of British 
opinion, we rely on the certain revolt of French opinion 
against a peace which would not include the occupation of 
the Rhine. England did not feel that the complete sur- 
render of the entire German fleet permitted her to do away 
with her own. And France will not admit that the partial 
disarmament of Germany on land — ^partial, because, for 
twenty years, she will have at her disposal three million 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 175 

trained men — absolves France from the necessity of taking 
guarantees. 

"To ash us to give up occupation, is like ashing England 
and the United States to sink their fleet of battleships. 
We refuse. 

*'We want no annexation. But we want our security. 
"We consider the question a vital one, and I do not even 
need to consult M. Clemenceau to declare, in his name, that 
we insist upon our demand. ' ' 

Accordingly, I hand my friends a draft of seven articles 
and agree with them that, as no agreement has resulted 
from our conference, the question will have to be decided 
by the heads of Governments. The proposal I submitted 
was as follows : 

March 12, 1919. 

WESTERN FRONTIER OF GERMANY 

1. In the general interest of peace and to assure the effective 
working of the constituent clause of the League of Nations, the 
Western frontier of Germany is fixed at the Rhine. Consequently 
Germany renounces all sovereignty over, as well as any customs 
union with the territories of the former German Empire on the 
left bank of the Rhine. 

2. The line of the Rhine to be occupied under a mandate of the 
League of Nations by an inter-allied military force. 

The extent and conditions of occupation in German territory of 
the bridgeheads of Kehl, Mannheim, Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne 
and Dusseldorf, necessary to the security of inter-allied forces to be 
fixed by the final Treaty of Peace. Until the signature of the said 
Treaty the conditions of occupation established by the Armistice of 
November 11, 1918, to remain in force. 

In a zone of fifty kilometers east of her "Western frontier Ger- 
many shall not maintain nor erect fortifications. 

3. The territories of the left bank of the Rhine (except Alsace- 
Lorraine) to constitute one or several independent States under the 
protection of the League of Nations. Their Eastern and Southern 
frontiers to be fixed by the Peace Treaty. Germany undertakes to 
do nothing which could hinder the aforesaid State or States in the 



176 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

fulfillment of the duties or tlie exercise of the rights devolving 
upon them from the causes or the conditions of their creation. 

4. Within one month after the signature of the present pre- 
liminaries of peace, the general conditions of evacuation of the 
higher German and Prussian civil officials at present on duty on 
the left bank of the Rhine, to be settled by a special agreement 
between the signatory Powers and the German Government. 

5. Within two months from the signature of the present pre- 
liminaries of peace, a special agreement between the signatory 
Powers and the German Government to determine, under the guar- 
antee of the League of Nations, the general conditions of liquida- 
tion of the German economic interests on the left bank of the 
Rhine. 

6. The German Government undertakes to furnish every year 
to the independent State or States, which may be created on the left 
bank of the Rhine, the amount of coal necessary for their indus- 
tries. This amount shall be credited to Germany in the general 
reparations account. 

This was on March 12. On the morning of the fourteenth 
President Wilson arrives in Paris. After an interview 
with Mr. Lloyd George, he meets the same afternoon M. 
Clemenceau and the British Prime Minister at a private 
talk of two hours, without secretary or interpreter at the 
Hotel de Crillon. M. Clemenceau explains once more the 
French proposals. He tells our needs, our dangers of yes- 
terday and of to-morrow. Alone against Germany, invaded 
and bleeding, we ask not for territory, but for guarantees. 
Those offered to us — disarmament, demilitarization. 
League of Nations — are inadequate in their present form. 
Occupation is indispensable. It is essential that this occu- 
pation be inter-allied. It is essential that the left bank 
be closed to the political and military schemes of Germany. 
Its independence is at once the condition and the conse- 
quence of the foregoing. 

At first the same objections are made to the same 
arguments. But to the great Frenchman who holds his 
ground and sticks to his original demands, an entirely dif- 
ferent and most capital proposal is soon made. Great 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 177 

Britain, with her century-old pride in her splendid isola- 
tion, the United States, ''too proud to fight," separated 
from the rest of the world by AYashington's Farewell Ad- 
dress and the Monroe Doctrine, offer France a formal 
pledge of alHance: — their immediate military guarantee 
against any unprovoked aggression on the part of Ger- 
many; an unprecedented and immensely significant pro- 
posal which will assure us in peace the same unity of 
power wliich enabled us to win the war. 

M. Clemenceau, "who asked nothing" — ^he will recall 
it with pride before the Senate later — immediately states 
the very great value he attaches to this offer. But he 
expresses at the same time his formal desire not to give an 
immediate answer. He intends before so doing to reflect 
and to take counsel. The next two days, March 15 and 16, 
three meetings are held at the Ministry of War between 
MM. Clemenceau, Pichon, Loucheur and myself, when ver- 
bally and in three successive Notes the various aspects of 
the problem are analyzed and discussed. From this study 
two conclusions appear, both equally illuminating, and for 
the moment at least mutually contradictory. 

The first is that a French Government which, receiving 
such an offer under such conditions, would allow it to 
escape would be guilty of a crime. The second, that a 
French Government satisfied with only this and nothing 
more would be equally guilty. A grave contradiction 
indeed. For, in the conversation of March 14, Mr. Lloyd 
George and Mr. "Wilson have clearly indicated that they 
offered the military guarantee in lieu of occupation and 
the independence of the left bank. It is to avoid the latter 
which they do not wish, that they propose the former which 
to these two countries so justly proud of their strength 
seems of equal, if not of greater, value. They recognize as 
indisputable France's right to the guarantee, demanded 
by her in the Notes of January 8 and February 19 
and 25 and in the conversations of February 6, 19 and 23, 
and March 11, 12 and 14. But rejecting the method pro- 



178 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

posed by us — and because they reject it^they propose 
another. The left bank of the Rhine to remain German. 
The left bank of the Rhine to be occupied neither by an 
inter-allied nor by a French force. In return, Great Britain 
and the United States to give France their solemn pledge 
of immediate military aid in case of danger. 

M. Clemenceau's mind is made up on the evening of the 
sixteenth and his decision expressed in a Note handed to the 
heads of the Allied Governments on the morning of 
the seventeenth. A proposal is made to us, which substitutes 
one guarantee for another. We refuse this substitution. 
We gratefully note, with the fullest appreciation of its 
value, the pledge offered and desire to accept it but only 
on the express condition that it be supplemented by most 
of the other guarantees demanded by us, first of all, 
by occupation. This is the text of the Note of March 17, 
1919. 



NOTE ON THE SUGGESTION MADE MARCH 14 



RESUME OF THE FRENCH PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 25, 1919. 

(1) The military occupation of the Rhine by an inter-allied 
force (with this immediate and lasting result, separation of the left 
bank from the German Reich and Zollverein) is, in the present state 
of international relations, a vital necessity for France and of com- 
mon interest to the Allies. A detailed memorandum has proved 
this assertion. 

The object is to prevent the renewal of that which we have 
undergone twice in fifty years and for that to deprive Germany of 
her essential means of attack (the left bank, the railroads and the 
bridges of the Rhine). 

As a guarantee of this the military occupation of the Rhine 
border is indispensable to France, with a far smaller population 
than Germany, deprived of Russia's alliance, and without good 
natural frontiers. 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 179 

On tlie other hand the Overseas Democracies cannot fight in 
Europe if the French ports and railroads are not substantially 
protected. The last war demonstrated how serious for them is this 
danger which might completely deprive them of a European 
battlefield. 

(2) The limitation of the military forces of Germany is not a 
sufficient guarantee against this danger until experience has 
proved the method efficacious, and especially so long as Germany 
has at her disposal more than three million men who are trained to 
war, because they fought in war. The total suppression of the 
German fleet was not sufficient reason for the naval countries to 
disarm their own fleets. On land, France, too, has need of physical 
guarantee. 

The League of Nations is also not a sufficient guarantee. The 
present draft of its clauses makes final victory almost certain. 
But the League is too slow moving a mechanism to prevent terri- 
torial invasion at the beginning of a war. Here also, therefore, a 
physical guarantee is necessary. 

This physical guarantee is the military occupation of the Khine 
and the control of its bridge traffic. 

(3) The objections presented do not modify this conclusion. 
It is feared on the left bank that there may be a movement for 

union with Germany. But the left bank is different from the rest 
of Germany. It fears Bolshevism and war-taxes. It is conscious of 
its economic independence. It has no liking for Prussian officials 
forced upon it by the Empire. Separatist tendencies are already 
making themselves felt despite the strict reserve we have 
maintained. 

A nationalist irritation in Germany is foreseen. Defeat has 
aroused this sentiment. The question resolves itself into protecting 
ourselves against its possible consequences. 

It is thought that the proposed solution may be suspected of 
imperialism. But it is not a question of annexation, it is a question 
of creating under the safeguard of the League of Nations, an inde- 
pendent State in accordance with the interests of the inhabitants 
and with the aspirations of a very large number of them. This is 
not a Bismarckian solution. 

Anxiety is expressed concerning the effect upon British and 
American opinion. But the whole lesson of the war is that the 
Rhine is the military frontier not only of FrauQe and Belgium, but 
of the Overseas Democracies as well, * ' The Frontier of Freedom, ' ' 



180 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

as President Wilson expressed it. These Democracies will under- 
stand this as they understood the necessity of conscription during 
the war, as British democracy understands to-day the channel 
tunnel. 

The danger is pointed out of the indefinite duration of the occu- 
pation. But as the entire organization of the left bank is to be in 
the hands of the League of Nations, the latter will always have the 
right to alter it. 

Therefore, the physical guarantee which will make impossible a 
renewal of the 1914 situation, remains of vital necessity to France 
in the present state of international relations. 

II 

EXAMINATION OF THE SUGGESTION PRESENTED BY OUR ALLIES 

(1) The suggestion presented on March 14, that Great Britain 
and the United States should pledge themselves in case of aggres- 
sion, by Germany to bring their military forces to the aid of France 
without delay, is a recognition that France needs a special guar- 
antee ; but in place of the physical guarantee demanded by France 
it substitutes a political guarantee designed to curtail by a definite 
pledge the time which would elapse between the menace of war and 
the joint action of the Allied forces. 

The French Government fully appreciates the great value of 
such a guarantee, which would profoundly change the international 
situation, but this guarantee to be effective must be supplemented 
and defined. 

(2) In the first place there will always be, on account of dis- 
tance, a period in w"hich France attacked will have to defend her- 
self single-handed without her overseas Allies; she must be able to 
do this under fairer conditions than in the past. 

On the other hand, it is important there should be no doubt 
about the substance and scope of the pledge — that is as to the obli- 
gations imposed upon Germany, the methods of their enforcements, 
the nature of the act which shall constitute a menace of war, the 
right of France to defend herself against it, and the importance of 
the military aid to be furnished by Great Britain and the United 
States. 

(3) In other words, before we can consider giving up the 
first guarantee (a material guarantee founded on space) it is essen- 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 181 

tial that the second guarantee (founded on time, that is on the 
speedy aid of our Allies) lend itself to no uncertainty and that it 
be supplemented by some of the other safeguards contained in the 
first guarantee. 

It is really not possible for France to give up ai certain safe- 
guard for the sake of expectations. 1 

III 

POSSIBLE BASES OP AGREEMENT 

Wishing to respond to the suggestion which has been made to it, 
the French Government thinks it its duty to set out in detail the 
general bases upon which agreement might be reached, these bases 
being the minimum guarantees indispensable to France. 

It should be agreed, in the first place, that : 

In case Germany, in violation of the peace conditions imposed 
upon her by the Allied and Associated Governments, should com- 
mit an act of aggression against France, Great Britain and the 
United States would bring to France the aid of their military 
forces. 

Therefore : 

(1) The date and the conditions of evacuation of the bridge- 
heads on the right bank, and of the territories on the left bank of 
the Rhine, to be fixed by the Peace Treaty (as one of the guarantees 
to be taken for the execution of the financial clauses).* 

(2) Germany to maintain neither military force nor military 
organization on the left bank of the Rhine nor within fifty kilo- 
meters east of the river. The German Army to be forbidden to ma- 
noeuvre there. Recruiting to be forbidden there — even appeals for 
volunteers. Fortifications to be demolished there. No new fortifica- 
tions to be erected there. No war material to be mnaufactured 
there. (Certain of these clauses already figure in the preliminary 
peace proposals: but in the present hypothesis it would be neces- 
sary to strengthen them.) 

(3) Great Britain, the United States and France to have the 
right to satisfy themselves by means of a permanent Commission of 
Inspection that the conditions imposed upon Germany are com- 
plied with. (For without this right the preceding clause would be 
worthless.) 

(4) Great Britain, the United States and France to agree to 



'In other words an occupation for thirty years. 



182 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

consider as an act of aggression any entry or attempted entry of all 
or any part of the German Army into the zone fixed in para- 
graph 2. 

(5) Furthermore, Great Britain and France to recognize the 
right of France to occupy the line of the Rhine with five bridge- 
heads of a radius of twenty kilometers in case Germany, in the 
opinion of the Commission of Inspection, should violate the terms 
of paragraph 2 or any one of the military, aerial, and naval clauses 
of the peace preliminaries. {In fact, if France gives up after thirty 
years' permanent occupation she must at least in case of danger of 
war resulting from Germany's violation of her pledges, he able to 
advance her troops to the only good defensive position, that is to 
the Rhine.) 

'(6) Great Britain and the United States to recognize to 
France her frontier of 1814 and by way of reparation the right of 
occupation without annexation of that part of the coal basin of 
the Sarre not included within this frontier. 

P. S. It goes without saying that hy act of aggression against 
France, the French Government also means any aggression against 
Belgium. 

The French Note of March 17 marks the beginning of 
negotiations in which twice a day up to April 22, we kept 
up our efforts. Our object? To obtain the proffered 
guarantee but with the addition of occupation — and a few 
other safeguards which to the minds of our Allies were to 
be replaced purely and simply by their military guarantee. 

Ill 

The difficulty which had revealed itself to us on March 
14, gained substance in every conference held and in every 
Note exchanged — English Notes of March 26 and April 2 ; 
American Notes of March 28 and April 12, and daily and 
uninterrupted conferences. On many points we make 
progress from day to day. For the first plan of disarma- 
ment, another and distinctly better one is substituted which 
does away with conscription and reduces the German Army 
to 100,000 men serving twelve years. The demilitarization 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 183 

of the left bank is extended to a zone of fifty kilometers on 
the right bank. The violation of this zone by Germany is 
to be considered a hostile act. Better still the right of 
verifying the execution of the military clauses of the Treaty 
by investigations in Germany is entrusted to the Council 
of the League of Nations acting by a majority. Finally 
the Treaties of Guarantee are drafted. But of occupation, 
no word agreeing to our initial demand, repeated and main- 
tained in our Note of March 17. 

It appears that Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. "Wilson are 
now in complete agreement against any occupation. On 
the twenty-sixth, the British Prime Minister hands his col- 
leagues a General Note on the peace, in which after insist- 
ing on the danger of too drastic a peace he sums up his 
point of view regarding the left bank of the Rhine as 
follows : 

No attempt to be made to separate the Rhenish provinces from 
the rest of Germany. 

These provinces to be demilitarized, that is, the inhabitants of 
this territory will not be permitted to bear arms or receive any 
military training or to be incorporated in a military organization 
either on a voluntary or a compulsory basis ; and no fortifications, 
depots, establishments, railway construction, or works of any kind 
adapted to military purposes will be permitted to exist within this 
area. No troops to be sent into this area for any purpose whatso- 
ever, without previous notification to the League of Nations. 

As France is naturally anxious about a neighbor who has, twice 
within living memory, invaded and devastated her land with sur- 
prising rapidity, the British Empire and the United States under- 
take to come to the assistance of France with their whole strength 
in the event of Germany moving her troops across the Rhine with- 
out the consent of the Council of the League of Nations. This 
guarantee to last until the League of Nations has proved itself to 
be an adequate security. 

Mr. Wilson also in a Note of April 12 forcefully recalls 
the scope and importance of his proposals of March 14 and 
27, which were identical with those of Mr. Lloyd George, 
and he adds with great gravity: 



184 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

It will be recalled that these proposals were made jointly with 
Mr. Lloyd George who made practically identical proposals with 
regard to the action of Great Britain. 

Both Mr. Lloyd George's proposals and my own, were made 
after repeated consideration of all other plans suggested, and they 
represent the maximum of what I myself deem necessary for the 
safety of France, or possible on the part of the United States. 

Every day, often twice a day, M. Clemenceau renewed 
his efforts: 

*'I beg to point out," he said, ''that on the seas this 
guarantee has already been provided. Germany no longer 
has a Navy. "We must have an equivalent guarantee on 
land. America is far away, protected by the ocean. Even 
Napoleon could not reach England. You are both under 
cover. We are not. No man has less of the militaristic 
spirit than I. But we want safety." 

Mr. Lloyd George kept to his invariable formula. 

**You must fully understand the state of mind of the 
British public. It is afraid to do anything whatsoever 
which might repeat the mistake Germany committed in 
annexing Alsace-Lorraine. ' ' 

We repeat our arguments, ever more urgent and direct. 
We recall the fact that the English put Prussia in; or 
allowed Prussia to put herself, on the left bank of the 
Rhine in 1815. They know what it has cost them. We 
show how they have continued to assure their own safety 
by a Navy superior to that of all other powers combined. 
Can they be astonished then that France desires a physical 
guarantee on the Rhine ! England has asked France not to 
question her naval policy which enabled the war to be won, 
but which restricted the liberty of neutrals. France whose 
Army saved the world on land, as the English Fleet saved 
it on the seas, thinks it just that for her safety on which 
the safety of all is dependent, a similar guarantee and 
restriction should be acceded to. On March 31, M. Cle- 
menceau summoned Marshal Foch and the Commanders-in- 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 185 

Chief of the Allied Armies before the Council of the Four. 
The Marshal of France once more presents the argument 
of his Notes of November 27, and January 10. He then 
reads a new report summarizing the others. This is its 
conclusion : 

To sum up, unless we hold the Rhine permanently, no neu- 
trality, no disarmament, no written clause of any kind, can prevent 
Germany from seizing the Rhine and debauching from it at an 
advantage. 

The Rhine remains to-day the barrier essential to the safety of 
the peoples of Western Europe, and therefore, of civilization. 

In the circumstances, it seems difficult to refuse to the nations 
in the forefront of battle — France and Belgium — the protection 
they deem indispensable to enable them to live and fight until 
their Allies arrive 

Whether the inhabitants of the left bank of the Rhine remain 
German or not, the political frontier between the Western Euro- 
pean nations and Germany is the Rhine. 

I urge with all my strength upon the Allied and Associated 
Governments, which in the most critical hours of the war entrusted 
to me the conduct of their armies and the future of our common 
cause, to consider that the future can only be permanently assured 
— to-morrow as it was yesterday — by the military frontier of the 
Rhine and its occupation by the Allies. This essential position 
must therefore be held. 

Everyone listens attentively. But not one of the Allied 
Generals supports the Commander-in-Chief. On April 4, 
the King of the Belgians joins the Conference of the heads 
of the Governments but he too does not express himself in 
favour of an extended occupation. We are alone. The 
atmosphere is tense. Overseas newspapers grow aggres- 
sive. Some French papers are no less so. In two days, 
Mr. Lloyd George gives out two soothing interviews, the 
effect of which does not last. Subordinates are nervous, 
and make blunders. In spite of Mr. House, the mendacious 
news is published that the George Washington has been hur- 
riedly summoned to Brest. 



186 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

M. Clemenceau holds his ground unmoved. We send 
Note upon Note (March 19, 20, 22, 28 and 31, and April 4, 
5, 15, 16 and 19). We show that no matter how important 
the results attained it remains indispensable to give the 
Treaty a guarantee of execution, to give to France a 
material safeguard against a Germany which because of 
the war will have millions of trained soldiers for years to 
come. We show that occupation alone meets this double 
need. Days pass. 

At last M. Clemenceau 's indomitable will wins its end. 
Light begins to break. Slowly, prudently and patiently, he 
widens the opening and on April 20 at six o'clock in the 
evening he secures — first of all — from President Wilson 
his approval of the provisions of Chapter 14. On the 
morning of April 22, Mr. Lloyd George gives his approval 
also, but not without again renewing his objections. M. 
Clemenceau, who for two days has been in agreement with 
President Wilson, maintains all his points— duration of the 
occupation, its possible extension; participation by the 
Allies. Mr. Lloyd George ends the discussion: 

*'Very well, I accept." 

The long debate is over. Despite divergencies of 
opinion, the personal relations between the three men dur- 
ing those forty days have never ceased to be sincere, calm 
and affectionate. May their fellow countrymen never 
forget it! 

The inter-allied occupation of the left bank and the 
bridgeheads of the Rhine are fixed at fifteen years. Evac- 
uation is to be by zones, every five years, but only on condi- 
tion that Germany faithfully complies with the Peace 
Treaty. If faithful compliance is lacking, there is to be no 
evacuations at five-year intervals. Even at the end of 
fifteen years, we retain in any event, a safeguard; if the 
guarantees against an unprovoked German aggression are 
deemed insufficient, there is to be no evacuation.* Finally, 
if, after evacuation, Germany fails in her obligations to 

*See Chapter VI, page 209, and following. 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 187 

pay, there is to be re-occupation by all the Allies, — not by 
France alone. Remember that, from the beginning of Jan- 
uary to the end of April, the participation of the Allies 
in the occupation and even occupation itself had been 
refused us; that as a substitute we had been offered the 
two Treaties of Guarantee and that at the end of the dis- 
cussion we had both the treaties and the occupation, y^e 
had gone a long way. 

But such was, notwithstanding the advantages won by 
M. Clemenceau, the attachment of some great men to our 
original proposal that, even before the agreement was made 
public, strong opposition broke out. Hardly was the dis- 
cussion between the Allies closed than it began between 
the French. Marshal Foch, whose views the French Govern- 
ment had so strongly defended, feels that the time limits 
accepted by M. Clemenceau destroy the value of the guar- 
antee. He does not hide his way of thinking, even from 
the Press. On April 17, he refuses to transmit to General 
Nudant, President of the Armistice Commission and rep- 
resentative of the Allied and Associated Governments in 
their dealings with the German Government, the convoca- 
tion which the Council of Four has decided to address to 
the enemy plenipotentiaries for April 25. On the eighteenth 
Le Matin publishes an article (inspired by him and the 
proofs of which had been corrected by one of his officers) 
against the conditions of peace. Then it is an interview in 
the Daily Mail, the reproduction of which is forbidden in 
the French Press by the Censorship, but which none the 
less has its echo in the lobbies of Parliament where a resolu- 
tion is prepared to be presented in the Senate. 

These incidents, and others as well, create a certain 
amount of friction in Allied circles. They oblige M. Cle- 
menceau to defend the Commander-in-Chief with some 
warmth against the criticisms of some heads of Govern- 
ments who blame his recent interventions. M. Clemenceau 
regrets them as much as they do. But he makes it plain — 
with generous foresight — that the men of victory must stick 



188 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

together and ''that the image they hold in the nation's 
mind be not broken." The discussion is somewhat sharp. 
Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Wilson take the view that the 
Commander-in-Chief has no right to adopt the attitude he 
has assumed in the past two days. They say: 

*'We very willingly placed our Armies under the 
supreme command of a French General for whom we have 
the highest admiration and the deepest gratitude. But 
this General, no matter how great his glory, is an obstacle 
to the decisions of the Governments. We cannot accept 
this situation and permit t^^e authority we have conferred 
to be turned against us. It is a fundamental question of 
constitutional responsibility." 

They add: 

''We are to-day as yesterday, ready to accept a French 
General as Commander-in-Chief. But, we must have a 
General who obeys the Governments." 

M. Clemenceau, to gain time, himself sends to General 
Nudant the message which Marshal Foch had declined to 
transmit and on the eighteenth in the evening asks M. Poin- 
care to summon Marshal Foch. On the nineteenth the heads 
of the Allied Governments asked M. Clemenceau what he 
had done in the matter. M. Clemenceau replies that he is 
going to see the Marshal immediately after the Council, and 
that the next day he will be able to inform them. As we were 
leaving the Hotel Bischof f sheim M. Clemenceau says to me : 

"Foch is coming presently. Although he has unques- 
tionably put himself in the wrong, I want to get him out 
of it. I don't want the Chief of Victory to be touched." 

I ask him if he expects to succeed. He answers : 

"I think so." 

Marshal Foch arrives at a quarter past six at the Min- 
istry of War. M. Clemenceau explains the situation to him. 
The Marshal, somewhat embarrassed, says that he has 
been misunderstood; that he made objections but that he 
does not refuse to send the convocation to the Germans; 
that he knows nothing of the newspaper articles. M. Cle- 
menceau reminds him that he wrote a letter of refusal on 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 189 

receipt of the order to transmit the convocation. He cites 
the name of the officer of his staff who went to correct 
the proofs. The Marshal remains silent. M. Clemenceau 
says to the Marshal: 

''Come, yon are sorry for all that, aren't you?" 

The Marshal answers: 

''I regret it with all my heart." 

M. Clemenceau, full of cordiality, bogs him not to allow 
himself to be used by papers and politicians and as he 
shows him out, he pats him on the shoulder with friendly 
bruskness : 

''Look here," he says, "they are pulling your leg. 
Don't let 'em." 

And the Marshal smiling answers: 

"All right. I will call off my dogs of w\ar." 

A frank avowal by the great soldier of the pressure that 
his over-wrought entourage has brought to bear upon him. 
M. Clemenceau is now sure of adjusting the matter which, 
from the very first, he had been anxious to do. He tele- 
phones the result of his interview to M. Poincare and the 
next morning, April 20, at ten o 'clock, he informs Mr. Lloyd 
George and Mr. Wilson that the matter is settled, that 
there has been a misunderstanding, that Marshal Foch is 
sorry and that all is well. The two heads of Governments 
let the matter drop. Thus, thanks to M. Clemenceau, thanks 
to his firm and prudent stand, thanks to the great moral 
influence with his colleagues, the incident was closed. 

But the conflict reappears on April 25, at the Cabinet 
meeting, in the final sitting when the whole French Gov- 
ernment is to pass upon the Treaty. Marshal Foch, 
specially invited to be present by M. Clemenceau, renews 
his criticisms. He is listened to mth attention. He mth- 
draws. The Cabinet deliberates and after two hours of dis- 
cussion unanimously approves the Treaty. But even that 
is not all, and on May 6, at the plenary session of the Con- 
ference twenty-four hours before the Treaty is handed to 
the Germans, the illustrious leader of the victorious Armies 
once more makes heard his protest : 



190 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

''Chapter XIV," he says, ''provides as guarantee for 
reparations, the occupation of the country on the left bank 
of the Rhine for a period of five, ten, or fifteen years. Could 
we discuss the question at length, it would be easy to prove 
that, from the military point of view, this guarantee 
amounts to nothing and that it mil become an increasing 
burden upon the Allied Armies. Before going any further, 
therefore, I wish to state that the guarantee represented 
by Chapter XIV or Section XIV — ^I do not remember which 
— is in my judgment equal to zero, all the while involves 
us in increasing military expenses. This is the first reser- 
vation that I make ! 

"Moreover, according to my understanding, we shall 
hold the Rhine for five years as a military guarantee and 
as a means of assuring our indemnities. After five years, 
and by the tenth year, we would abandon the Rhine, from 
the Dutch frontier to below Cologne — that is a space of 
more than two hundred kilometers out of the five hundred 
held by us. 

"Right now I would call attention that from the point of 
indemnities, this means giving up the greatest industrial 
area in the occupied territory and the bridgeheads which 
furnish access to the basin of the Ruhr, the principal source 
of Germany's wealth, which we no longer menace and 
whose seizure we renounce. 

"After ten years, we give up eighty additional kilome- 
ters of the Rhine line, from Cologne to beyond Coblenz. 
Eventually, after fifteen years, the Rhine barrier will be 
abandoned along the whole length of the occupied territory, 
and France will find herself with her frontier of 1870 — 
that is with no military guarantee, whatsoever. After fif- 
teen years, as you see, we shall have no further guarantee 
for the indemnities. Therefore, I state that, in this respect, 
Section XIV is completely ineffectual. As payments and 
indemnities are to continue for thirty years, we shall find 
ourselves for fifteen years with guarantees more or less 
restricted and, after those fifteen years, with none at all. 

"I call your attention to this lack of military guarantees. 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 191 

On the other hand, reoccupation of the occupied territory, 
during or after this fifteen-year period, is contemplated, 
in case Germany should fail to execute part or all of the 
Treaty which she signed. Who is to decide upon the advis- 
ability of this reoccupation? The Reparation Commission. 
For all violations of the Treaty clauses — even those which 
have no connection with indemnities, whether they be of a 
military or of an administrative nature — the Commission 
on Indenmities will be the one to intervene and say ' Clause 
so-and-so has been violated. Therefore, reoccupation of 
the occupied territory is in order.' Is the Commission 
alone quaUfied to do this? Furthermore, in the question of 
indemnities, it will be the part of the Commission to estab- 
lish any violation of clauses that do not figure in the 
Treaty, since they are not to be established until a period 
following the signing of the Treaty. This jurisdiction is 
not sufficient. 

*'To sum up, the Treaty assures complete guarantees 
for a period of five years, during which Germany will 
doubtless be in a position to do no harm. But, from that time 
on, as German power returns and our danger increases, 
our guarantees decrease, until, at the end of fifteen years, 
they disappear altogether. After this period, there will be 
no further means of enforcing payment from an enemy 
which has thirty years in which to pay, while all the time 
the Allied expenses will be mounting up. 

*'In short, it is an indisputable fact that, in order to 
occupy a line other than the Rhine line and establish a 
strong barrier on this side of the river, more troops will be 
necessary. Our expense, therefore, will increase as our 
guarantees decrease, until they reach zero. At the same 
time, during the fifteen years, we shall have other losses 
to make good. 

* ' There is only one way to hold the enemy to his engage- 
ments, and that is to maintain the occupation of the Rhine. 
With only a few forces on the Rhine, we can in fact prevent 
all action on the part of Germany, and reserve all action 
for ourselves. 



192 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

"These are the observations I have to present on Sec- 
tion XIV. I ask that all these provisions be re-examined, 
especially by the military experts of the Allied Nations. 

*'If I were asked what solution I have to suggest, I 
should answer as follows : * The question of the Rhine bank 
is absolutely conditional upon the Rhine. Everything is 
regulated by this river. Master of the Rhine, means mas- 
ter of the whole country.' Not to be on the Rliine means 
losing everything. "We have a comparison close at hand. 
If we wished to defend ourselves in this room, we should 
need only to hold the doors to keep the enemy from enter- 
ing. Inversely if we lose the doors, the enemy can enter. 
And so, as long as we hold the barriers of the Rliine, we 
shall be complete masters on the left bank, at little expense. 
If, on the contrary, we give up the Rhine, we shall need a 
large force to hold a land where, in any case, our position 
will be weak, since the enemy will be free to come and 
attack us when he will, 

''From a military point of view, therefore, the Rhine 
alone is important. Nothing else counts. Occupation of the 
Rhine bank is valueless unless we seize the Rhine. If we 
fall back, we will, as I have said, give up our pledges, we 
will open the doors, and place ourselves in a position of 
inferiority, because we shall be obliged to occupy a country 
that has no obstacles, to keep in it a much larger Army — in 
a word to occupy it in a much more expensive manner. 

"The most economical and the surest way is to maintain 
the occupation of the Rhine. It may be that I am mistaken. 
That is why I ask the other military experts to join me in 
going over this chapter again. How long should the Rhine 
be held? Just as long as we wish to keep our guarantee, 
since there are no others. When we find we have been 
paid, and that we have sufficient guarantees, we shall only 
have to retire our troops and leave. 

"Take note that I ask for the occupation of the Rhine, 
and not for that of the Rhine land. It is on this point that 
our opinions disagree. I have been criticized for wishing to 
occupy a country. That is quite inexact. I wish to occupy 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 193 

the passage of tlie Rhine, — an occupation which will re- 
quire a very small military force. 

"When the execution of the Treaty shall have been car- 
ried forward, when the German countries have given evi- 
dence of unmistakable good faith, and disarmament has 
gone into effect, the expenses of everybody — ^Allies and 
Germans — can be lightened by reducing the Army of Occu- 
pation. This will be accomplished, as you see, not by giv- 
ing up ground, but by reducing the actual numbers of the 
occupying Army. 

''To sum up, from the military point of view, I state 
absolutely that we must stay on the Rhine, and that we 
must not abandon this line, or even part of it, unless we 
wish to assume a burden of expense, weaken our position, 
and stand without guarantees at the end of a certain time. 
These observations apply to the whole line of the Rhine, 
from Cologne to Coblenz and Mayence. 

''These are the chief observations I wished to make. I 
ask that they be given consideration, and that some action 
be taken with regard to my statement, for I cannot allow 
these provisions to pass unchallenged. I have not seen the 
text of the Treaty. I may be mistaken, but I ask, again, 
that, if the text be thus, it be given for examination to mili- 
tary experts, who will see to what extent it may be 
modified." 

The Government heads held a meeting immediately. 
This statement created more surprise than emotion. On 
the one hand, the Marshal placed himself on financial 
grounds which escaped his competence and propounded a 
theory of guarantees which figures reduced to absurdity.* 
On the other hand, from the military point of view, he 
arbitrarily ignored a certain number of facts which had to 
be taken into account in any case: first the unswerving 
opposition of the Anglo-Saxon countries to indefinite occu- 
pation; then the offer made by them to France to bring 
her their armed assistance in case of German aggression; 



*See Chapter X, page 334. 



194 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

finally the right obtained by M. Clemenceau not to evacu- 
ate in five-year periods if Germany violated her financial 
undertakings, and not to evacuate at the end of fifteen 
years if at that time the guarantees, that is to say, the 
British and American Treaties, seemed insufficient* and 
to reoccupy after evacuation if any violation by Germany 
was proved. All these provisions together gave satisfac- 
tion to the demands of the Commander-in-Chief. Besides, 
his demands had varied. In his Note of November 27, 1918, 
the Marshal had asked that the German inhabitants of the 
left bank of the Rhine be * included in the French military 
establishment. ' ' This was an extreme proposal amounting 
to annexation in disguise which had never been endorsed 
by the French Government. But the Marshal himself had 
quickly abandoned it. In his Note of January 10, the Com- 
mander-in-Chief confined himself to demanding the occu- 
pation of the Rhine and of its strategic points while seeking 
a suitable political status for its inhabitants. On March 
31 he had read a Note of similar tenor and in the course of 
the discussion which had followed he had said : 

*' Peace can only be guaranteed by the possession of 
the Rhine till further orders, that is to say till Germany 
has a change of heart." 

On May 6, he had insisted in Ms premises upon the 
execution of the financial clauses of the peace, in his con- 
clusion upon the limited object of his demand — occupation 
not of the left bank but of the Rhine; occupation limited 
in time and scope, ''when we find we have been paid and 
have sufficient safeguards, we shall only have to retire our 
troops and leave.'' If this is compared with the clauses of 
the Treaty itself, what difference is there? Very little, — 
for, as on one hand, the faculty of prolonging the occupa- 
tion after fifteen years is assured to France; and on the 
other, because the suggestion of the Marshal to occupy the 
river mthout the left bank would plainly have been in case 
of conflict a grave imprudence to the troops thus thrust 
forward. 



*See Chapter VI, page 211. 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 195 

Such was, on the evening of May 6, the unanimous feel- 
ino- of the heads of Governments who at once meet m M. 
Pichon's room. After a brief exchange of news it is clear 
that Marshal Foch had advanced no argument that had not 
already been discussed. It was therefore decided to main- 
tain the clauses of the Treaty. But on the other hand, the 
matter adjusted with such difficulty by M. Clemenceau 
twenty davs before, was revived. One of the British dele- 
gates, Mr!^ Bonar Law, kno^vn for his habitual restraint, 
declares : 

''If a British General adopted such an attitude towards 
his Government, he would not retain his post for five 
minutes." 

M. Clemenceau answered: 

''You know my opinion. No matter how much I regret 
the attitude of the Marshal, we cannot forget that he led 
our soldiers to Victory." 

The matter rested there. The next day the Treaty was 
handed to the Germans. 

IV 

We had gone a long way, as I said above, but we still 
had a long way to go. On May 29, the German delegation 
presented over the signature of Count Brockdorff its "re- 
marks on the conditions of peace." Chapter XIV was 
more especially denounced as an odious abuse of power. 
There was great uneasiness everywhere: in the Confer- 
ence, in the Parliaments, even among the public. ''Will 
they sign?" was the question on everyone's lips, and on 
how to make them sign there was wide divergence of 
opinion. M. Clemenceau, a few days later, summed up the 
disagreement as follows: 

"There are two ways. Some wish to make concessions. 
We favour decisive action." 

No question showed this divergence of views more clear- 
ly than that of occupation. At the end of May, Mr. Lloyd 



196 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

George expressed his regret at having allowed himself to 
be convinced too quickly by the arguments of his French 
colleague. In the stormy atmosphere of the beginning of 
June, the concession made to our urgent demand seemed 
to him to be the greatest mistake that had been made, one 
which might perhaps lead to-morrow to a renewal of the 
war. A new discussion was beginning. On four, six, ten 
occasions the question of occupation was opened up in 
earnest. The Treaty leaves the Germans only 100,000 men 
— is it against that that an Army is to be kept on the Rhine ? 
Germany has damages and pensions to pay. Is a great part 
of her resources to be used to pay for Armies of Occupa- 
tion? The Germans are at the highest pitch of national 
excitement. There is no telling what incidents may arise 
from this system employed in 1815 and 1871. The Treaties 
of Guarantee henceforth bind the overseas nations to come 
to the aid of France. If danger arises from such an inci- 
dent, those nations will be reluctant to recognize their 
obligations and their moral strength will not be back of 
their material strength, as in the late war. Protests are 
already pouring in from other sources. Labor and demo- 
cratic circles condemned the occupation as unjust, moder- 
ates as absurd and useless. It is a matter of sentiment, not 
of logic, they say. It should never have been accepted. 
At least it must be greatly restricted. 

*'I fear," said Mr. Lloyd George, ''that we rallied too 
quickly to the idea of a prolonged occupation. In my 
opinion, the whole scheme should be reconsidered. 

*'I accepted the occupation, it is true. But since then 
I have held four meetings of Imperial War Cabinet and our 
delegates to the Peace Conference. They are unanimous 
in their belief that I did wrong, and that I should have 
given you the choice between the occupation and the Treaty 
of Guarantee. 

"Occupation is useless since Germany will have only 
100,000 men and Great Britain and the United States also 
will be on the side of France in case of aggression. It is 
illogical because it is only much later in fifty or sixty years 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 197 

that Germany mil become dangerous. It is unjust because 
it amounts to making Germany pay for the cost and upkeep 
of the French Army. It is ruinous because it will absorb 
to the detriment of the indemnity fund the best part of the 
German resources. It is dangerous because unpopular, 
inspired by the methods of 1815 and 1871, and of a nature 
to give rise to local incidents which will arouse Anglo-Saxon 
sympathy for Germany. 

"That is the conclusion I draw from my recent inter- 
views. I reproach you with nothing. I accuse myself only 
of having yielded too quickly last April to your arguments. 
If you persist, I shall be forced to leave Paris and go to 
London to submit the question to Parliament.'* 

For three long weeks, from May 23 to June 13, M. Cle- 
menceau, unmoved and unflinching, continued to answer: 

"I cannot accept a reversal of the decision already made. 

**You know my policy. It is wholly based upon the 
close union of France with Great Britain and the United 
States. On that account I am attacked on every side as 
weak and inadequate. I am sure that in persisting I am 
serving my country well and so I persist. But in this ques- 
tion of occupation you do not understand the French point 
of view. You are in your island, behind the rampart of the 
sea. "We are on the continent, with a worthless frontier. 
My country suffered more than any other from the Ger- 
mans. We know them better than you do. 

''What we fear in the years to come is not a German 
attack, but systematic failure to execute the Treaty. No 
treaty ever contained so many clauses; and no treaty, 
therefore ever involved so many risks of non-execution. 
Against these risks, we want the material guarantee of an 
occupation and we intend to retain it as long as may be 
necessary to form our opinion as to Germany's good faith. 
In exchange for the two treaties of immediate assistance, 
I shortened the duration of occupation I had originally de- 
manded. But as I wished to provide for everything, I also 
asked — and you agreed — that occupation might in certain 
events be prolonged beyond the fifteen years. All that has 



198 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

been accepted. I cannot consent to having the question 
reopened again. 

'*So much for the guarantee. But we also need in the 
coming years a barrier behind which our people can work 
in security and rebuild their ruins. That barrier is the 
Rhine. I must reckon with national feeling. I do not mean 
that I am afraid of being overthrown, that does not matter. 
But I cannot by giving up occupation do something that 
would take the very backbone out of our people 's life. 

''Besides it is your interest as well as ours. For in 
the union of our three countries, France also is 
indispensable. 

** There are now two methods under consideration. We 
are all anxious to settle the matter. But in England it is 
believed that the way to succeed is by making concessions. 
In France we believe that it is by taking decisive action. I 
will have none of a poUcy begging Germany's pardon for 
our victory. I know them too well. I have known them 
too long. The whole world was told of our principles, in 
war and in peace. "We have remained faithful to them. It 
is our duty to make them triumph. If the Germans feel 
that peace is imposed by the strong, who have justice on 
their side, upon the weak, who were the aggressors, they 
will resign themselves to it. 

*'I know that you and your colleagues are perfectly sin- 
cere, and this is what makes the situation so serious. 
Weighing my words, I say to you: If you go before your 
Parliament, I will go before mine and, if need be, resign. 
But I will not accept what you propose, it is impossible. 

"And now I say that I will not even think of such an 
hypothesis, nor admit that after five years of war, we can 
be incapable of giving the German a united answer. ' ' 

Never I believe has the voice of a citizen speaking for 
his country had greater force or a more persuasive power. 
On June 13, with the discreet support of Mr. Wilson, M. 
Clemenceau obtained satisfaction and secured the unre- 
served agreement of all his colleagues. Chapter XIV was 
kept in its entirety, without the change of a single word. 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 199 

To inform Germany of this — three days later — the Allies 
forward a phrase from the President of the United States : 
''The peace must be guaranteed because, among the con- 
tracting parties, are those whose promises have proved 
unworthy of our faith." 

It is the interest of France, the common interest of the 
Allies that I hope to serve in showing — by the detail of an 
important discussion — how difficult it is for men — even 
the most earnest and the most sincere — to reach agree- 
ment when these men represent different nations and cen- 
turies of opposite traditions. May those who make light 
of this difficulty never be called upon to face it. In this 
great discussion the responsible heads of Governments put 
forward their arguments without the slightest reserve. 
They passed through difficult hours of total disagreement. 
They defended their views to the very limit. But they did 
it in mutual esteem and — it is M. Clemenceau who speaks 
— '*in a conversational and friendly tone, even when hav- 
ing cruel things to say to one another." They felt to the 
full the iron hand of the conflicting past which weighed 
upon them. They found themselves — again I quote M. Cle- 
menceau — ''more French, more English, more American 
than they could have believed." But the wdll to agree was 
strongest. Agreement was reached, and upon this agree- 
ment — now signed and sealed — depends the safety of the 
world. Without it there would have been neither Victory 
in War, nor Treaty in Peace, nor Security in the Future. 

The French Government has been violently attacked 
over these very clauses. Its difference of opinion with 
Marshal Foch — from which M. Clemenceau in his personal 
feelings suffered very keenly — was unrelentingly employed 
against it. I have shown that if one looks closely at the 
Treaty and at the facts, the variation between the clauses 
of the Treaty and the proposals of the Commander-in- 
Chief is not very considerable. Occupation for fifteen 
years it is true. For fifteen years? Yes, — but with pos- 
sibility of prolonging it and of reoccupying either should 
Germany prove unfaithful to her undertakings, or should 



200 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

the gimrantees contained in the British and American 
Treaties be inadequate or, a fortiori, absent. There is one 
difference and only one, it is a political not a military dif- 
ference. The left bank remains German instead of becom- 
ing independent. One may regret it. But if we had stuck 
to the original proposal it would have meant a break with 
the Allies ; the hostile outbreaks of a mixed population, the 
necessity for intervention with all its risks, the imposition 
of independence with all its drawbacks. *'It is not," as M. 
Clemenceau told the Senate, *Hhe fault of the Armies of 
the First Republic if we did not stay on the Rhine. But it 
is not our fault if to-day when I want to go to the Rhine I 
find German lands between the Rhine and me, — and if I 
am obliged to take that into account." Could M. Cle- 
menceau, having obtained satisfaction on all essentials, 
break with Great Britain on this special point? He did 
not think so. Who would have proposed it? 

Parliament, when, in turn, the question was placed be- 
fore it, confirmed the decision of the Chief of the Govern- 
ment and of the Cabinet, — the Chamber by 372 votes to 
53, and the Senate unanimously. Mr. Barthou, one of M. 
Clemenceau 's opponents, who made the General Report on 
the Treaty, passed upon this matter with great fairness 
when he wrote : 

No matter how great the authority of the illustrious General in 
question, a problem such as this can only be treated by military 
men from a special, isolated, and very exclusive point of view. To 
a Government this same problem presents itself as a whole with all 
its components, which agree or disagree, but none of which is unim- 
portant or negligible. 

Between so many reasons it is necessary to make a choice and 
making this choice means adopting a definite policy. 

Mr. Barthou added: 

The French Government, and it is not likely that in its place 
another government would have acted differently, has secured for 
France strong guarantees. Can anyone deny their imposing 
strength? They complete and strengthen each other. 



THE LEFT BANK OF THE RHINE 201 

On the vital point — the closing to Germany's Army of 
the Rhine regions and joint occupation by all the Allies — 
the French proposals prevailed. It was just that they 
should prevail. The Germans and their friends — for they 
know how to have friends in every country — have made 
this an excuse for attacking France. They forget that 
France never demanded annexation. All that France 
sought was to avert the risk of invasion, which she has 
known twice in fifty years. "We were determined that that 
should not be renewed. Nothing more, nothing less. Our 
proposals were as frankly made as they were steadfastly 
upheld. "VVe modified them on certain secondary points to 
secure full agreement with our Allies, and to obtain the 
Treaties of Guarantee. But we did not consent to give up 
occupation any more than the right tp prolong it. We 
followed this policy in the face of weighty and conflicting 
opposition — sometimes French, sometimes Allied — because 
we thought that it was our duty to France. I am still wait- 
ing to hear what others would have done in our place. 



CHAPTER VI 

TREATIES OF GUARANTEE 

It was on March 14, 1919, that Mr. Lloyd George and 
President Wilson proposed to M. Clemenceau, in place of 
the inter-allied occupation of an independent Rhineland, the 
undertaking by Great Britain and the United States to 
come immediately to the assistance of France in case the 
latter should be the object of an unprovoked aggression by 
Germany. I have shown in the preceding chapter how, 
after five weeks of negotiation, M. Clemenceau obtained 
at one and the same time the occupation of the Rhineland 
as well as the two Treaties. The genesis, text and ultimate 
fate of these solemn and unprecedented undertakings hold 
an important place in the peace considered as a whole. 

I have said ''unprecedented;" on that I would lay 
stress. England in the course of her history has entered 
into specific and temporary agreements with various con- 
tinental countries but has never subscribed to any general 
and permanent obligation. She has at times lent her aid; 
she has never bound herself in advance to give it. Even 
in the years before the war — ^in spite of the ever growing 
German menace — Great Britain did not bind herself. On 
August 2, 1914, she was free and could in all independence 
shape her course. The conversations carried on in 1911, at 
the time of the Agadir crisis, by the French and English 
military staffs had been a study of the eventual possibili- 
ties of combined action. But nothing had been decided as 
to the aims and conditions of such action. The letters 
exchanged, in November, 1912, between Sir Edward Grey, 
British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the 
French Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, left both parties 
absolutely free. Sir Edward Grey wrote: 

202 



TEEATIES OF GUARANTEE 203 

On various occasions during the past few years, the French and 
British Military and Naval Staffs have exchanged their views. It 
has always been understood that these exchanges of views in no way 
affect the liberty of either of the Governments to decide at any 
moment in the future whether it shall or not assist the other with 
armed forces. 

We have admitted that exchanges of views between technical 
experts do not constitute and must not be regarded as constituting 
an engagement binding either of the Governments to interfere in 
an eventuality which has not yet presented itself and which may 
never arise. For example, the present distribution of the French 
and English Navies is not based upon an undertaking to cooperate 
in case of war. 

When, in presence of the mobilization of the German 
Army, M. Poincare addressed an appeal to His Majesty 
George V asking that Great Britain take her place at 
France 's side in the conflict which was then certain, George 
V confined his reply, couched in terms of the utmost sym- 
pathy, to stating that exchanges of views would continue 
on all points between his Government and the French 
Government but that "as far as the attitude of his country 
was concerned events were changing too rapidly for it to 
be possible to foresee what would happen." The whole 
letter is worth quoting: 

Buckingham Palace 

August 1, 1914 
My Dear and Great Friend, 

I appreciate most highly the sentiments which inspired you to 
write me in so cordial and friendly a spirit and I am grateful to 
you for having set forth your views so fully and frankly. 

You may be assured that the actual situation in Europe causes 
me much anxiety and I am happy to think that our two Govern- 
ments have worked together in so friendly a manner to try to find 
a peaceful solution for the questions which have arisen. 

It would be for me a source of real satisfaction if our combined 
efforts met with success; and I am not without hope that the ter- 
rible events which seem so near, may still be averted. 

I admire the calm that you and your Government have shown 
in avoiding exaggerated military measures on the frontier and in 



204 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

adopting an attitude that cannot in any manner be construed as a 
provocation. 

I personally am making every effort to find a solution that will 
permit, in any case, of the adjournment of active military opera- 
tions and leave to the Powers time for calm discussion among them- 
selves. I intend to pursue these efforts unceasingly, as long as 
there remains a hope of a friendly settlement. As to the attitude 
of my country, events are changing so rapidly that it is difficult to 
foresee what will happen, but you may be assured that my Govern- 
ment will continue to discuss frankly and fully with M. Cambon all 
points of interest to the two nations. 

GEORGE R. I. 

On the evening of August 2, the British Government 
promised us to block the Channel with its fleet in case the 
German fleet should come out. Nothing more, nothing less. 
And it was only after the invasion of Belgium that England 
decided to enter the war. The formal undertaking offered 
to us by Mr. Lloyd George, on March 14, 1919, was a 
startling innovation in the development of his country's 
traditional policy. Had his desire to induce M. Cle- 
menceau to forego the occupation of the Rhineland any- 
thing to do with it? Doubtless! But tliis offer was to 
an even greater extent, not only on the part of Mr. Lloyd 
George, but on the part of his country as well, an accept- 
ance of the great lessons of the war; a homage rendered 
the tremendous effort and unexampled sufferings of 
France ; a token of esteem and affection which honours the 
British nation as much as it does the French. 

On the American side, the break with the past was no 
less worthy of note. Since Washington's Farewell Address, 
the United States had remained unswervingly faithful to 
the policy of aloofness from European affairs which the 
Father of His Country laid down when leaving office. The 
Monroe Doctrine a few years later gave form and sub- 
stance to this policy. Mr. Roosevelt often expressed his 
regret that his fellow countrymen were unable to grasp 
the significance of world politics. That they were indeed 
unable is abundantly proved by the first years of the war. 



TREATIES OF GUARANTEE 205 

It needed Germany's accumulated provocations and Presi- 
dent Wilson's firm decision to enlighten their minds. The 
war once over, many citizens of the United States, mth but 
sunnnary notions as to the future of the world, desired 
nothing better than to return to their isolation. Political 
parties even urged this as a national duty. What reasons 
prompted President Wilson to ignore these objections and 
to associate himself with Mr. Lloyd George in the proposal 
which the latter laid before M. Clemenceau ? 

I have answered this question by publishing the Memo- 
randmn in which the French Government, on February 25, 
gave the reasons for its Rhineland policy. As a matter of 
fact it was our arguments on the inadequacy of the guar- 
antee given to France by the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, that finally convinced Mr. Wilson. When M. Cle- 
menceau, with all the intensity of his patriotic faith, said to 
him: "The Covenant may guarantee our victory; for the 
time being it is inadequate to guarantee us from invasion," 
Mr. Wilson honestly believed this to be true, and sought a 
solution. On March 28, he put this solution into concrete 
form, and handed the head of the French Government the 
following : 

In a separate Treaty with the United States, a pledge by the 
United States, subject to the approval of the Executive Council of 
the League of Nations, to come immediately to the assistance of 
France as soon as any unprovoked movement of aggression against 
her is made by Germany. 

This formula, approved by Mr. Lloyd George, became 
the basis of the negotiation. A difficult negotiation indeed, 
because, as I have said and repeat, M. Clemenceau had to 
derive the maximum of efficiency from the undertakings 
thus offered and at the same time to obtain the occupation 
— that is to say the very thing in exchange for which the 
Treaties of Guarantee had been offered him. The debate 
on the occupation, longer and more difficult than the other, 
lasted until April 22.* The actual text of the two pledges 
was decided upon in the course of the following days. 



*See Chapter V. 



206 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

It was proper first of all in urging reasons for them to 
give them their true meaning. Some political parties — 
notably the French Socialists — have discovered a contra- 
diction between the Covenant of the League of Nations and 
the Treaties of Guarantee. Need I, after what I have just 
written, assert that this contradiction does not exist ; or add 
that these Treaties form an integral part of the funda- 
mental charter of the League and are destined, within its 
scope and in its service, to establish a security which the 
League itself might at first have proved incapable of assur- 
ing effectively! The two instruments, almost identical in 
form, make this clear in their preamble : 

"Whereas there is a danger that the stipulations relating to the 
left bank of the Khine contained in the Treaty of Peace, signed this 
day at Versailles, may not, at first, provide adequate security and 
protection to the French Eepublic. 

The Treaty with the United States, even more explicit 
in its statement of reason than that with Great Britain, 
emphasizes the general importance rather than the particu- 
lar bearing of a German aggression against France and 
the union for protection that such an aggression would call 
forth. 

Whereas the United States of America and the French Republic 
are equally animated by the desire to maintain the peace of the 
world, so happily restored by the Treaty of Peace signed at Ver- 
sailles the twenty-eighth day of June, 1919, putting an end to the 
war begun by the aggression of the German Empire and ended by 
the defeat of that Power and, 

"Whereas the United States of America and the French Repub- 
lic are fuUy persuaded that an unprovoked movement of aggres- 
sion hy Germany against France would not only violate both the 
letter and the spirit of the Treaty of Versailles to which the United 
States of America and the French Republic are parties, thus expos- 
ing France anew to the intolerable burdens of an unprovoked war, 
hut that such an aggression on the part of Germany would he, and 
is so regarded hy the Treaty of Versailles, an hostile act against all 
the Powers signatory to that Treaty and as calculated to disturb 



TREATIES OF GUARANTEE 207 

the peace of the world by involving inevitably and directly the 
States of Europe and indirectly, as experience has unfortunately 
and amply demonstrated, the world at large 

The reasons for general solidarity being thus asserted, 
the manner of giving it effect follows directly and is 
defined by Articles 2 and 3. Article 2 makes clear that 
what is involved is not an agreement between two Powers 
for particular ends, but a common measure of precaution 
wliich will come into force simultaneously with ratification 
by the signatory Powers. 

/■\ The present Treaty, in similar terms with the Treaty of even 
date for the same purpose concluded between the United States and 
the French Republic, a copy of which Treaty is annexed hereto, will 
only come into force when the latter is ratified. 

M. Clemenceau's opponents, in the course of the parlia- 
mentary debates on the ratification of the Peace Treaty, 
lyingly asserted that the aid to be furnished by one of the 
two Powers to the third would always be dependent upon 
prior negotiations between the first two. The very word- 
ing of these two Treaties gives the lie to this fabrication. 
It is only the coming into force of each Treaty that is put 
off until the other shall have been ratified. Once this con- 
dition is fulfilled, the provisions of both become binding 
without restriction or reserve, on all the contracting 
parties. These provisions, to fulfill the obligations 
assigned them, are to receive the approval of the League 
of Nations. To this effect: 

The present Treaty must be submitted to the Council of the 
League of Nations and must be recognized by the Council — acting, 
if need be, by a majority — as an engagement which is consistent 
with the Covenant of the League. 

Here another question arises. How long are the two 
Treaties to remain in force? Our Allies to make clearer 
their immediate purpose had at first proposed a period of 
three years. M. Clemenceau refused this absolutely. In 
support of his refusal, we drafted a Note which read : 



208 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

The solution of undertaking for three years cannot be accepted 
by the French Government. First, it is not in the next mon^ths that 
Germany will again become dangerous, it is later. The guarantee 
would in that case cease to operate at the very moment when most 
necessary. 

But this it not all. The French Government has shown in its 
Memorandum of February 25 how permanent is the need for the 
guarantee it demands. This permanent need finds expression in 
the numerical strength of the French population as compared with 
that of the German population and in all the history of the last 
century. 

In a general way, the French Government believes that the pro- 
posed political guarantee will have its full material and moral 
value in international public opinion only if it expresses on the 
clearest lesson of the war unanimity of the three democracies of 
France, Great Britain and the United States. For this reason also, 
a temporary pledge should not be considered. Therefore we ask 
that the Treaties of Guarantee remain in force until such time as 
their three signatories, France, the United States and Great Brit- 
ain, shall deem them to have become no longer necessary. 

To this end, we proposed the following text which was 
accepted by President Wilson (Note of April 12) : 

The pledge to continue until it is considered by all the signatory 
Powers that the League itself affords sufficient protection. 

The British Law Officers of the Crown felt that this 
wording while leaving France sole mistress of the decision, 
implied an inadmissible restriction of the rights of the 
Council of the League of Nations which would have to 
approve the two Treaties. The discussion lasted three 
days. At last a compromise draft was accepted by France 
who realized that the worth of Treaties, no matter how 
formal, is no greater than the good-will of their signa- 
tories. This was worded as follows: 

The present Treaty will continue in force until, on the applica- 
tion of one of the parties to it, the Council of the League of Na- 
tions — acting, if need be, by a majority — agrees that the League 
itself affords sufficient protection. 



TREATIES OF GUARANTEE 209 

In these conditions, and by virtue of these principles, 
the United States declared itself ''bound to come immedi- 
ately to the assistance of France in the event of any 
unprovoked movement of aggression against her made by 
Germany,'' Great Britain accepted the same undertaking. 
In consideration of this dual pledge, M. Clemenceau agreed 
that, if Germany fully complied with the Treaty, the occu- 
pation of the left bank of the Rhine should last only fifteen 
years and withdrew the demand that by the creation of an 
independent Rhineland, the Rhine should form the Western 
frontier of Germany — the left bank and fifty kilometers on 
the right bank being, moreover, demilitarized and forbidden 
to German troops. 

Thus everything appeared to be settled. But every- 
thing being settled, the main problem resulting from this 
arrangement still confronted the French negotiators and 
demanded a solution. The guarantee of assistance offered 
to France by the United States and Great Britain was 
embodied in the two Treaties which I have just analyzed. 
On the contrary M. Clemenceau 's concession — ^limitation to 
fifteen years of the occupation of the left bank if Germany 
observed faithfully the conditions of the Treaty — found 
place in the Treaty with Germany. In other words there 
was a risk that the two elements of the agreements regis- 
tered in different instruments, might not come into play 
together. Great Britain and the United States who, in 
signing these two Treaties, had departed — how far I have 
already shown — from their common traditions, were par- 
liamentary countries. Their negotiators could therefore 
bind them only subject to the approval of their respective 
Parliament. If, the Treaty with Germany having come 
into force, the House of Commons or the American Senate 
refused to ratify the Treaties of Guarantee the coming into 
force of which was mutually dependent upon each other, 
what would happen ? France, bound by the German Treaty 
to the concession in exchange for which the defensive 
pledges were given, would have agreed to this sacrifice 
without compensation and accepted the evacuation at the 



210 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

end of fifteen years, mthout obtaining American and Brit- 
ish military assistance. This was a risk that our country 
could not accept: it could be thus stated, ''If, by failure of 
either to ratify, the British and American Treaties are lost 
to us, would we nevertheless at the end of fifteen years be 
deprived of the material guarantee resulting from the 
occupation?" The question was disconcerting and a 
proper answer hard to formulate. 

It was, on April 25, that face to face as was his wont 
M. Clemenceau boldly confronted the difficulty in an inter- 
view with President Wilson by saying : 

**The Treaty, as it stands, satisfies me on the score of 
guarantees; but the future belongs neither to you nor to 
me. You have a Senate and I have a Parliament. We 
cannot be sure of what they will do ten years hence, or 
even of what they -wdll do to-morrow. If, for example, the 
Treaties with the United States and Great Britain were not 
ratified, what would be France 's situation 1 What alterna- 
tive guarantee would she have at her disposal?" 

President Wilson answered: 

**Your observation is perfectly just. But it raises a 
delicate question. Let us seek a solution." 

Prior to this conversation, Chapter XIV of the Treaty 
(Article 429) relating to guarantees, read as follows: 

If the conditions of the present Treaty are faithfully observed 
by Germany, the occupation (of fifteen years) provided by Article 
428 will be successively reduced as stated below : 

(1) At the end of five years.. . 

(2) At the end of ten years. . . 

(3) At the end of fifteen years the remainder of the occupied 
territories will be evacuated. 

The right not to evacuate or to reoccupy after evacua- 
tion in the event of ''Germany's refusing to observe all or 
part of her obligations concerning reparations," was 
embodied in Article 429. But anent the situation that would 
result from the non-ratification of either the English or 



TREATIES OF GUARANTEE 211 

the American Treaties, not a word! It was this omission 
that had to be remedied. 

The debate lasted for more than a week. On five dif- 
ferent occasions the two Presidents exchanged suggestions 
and drafts. The sequence of these drafts which are in 
existence throws full light upon their common efforts. 
They arrived on April 29 at the following solution which 
became the final paragraph of Article 429 : 

If, at that date (the end of fifteen years), the guarantees 
against an unprovoked aggression by Germany are not considered 
sufficient by the Allied and Associated Governments, the evacua- 
tion of the occupying troops may be delayed to the extent regarded 
as necessary for the purpose of obtaining the required guarantees. ' ' 

What is the situation created by this additional clause f 
It is that at the end of fifteen years, on January 10, 1935, 
the Allied and Associated Governments will, according to 
the term of the last paragraph, have to decide whether the 
guarantees against an unprovoked aggression by Germany 
are or are not sufficient. What are the guarantees 
referred to? Those provided for at Versailles on June 28, 
1919, by the Treaty with Germany and by the two English 
and American Treaties; that is, in the distant and indefi- 
nite future, the League of Nations; in the nearer future, 
occupation supplemented by the two Treaties. In what 
case would these guarantees, in 1935, be deemed insuf- 
ficient? In case of course of the failure of the two Treaties ; 
that is precisely the case actually presented by the neg^-tive 
vote of the American Senate. In this case what may hap- 
pen? The evacuation may be delayed so long as is deemed 
necessary to secure the above guarantees. 

In other words if, failing the ratification of the British 
and American Treaties, France in fifteen years has no 
other guarantee of security than the occupation of the left 
bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads, this occupation may 
be prolonged until other guarantees come into existence — 
that is to say until the coming into force of the two Treaties 
signed on June 28, or of equivalent agreements. Thus to 



212 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

the hypothetical question put, on April 23, 1919, by the 
head of the French Government to the President of the 
United States, and to the practical question raised on 
March 19, 1920, by the negative vote of the United States 
Senate, the final paragraph of Article 429 which crowned 
our efforts, brings a clear and formal answer. This answer 
whatever may happen safeguards the interests of France. 
For, in the by no means certain event that the con- 
tractual guarantee of the United States and Great Britain 
fails her, France will retain the physical and territorial 
guarantee afforded, and instead of retaining it at the risk 
of a break with her Allies she will hold it by virtue of the 
Treaty of Versailles itself. In a word, no Treaties of Guar- 
antee, no evacuation in 1935. 

Thus balanced, the agreement was equitable and satis- 
factory. The union publicly asserted against unjust aggres- 
sion of the three greatest democracies of the world was an 
appreciable guarantee of stability. Remember the past — 
remember the last visit of the British Ambassador to 
Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg on August 2, 1914, — 
the stupefaction and the consternation of the German on 
hearing that England is to defend violated Belgium. Con- 
sider again that situation; suppose that in the weeks pre- 
ceding the war, Germany, instead of being condemned by 
the absence of public pledges between the Western Nations 
to draw chance inferences concerning England's attitude, 
had known by the existence of a public Treaty that England 
would be on the side of Belgium and of France, that the 
United States would come in also. I think that mthout 
undue optimism it may be believed the idea of war would 
have less easily taken hold of German minds, that their 
plans of aggression would have vanished. This is the 
situation created by the Treaties of Guarantee. For the 
three contracting parties who had learned the lessons of 
the war, it was the part of logic and of prudent foresight. ' 

For France it was the crowning achievement of the 
policy followed by M. Clemenceau. On December 29, 1918, 
the head of the French Government, applauded by the 



TREATIES OF GUARANTEE 213 

immense majority of the Chamber, had declared his deter- 
mination to do everything to maintain in peace time com- 
plete harmony among the Allies so as to avoid after a 
victory won by unity a peace of disunion. Not only was 
this result achieved, but the signing of the Treaty with 
Germany was accompanied by the signing of agreements 
perpetuating the coalition against which German force had 
shattered itself. France there found the just satisfaction 
of a vital interest. In point of fact the triumphant end of 
the war had left her alone and unallied. Russia had ceased 
to be, as regards Germany, the counterweight she had been 
in the past. The agreements entered into for the war with 
Great Britain, Belgium, Italy and the United States were 
valid only for the duration of the war and ended with peace. 
Where in this peace was France to turn for necessary 
assistance? Some people rather vaguely and as a timid 
echo of M. Caillaux's policies, had spoken of a ''continental 
policy." But however dear and precious to France her 
relations of friendship with her European neighbors, the 
war itself has proved that no continental Power on our 
side could take the place of Great Britain and the United 
States, or bring us anything but an aid which no matter 
how desirable, could not be decisive. The policy of union 
with the Anglo-Saxon world remained after victory as 
before the part of wisdom and of truth. 

Not only did this policy bind us to countries whose 
integrity, vigour and physical and moral soundness we had 
tested for long months; to countries which in both hemi- 
spheres were in touch with us and by their financial, indus- 
trial and conmiercial resources appeared more capable 
than any others of aiding us in our reconstruction ; not only 
did it afford us the best of means for exercising a just 
influence within the League of Nations, at the same time 
as it joined us to two great and liberal nations whose 
democratic views we are certain of sharing; but in addi- 
tion by making us one with Powers which by their magni- 
tude and the nature of their interests are obliged both to 
interest themselves in European afftiirs and to avoid 



214 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

becoming absorbed therein, this policy placed ns on our own 
continent in the honourable and lucrative position of being 
the representative and guarantor of the policy of peace 
which had triumphed in the war. These truths were so 
well understood by all France that M. Clemenceau's most 
impassioned opponents did not dare vote against the two 
Treaties, and that in the Chamber as in the Senate they 
were unanimously ratified. 

But a misfortune has happened — through no fault of 
France's. The Franco-British Treaty was approved by 
the House of Commons. Not so the American Treaty which 
went down in the defeat of the Treaty of Versailles by the 
Senate in Washington. The Treaty of Versailles lacked six 
votes for ratification. The Treaty of Guarantee though 
favourably reported by the Commissions, was not even dis- 
cussed ; so that under Article 2, which provides that these 
two Treaties shall come into force simultaneously, the 
treaty with Great Britain is also pending. Need I say that 
this development has been exploited to the full against the 
French negotiators, who are accused in France — sometimes 
even in the United States — with having abandoned the 
substance for the shadow and renounced part of the sub- 
stantial guarantees demanded in their Memorandum of 
February 25, 1919, for the sake of obtaining two Treaties 
which up to now do not exist? It has also been said that 
this mistake was the more inexcusable in that no one had 
the right to ignore the fact that Mr. Wilson was in a minor- 
ity in Congress following the elections of November 5, 
1918. The conclusion drawn is that the non-ratification of 
the agreements negotiated by him should have been fore- 
seen. This double accusation has held a prominent place 
in discussions on the peace. Entrusted as I was with 
Franco-American relations in the Clemenceau Ministry, 
my desire to leave nothing unrevealed and to give the full 
facts, will easily be understood. 

Moreover, the facts are quite simple ; for the two accusa- 
tions that I have mentioned can harm no one but their 
authors. We have, it is said, abandoned the substance for 



TREATIES OF GUARANTEE 215 

the shadow. Look at the last paragraph of Article 429, 
analyzed a few pages above, and you will see that failing 
the guarantees against German aggression, embodied in 
the Franco-British and Franco-American Treaties, the 
occupation of the left bank of the Rliine can be extended 
beyond fifteen years. So we did foresee the risk of non- 
ratification and did adopt appropriate precautions. As to 
the childish accusation that we ignored the results of the 
American elections of November 5, 1918, or that we did not 
allow for their possible consequences — ^it is to laugh. These 
elections attracted some attention in the Press. Their pos- 
sible effect on the ratification of the various Treaties 
escaped us so little that precisely because of the result, we 
demanded and obtained by strenuous efforts the final 
paragraph of Article 429. "What more could we have done 
and what would others have done in our place ? Not nego- 
tiated with President "Wilson, our critics answer. With 
whom then should we have negotiated? The French Gov- 
ernment knew as well as any one that on November 5, 
1918, Mr. Wilson had lost his majority in Congress — a mis- 
hap that has befallen a number of his predecessors not 
excepting the greatest among them, George Washington. 
But it knew also that in spite of this adverse election, Mr. 
Wilson remained none the less until the end of his term the 
only constitutional power with whom we could treat; for 
the President of the United States is responsible not to 
Congress but to the whole electorate. It is objected that 
Mr. Wilson in appointing the American delegation has 
neglected to include Republican Senators. Was this an 
error of judgment on the part of the President! It is quite 
possible. But that was none of our business, any more than 
it would have been Mr. Wilson's or Mr. Lloyd George's 
business to decide whether M. Clemenceau was right or 
wrong in not calling upon M. Briand or M. Barthou. The 
reproach of ''having negotiated with Mr. Wilson" is 
simply absurd — just as absurd in fact as it would be to 
reproach Mr. Lloyd George with having made important 
concessions to M. Clemenceau without foreseeing that M, 



216 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Clemenceau, six months later, would be placed in a minority 
by M. Deschanel. 

These are — whether we look upon it as good or bad — 
the risks of the parliamentary system. The heads of Gov- 
ernments who negotiated the peace legally represented 
their respective Governments and it was possible, whether 
one liked it or not, to negotiate or bargain vnth. them alone. 
None of them on the other hand could enter into an under- 
taking except subject to parliamentary ratification, which 
no one of them could command. These were the very condi- 
tions of the undertaking. It was in nobody's power to avoid 
the contradictions implied in these conditions. After the 
exchange of signatures, it was the delegates' business to 
return to their respective Parliaments and obtain their 
approval. Mr. Lloyd George was fortunate enough having 
his elections behind him to meet with no opposition. M. 
Clemenceau, whom his enemies sought to overthrow by 
means of the Treaty before the general elections of Novem- 
ber, 1919, had to fight for more than two months in the 
Chamber finally to obtain the imposing majority of 372 
votes against 53 ; on the other hand it took him but two days 
to secure the unanimous approval of the Senate. Mr. "Wil- 
son met with a harder fate, singularly aggravated by his 
illness which for more than six months isolated him phys- 
ically and intellectually from his country and the rest of the 
world. A campaign lacking strong opposition succeeded 
in wrecking the work of unity he had accomplished in Paris. 

France from the point of view of her own interests, 
which no one can reproach her for holding dear, deplored 
this and deplores it still, but it was not in her power to pre- 
vent it. All she could do was to take precautions and 
guarantees against this risk which had been present from 
the very first in the minds of her negotiators. This she 
did by obtaining the addition of the final paragraph to 
Article 429 on the importance of which I have laid such 
stress. The future rests with the Government of the 
United States, and with it alone, in the exercise of its 
national sovereignty. We know what we wish may be the 



TREATIES OF GUARANTEE 217 

outcome for the sake of the peace of the world in which 
France more than anyone else is interested. But in case 
the hoped-for assistance fails us, we shall have to remain 
on the Rhine and, in the absence of undertakings now 
pending as by virtue of the Treaty of Versailles for the 
common good of all, mount guard for Liberty. 

II 

If the policy of union with the Anglo-Saxon peoples was 
for France — as indeed it was for them — a labour of love, of 
experience and of foresight, there was for my country yet 
another labour, which experience commanded us to pre- 
pare equally with love and foresight : a union with Belgium ! 
Like brothers both in danger and in misfortune, our two 
countries might have found in a more active pre-war policy 
some measure of protection. Had they been better informed 
of Germany, less trustful, more confiding in each other, 
they might perhaps have held the German onslaught at the 
start ; won on the Meuse the Victory of the Marne ; and if 
not by their own unaided efforts have decided the outcome 
of the war, at least saved from invasion and from ruin 
millions of acres of their soil. 

From the beginning of the Conference, M. Clemenceau 
attached peculiar importance to the realization of this 
union. I shall advance but one proof. In our reply of 
March 17,* to the offer of the English and American 
Treaties, we ended our statement of the clauses which we 
considered essential with the following* sentence which 
expressed the indissoluble unity of French and Belgian 
interests : 

It goes without saying that by act of aggression against France 
the French Government understands also any aggression against 
Belgium. 

Briefly in the mind of the French Government the 
destiny of France and that of Belgium were inseparable. 

(1) See Chapter V, page 182. 



218 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TEEATY 

Our aim was to associate them practically. But to realize 
this association two preliminary conditions had to be met ; 
first that a general plan of security in which Belgium should 
form an integral part be drawn up; second, that satisfac- 
tion in accord with France, be given to the Belgian demands 
by the Conference. M. Clemenceau's Government worked 
hard, until its retirement, to obtain these two results. 
When he relinquished power, both had been achieved and 
the way was open for the defensive agreement signed in 
August, 1920, between the Governments of France and 
Belgium. 

It was necessary, in order to build up the future, to 
first clear away all vestiges of a dead past and for that 
purpose to obliterate the Treaties of 1839 — the burdensome 
and unavailing charter of a violated neutrality. By the 
revision of these Treaties, moreover, Belgium summarized 
her various demands. The unswerving support of France 
was given her for the breaking of this obsolete encum- 
brance. On February 12, 1919, the Supreme Council 
appointed the Commission for Belgian Affairs of which I 
was chairman and in accord with my colleagues I imme- 
diately asked for explicit authority to present general pro- 
posals concerning the revision and its consequences. Why? 
Because knowing the hesitation of some in regard to stipu- 
lations which necessarily affected a neutral country — 
Holland — I wished, before entering into any discussion of 
details, to assert and justify the essential principle of the 
free existence of a victorious Belgium. On February 25, 
I said to the Supreme Council : 

''There is only one question. It is this, Belgium lived 
wholly and entirely under the Treaties of 1839. The war 
has destroyed these Treaties, and Belgium demands that 
they be revised. 

*'The signatory Powers which fought together in the 
war are in agreement. President Wilson, in one of his 
fourteen points, expressed the opinion that the neutrality 
of Belgium ought to disappear. 

''The Treaties of 1839 are signed not only by Belgium 



TREATIES OF GUARANTEE 219 

and Holland, but by the Guaranteeing Powers two of which 
are here represented. It results therefore that, so long as 
the Great Powers have not officially declared that new 
negotiations should be begun with a view to establishing 
a new regime in place of the Treaties of 1839, we shall con- 
tinually encounter the difficulties already noted.'* 

The delegates of the Powers were of this opinion and 
the next day the Commission set to work on the basis of my 
proposals. Five days later the report was unanimously 
adopted and transmitted to the Supreme Council. On the 
points of law we recalled first that the three Treaties of 
1839 — between Belgium and Holland and the Five Great 
Powers — by virtue of their stipulations formed an indi- 
visible whole. Three of the guarantors had violated their 
undertakings — Prussia and Austria in 1914, Russia by the 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk — while two of them — France and 
Great Britain — have honoured their signature. The sixth 
Power among the signatories — Holland — had declared its 
neutrality. Without discussing either the question of the 
manner in which this neutrality had been observed, or that 
of the nullity in law of these Treaties by reason of the non- 
execution of their fundamental clause, the Commission 
reported in favour of revision on the grounds that Belgium, 
France, Great Britain and the United States had declared 
it necessary and that furthermore it was the logical out- 
come of the events of the past seventy years. 

Following the same line the Commission showed the 
Treaty of 1839 originally negotiated not on behalf of Bel- 
gium but against her by the authors of the Treaty of 1815 ; 
all the Belgian claims of 1839 concerning the freedom of 
the Scheldt, Limburg and Luxemburg ruthlessly rejected 
by the future guarantors; Belgium, eight years later 
declaring on the eve of the signature that ''she was yield- 
ing to the imperious law of necessity." Our report estab- 
lished that these Treaties born of a so-called "higher 
interest" — foreign in any case to Belgium and to Holland 
— had, in no degree and at no time, expressed the self- 
determination of the two principal countries involved ; and 



^20 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

that moreover if tliey had imposed on Belgium undisputed 
and onerous servitudes, they had not in the hour of danger 
given her the promised security. Much to the contrary, the 
regime of tlie Scheldt had prevented sending supplies to 
Antwerp. Luxemburg had served as an offensive base 
for Germany. It had not been possible to hold the Meuse 
properly. Dutch Limburg had at the time of the Armistice 
given passage to German troops. 

The Commission reported therefore, de jure et de 
facto, in favour of revision: 

(1) The Treaties of 1839 should be revised in the totality of 
their clauses on the joint demands of the Powers which consider 
this revision necessary. 

(2) Holland should take part in this revision. 

(3) Those among the great guaranteeing Powers which have 
held their engagement, should also take part in it. 

(4) The Great Powers which have general interests repre- 
sented at the Peace Conference should also take part in it. 

(5) The general aim of this revision is (in accordance with the 
purpose of the League of Nations) to liberate Belgium from the 
limitations of sovereignty imposed upon her by the Treaty of 1839, 
and to suppress as much for her sake as for that of peace in general 
the various risks and inconveniences resulting from the said 
Treaties. 

On March 8, I presented the report to the Supreme 
Council which on the same day unanimously adopted its 
conclusions. The Treaty handed to Germany, on May 8, 
consequently stipulated that the latter, recognizing that 
the Treaties of 1839 no longer met the circumstances, 
accepted their abrogation and undertook to conform to all 
the conventions destined to replace them, between Belgium 
and the Powers. 

There remained Holland. Some of our great Allies 
would have preferred — and they made no secret of it — 
that the negotiation be carried on directly between that 
country and Belgium. On the strength of the decision of 
March 8, 1 obtained on June 4, consent from the Council of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, after long discussion, that 



TREATIES OF GUARANTEE 221 

the Great Powers should take part in the negotiations along 
with Belgium and Holland. The first meeting was held on 
July 29, 1919, the last on March 23, 1920. This agreement 
reached so laboriously was halted again, at the last moment 
by the unjustified claims of Holland to the Wielingen 
Channels which she herself during the war had recognized 
as not belonging to her territorial waters. In any case the 
revision of the Treaties of 1839 and its main consequence, 
the abrogation of Belgian neutrality, are no longer opposed 
by anyone. Thus liberated Belgium acquires the right of 
providing for her own safety. It is the birthright of the 
Belgian Army of 600,000 which to-morrow will be joined in 
brotherly union with our o^\ai for the defense of peace. 
France, by the part she played in the negotiations, may 
justly claim an honourable sponsorship. 

On principle the case was won. But practically as 
regards the consequences, or at least some of them, Bel- 
gium was less fortunate. Here two distinct but contradic- 
tory currents manifested themselves in the Belgian 
Government, in which all parties were represented. The 
Socialists said: ''No annexation." The bourgeois parties 
inclined to believe that to guarantee to Belgium full mili- 
tary and economic security (use of the Scheldt, canal from 
Ghent to Tervueren, canal from Antwerp to the Mouse) the 
simplest solution would be to place the left bank of the 
Scheldt and Dutch Limburg under Belgian sovereignty. It 
is superfluous to add that this transfer was justified not 
only on historical ground but by excellent arguments of 
national security confirmed by more than four years of 
war. In spite of this, the Belgian case was put forward 
with hesitation. Premises were presented and no conclu- 
sions drawn. Belgium did suggest, however, that in the 
event of satisfaction being given her Holland might receive 
compensation either on the banks of the Ems, or in Guel- 
ders — a Prussian district inhabited by a people of Dutch 
origin and tradition. 

The Commission for Belgian Affairs, after a minute 
discussion, admitted the principle of this solution which 



222 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

seemed to be a just and necessary guarantee of Belgian 
security; but it very soon appeared that such a solution — 
obviously delicate, as it implied cession of territory by 
Germany to a neutral power — would meet with objections. 
As early as February 11, Mr. Wilson had said: 

*'I do not see how Holland can be brought to discuss 
this question of sovereignty." 

On March 31, he added: 

**You ask Germany to yield German territory to a neu- 
tral country. That may be just, but it is difficult to 
justify." 

April 4, the King of the Belgians insisted in his usual 
clear and straightforward fashion and expressed astonish- 
ment at the objections presented by the British Admiralty 
with regard to the left bank of the Scheldt. Mr. Lloyd 
George replied to him: 

''If you wish to modify the regime of the Scheldt, we 
are ready. If however territorial questions are concerned, 
it is another matter." 

On April 16, 1 was summoned, as President of the Com- 
mission for Belgian Affairs, to defend the report of this 
Commission before the Council of Four. Mr. Hymans was 
present. We both insisted upon the character of the pro- 
posal, it was — neither more nor less — to render possible a 
future Dutch and Belgian agreement, which could hardly 
be arranged without some medium of exchange. We asked 
to have a door left open and we expressly reserved the 
rights of the population by a plebiscite. We had the con- 
viction that our suggestion was just and we defended it 
with force. In vain. All cession of Dutch territory to Bel- 
gium, and of German territory to Holland was rejected by 
the Council. 

Henceforth, Belgium's territorial claims were limited 
to the two Walloon districts of Eupen and Malme^y and 
to the territory of Moresnet. Ten meetings of the Commis- 
sion finally led to a favourable solution which events have 
since justified ; for out of a population of 55,000 inhabitants 
only 266 protests were made within the time fixed by the 



TREATIES OF GUARANTEE 223 

Treaty. Tliis was for Belgium, a very meagre extension of 
territory. The increases that were refused would have been 
of real importance to her. Belgium despite the weight of 
historical argument was defeated — as France had been in 
her demands for the 1814* frontier and an independent 
Rhineland.f But she had been able once again to test our 
country's active support and to understand the need of a 
close union between the two countries. 

This union was riveted still more firmly by the result 
of another discussion equally vital for Belgium and for 
France — that of the reparations. Nothing more certain 
than Belgium's right in this matter. In the month of 
April, 1914, Herr Bethmann-Hollweg — ''Necessity knows 
no law" — had himself recognized it. Attacked not on 
political grounds involving her, but as a result of her 
geographical situation ; thrust into the struggle in violation 
of the Treaties of 1839 and of the Hague Convention of 1907 
— Belgium had on February 14, 1916, received from her 
Allies by the declaration of Ste. Adresse the solemn Assur- 
ance that she would be restored and effectively aided in 
her recovery. January 8, 1918, President Wilson, in the 
seventh of his fourteen points, had declared for "the full 
restoration of Belgium." The bases of peace announced 
on November 5 following had sanctioned this declaration. 
Agreement as to principle was complete. But its applica- 
tion was to give rise to difficulties. 

As soon as the Commission and Sub-Commission 
entrusted by the Supreme Council with the study of the 
problem of reparations began their work in February, 
1919, the Belgian delegate, M. Van den Heuvel, made no 
secret of the fact that he claimed exceptional treatment 
for his country. Other delegates immediately opposed this 
claim on the ground of absolute equality for all, and the 
desirability — which was unquestioned — of general solu- 
tions. I had met the same objections when as President of 
the Commission formed to draft the clauses relative to 



*See Chapter VIII. 
tSee Chapter V. 



224 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Alsace and Lorraine* I was obliged to fight through long 
sessions to obtain departures from the general principles 
of the Treaty no matter how justified in equity. Such was 
the Belgian situation in February. Neither Belgium nor 
France obtained all she asked. But we did get the 
essential. 

M. Van den Heuvel's plea was a strong one. In order 
to avoid a total of more than a thousand billions which 
clearly could never be recovered, the Allies did not demand 
from Germany the reimbursement of their war expendi- 
tures. Belgium, contractually neutral and victim of a 
double violation of international law, asked that an excep- 
tion be made to this rule and Germany be forced to pay all 
her war and Government expenditures which the loans of 
the Allies had enabled her to meet. Germany was compelled 
to pay the Allies pensions and separation allowances in 
addition to reparations for damage to property. Belgium 
asked that it be remembered that invaded at the very start 
of the war she had not been able to raise a large Army and 
that therefore her share of payments on account of pen- 
sions would be very small. Finally under the two heads 
settled upon by the Allies, Reparations and Pensions, Ger- 
many would have to pay hundreds of billions; Belgium 
urged that as her share would be only a small one, she 
would in the ordinary course of pro-rata distribution be 
obliged to wait too long for monies of which she stood in 
urgent need. For all these reasons, Belgium demanded 
privileged treatment and priority, the exact terms and 
amounts to be settled later. This demand was formulated 
in a Note of March 29 which ended as follows: 

Belgium does not overlook the demands for reparations that 
may be presented by other Powers ; but she thinks she may legiti- 
mately claim that her special position should be taken into account 
and her recovery facilitated. 

Owing to the de jure et de facto position in which it is placed, 
the Royal Government demands priority for Belgian claims, and 
solicits the aid of the Allied and Associated Governments to obtain 



*See Chapter VII. 



TREATIES OF GUARANTEE 225 

such privilege for Belgium in the division of the indemnities paid 
by Germany, so that the reparation to which she is entitled may be 
completely and rapidly realized. 

The opposition of Great Britain's representatives on 
the Commission, which had., been apparent from the very 
beginning of the discussions, continued during the months 
of March and April. King Albert, at the meeting on April 
4, was unable to overcome it. The British delegates 
answered that Belgium's losses were less than those of 
other countries, and that thousands of soldiers come from 
afar had died to give her back her land. Broad promises 
had been made at the time of the Armistice with regard to 
German payments ; and it would not do for any Parliament 
to be able to say that Belgium alone had benefited from 
them. The resistance was unyielding, and M. Loucheur, in 
the Committee of five members appointed to deal with the 
financial questions, could not break it. Equality for all; 
such was the principle adhered to. 

Belgium then made a supreme effort. On April 24 in 
two Notes handed to the plenipotentaries, M. Hymans sum- 
marized his country's demand. He no longer claimed full 
priority, but only a privileged payment of 2,500 millions. 
He asked in addition for the reimbursement of food relief 
expenses, war expenses, and expenses of administration 
while the Belgian Government was at Havre and also the 
reimbursement of communal relief loans, the interprovincial 
loan raised to pay off penalties inflicted by the Germans ; 
and of loss sustained by the Government on marks repur- 
chased at 1 fr. 25 from Belgian citizens. April 29, M. 
Hymans, accompanied by M. Van den Heuvel and M. Van- 
dervelde, appeared before the Council of Four. It was a 
thrilling and tragic meeting, in which the three Belgian 
Ministers pleaded mth their hearts and their heads, a 
confused meeting in which the Great Powers tried in every 
way to persuade Belgium to keep calm and be moderate — a 
tumultuous meeting also for at certain moments one won- 
dered whether Belgium would not break away. 



226 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TKEATY 

''Think of our people," said M. Vandervelde, **a little 
people but one that trusts you. Do not refuse what it 
expects and what it has a perfect right to. ' ' 

"You have fewer dead than we," answered Mr. Lloyd 
George. 

''Look at France," said M. Clemenceau, "I have not 
always been satisfied with the solutions that I have been 
obliged to accept. Our Parliaments all believe that we do 
not obtain enough. I do my duty and that is enough for me. 
I give way sometimes to solutions which I feel to be imper- 
fect and even unjust. I do so in the interest of higher 
unity. You think that you have not been given enough. I 
do not say no. You ask our aid? I do not say no. But 
there are general rules against you, rules the strength of 
which lie in the very fact that they are general, equal for 
all. Do not be uncompromising and rest assured that you 
will never find us indifferent to your difficulties." 

And France, by the side of Belgium — France unjustly 
attacked and who in order to facilitate the practical accord 
of the Allies did not claim the recovery of her own war 
expenses — France, through a new effort of her financial 
experts, principally due to M. Loucheur, succeeded, by dint 
of patience and firmness, in finding a solution which, 
although incomplete, gave Belgium essential advantages. 
She was not reimbursed, any more than France was, for her 
losses in marks ; because such a course would have plunged 
us into an abyss of unlimited claims, on the part of Bohemia, 
Poland and Roumania. On the other hand, the reimburse- 
ment of all the loans contracted by Belgium up to the 
Armistice was charged against Germany, and Belgium was 
liberated by the Treaty itself from her debt to the Allies. 
In addition, a priority of 2,500 millions was granted to her 
on the first German payments to rank immediately after 
the expenses of occupation. 

Four months later, M. Clemenceau declared in the 
Senate : 

As far as priority is concerned, I have done something which 
may be said to be imprudent. We have not obtained priority for 



TREATIES OF GUARANTEE 227 

our own reparations. . .and yet, at a critical moment, Belgium hav- 
ing great need of us, I pleaded for her and obtained for her a 
priority payment of two and one-half billions. I was unable to get 
this priority for France, but I got it for another country. I repeat 
it was perhaps imprudent, but I could not permit that Belgium 
should be left in the situation you know of with the consent of 
France. (Applause.) 

Several Senators. You were right. 

From beginning to end of the financial discussion, with- 
out restriction or reserve but with practical foresight, 
France bad lent Belgium her active, ber full support. 
Honour commanded it. The result bas justified it. 

There remained a last question, more delicate tban the 
others— that of Luxemburg. More delicate for it might 
easily, if caution were not exercised, lead to at least an 
apparent conflict between French and Belgian interests. 
On February 11, 1919, M. Hymans, with the unanimous sup- 
port of Belgian opinion, had declared that bis country, 
repudiating all policy of annexation, counted nevertheless 
upon the Powers to aid in establisbing closer relations 
between Belgium and tbe Grand Ducby — relations justified 
by historic memories and considerations of security. In 
Luxemburg, on the other hand, many who desired to change 
the pre-war system were attracted politically and econom- 
ically towards France rather than tow^ards Belgium. Their 
appeal w^as heard in Paris and many of our countrymen, 
especially in Parliament, urged the blood shed in our cause 
by so many Luxemburgers as an argument to oppose Bel- 
gian claims. They demanded that Luxemburg should be 
permitted to choose freely, and that France should hearken 
to a call the tenour of which none of them doubted. 

The French Government, even before the signing of the 
Armistice, had felt these two contradictory currents. M. 
Aristide Briand in his confidential Memorandum to the 
French Ambassadors of February, 1917, on the war aims, 
had avoided any definite reference to the solution of the 
Luxemburg problem. Five months later however on June 
9, 1917, M. Ribot, then Premier, had declared to Baron de 



228 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Gaiffier, the Belgian Minister, that the annexation of 
Luxemburg was not one of France 's war aims and had for- 
mally authorized King Albert's representative to make 
official use of this declaration. At the opening of the Peace 
Conference, French policy had no other legal basis than 
this negative affirmation. Is it necessary to add that how- 
ever lively our sympathies for the people of Luxemburg 
surrendered by its dynasty to Germany in 1914 but now 
steadfast in its desire for liberations, the will to give Bel- 
gium a proof of our friendship was uppermost in all minds? 

During the negotiations of 1919, M. Clemenceau, in 
spite of pressure brought to bear upon him in varying 
directions, treated these difficult problems in the only right 
way, with complete loyalty and entire frankness. From the 
first day, he told Belgium what he would and what he could 
do. From the first day also he made clear the one thing 
he could not do. Confirming without restriction M. Ribot's 
promise he declared: 

"France has in Luxemburg no design of annexation 
either open or disguised." 

Going even further, he added: 

*' France will welcome any agreement between Belgium 
and Luxemburg. Not only will she rejoice at it, but she 
will aid it by every means in her power. ' ' 

The only restriction — and who could fail to understand 
it — was the following: 

''Settle your own affair with Luxemburg. But do not 
ask me to repel — by an official act — affections that turn 
towards France, or to impose the Belgian solution — a solu- 
tion which, in my opinion, should come from a free under- 
standing and form another link between our three 
countries." 

Ever unchanging M. Clemenceau, to the day of his 
retirement, proved to Belgium by his acts the sincerity of 
his declaration. In the question of the recognition of the 
Luxemburg Government he constantly refused to take any 
initiative and declared his intention of leaving to Belgium 
the privilege of priority. On March 5 in response to the 



TEEATIES OF GUARANTEE 229 

wish of the Belgians he intervened to adjourn the hearing 
of the Luxemburg delegation by the Supreme Council. At 
the same period incidents having arisen in Luxemburg the 
responsibility for which Belgium laid to a French general, 
this general was relieved of his command. It was M. Cle- 
menceau who in order to leave Belgium full liberty of action 
and negotiation, supported on two occasions the adjourn- 
ment of the political plebiscite and the economic referen- 
dum. Finally when on May 28, M. Renter, Minister of the 
State of Luxemburg, was heard by the Council of Four, 
these were the terms in which the head of the French Gov- 
ernment summed up the situation: 

"We are, and we wish to be, your friends. We also 
want to be on the best terais with the Belgian people, who 
threw themselves into the battle with a heroism that Ave can 
never forget, and which lays us under great obligations to 
them. As the political situation in Luxemburg did not 
appear to us to be very clear we have preferred to ask you 
to adjourn your plebiscite and your referendum. I am 
glad we waited. The potential difficulties and misunder- 
standings are now in fair way to be settled. 

*'Your object is to bring France, Belgium and Luxem- 
burg closer together. Belgium has already begun these 
conversations. We are ready to join you in them, if you 
both desire it. I do not want to force myself upon you.; 
If you desire our participation in your conversation, we 
shall be glad to add thereto our friendship." 

It was in these conditions, and in this atmosphere that 
a Committee over which I presided and on which Baron de 
Gaiffier represented Belgium prepared Articles 40 and 41 
relative to Luxemburg. Germany, under these articles, 
renounced the advantages accruing to her from all provi- 
sions in the Treaties and conventions that had been con- 
cluded between herself and the Grand Duchy from 1842 to 
1902. Luxemburg was to withdraw from the German Zoll- 
verein. Germany was to renounce all her rights in the 
operation of the railways, and to adhere in advance, to all 
arrangements relative to the Grand Duchy that might be 



230 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

arrived at by the Powers. Moreover, according to Annex 
5, Chapter 8, she undertook to deliver to Luxemburg an 
annual quantity of coal equal to that which the latter bought 
in Germany before the war. Thus was finally achieved 
emancipation from the tutelage imposed by Prussia. Full 
liberty was in addition guaranteed to the Allies for the 
negotiation of further agreements. 

At the end of 1919, the situation was favourable to the 
definite conclusion of such agreements. At the meeting of 
the Supreme Council, November 13, M. Clemenceau said: 

**At present there is no difficulty between France and 
Belgium with regard to the question of Luxemburg as a 
whole. The only point at issue relates to a railroad which 
Bismarck took from us in 1871. Tliis technical difficulty is, 
moreover, in a fair way to be settled."* 

Thus by his unwavering fairness the head of the French 
Government had succeeded in negotiating without a hitch 
a question which through no fault of Belgium's or of our 
own, might at times, by the very force of circumstances, 
have provoked friction. The road was clear for a complete 
and general agreement between our neighbors and our- 
selves. Before long this was to be officially consummated. 

On January 6, 1920, as a result of technical negotiations 
between two members of the French and Belgian Govern- 
ments, M. Loucheur and M. Jaspar, it was recognized 
that a general conversation was necessary and possible, 
notably with regard to the military agreement of which the 
French representatives in 1919, had occasion to speak 
either with the King of the Belgians or his Ministers. On 
January 8, M. Clemenceau called upon Marshal Foch to 
take up the question and prepare a plan. On January 18 
the Clemenceau Cabinet resigned. 

The negotiation thus begun — the consequence and the 



*Article 67 of the Treaty of Versailles, substituting the French Gov- 
ernment in all the rights of the German Empire over all the railway lines 
managed by the Empire Eailroad Administration, had placed in the hands of 
France, the Luxemburg system which had, moreover been operated before 
1870 by the Compagnie dcs Chemins de Fer de I'Est. It was on this point 
that Belgium has asked for an amendment. 



TREATIES OF GUARANTEE 231 

consecration of a year of brotherhood in peace after four 
years of brotherhood of arms — was carried to a successful 
conclusion by the Millerand Cabinet. Such an agreement 
answers so clearly to the interests and feelings of the two 
nations that it needs no comment. It is the contractual 
expression of the nature of things and the instincts of 
nations. France and Belgium, to whom the war has taught 
so much, had on the way to peace met the same obstacles. 
Great and loyal Allies without whose aid their very exist- 
ence would have been compromised did not always under- 
stand certain of their claims. Who was wrong? Who was 
right ? The future will tell. In any case the policy followed 
since November 11, 1918, has tightened bonds forged in 
anguish — that is the main thing! Two nations, brave and 
honest, standing shoulder to shoulder to uphold their rights 
and make Europe safe, can look to the future with confi- 
dence. In the future as in the past, in the future even more 
than in the past, in peace or in war — if ever Germany should 
resort to war again — Frenchmen and Belgians will hold for 
the welfare of mankind as much as for that of their respec- 
tive lands. 

Need I insist — after the foregoing — upon the character 
of these three Treaties — the first two still pending, the 
third in force? Whoever may have doubts as to their 
scope or origin will find an answer in the ruined cities and 
the devastated regions of Belgium and of France. They 
are like the Treaty of Versailles itself, the work of men 
who are determined that it shall never recur. Menace? 
No. Protection? Yes. Neither Belgium nor France can, 
to save the liberty of the world, inflict upon themselves 
every few decades the sufferings they underwent for five 
years. They are determined that in the future the door 
shall be closed and the bolt made strong. Moreover these 
three defensive Treaties are within the scope and beneath 
the control of the League of Nations. They are secret 
neither in their origin nor in their clauses. They appear 
as — what they indeed are — the living lesson of history — 
the seed of a prosperous future. They are also — and I 



232 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TEEATY 

hope that Great Britain and America will see it— an essen- 
tial factor of that Peace of Justice and of Eight which 
France, in complete accord with her Allies, wanted and 
has achieved. 



CHAPTER VII 



ALSACE AND LORRAINE 



What Alsace and Lorraine were to France, the whole 
world knew on that day when the two provinces acclaimed 
the triumphant entry of our troops. Their loyalty was of 
long standing. As far back as the eighteenth century Prus- 
sians acknowledged it. Read what at the time of the Con- 
gress of Utrecht, their Government wrote to its 
plenipotentiaries : 

It is notorious that the inhabitants of Alsace are more French 
than the Parisians and that the King of France is so sure of their 
attachment to his service and his glory that he commands them to 
provide themselves with swords, guns, halberds, pistols, powder and 
shot, whenever there is rumour that the Germans purpose crossing 
the Rhine, and that they rush in a body to the banks of that river to 
prevent or at any rate to oppose the passage of the Germanic 
nations at the evident risk of their own lives, as though they were 
marching to victory 

Were the Alsatians to be separated from the King of France 
whom they adore, he could not be deprived of their hearts except 
by two hundred years of bondage. 

Bismarck knew this and what the result would be. After 
brief hesitation, he nevertheless yielded to Moltke's 
demands and to the theory of the military frontier. He 
attempted neither to deny nor to excuse the outrage per- 
petrated against the rights and the will of a people. Just 
as Bethmann-Hollweg was to appear in the Reichstag forty- 
three years later, so Bismarck was in the same place on 
May 2, 1871. Proclaiming ''the repugnance of the inhabi- 
tants for their separation from France," he asserted his 

233 



234 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

intention of taking no account of this. The representatives 
of Alsace and Lorraine had just launched from Bordeaux 
their heartrending appeal for justice.* No one answered. 
The ''Land of Empire" was necessary to the new-born 
Empire not only as a bulwark, but as cement. It became, 
under the absolute authority of the Emperor, King of Prus- 
sia, the common property of the German States. It was 
the first Imperial conquest, the first sign of Empire. But 
historically in a century of national aspirations, the annex- 
ation was a monstrous solecism. By it German victory 
assumed against France a meaning and an importance it 
had not had against Austria. For an indefinite future the 
relations between France and Germany were encumbered 
by a lien which precluded harmony or healthy exchanges. 
The peace of the whole world, to use President Wilson's 
words, ''was greatly disturbed thereby." 

From 1871 to 1914, the drama of two million men defend- 
ing their national soul against a powerful Empire went on. 
In Alsace-Lorraine, in France and abroad, 536,000 Alsa- 
tians and Lorrainers declared for France. Those who 
remained at home did not give way. With ruthless severity 
Germanization fell upon both provinces. In Government 
as in education, everything that recalled the past was 



*"The representatives of Alsace and Lorraine, prior to any negotia- 
tions for peace, have laid on the table of the National Assembly a declaration 
most solemnly stating, in the name of both Provinces, their wish and right to 
remain French. 

"Having been handed over, contrary to all justice, and through an odious 
abuse of power, to the domination of the foreigner, we have one last duty to 
perform. 

* ' We once again declare to be null and void a treaty which disposes of us 
without our consent. 

"The revindication of our rights remains forever open to each and all, 
according to the dictates of our conscience. 

' ' On leaving these precincts, where our dignity will not allow us to remain 
any longer, and despite the bitterness of our sorrow, the supreme thought, 
which lies at the bottom of our hearts, is one of gratitude to those who, for 
the last six months, have unceasingly defended us, as also of unalterable 
attachment to the Mother country from which we have been so violently torn. 

"We shall still be with you in our prayers, and shall wait, with full con- 
fidence in the future, for regenerated France to resume the course of her great 
destiny. 

"Your brothers of Alsace and Lorraine, albeit separated for the time 
being from the common family, will retain for France, absent though she be 
from their homes, a filial affection until the day when she returns to take 
again her place therein. ' ' 



ALSACE AND LORRAINE 235 

abolished and forbidden. Men came and went. Manteuff el, 
the two Hohenlohe, Wedel. The principle remained and 
never varied even when domination made pretense of 
indulgence. But the spirit of protest never abated even 
when the exigencies of life suggested accommodation. I 
will refrain from writing here the history of this long 
martyrdom: independent newspapers suppressed; the 
French language forbidden ; the right of association denied ; 
police pressure unloosed; political trials multiplied; indi- 
vidual relations hampered by passport regulations; the 
''peace of the grave" organized by the victors under the 
notorious ''paragraph concerning dictatorship." Sepa- 
rated from France, refractory to Germany, Alsace and 
Lorraine sought refuge in their own genius ; here too after 
a few months, everything this effort had created — 
museums, theatres, magazines, sporting clubs or literary 
societies — fell under the iron hand of unbending authority. 
In 1902, the law establishing the dictatorship was 
repealed; in 1911, a new Constitution was promulgated but 
neither real liberty nor legal autonomy resulted for 
Alsace-Lorraine. "We have been swindled," wrote the 
Abbe Wetterle. A few isolated Germans understood the 
cleavage which Prussian officialism was every day widen- 
ing between conquerors and conquered. Never did the 
Imperial Government abandon oppression of those it felt 
unable to convince. Its active and often beneficial adminis- 
tration was unable to offset the initial error and its conse- 
quences. Years pass and antagonism grows more bitter. 
In 1909 authoritarianism turned to persecution. Every 
day brought a lawsuit. Every verdict a renewal of protest 
which expressed itself in a thousand ingenius ways that 
irritated and exasperated the dull-witted Germans. Expul- 
sions increase daily as do imprisonments. Suspects are 
hunted down and then came the Saverne incident when a 
colonel, setting law at naught, charges people in the streets 
and arrests magistrates in their homes, for the glory of an 
Army which he alleges has been insulted : a striking epitome 
— ^not only for the people of Alsace and Lorraine, but also 



236 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

for Germany and the whole world— of the relentless strug- 
gle between a tortured race and a government of oppression. 
Thereafter, the ''Land of Empire" is openly treated as 
enemy country. Spies lurked in every home. Germans no 
longer even try to dissimulate, they think only of crushing 
and of uprooting. 

The war breaks out and the Imperial Government which 
up till 1918 is to repeat that "there was no Alsace-Lor- 
raine question," the Imperial Government which by the 
mouth of Count Hertling is to aver that "Alsace- 
Lorraine is bound to Germanism by bonds that grow daily 
stronger" — the Imperial Government, I repeat, inflicts 
upon the downtrodden provinces an iron-clad regime the 
like of which history has never known. For the civilian 
population, Alsatians are forbidden, under pain of impris- 
onment, to post their letters in boxes other than those of 
their own districts. On January 5, 1917, 4,000 inhabitants 
of Mulhouse, between seventeen and sixty, are assembled 
in the barracks and deported to the interior of Germany. 
An old man in Strassburg, who took off his hat to French 
prisoners in the street, is sentenced to six weeks ' imprison- 
ment. To facilitate arbitrary repression, newspapers were 
forbidden to publish reports of courts-martial. An Alsatian 
nun for protesting against the destruction of the Cathedral 
at Reims is sent to prison for six months. Another, at 
Riedisheim, for treating the French wounded too kindly, 
is sentenced to five years' hard labour. A Swiss has com- 
puted the sentences passed in three years by German 
courts-martial upon natives of Alsace and Lorraine; the 
total exceeds 5,000 years ' imprisonment. A label in French 
on any package brought fine or even imprisonment to the 
sender. Two women speak French in a tramcar: fourteen 
days' imprisonment. The mayor of a commune speaks in 
French to one of his fellow townsmen: three months in 
prison. Of course as soon as war began all newspapers 
printed in French were suppressed. The governor of 
Alsace-Lorraine summed up the situation in 1915 in a 
proclamation which brands the inhabitants as traitors, 



ALSACE AND LORRAINE 237 

14,000 of them having, at the risk of their lives joined the 
French Army in August, 1914. 

Meanwhile, Alsatian recruits already conscripted when 
the war began, serve in the Germany Army. They are sub- 
jected to savage persecution. A general order prescribed 
special treatment for all soldiers, natives of Alsace or 
Lorraine: more stringent postal censorship: no leave: 
police supervision and corporal punishment. An Alsatian 
soldier complains of having had nothing to eat : his lieuten- 
ant and adjutant horsewliip him till he faints beneath 
their blows. Another officer instructs his sergeants to 
''break in well the Alsatians and Lorrainers who are all 
bandits and traitors. " It is ordered that they be stationed 
in the most dangerous places and everywhere regarded as 
suspects. In the course of the battles of 1918, we captured 
on prisoners several hundred such orders. Among them 
I will quote two : one in which it is laid down that German 
troops, quartered in Alsace-Lorraine, are to conduct them- 
selves ''as in enemy country"; the other, issued by General 
Loewenfeld, commanding the Prussian Guard, where one 
may read: "The Lorrainers do not belong to our race." 
Herr von Kuhlmann said in December, 1917 : ' ' There is no 
Alsace-Lorraine question." To this piece of ministerial 
impudence fit answer was given throughout the war by 
the acts of German civil and military authorities. Besides, 
was it not a deputy for Saxony, the Socialist Wendel, who 
declared to the Reichstag on June 7, 1918 : "If a vote of the 
people of Alsace-Lorraine were taken to-day, four-fifths 
— that is to say, the whole, minus the German immigrants — 
would vote in favour of France." 



II 



In France all parties without distinction, in peace as in 
war, have lived the martyrdom of Alsace-Lorraine. ' ' Think 
of them always," said Gambetta. And, twenty years later, 
Jaures answered this appeal: "Alsace and Lorraine are 
like two trees which may be separated from the forest by 



238 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

a wall but whose far-reaching roots extend beneath the 
enclosure and rejoin the roots of the main forest." The 
French did not declare a war of revenge. But when the 
conqueror of 1870 renewed his criminal aggression, the 
recovery of the two provinces became, with the defense of 
French soil, the instinctive war object of the nation. On 
that point neither hesitation nor doubt. Full recovery, pure 
and simple, was a natural right. 

By no means all the Allied Governments and people had 
during the war an equally clear understanding of the mani- 
fest justice of our claim. Take Great Britain, for example. 
Up to the last moment, the more advanced Liberals 
accepted the idea of the return of Alsace and Lorraine to 
France only under express reservations. The least unrea- 
sonable demand a plebiscite which the conscience of France 
rejects as an outrage against truth and a challenge to jus- 
tice. Others (read the articles published in the Nation, 
Manchester Guardian and Labour Leader) — go further 
still and demand that, when peace is declared, ''both the 
annexed provinces, by universal and solemn Treaty, be 
placed under the guardianship of all the belligerent Powers, 
America included." An influential pacifist, M. Snowden, 
^viites at the same time (end of 1917) that "if, in the ques- 
tion of Alsace-Lorraine, the Allies persist in their present 
attitude, the war will not be finished either in 1917 or in 
1918." On January 18, 1918, a delegate of the Trades 
Unions, received by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, 
asks him this question which reveals both suspicion and 
lack of understanding: 

''Is it the people of France or the people of Alsace- 
Lorraine who complain of the latter 's present situation?" 

Mr. Lloyd George himself hesitated long before he 
asserted the conviction which will for ever honour his 
speech of January 5, 1918: "The question of Alsace- 
Lorraine is a sore, which, for the last half century, has 
infected the peace of Europe. Normal conditions cannot 
be re-established before it is cured. . . .We mean to support 
the French Democracy to the death, when it calls for a 



ALSACE AND LORRAINE 239 

revision of the great iniquity perpetrated in 1871." Six 
months earlier, on July 14, 1917, he had not thought the 
question sufficiently clear in the minds of his fellow 
countrymen to warrant his being present at the banquet to 
which the Alsatians and Lorrainers in England had invited 
him. Up to the very end of the war, the special case — 
unique and clear — ^presented by the Alsace-Lorraine ques- 
tion, was persistently misunderstood by a portion of 
British public opinion. 

In America the same misunderstanding prevailed to an 
even greater extent. On my arrival in Washington on 
May 15, 1917, as High Commissioner of the French Repub- 
lic, I at once noticed that, however sincere the affection of 
America for France, the question of Alsace-Lorraine was 
misunderstood by the majority. For most Americans, 
Alsace was a German-speaking country. That settled 
everything. They were ignorant both of the facts and the 
feelings, as well as of the incomparable example of moral 
loyalty displayed for nearly fifty years by these people, 
hard and staunch as granite. They hesitated to take the 
word of Alsatians in America who, when speaking of the 
sufferings and the hopes of their native land, did so with 
an accent which though foreign, was not French. More- 
over, every country in Europe — ^not without abuses of 
analogy — ^professed to have its own Alsace-Lorraine. 
Italians, Serbians, Greeks, Roumanians, Poles, to justify 
certain pretentions warranted in principle but very differ- 
ent in historical evolution from the case of Alsace-Lorraine, 
never tired of evoking Metz and Strassburg ; and this gen- 
eralization alarmed timid minds which regarded all terri- 
torial claims as germs of war. How often Americans have 
expressed to me the hope that France would be content 
with an independent and neutral Alsace-Lorraine! How 
many expressed surprise when, to the statement of our 
rights, I added that their obvious justice made a plebiscite 
useless and unacceptable. I remember a long discussion I 
had in August, 1917, with Mr. Walter Lippmann, a member 
of the Inquiry Office, the official bureau established for 



240 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

the advance study of peace questions: the idea of a plebi- 
scite was so deeply rooted in his mind — the idea of Alsace 
and Lorraine forming an integral part of France was so 
perfectly foreign to him — that he had concocted a system 
of voting by fragments under which the two provinces 
would be divided into a dozen sections. Two hours of 
explanation were needed to dissuade him from a scheme at 
which the Alsatians and Lorrainers would have been the 
first dismayed could they have known of it. 

A few months later this state of opinion was entirely 
changed. I venture to believe that the activities of my 
co-workers and of myself, the 15,000 lectures in English 
where young officers, with all the authority of their war 
record and of their wounds, presented the pitiful situation 
of the captive provinces, had something to do with this 
transformation. On May 10, 1918, in introducing in New 
York at an impressive ceremony, a company of chasseurs 
a pied, which I had asked M. Clemenceau to place at my 
disposal for the third Liberty Loan campaign, I described 
the convict system enforced in Alsace-Lorraine and added : 
*^If, as alleged by Kuhlmann and Scheidemann, there is no 
Alsace-Lorraine question ; if, as Hertling avers, Alsace and 
Lorraine are bound to Germanism by ever tightening 
bonds, then I ask why Germany has for the last four years, 
been treating Alsace-Lorraine as a conquered country; I 
ask why the regulations which she applied to those prov- 
inces are even more savage than those to which Belgium 
and Northern France have been subjected." I was 
answered by tremendous cheers. At my side, stood M. 
Daniel Blumenthal, former mayor of Colmar, who, by the 
reorganization under his presidency of the Associations of 
Alsatians and Lorrainers in America, had afforded me the 
most valuable assistance. Thousands of huge posters, 
reproducing Henner's "Alsacienne," with the text of the 
Bordeaux protest referred to above, had carried the mean- 
ing and scope of our claim to every state of the Union. 
Support came from all sides. The battle was won. 

In this success which does honour to the heart of 



ALSACE AND LORRAINE 241 

America, Americans themselves, particularly university 
men, worked with us. French gratitude must assign a 
place apart to the eminent university man who presided 
over the destinies of the United States. On January 8, 
1918, at 11 o'clock in the morning, a gentleman connected 
with the White House telephoned me: "The President is to 
read a message to Congress at noon. Come. You will be 
pleased." An hour later, I heard President "Wilson, 
before the Senate and House, which stood to cheer him, 
utter the famous words: "The wrong done to France by 
Prussia in 1871, in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine which has 
unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, — 
should be righted in order that peace may once more be 
made secure in the interest of all." 

Of all the public declarations of our Allies upon this 
essential matter this was the clearest and most comprehen- 
sive. The President formulated the axiom of pure and 
simple reparation of an international outrage. It excluded 
at the same time the insultingly illegitimate solutions of 
neutrality and of a plebiscite. Lastly, it gave to the prob- 
lem of Alsace-Lorraine its full significance not only from 
a French but from a human standpoint; its true symbolic 
value of a triumph of justice and liberty. A few days later, 
replying to the President of the Association of Alsatians 
and Lorrainers, Mr. Wilson telegraphed his hope that 
"the year 1918 would see the realization of the deferred 
hopes of Alsace-Lorraine." And as, owing to controversies 
in the Press, M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
wished to have from the President himself a definite inter- 
pretation of his words, Mr. Wilson answered, smiling: 

' ' I think I have spoken clearly. To right a wrong means 
only one thing — to put things back in the state where they 
were before the wrong was done. Alsace and Lorraine 
must be placed purely and simply in the situation they 
were in before the Treaty of Frankfort." 

A Frenchman would not have spoken otherwise. More- 
over, the President's conviction was of long standing. 

"When I was a boy," he told me one day, "I could never 



ii^. 



242 THE TKUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

think of Alsace-Lorraine without sorrow. For half a cen- 
tury, they had the unique privilege of representing violated 
justice in the eyes of the entire universe. In the world's 
history, there is no parallel of their case." 

From the beginning to the end of the Peace Conference, 
President Wilson was for all our Alsace-Lorraine pro- 
posals, a staunch and active friend. Just as by his supreme 
authority, he had welded the public opinion in his country 
on the principle of the case, so, in its application, he loyally 
helped us in securing the necessary guarantees. I wish 
here to express to him my deep gratitude. 

On July 14, 1918, at Mount Vernon, on the annual pil- 
grimage to Washington's tomb, each of the races repre- 
sented in the American people sent delegates to speak in 
their name. When the turn came for Americans of French 
origin, it was an Alsatian who stepped forward and, on the 
verdant slopes which rise from the banks of the Potomac 
to the wooded heights above, a tremendous cheer greeted 
Alsace, as the spokesman of France. All America had 
understood. 

Ill 

Once the Conference began, our rights were never again 
challenged from any quarter. But when it came to its 
application, many difficulties arose, some of which were of 
a moral, others of a material order, but had the same 
origin. 

Our Allies were veiling in principle to entertain our 
demands. But it was their understanding that this should 
be subject to the same procedure and rules as applied to 
the other chapters of the Treaty of Peace. France on the 
contrary considered that the question of Alsace-Lorraine — 
not being like any other — should be settled in strict equity, 
even at the expense of precedent. We wished that by its 
preamble and its clauses, that portion of the Treaty relat- 
ing to Alsace-Lorraine should bring out the unique charac- 
ter of a restitution consecrated by universal conscience as 
inuch as by the wave of joy which overwhelmed our troops 



ALSACE AND LORRAINE 243 

after the Armistice and which caused one of our Socialists 
to say : * ' The plebiscite is over. ' ' We wished that by reason 
of its unique character this restitution should be accom- 
panied both as regards persons and property by special 
conditions. And when we were told that w^hat we wanted 
was contrary to the general principles of the Treaty, we 
replied: '*A11 the more reason." Any Frenchman, in our 
place, would have felt and spoken as we did. Let us not 
blame foreigners — even Allies — for having felt otherwise. 
The soul of each nation has its secret garden. 

I was personally responsible for this negotiation as 
President of a Committee of three members, on which Mr. 
Charles H. Haskins represented the United States, and 
Mr. Headlam Morley, Great Britain. I had cause to con- 
gratulate myself upon the friendly understanding of both 
of my eminent colleagues. But the dozen experts, by 
whom each was accompanied, at times gave me great 
trouble. Like all my compatriots, I was inclined to think 
that our claims in connection with Alsace-Lorraine called 
for no discussion whatever and were a foregone conclusion. 
Ten meetings lasting four hours each, in which Mr. Keynes 
poured out his pro-German views, taught me that with 
specialists feeling forfeits its rights. Without returning to 
the history of this long and minute controversy, I will by 
a few examples show the difficulties encountered and the 
results obtained. 

I asked first of all that the Allied Powers, and Germany 
with them, should recognize the moral grounds for the 
arrangements to be made. Some opposition shows itself: 
Do we propose to write a preliminary explanation for each 
article? I replied that no article could be compared with 
this, that its meaning and importance to mankind had been 
recognized by all the Allies. I added that it was not enough 
for Germany to give up what she had stolen ; that she must 
also confess her guilt and admit the justice of the penalty. 
Satisfaction was given us by the following paragraph: 

The High Contracting-Parties (thus including Germany) recog- 



^^"^»^ 



244 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

nizing tlie moral obligation to redress the wrong done by Germany 
in 1871, both to the rights of France and to the wishes of the pop- 
ulation of Alsace and Lorraine, which were separated from their 
country in spite of the solemn protest of their representative at the 
Assembly of Bordeaux, agree upon the following articles : 

In compliance with this principle, the Treaty defined 

the nature of the restitution, the principle of Avhich has 

^^A^^kJi^*^^^ been laid down. According to a wording nowhere else 

J^rtS used in the Treaty, the two provinces were "restored to 

^^"9^ French sovereignty." They were so restored contrary to 

^-- what was done for other territorial transfers, not as from 

the date on which the Treaty of Peace was signed, but as 

from the date of the Armistice concluded on November 11, 

1918. Their emancipation de facto, in this particular case, 

sufficed to establish the right. The consequences were 

at once apparent in the section concerning nationality. 

Here again the clauses demanded by the French negotia- 
tors, pursuant to the programme prepared by the authori- 
ties of Alsace-Lorraine, were prompted by the idea of 
reintegration and restoration. They differed on some 
important points from those which the Treaty of Versailles 
applied to cessions of territory in general. In all other 
cases, the right of option in favour of the ceding Nation 
was admitted. We rejected and caused to be set aside this 
procedure. In Alsace-Lorraine, there is no right of option 
in favour of the Germans. On the contrary, the French 
Government alone has the right, under the Treaty and in 
the exercise of its restored sovereignty, to confer the title 
of ''Frenchmen" to true Alsatians and Lorrainers which 
it recognizes as such. For tliis it alone has power to deter- 
mine the limits of reintegration 'pleno jure as well as the 
conditions with which Germans, who may seek naturaliza- 
tion, must comply. In short we have here in this matter of 
paramount importance an integral resurrection of our right 
which makes manifest by penal dispositions unlike any- 
thing else in the Treaty, the criminal character of the 
annexation. Other clauses, relating also to persons, are 
based upon the same principle: fines inflicted by Germany 



ALSACE AND LORKAINE 245 

to be refunded by her ; judgments rendered by the civil or 
commercial courts, since August 3, 1914, between Alsatians 
and Lorrainers and Germans not to be executory until 
confirmed, — sentences for political offenses or misde- 
meanours after the same date to be quashed. All this was 
only just in view of the special situation of Alsace-Lor- 
raine, but to obtain this justice in derogation of the 
ordinary rules entailed several days' effort. 

After questions affecting persons came questions relat- 
ing to interests. Here the difficulty took shape; for we 
were claiming exemptions refused to others in clauses, the 
effects of which would amount to millions for each of the 
Allies. I am referring to the taking over of national debts, 
the repurchase of public property, of sequestrations and 
industrial organization. For all territories transferred, 
the Treaty stipulated the assumption by the Nation in 
whose favour the cession was made of a portion of the pub- 
lic debt of the ceding Nation. By derogation from Article 
254 I asked and obtained — Bismarck having boasted in 
1871 of having assumed no portion of the French debt on 
Germany's behalf — that Article 254 should not apply to 
Alsace-Lorraine. Article 256 stipulated that Powers, to 
whom German territories were transferred, would acquire 
all property or real estate belonging to the Empire or to 
the States located within such territories and that the value 
thereof should be placed to Germany 's credit by the Repara- 
tions Commission; I asked and obtained, despite this 
formal provision, despite the enormous increment of cer- 
tain State properties — railways, for instance — since 1871 
that France should have nothing to pay. Belgium alone 
obtained a like privilege in respect to the territories of 
Malmedy and Eupen. By certain no less legitimate, but 
no less exceptional enactments, we obtained recognition of 
our right to sequestrate and dispose of all property in 
Alsace-Lorraine belonging to Germans, as well as of the 
right to prohibit hereafter all German participation in 
private enterprises of public interest, such as mines, elec- 
tric power stations, etc and lastly, of the right to annul 



246 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

all German interests in the exploitation of potash deposits. 
By this clear-cut and total suppression, the rights of France 
were wholly restored — a matter of no less importance to 
us than the material advantages assured by the foregoing 
clauses. What a conflict of arguments before reaching 
this point! When at last Mr. Keynes, who had led the 
attack, saw that he had lost, he left our conference room 
with an angry gesture. He has vented his spite in his 

y notorious book. Mr. Keynes has his book. France has the 

■' Treaty. So all is well! 

Some articles remained in abeyance in which the posi- 
tion of France was even more delicate. To leave to victory 
its full moral significance, we had asked and obtained the 
solemn and absolute severing of all bonds forged by might 
between Germany and Alsace-Lorraine. But, in some 
things, perfectly respectable interests made it necessary 
to maintain temporarily economic relations, which this rup- 
ture would have jeopardized. And again it was necessary 
in view of the ruins caused by the war, that the maintenance 
of such relations, indispensable to Alsace-Lorraine, should 
not entail to the benefit of Germany the reciprocity gener- 
ally prescribed in like matters by the Treaty ; indeed, this 
reciprocity would only too obviously have tempted the 
Germans to try by commercial and industrial infiltration, 
to regain possession of everything that a just victory had 
so recently taken from them and restored to us. After what 
I have said of the state of mind of the Allies ' experts, it can 
be guessed how easy this was. Despite the difficulty, 
France succeeded in obtaining both for herself and Alsace- 
Lorraine, all essential guarantees : the right for a period of 
five years to a special customs treatment without reciproc- 
ity for Germany; the guaranteed supply — for ten years 
and at the same rates as to Germans — of the electric current 
from the power stations on the left bank ; the water power 
of the Rhine in its course through Alsace ; the maintenance 
of private contracts with exclusive power to the French 
Government to cancel them — the maintenance in Germany 
and under German law of the industrial, literary and artis- 



ALSACE AND LORRAINE 247 

tic rights of Alsatians and Lorrainers. Each of these 
derogations entailed hours of discussion. The final discus- 
sion lasted five days, it was over the port of Kehl. This 
port created by Germany just opposite Strassburg and 
splendidly equipped had been purposely used to the detri- 
ment of the Alsatian port. If, after the signature of Peace, 
Kehl were to be free to compete in any way it chose, Strass- 
burg would be finally throttled. So we asked that for a 
certain number of years Strassburg should be afforded the 
possibility of organizing itself and that with this in view 
the two ports should during this period be placed under a 
single management. Objections rained upon us : Kehl is a 
German port: a German port cannot be placed under a 

French comptroller Our only reply was to ask the 

experts to make an investigation on the spot; as soon as 
they got back; our demand, contrary to precedent but in 
accordance with equity, was acceded to. Its success is 
recorded in the Treaty. 

France saw herself on the other hand obliged to comply 
with the ordinary rule on two other questions, which the 
Council of Four finally decided: that of redeeming the 
marks and that of reparations. In Alsace-Lorraine as in 
our liberated regions and in Belgium, the national Govern- 
ment had redeemed from the inhabitants, at the rate of 
francs 1.25, the marks put in compulsory circulation by the 
German authorities during their occupation. It had con- 
sequently suffered the loss caused by the depreciation of 
that currency. France and Belgium demanded, not with- 
out reason, that this loss be borne by Germany. The Peace 
Conference decided otherwise, to avoid the contingent effect 
of such a principle in Central and Eastern Europe, where 
Germany had abused the compulsory circulation of her 
currency to an even greater extent. Had this debt been 
admitted a bottomless pit would have been opened in the 
reparations fund. This decision, albeit well grounded, 
clearly did not permit the reimbursement of the loss sus- 
tained on marks in Alsace-Lorraine more especially as, up 
to the time of the Armistice, the mark had been the legal 



248 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

currency in that country. So the French Government itself 
bore the whole loss from which by redeeming the marks at 
francs 1.25, it had saved the Alsatians and Lorrainers. A 
like solution prevailed as regards the damages sustained by 
Alsatians and Lorrainers, which were not placed to the 
debit of Germany. An injustice, at first sight ; why make 
a distinction between the damage sustained at Bacearat in 
France, for which Germany has to pay, and the damage 
sustained at Thann, in Alsace, for which she does not have 
to pay? Here again the decision was dictated by prudence 
for although the destructions in Alsace-Lorraine were rela- 
tively of slight importance, other transferred territories, 
such as those which passed to Poland and Roumania, would 
have been very difficult to verify. The reparations to the 
countries most severely damaged by five years of fighting 
would have been correspondingly reduced. The Confer- 
ence thought it better not to run the risk. 

Such as it is, the chapter of the Treaty dealing with 
Alsace-Lorraine presents a character of pure justice and 
draws from the war one of its grandest conclusions. Vio- 
lated right restored to the full at the very point where 
violation had attained in modern times the maximum of its 
cynical brutality. To the full also is ^viped out the wrong 
done both to these two provinces and to France and all 
proper steps are taken to prevent any of its consequences 
continuing in time of peace. It is to the honour of the 
Allies that they thus recognized that Alsace and Lorraine 
had all through Europe, infused life into the national ideal 
for which they had fought and by which they had con- 
quered. At the sight of Alsatians and Lorrainers, suffer- 
ing patient and undaunted for more than fifty years, 
Bohemia, downtrodden for centuries, began again to dream 
of liberty; Poland, di\dded into three enslaved parts, con- 
ceived possible an improbable restoration. It was in Strass- 
burg and in Metz that the Tyrol, the Trient, Istria, Croatia, 
Slovania, Transylvania, the Greeks of Macedonia and Asia, 
the Belgians of the Walloon cantons and the Danes of 
Schleswig found abundant reason not to despair of the 



ALSACE AND LORRAINE 249 

future. It was at Alsatian firesides that all oppressed 
nationalities kindled their hopes of redemption or of 
rebirth. All these hopes and all these aspirations were fed 
by Alsace and Lorraine. Quickeners of French energies, 
our oppressed brothers have quickened all the national 
energies of the present age. And as a crowning act of 
justice, the Treaty which liberated them, has carried to 
darkest Europe the same resplendent message of freedom. 
In December, 1917, Herr von Kuhlmann, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the German Empire, cried: ''Alsace- 
Lorraine ? Never ! ' ' Less than two years later the Treaty 
of Versailles gave to the arrogance of this German Minister 
the reply of the universal conscience of mankind. Might — 
this time — served Right! 



CHAPTER VIII 



THE SARRE BASIN 



The problem of the Sarre Basin was one of those which 
the American delegates to the Peace Conference, and the 
United States as a whole, least understood. It is the only 
one that led to disagreement between the French and 
American representatives. It lasted ten days and at times 
assumed an aspect of conflict. It was the basis of the most 
outrageous attacks upon my country. All the more reason, 
therefore, for leaving nothing in the dark. I shall follow 
the negotiations day by day, and publish the documents, 
hitherto secret, but which France has no need to hide, to 
regret or to withdraw. 

A difficult problem, indeed, for it had two aspects: an 
economic aspect because of the coal mines, the ownership 
of which was essential — in equity and in fact — to a nation 
systematically ruined by Germany; and a moral and his- 
toric aspect because a large part of this territory was 
inhabited by people French by race, by tradition and by 
aspiration, which the Treaties of 1814 had left to France 
and which violence alone had torn from her in 1815. A 
difficult problem also because its two elements were geo- 
graphically contradictory. When, strong in our national 
right, we demanded the return of these French people 
wrested from us by the Treaty of 1815, and strong in our 
right to reparations, we demanded the coal mines of the 
basin, we were confronted on the map with an undeniable 
conflict between these two claims. The frontier of 1814 
would have given us but a part, and the less important part, 
of this coal basin. On the other hand, the basin itself, while 
exceeding by 700 square kilometers on the north, the terri- 

250 



THE SARRE BASIN 251 

tory included between the frontiers of 1814 and 1815, 
enclosed only a part of these territories. Jn other words, 
our claim to the soil did not coincide with our claim to the 
sub- soil, and neither the one nor the other could be 
abandoned. 

The conclusion was evident. Justified in claiming the 
mines as a whole, incapable of insuring their operation on 
Germany territory without serious industrial, administra- 
tive and political guarantee ; morally obliged and naturally 
anxious on historical and sentimental grounds to recover 
the frontier of 1814 ; bound by our war aims to forego any 
forcible annexation, we had, of necessity, to find a mixed 
solution, economic and political ; applicable in its first part 
south of the 1814 frontier, in its second part north of that 
line. And nothing but the combination of these two solu- 
tions could satisfy the double claim which it was our duty 
to press. 

This statement explains the difficulties encountered. 
These difficulties were not underestimated by the French 
delegations and they were met mth frankness in a Memor- 
andum which I myself drew up. Its more salient portion 
I reproduce here, as it has never before been pubUshed. 

MEMORANDUM PRESENTED BY THE FRENCH 
DELEGATION 



Restitution 

The region under consideration was for many centuries united 
to France and was only separated from her by force. 

(1) Union with France. 

(a) Landau was ceded to France in 1648. Sarrelouis was built 
by Louis XIV. These two towns were represented, at the time of 
French Revolution, at the Federation Fete, and they proclaimed 
their union with the Republic ' ' one and indivisible. ' ' 

In 1793, Landau sustained a heroic siege, at the end of which 
the National Convention declared that ''the town had earned the 
gratitude of the nation." 



252 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

All the rest of the Sarre Basin became French between 1792 and 
1795, amid the enthusiasm of the population so well described by- 
Goethe, and their vote, expressed in eloquent petitions, still pre- 
served in our National Archives, recorded their union with France, 
' ' in one and the same family. ' ' 

(b) All these petitions deserve to be reproduced, but we will 
quote a few only. 

Those of the Cantons of Queich, Blies and the Sarre express 
unanimously "the most earnest wish to be reunited to the French 
Republic." 

Certain others, like Impflingen, make a special point of the fact 
that "this wish is not one for unlimited liberty, but prompted 
solely by love of their native land." 

Others, like Deux-Ponts, offer the prayer to which subsequent 
events have given its true significance: "to be sheltered from the 
wars that German despots stir up in their country every twenty 
years, usually for reasons entirely foreign to them." 

The inhabitants of Neuenkirchen hope that France will have 
the "magnanimity to bestow upon them the greatest possible happi- 
ness, by pronouncing their reunion with the first of Republics," 
and they added : ' ' We will do our utmost to prove worthy of this 
signal favour." 

In the Sarre the tone is very marked. The population hope 
that "France may deign to admit them to the rank of beloved 
children, and crown her work by bestowing upon them the 
glorious title of Frenchmen, which they have so long carried in 
their hearts, and of which they will never cease to show themselves 
worthy. ' ' 

The population of Sarrebruck phrases its feeling as follows : 
"May our reunion, as pure as it is inviolable, associate us with 
France, our Mother country. We shall have henceforth but one 
heart, one mind, one common welfare." 

(c) This passionate desire to be united to France found, 
moreover, justification in the wise administration we gave to the 
country. Great public works drew the bonds of sentiment closer. 
France was the first to operate the mines. A mining school was 
founded by Napoleon at Geslautern on the left bank of the Sarre, 
south of Voelklingen, and the results achieved excited the covetous- 
ness of the Prussian metallurgists, whose agent, Boecking, in 1814 
and 1815, conducted a campaign on behalf of his employers, in 
favour of Prussian annexation. 



THE SARRE BASIN 253 

The system of State operation instituted by France still exists 
there. All the mining has moreover been conducted on the basis 
of studies made by our engineers, and our National Archives con- 
tain the receipt, signed by Prussia, of the "plans and registers 
relative to concessions of the coal mines of the Departments of the 
Sarre and the Ruhr. ' ' 

(2) Since the Separation. 

(a) It was force alone that separated these regions from 
France. The Treaty of Paris, May 13, 19^.4, had not attempted 
this separation, which was effected only at the request of Prussia 
in 1815, without reference to the wishes of the population, in order 
to hold France under a perpetual menace of invasion. 

At the very outset several Powers, Great Britain among them, 
protested against the "cession of territories belonging to France, 
the loss of which would stir the indignation of all French hearts. ' ' 
Finally Prussian insistence prevailed. 

Metternich condemned this operation when he wrote: "Prus- 
sia had no respect for any principle of justice or even of decency. ' ' 

(b) Many of the inhabitants expatriated themselves. Others, 
oppressed by the Prussian administration and colonization, 
declared themselves to be "Prussians perforce" (Musspreussen) . 

In 1850, during the Italian war, the feeling was the same. Vio- 
lent pro-French manifestations were organized at Landau. Again, 
in 1865, William I traveling in this region was very coldly received. 

In 1866, Prince Clovis von Hohenlohe wrote in his memoirs : — 
"The Bavarians of the Palatinate (i. e. the region about Landau 
and north. of it) would very willingly accept being transferred 
back to France." Prussian officials in 1870 called Sarrelouis the 
"French Nest.'' 

(c) German historians did not attempt to deny the feeling of 
"mesalliance" that persisted in the population for half a century 
after union with Prussia. They even found in the ' ' faithfulness of 
these Rhinelanders to their memories of France" a proof of their 
Germanic character. 

Treitschke's remarks on this subject are amusing and instruct- 
ive. "We gather from his description that, until 1848, the Rhine- 
landers had given proof of their German patriotism by vigorous 
defense of their French institutions against Berlin, and by the dis- 
play of that invincible dislike with which their new Prussian 
compatriots inspired them. 

(d) There exists, even to-day, in the Sarre Basin, a strong 
middle class and peasant element passionately attached to French 



254 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

tradition. In the region of Sarrelouis, it forms a large majority. 
This town welcomed the French troops after the Armistice and 
addressed a cordial telegram to the President of the Republic. The 
sentiment had survived. 

"The sympathies of Sarrelouis for France are stronger than 
might have been hoped, ' ' writes a witness. ' ' The population would 
declare itself without hesitation, were it not restrained by fear of 

Prussian retaliation, in case the frontier were not modified 

Many people at Sarrelouis were disposed not to take part in the 
last elections for the German National Assembly. 

"The Municipal Council of Sarrelouis proposed a secret delib- 
eration for the purpose of demanding its reunion with France. 
It would gladly send a deputation to Paris if this were desired. 
Even now, we may be sure that Sarrelouis would send to the Cham- 
ber a deputy of French sympathies.'* 

To sum up, the whole of this country which was French for a 
lon^ time and never had any reason to complain of French sov- 
ereignty, was wrested from France by force, without the inhab- 
itants having been consulted. In spite of the Prussian immigration 
it has kept its remembrance of the past and in spite of continual 
divisions, recalling those of Poland, it remains at least partly 
French in sentiment. 

(3) Possible Objections. 

(a) Two objections have been offered. 

The separation, though violent and unjust, dates back a century. 
Is it possible to blot out one hundred years of history ? 

Besides, must we not take into consideration the great German 
immigration, systematically carried on through half a century, 
which has profoundly modified the population ? 

(b) To the first objection it may be answered that in the 
opinion of the Conference time does not suffice to eliminate 
righteous claims. Poland is revived after more than a century, and 
Bohemia after more than four centuries. 

To tne second objection, the French Government can also oppose 
some of the most justifiable decisions of the Conference. 

The systematical colonization of a country conquered by force is 
not an excuse for the outrage to which it has been subjected. It is 
rather an aggravation. 

Prussian colonization in Poland, German colonization in Bohe- 
mia, Magyar colonization in Transylvania, did not prevent the 
Powers from heeding the wishes of peoples conquered in the past, or 
from restoring their rights. 



THE SARRE BASIN 255 

France claims the same treatment. 

(4) Conclusions to be drawn from the Principle of Restitution. 

The minimum France claims, under this head, is the frontier of 
1814. The line of this frontier is as follows : 

Starting from the Rhine, south of Germersheira, it takes in 
Landau and, at Weissenburg, joins the 1815 frontier which it fol- 
lows till it reaches the valley of Sarrelouis. From this last point it 
forms two salients, north of Sarrebruck and Sarrelouis, and joins 
the French frontier of 1815 about sixty kilometers south of Merzig. 

In its details, this line shows the influence of principalities 
which have disappeared. 

Eventual alternations would, therefore, be required m its appli- 
cation; but, as a whole, it represents a principle which cannot be 
questioned. 

This principle, France has a right to invoke. 

II 

Reparation 

The region which, north of Alsace Lorraine, is its geographical 
continuation and extends beyond the frontier of 1814 is a mining 
and industrial region, of well marked character. This region is 
known as the Basin of the Sarre. 

(1) Brief Description of the Region. 

(a) The Sarre Basin, which is triangular in form, its base run- 
ning parallel to the Sarre between Sarrebruck and Sarrelouis, and 
its apex being at Frankenholz (nine kilometers northwest of Hom- 
burg) has an economic unity derived from its coal. 

There are three principal groups of mines; the first situated m 
the Valley of the Sarre, from Sarrelouis to just above Sarrebruck; 
the second, around Neuenkirchen ; the third, in the region of 

St. Ingbert. . . 

Around these mines has developed an industrial region in whicn 
the three main industries, in the order of their importance, are: 
metallurgy, glass making and pottery. 

(b) This whole region, mining as well as industrial, is inhab- 
ited by miners and factory workers. Nearly all of them are natives 
of the country. 

Many have small houses and cultivate a little plot of ground. 
In 1912, 39 per cent, of those who worked in the mines belonging 
to the Government were owners of real estate, 65 per cent, being 



256 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TEEATY 

married. The unmarried were nearly all sons of miners in the dis- 
trict and lived with their parents. 

Thanks to a highly developed system of communications (in- 
cluding both standard and narrow gauge railwaj^s, electric tram- 
ways and motor-car services), it is possible for these workers, 
72,000 in number, to live at a certain distance from the mines 
which are the very heart of the district. More than 40 per cent, of 
them avail themselves of this privilege. 

In other words, the Sarre Basin forms an entity the three ele- 
ments of which are: a mining zone (very incompletely devel- 
oped) ; an industrial ione, which is the outgrowth of the former; 
and finally a workers' zone which extends beyond the other two 
and is connected with them by railroads, of which Homburg is the 
most important center. 

(c) In this basin, the component parts of which are so inter- 
dependent, any artificial separation would be ruinous. 

A frontier cutting in two the basin and its railroads, would 
place the non-French section at a disadvantage, since it would have 
to compete with the Westphalian factories on the German side and, 
at the same time, would be isolated on the French side from the 
Briey ore which is the necessary complement of the Sarre coal. 

The financial situation would be no less disadvantageous be- 
cause, the mark falling below the franc, remuneration for the same 
work would be different in the two sections, owing to the exchange. 

Finally, the labour situation would be equally deplorable. 
First on account of transportation, for many of the workers would 
find a frontier between their place of residence and their place of 
work : second on account of wages, for the various reasons already 
enumerated: and finally on account of the cost of production; of 
working regulations, of social laws and the maintenance of order in 
times of strike. 

(d) Recent facts have, moreover, revealed the unity of the 
region. 

On the one hand several of the big Prussian manufacturers, 
actuated by economic consideration, have made significant ap- 
proaches to the French authorities with a view to maintaining this 
unity. 

On the other hand, since the Armistice, the French authorities 
charged with the supervision of the local administration have been 
unanimous in recognizing the impossibility of separating the min- 
ing, industrial and working men 's districts. They all declared the 



THE SARRE BASIN 257 

danger which would result, even during the transitional period of 
the Armistice, from the establishment of barriers between the dif- 
ferent circles (bezirks), constituting the Basin. The military- 
organization has thus been placed, though temporarily, on the basis 
of the economic unity of the region. The results have been 
excellent. 

(2) France's Special Title to Reparation in the Sarre Basin. 

(a) It is notorious that the industrial destruction committed 
by Germany in France was especially directed against the coal and*^ 
industrial zone of the departments of the Nord and the Pas-de- 
Calais. Two-thirds of the surface, as well as of the production of 
this zone, have been systematically destroyed by the invader. 

This destruction was committed in the following order : — 

First, the flooding of the Lens Basin, resulting in an annual 
loss of eight million tons of coal. 

Next, the destruction of the Courrieres Basin and of Dourges, 
resulting in an annual loss of four million tons. 

Finally, the general devastation of the coal district of the 
departments of the Nord, resulting in an annual loss of eight mil- 
lion tons. 

(b) This destruction was not the result of chance or of war 
operations. It was an integral part of the economic plan of the 
German Staff. . This plan, which was printed in Munich, by order 
of the German Quartermaster General, in February, 1916, and 
which was the work of 200 experts covering 4,031 operations, dis- 
closed in detail the benefit anticipated by Germany from the 
disappearance of the French mines and industries. Premeditation 
is thus thoroughly established.* 

This premeditation is explained as regards the Basin of the 
Nord and the Pas-de-Calais by its keen competition with the West- 
phalian Basin. 

(c) The results of the methodical operations conducted by 
Germany are as follows : 

Two hundred shafts rendered useless for several years. 
All plants in existence at that date entirely destroyed. 
A production of over twenty million tons, or 50 per cent, of the 
national production, withdrawn from the country : 

A production of corresponding by-products equally eliminated, 



*See Chapter IX, page 281, 



258 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY -'t 

Coke 2,243,000 tons 

Briquettes 1,674,925 " 

Sulphate of Ammonia 23,200 " 

Benzol 13,900 " 

Coal Tar 61,000 '' 

The labour population of 100,000 workmen, throAvn out of work 
and their families reduced to want. 

In all, a material damage of at least two thousand million francs 
gold (price of 1912) to which should be added loss of production 
during the ten years required for reconstruction. 

It is enough to state these facts to establish France's right to 
complete reparation. 

(3) France after the War. 

(a) If France, at the conclusion of peace, were not in pos- 
session of the Sarre Basin, her economic position would be 
disastrous. 

France needs this basin, not only to furnish coal to Alsace and 
Lorraine which consume seven million tons more than they pro- 
duce, but for herself also. 

Before the war, France imported annually 23,000,000 tons. 
"With the added needs of Alsace and Lorraine, she would therefore 
without the Sarre coal be obliged to import even after the re-estab- 
lishment of her mines in the North, thirty million tons, and, until 
this re-establishment, fifty millions out of a total consumption of 
seventy-five millions. 

(b) This situation is summarized in the following table which 
calls for no comment : 

In millions of tons. 

France's consumption of coal (1913) 63 

Consumption by Alsace-Lorraine (1913) 12 

Total consumption 75 

France's production in coal (1913) 40 

Destruction of the French mines during the war 20 

France 's production of coal up to date 20 

Production of Alsace-Lorraine 4 

Total production up to date 24 

Coal to be imported up to date 51 



THE SARRE BASIN 259 

(c) In other words, France would be economically tributary 
to Germany, who, through coal, would control the prices of all our 
steel and iron in the east and thus dominate our policies. 

German manufacturers themselves wrote in their Memorandum 
to the Chancellor on May 20, 1915 : "Coal is one of the most decisive 
of political factors. The neutral countries are dependent upon the 
belligerent who can supply them with coal. 

Consequently if France were left without coal Germany's dom- 
ination over her would be assured. 

Such a situation would mean imposing upon France defeat in 
peace after victory in war. 

(4) The Cession of the Sarre Basin is indispensable as a 
reparation from the general point of view. 

(a) It is not only reparation for the special damage done to 
French mines that is here involved. It is the whole problem of 
Germany's indebtedness to France. 

The amount of reparation for which Germany is indebted to 
France on account of devastations is a difficult financial problem, 
complicated by the just claims of other Allied Powers. 

It is doubtful whether the means of payment which Germany 
has at present at her disposal, or which she will have in the course 
of the next few years, will enable her even approximately to meet 
the estimates for this reparation, the total of which amounts to 
1,000,000 millions. 

(b) Therefore in her own interest as well as in that of her 
creditors it is indispensable that Germany should avail herself of 
every possible means to discharge her debt. 

It must be recalled that : — 

Germany is one of the greatest coal-producing countries in the 
world, and that her production exceeds her consumption (she 
extracted before the war 191 million tons and consumed 137), 
without counting 87 million tons of lignite, which gives for 1914 a 
total production of 278 million tons. 

The coal mines constitute a sure resource and yield a product 
readily convertible into money. 

Coal, like all other raw materials, has an intrinsic value inde- 
pendent of the German exchange situation, and therefore eliminates 
one of the most difficult problems in the financial settlement. 

In these circumstances we are led to consider the cession of the 
German part of the Coal Basin of the Sarre as a necessary element 
of the reparation due by Germany to France. 



260 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

(c) The Sarre Basin produced in 1912-1913 :— 

Prussian Mines 12,730,000 

Bavarian Mines 896,000 

Lorraine Mines 3,846,000 

Total 17,472,000 

The production of that part of the basin situated north of the 
frontier of Alsace-Lorraine represents therefore 13,626,000 tons. 

It is difficult to calculate the value of these mines — this value 
depending naturally upon the net cost of production, upon the 
sale price and upon the duration of the mines, etc. 

In any event the mineral wealth of the basin estimated, for 
layers worked at a depth of at least 1,000 meters, amounts to 3,660 
million tons. 

It is therefore wise and just to take account of so important a 
resource in the general account of reparations. 

(5) This necessary reparation is an easy reparation. 

(a) The Sarre Mines belong almost in their entirety to the 
Prussian and Bavarian Treasuries. 

Total Surface 116,000 Hectares 

Prussian Fiscal Mines 110,000 

Bavarian Fiscal Mines 4,000 " 

The cession from State to State presents no difficulty ; the few 
private mines that exist would be repurchased by the German 
State from their owners and ceded to the French State. 

As has previously been mentioned, the Sarre Basin through its 
cession will revert to the country which developed its value and 
which after having done so was deprived of it by force. 

(b) No economic break will result from this cession. 
Indeed, the economic outlet of these mines is to the South for 

they competed in the North with Westphalian coal to which Prussia 
has always sacrificed them. 

It suffices to recall that with this in view Germany has con- 
stantly opposed the canalization of the Sarre below Sarrebruck 
and of the Moselle as far as the Rhine. The only water communi- 
cation which she decided to grant to the Sarre Basin, was the canal 
of the coal mines which at present has no outlet except on French 
territory at Nancy on one hand, and at Strassburg on the other. It 
may therefore be said that it was Germany herself who in order to 
protect the interests of the rival Westphalian Basin, imposed and 



THE SARRE BASIN 261 

maintained the outlet of the Sarre in the direction of France and 
Alsace-Lorraine. 

Before becoming French citizens in 1793, several magnates of 
the region alleged in a Memorandum addressed to the Representa- 
tives of the People, that: " Commerce— the exchange of our iron, 
our timber and our coal for goods produced by French factories — 
has cemented and maintained the bond between the inhabitants and 
the French." 

At present, Alsace-Lorraine, France, Italy and Switzerland are 
important buyers in the Sarre Basin. The return of Alsace-Lor- 
raine to France and the orientation that Germany deliberately gave 
the basin can only serve to develop this situation in the near future. 

(c) Finally, the prejudice to Germany will not be of a nature 
to compromise her economic equilibrium so far as coal is con- 
cerned. The following table so indicates: 

Total production of Germany in 1913 (without count- 
ing eighty-seven million tons of lignite) 191,000,000 

Production of the Sarre 13,626,000 

Balance 177,374,000 

Total consumption in 1913 137,000,000 

Surplus after cession of the Sarre 40,374,000 

5° Conchisions drawn from the Principle of Reparation. 

As special reparation for the destruction of her mines, as well 
as a necessary element in the total reparation, France is justified 
in claiming the Sarre Basin. 

By the Sarre Basin must be understood: 

(a) The mines operated. 

(b) Layers not yet exploited. 

(c) Industrial Region (factories, steel works, foundries, etc.,) 
which owes its existence to the basin and forms part of it. 

The profound unity of this region has already been referred to. 

To separate it into several sections would be ruinous and a 
source of innumerable vexations for the inhabitants. 

This separation moreover would render the operation of the 
mines impossible or in any event exceedingly difficult. It should 
therefore not be considered. 

For these reasons France's minimum claim under the head of 
Reparations, includes the region delimitated by the following line ; 



262 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Starting from the frontier of 1815 to the point where it ia 
crossed by the French Nied, this line includes in the Basin of the 
Sarre the valley and the villages of the French Nied — passes by 
Beckingen (excluded), Duppenweiter-Bettingen, Tholey, St. Wen- 
del, Werschweiter, Kuselberg, (two Idlometers east of Momburg) 
Kirrberg, Einod, (all these preceding localities included), and 
joins the frontier of 1814 and 1815 in following the ridge valleys 
of the Blies and the Bickenhall. 

This Memorandum, based upon the admirable essays of 
Professor Gallois and his colleagues of the Comite 
d 'Etudes,* was explained and interpreted to our Allies in 
the course of numerous conferences during the months of 
January and February. It offered a three-term solution 
imposed upon us by the circumstances: restoration to 
French sovereignty of the territories south of the frontier 
of 1814 ; a special political administration for the territories 
of the mineral and industrial basin north of this frontier ; 
full ownership of the mines in these two zones. Our 
Memorandum was distributed in March to the heads of the 
delegations. The discussion thus prepared, opened a few 
days later. 

II 

On the morning of March 28, M. Loucheur and I were 
summoned by the Council of the Four to President Wil- 
son's residence. We were jointly entrusted with the verbal 
presentation of the French case. The moment we entered 
the meeting our impression was formed. Mr. Lloyd George 
did not attribute first rate importance to this matter. 
President Wilson on the contrary, wore a quizzical smile 
that foreshadowed objections. 

I will not reproduce the statement made that day by M. 
Loucheur and myself, the whole substance of which was 
borrowed from the document I have just quoted. The first 
interruptions showed us just where we stood. Mr. Lloyd 
George without hesitation expressed himself in favour of 
our contention so far as the ownership of the mines was 



*See Chapter III, page 



THE SARRE BASIN 263 

conceraed. He recognized that this ownership was due to 
us as a just compensation. With regard to the territories, 
he was less categorical. He admitted that an autonomous 
organization ought to be established for the entire coal 
basin ; in other words that it should be detached from Ger- 
many. On the other hand, however, he did not admit our 
right to possess both the territories and the coal, and our 
claim for the frontier of 1814 alarmed him; he repeated 
the formula so often heard during the discussions: ''Let 
us not renew the mistake committed by Germany in 1871 
in the name of a fictitious historical right. Do not let us 
create a new Alsace-Lorraine." 

Mr. Wilson, who at first had said nothing, then spoke. 
Mr. Lloyd George had accepted the greater part of our 
claims; the President, on the contrary, rejected them all. 
He admitted our right to take from the Sarre Basin a 
quantity of coal equal to the deficit from our mines, due 
to the war. But he refused us the ownership of the 
mines, the frontier of 1814, and the autonomous organiza- 
tion suggested by Mr. Lloyd George. His point of view, 
presented in the most friendly, but most emphatic manner, 
was as follows : 

** Never has France, in any public document, claimed 
the frontier of 1814. The bases of peace accepted by her 
speak of reparation for the wrong which she suffered in 
1871— and not in 1815. 

"Now these bases bind the Allies. The historical argu- 
ment used by Germany against France to justify her theft 
of Alsace and Lorraine is a dangerous one. Let us avoid 
using it. 

''The frontier of 1814 does not correspond to any 
economic reality. It would ruin the basin by cutting it in 
two, without assuring coal to France. A cession of terri- 
tory, without an immediate plebiscite, would under these 
conditions be inadmissible. 

"There is no Nation more intelligent than the French. 
If I thus frankly express my point of view I do not fear 
her judgment. I have so high an opinion of the intelli- 



264 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

gence of the French Nation that I believe she will always 
accept a principle based upon justice and applied fairly. 

*'I do not believe that this problem can be compared 
with that of Alsace-Lorraine. For half a century the world 
had its eyes turned towards Alsace-Lorraine. For half a 
century the world has never thought of those provinces as 
being German. The question of the frontier of 1814 has 
not quite the same character. 

**I am ready to recognize that France should have the 
use of the mines for a period that shall be determined ; but 
as there can be no question of depriving the local industries 
of coal the question of the ownership of the mines appears 
to me to be purely sentimental. 

**I regret to make these objections and I apologize for 
it. It is painful to me to oppose France's wishes. But I 
could not act otherwise without failing in my duty." 

The discussion from this time on went to the very roots 
of the problem. M. Clemenceau, who had allowed his col- 
leagues to answer questions of fact and figures put by 
President Wilson, felt it necessary to intervene, and did 
so with rare elevation of thought. 

**I have," he said, '*a serious reservation to make. You 
eliminate sentiment and memory. The world is not guided 
by principles alone. 

*'You say you are ready to render us justice from the 
economic point of view, and I thank you for it. But 
economic interests are not everything. The history of the 
United States is glorious, but brief. One hundred and 
twenty years is a very long period for you ; for us it is a 
short one. Our conception of history cannot be quite the 
same as yours. 

"Our ordeals have created in us a profound sentiment 
of the reparation due us. The point at issue is not material 
reparation only; the need for moral reparation is no less 
great. 

*'I know all that you have done for victory but I believe 
that you will lose nothing by recognizing in this question 



THE SARRE BASIN 265 

a sentiment which is something different from your prin- 
ciples, but no less profound. 

''When Lafayette and Rochambeau — ^two youths — ^went 
to the aid of America struggling for her independence, it 
was not cold reason or deeds of valour, common enough 
after all, which sowed the seed of affectionate gratitude 
which has sprung from their action; but an impression, a 
deep fellow-feeling that has linked our two nations forever. 

''I am old. In a few months I shall have left politics 
forever. My disinterestedness is complete. I will defend 
before Parliament the conclusions that we shall reach here 
together; but if you do not listen to me to-day, you will 
lose an opportunity of riveting yet another link in the 
chain of affection binding France to America. 

** There are, in this region, 150,000 Frenchmen. These 
men who in 1918 sent addresses to President Poincare 
have also a right to justice. You wish to respect the rights 
of the Germans. So do I. But bear in mind the rights of 
these Frenchmen as you will have to bear in mind later the 
historic rights of Bohemia and of Poland. 

''We shall soon resume this discussion. For the moment 
I merely ask you, when you are alone, to think over all I 
have just said to you and ask your conscience whether it 
does not contain a great deal of truth. ' ' 

Thus, two principles confront each other. On one side, 
economic arguments which can be shown in figures ; on the 
other side, moral arguments which can be weighed. On 
both sides a lively and honest desire for agreement, but 
the impossibility of reaching this agreement. Mr. Lloyd 
George favours a compromise. But the historical argument 
so dear to the French heart has no weight with any of our 
Allies. Our entire contention is disputed. We are far 
from the goal and the road is long and hard. 

This dramatic meeting ended at twelve-thirty. At two 
o^clock M. Clemenceau, M. Loucheur and I met again at 
the War Office and went over the situation which was not 
promising. Frontier of 1814 — we were alone, therefore 
without hope of success. Ownership of the mines and crea- 



266 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

tion of an autonomous state — we had Great Britain's sup- 
port without, however, adequate guarantees either for the 
operation of the mines or above all for the liberation of 
the French inhabitants of the Sarre. Long experience had 
taught us that reasoning borrowed from the past had but 
little appeal for Mr. Wilson: there he feared to find the 
germ of new wars. The one point on which we felt a lesser 
resistance was the economic problem. Mr. Wilson contested 
our ownership of the mines : but already he recognized our 
right to work them. It was upon that point, therefore, that 
M. Clemenceau, M. Loucheur and I agreed unanimously to 
make our first effort. We would assert simultaneously 
two principles, distinct in their character but one in their 
consequence. The first Avas that operation of the mines 
required a special political organization of the territory. 
The second, that if our Allies believe there are too many 
Germans in the Sarre Basin to justify an immediate reunion 
with France, we on the other hand deem that there are in 
this same basin too many people of French origin and 
aspirations for France to consent to leave them under 
Prussian domination. The assertion of these three prin- 
ciples — ownership, complete guarantee of operation 
through a special political administration, safeguards for 
the rights of the inhabitants — became the bulwark of our 
defense. We dealt with them in three Notes, dated respec- 
tively March 29, and April 1 and 5, I publish the first 
below : 

March 29. 

NOTE ON THE SABRE QUESTION 

France demands first that the preliminaries of peace should 
permanently guarantee : 

(a) FuU ownership of all the mines of the Sarre. 

(b) An economic regime which, on the soil, would permit the 
development of the sub-soil. 

If the Sarre coal were found under the soil of the Ruhr, France 
would ask nothing more. 

We ask more because the soil of the Sarre was formerly French 



THE SARRE BASIN 267 

— in part for nearly two centuries 

— in part for more than twenty years 
and during the Revolution, when the right of self-determination 
for all nations was applied for the first time, this country was 
entirely incorporated with France "one and indivisible" by the 
free vote of its people. 

It was wrested from France against the will of its inhabitants. 
This was the first manifestation of the military and economic 
imperialism of Prussia from the moment she became our neighbor — 
an imperialism whose traces it is the first object of the Treaty of 
Peace to obliterate. 

It is true that, on this soil gerraanized for one hundred years, 
the majority of the population is German owing to immigration. 

We recognize this fact by not claiming annexation. On the 
other hand we insist on a solution which would recognize in part at 
least France's unquestionable claim on a country consecrated 
French by the will of its inhabitants. 

This country has been French. The fact creates the presump- 
tion that it will become so again gladly. The example of Alsace- 
Lorraine is there to prove it. We already know that the majority 
of the inhabitants living in the circle of Sarrelouis are ready to 
demand their reunion with France. 

In order to allow time in all fairness to undo what was done a 
century ago by force, it is just that the question of the sovereignty 
of this region should not be settled immediately. 

For the time being it will not be placed under the sovereignty 
either of Germany or of France, but under the protection of the 
League of Nations. 

The Germans in this region will retain their nationality. 

But, like Germans living in a foreign country they will take no 
part in the elections for the German Assemblies. 

They will vote for the local Assemblies (District Council and 
Municipalities). 

The German officials, appointed by the Central Administration, 
will be withdrawn. 

All facilities for the liquidation of their possessions will be 
given Germans who desire to leave the country. 

France will receive from the League of Nations a double 
mandate : 

(1) Military occupation. 

(2) Right of visa or veto on the local administration (includ- 
ing the schools), the nomination of Mayors and deputy Mayors. 



268 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Frencli nationality will be conferred individually and after 
investigation upon those who ask for it. 

When in each of the principal administrative sections the 
majority of the electors shall have adopted French nationality, or 
rather when the district council shall ask for annexation to France, 
this annexation will occur de jure upon its acceptance by the 
League of Nations. 

At the end of fifteen years the inhabitants who have not already 
manifested their choice must be given an opportunity to do so. No 
demand for reunion with Germany would be considered before that 
date as this term of fifteen years is fixed precisely with a view to 
allowing events to shape themselves and the population to decide 
justly and freely as to its sovereignty. Prussia had one hundred 
years to consolidate her work of violence. 

The solution outlined above enables us to meet the two objec- 
tions formulated against the French demands : — 

First objection: It is a new claim advanced by France, who 
had hitherto spoken only of Alsace-Lorraine. 

Here also is a question of Alsace and of Lorraine for it is a 
question of their frontier. French Lorraine mutilated in 1871 had 
already been mutilated in 1815. Time without doubt has placed 
these two frontiers on different planes. But the proposed solution 
respects them. 

The Lorraine of Metz and Thionville will be immediately 
detached from Germany. The Lorraine of Sarrebruck will be given 
time to decide to which of the two countries, having already been 
governed by them both, she wishes to be attached definitely in view 
of the fact that her re-attachment to Prussia one hundred years ago 
was entirely due to violence. 

Second objection : It is a breach in the principle of the right of 
self-determination of peoples. 

No. Nothing definite or irreparable is decided. On the con- 
trary homage is rendered to this principle in giving the population 
the opportunity under the protection of the League of Nations to 
decide upon a matter concerning which Germany — as opposed to 
France — ^has never consulted them, i. e. the sovereignty under 
which they desire to live in the future, in view of the possible 
hesitation created by the double historic title of the two countries. 

To sum up, if on the one hand our Allies deem France's right 
to the region of the Sarre insufficient to justify immediate re- 
annexation, on the other hand, France deems these rights too 
important for her to accept the definite adjudication of the Sarre 



THE SARRE BASIN 269 

Basin to Germany by the Treaty. An intermediate regime sliould 
therefore be considered. 

We now went at once to the heart of the discussion. The 
Note just read establishes the fact that if, in order to reach 
an agreement we eventually decide to give up the frontier 
of 1814, we yield neither on the question of the liberation 
of the French population of the Sarre, the ownership of the 
mines, nor on the special political regime necessary for 
their operation. After this triple assertion which defines 
the limits of the debate, we take up, to deal with the prob- 
lems one by one, the long chapter of the mining clauses. 
The question of ownership is settled on March 31, when 
Mr. Wilson agrees to the transfer of the mines to France 
with certain guarantees of an economic order but on the 
condition that there should be no question either of displac- 
ing the frontier or of creating an independent State. His 
proposal which did not give us satisfaction but from which 
a week later we are to evolve the solution is as follows : 

It is agreed in principle : 

L That full ownership of the coal mines of the Sarre Basin 
should pass to France to be credited on her claims against Germany 
for reparation. 

2. That for the exploitation of these mines the fullest economic 
facilities shall be accorded to France, including particularly : 

(a) Exemption from taxation on the part of Germany, includ- 
ing important export dues. 

(b) Full mobility of labour, foreign and native. 

(c) Freedom for the development of adequate means of com- 
munication by rail and water. 

3. That the political and administrative arrangements neces- 
sary to secure the foregoing results be inquired into. 

We are still far from the goal. Nevertheless on one 
important item, the points of view begin to harmonize. 
M. Clemenceau seizes the occasion. He takes the paper 
handed to him by the President. He reads and re-reads 
it — saying neither yes nor no. He states that before 
answering he must consult his advisers. So a committee of 
three is formed. I represent France, and I have the assist- 



270 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

ance of M. Louis Aubert, who for two years had most suc- 
cessfully directed the Press and Information Service of 
the French High Connnission in America, and of M. 
Deflinne, Director of Mines. Professor Charles H. Haskins 
is the American delegate ; Mr. Headlam Morley the British. 
France should remember the names of these two men; 
their uprightness and sympathetic understanding of our 
rights played a most important part in the results obtained. 
After ten meetings of several hours each, the demands of 
our engineers are accepted and on certain points com- 
pleted. We agree on the technical conditions of the opera- 
tion of the mines in German territory by the French State 
which was to own them. But that does not satisfy me. 
No technical clauses can avail if, on all sides, political and 
administrative pressure is to distort and warp them. I 
appeal to the good faith of my British and American col- 
leagues with whom I was convinced in these circumstances, 
as in all others, I should not plead in vain and I obtain 
from them their signatures at the end of our report to the 
following declaration, the importance of which I need not 
emphasize : 

The undersigned are agreed in the opinion that if the above 
articles which appear to be necessary from the social and economic 
point of view were to be applied without the establishment of a 
special administrative and political regime, serious difficulties and 
conflicts would inevitably arise, 
(signed) 

Andre Tardieu 
Charles H. Haskins 
Headlam Morley. 

Thus the second part of the problem rejected on March 
31 by President Wilson and no less important for us than 
the first, is put forward by those who, up to that time, had 
not been entrusted with its discussion. From then on the 
negotiation is solidly established and if we finally have to 
give up our claim to the frontier of 1814, we shall at least 
obtain liberal and essential compensations ; but not without 
another effort. 



THE SARRE BASIN 271 

On the morning of April 8, Mr. Lloyd George, after 
reading Mr. Headlam Morley's report, frankly sides with 
us. We offer either the establishment of an independent 
State linked to France by a Customs Union, or the 
sovereignty of the League of Nations with a mandate given 
to France, and a plebiscite at the end of fifteen years. 
Mr. Lloyd George presents at the same time two proposi- 
tions similar to ours, and in a few words states his opinion : 

''I would give the Sarre Basin its independence under 
the authority of the League of Nations. 

**A Customs Union would attach it to France. There 
does not exist, it is true, any natural economic link between 
this region and Germany. All its relations are with Alsace 
and Lorraine. 

*'We must also not forget that this country was French 
in its greater part until the beginning of the nineteenth 
century; that it was taken away from France by force in 
spite of the opposition of English statesmen. 

*'We are opposed to all annexation. But we do not 
believe that it is possible for this region to live if we do 
not make it a political unit. 

**I am convinced that, if in a few years a plebiscite takes 
place, this population will not ask to belong again to 
Germany." 

Mr. House that day represented President Wilson who 
was ill. He admits that these solutions are **very interest- 
ing and worthy of close examination.'* It seems that a 
step forward has been made. 

But on the same day, the eighth in the afternoon. Presi- 
dent Wilson, who has returned to his place, again voices 
Ms hesitations. He approves our plan of economic clauses. 
On the other hand he approves neither change nor suspen- 
sion of sovereignty. He also rejects the suggestion of a 
mandate and to meet the danger pointed out by us of inci- 
dents and conflicts, hands us a Note which merely proposes, 
instead of an independent political unit, the setting up of 
a Commission of Arbitration to settle the differences 
between the French mines and the German Government. 



272 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

M, Clemenceau refuses. A short and lively debate 
ensues with a brisk volley of questions and answers. The 
President implores us not to make the peace of the world 
depend upon the question of the Sarre. M. Clemenceau 
replies that the peace of the world demands, first of all, 
that justice be established among the Allies. No conclu- 
sion is reached. The atmosphere is tense. Since March 27, 
the minor officials at the Hotel Crillon are nervous. The 
Chief of the Press Service, Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, is 
particularly active in spreading pessimistic reports. On 
April 6, he accuses M. Clemenceau of ''claiming annexa- 
tions." The following day, the seventh, the rumour spreads 
that the President, discouraged, has ordered the George 
Washington to Brest. The hour is critical. 

Ill 

Once again, M. Clemenceau, M. Loucheur and I meet on 
April 8 at the War Office at seven o'clock in the evening. 
We weigh the consequence of an adverse decision. Never- 
theless we decide not to yield. A Note, which I write dur- 
ing the night, states the reasons for our resistance. This 
Note distributed very early the next morning to the heads 
of Governments asserts both our spirit of conciliation and 
the impossibility of our making any further concessions. 
This is the text: 

April 9. 

ANSWER TO PRESIDENT WILSON'S 
NOTE OF APRIL 8. 

I. Preliminary observations -. 

The Note presented by President Wilson to M. Clemenceau on 
March 31 was worded as follows : 

"It is agreed in principle: 

'' (1) That full ownership of the coal mines of the Sarre Basin 
should pass to France to be credited on her claims against Germany 
for reparation. 

" (2) That for the exploitation of these mines the fullest eco- 
nomic facilities shall be accorded to France, including particularly : 



THE SARRE BASIN 273 

*'(a) Exemption from taxation on the part of Germany 
including import and export dues. 

"(b) Full mobility of labour, foreign and native. 

** (c) Freedom for the development of adequate means of com- 
munication by rail and water. 

"(3) That the political and administrative arrangements 
necessary to secure the foregoing results should be inquired into." 

With reference to this Note the three designated experts drew 
up a set of economic clauses which they recognized as just and 
necessary, both in the interest of the working of the basin as well 
as for its general prosperity and the welfare of the population. 

The experts at the same time gave as their opinion that certain 
of these clauses would, in application, cause inevitable friction and 
conflict unless a special political and administrative regime were 
established. 

The Note presented by President "Wilson on April 8 accepts, 
save for certain amendments, the economic clauses, but carries no 
political or administrative clauses. 

In effect, it creates a Court of Arbitration for settling conflicts, 
but does nothing to prevent the said conflicts. 

In other words the Note of April 8 recognizes that conflicts will 
be inevitable, and confines itself to establishing a jurisdiction 
which, in every case, will decide between France and Germany. 

Thus the Sarre Basin will in final analysis be under the admin- 
istration of a court. 

Such a regime of perpetual lawsuits seems inacceptable not only 
for France and for Germany but also in the interests of the pop- 
ulations of the Sarre and of world peace. 
//. Proofs that conflicts would arise. 

Examination of the articles proves that conflicts would be sure 
to arise. For example . — 

Article 9. If German sovereignty and administration remain 
intact, how will it be possible to apply French law in the matter of 
labour, recruiting, wages, etc., for only a part of the workmen of 
the basin ? 

Article 12. How can the powers of police inspectors, appointed 
by the French State, be conciliated with the application of German 
justice and police ? 

Article 13. How will France be able to exercise her visa on the 
mining, industrial and social regulations if she has no official or 
administrative standing ? Let us suppose that Weimar were to pass 



274 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

laws reducing working hours to six for an electric station supplying 
the mines. How in such a case would the miners be able to work 
eight hours under the French regime ? 

Article 16. How can the territory of the Sarre be submitted to 
a French Customs Administration if France has no administrative 
personnel there or any other title than ownership of the mines? 
A Customs House cannot exist without Customs officers. 

All these articles are necessary and economically just, but re- 
quire an administrative and political complement which the experts 
have demanded and which^the Note of April 8 does not provide. 
Many similar examples could be quoted. 
///. General consequences of the proposed system. 

According to the terms suggested by President Wilson the solu- 
tion would be as follows : — 

(1) The inhabitants would be represented in the Reichstag 
where incidents could be artificially' provoked. 

(2) The whole German and Prussian administrative system 
that has oppressed the region for one hundred years would be 
continued. 

(3) Ev^ry economic measure however indispensable taken by 
<ihe French Government would be indefinitely held up by the Ger- 
man authorities who, to this end, would have only to bring an action 
before the Court of Arbitration. 

(4) If the 72,000 workmen placed under French labour laws 
started a strike, what legislation could be applied in the basin? 

Franco-German friction would thus be multiplied in this region 
and would be reflected in all the relations between the two coun- 
tries. No special and local Tribunal would be able to repair the 
damage done in this way. 

The Sarre Basin, under such a regime, would become a Euro- 
pean Morocco with all and more than all the defects of the Algeci- 
ras Act. It would be a hot-bed and forcing ground for continual 
Franco-German conflicts. 
IV. France's two essential interests are defeated. 

Moreover, the arrangement suggested satisfies neither of the 
two essential interests which the French Government must safe- 
guard. 

(1) As regards the sub-soil. 

The ownership of the mines as a perpetual right was agreed to 
by President Wilson's Note to M. Clemenceau on March 31. 
France claimed that this coal to which she had a right of reparation 



THE 3ARRE BASIN 275 

was indispensable to her and to Alsace-Lorraine. Now the Note of 
April 8 considers the simple cession of this right of ownership after 
fifteen years. France cannot agree to such an arrangement. 

(2) As regards the soil. 

The President of the United Stateis objected to France's first 
claim that there are on this territory — formerly French in its 
greater part — too many German elements due to German immi- 
gration for an immediate union with France to be acceptable.^ The 
French Government agreed on March 28 to examine another solu- 
tion but it constantly declared that there are on this same territory 
too many French elements henceforth turned towards her for 
France to renounce safeguarding for the future their right to be 
reunited to her. 

Moreover, in order to ensure this reunion in fifteen years by 
the free vote of the population, the minimum condition is that the 
territory until then be withdrawn from the pressure of Prussian 
administration to which it has been subjected for one hundred 
years. 

This administration (elections, functionaries, etc.) which the 
Note of April 8 leaves in force would give the Germans the weapon 
for that terrorism whereby they have always ruled, and would de- 
prive the inhabitants of that "fair chance" of liberation which 
France wishes to procure for them. 

France agrees that all guarantees, even that of nationality, be 
given to the inhabitants as individuals. But she cannot admit that 
the economic and social mandate which will be entrusted to her be 
mortgaged at every turn by the exercise of Prussian sovereignty 
and administration. 
V. Conclusion. 

To sum up, the French Government, after having carefully 
studied President Wilson's Note of April 8, believes that this Note : 

(1) Does not contain the administrative and political clauses 
which the feperts' report of April 5 deems indispensable in order 
to avoid conflicts. 

(2) Involves, by reason of this fact, great risk of stirring up 
local and general complications. 

(3) Supplies Germany with a permanent means of obstruct- 
ing French operation of the mines of the basin. 

(4) Entirely re-opens the question at the expiration of fifteen 
years of France's right of ownership over the mines which was 
sanctioned by President Wilson's Note of March 31. 



276 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

(5) Does not insure to the population in view of the proposed 
plebiscite the indispensable guarantees necessary after one hundred 
years of Prussian oppression. 

The French Government wishes therefore to adhere to one of 
Mr. Lloyd George's proposals in harmony with those which it has 
itself formulated. 

It is ready to complete them in conformity with President WiV 
son 's suggestions : 

(a) By a plebiscite after fifteen years; 

(b) By a Court of Arbitration appointed to settle possible 
conflicts in the application of one or the other of these three 
solutions. 

(signed) G. Clemenceau. 

Henceforth the positions could hardly be modified or 
the solution much delayed. April 9 would in fact be deci- 
sive. At the morning meeting Mr. Lloyd George gave his 
full approval to our Note of the previous day and drew 
attention to the fact that the plebiscite at the end of fifteen 
years answered President Wilson's objections. The latter 
still holds out. But he and his counsellors waver under the 
force of our arguments. 

The afternoon of the ninth he presents a new text which, 
without conferring the mandate upon France transformed 
into an administrative commission the Commission of 
Arbitration which he had suggested the previous day. I 
ask the President three essential questions : 

1° — ^Will German sovereignty be suspended? 

2° — ^Will the Commission have full rights, including 
that of dismissing officials? 

3° — ^Will the elections to the Reichstag be suppressed? 

President Wilson answers: "Yes." 

On hearing this affirmative answer M. Clemenceau 
agrees to leave to the Committee, composed of Mr. Has- 
kins, Mr. Morley and myself, the task of drafting a clause. 

Working from five o'clock in the afternoon until three 
o'clock in the morning, our Conunittee, assisted by technical 
and legal experts, completes this task and on the morning 
of the tenth the draft is submitted to the Council of Four 



THE SARRE BASIN 277 

who accept it: it will become Section 4 of Part III of the 
Treaty. It sets forth in forty-six articles the principles 
which since March 28 France had defended before the Con- 
ference. The mines are yielded to us in full ownership 
^\^th the most minute guarantees for their operation. In 
order to assure the rights and welfare of the population 
the Government is transferred for fifteen years to the 
League of Nations which delegates it to a Commission of 
five members. This Conunission will have all the powers 
liitherto belonging to the German Empire, Prussia and 
Bavaria. A Customs Union mil be established betw^een 
France and the territory of the Sarre. At the end of fif- 
teen years the population will vote by districts on the 
following questions: reunion with Germany: union with 
France: continuance of autonomy. If a mining district 
voted for Germany the latter would have the right to repur- 
chase the mines of that district but with the obligation to 
supply France with the corresponding quantity of coal 
called for by her industrial and domestic needs. In all 
other cases the total ownership of the mines goes to France. 

These provisions, like the rest of the Treaty, have been 
subjected to contradictory criticisms, some people finding 
them insufficient, others excessive. The latter criticisms 
have been keener than the former and have furnished anti- 
French propaganda with valuable material. 

What can be said in reply to the first of these two 
criticisms which is not already clear from what precedes? 
We have not obtained the frontier of 1814. The complete 
silence on this point in the Allies' declarations on Decem- 
ber 21, 1916, and January 10, 1917, as well as in the par- 
liamentary resolutions in the month of June following did 
not, it must be confessed, render the task of the French 
delegation any easier. Besides who could deny that this 
frontier would have given us but a small part of the coal ; 
that it would have ruined the economic unity of the basin ; 
and that it would have involved the risk of having protest- 
ing German deputies in our parliamentary bodies ? It was 
to these arguments continually put forward by our Allies, 



278 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

which were by no means devoid of force, that we had 
finally to sacrifice our initial contention. At last we won 
both our right to full ownership of the mines and self- 
determination for the population. Henceforth the French 
of the Sarre are liberated from Prussian oppression and 
the future is theirs. 

This solution is bad, was the. criticism of some, not 
because insufficient, but because abusive, vexatious, 
hypocritical, injurious to the Hberty of peoples. It has 
hurt France deeply to see an English writer parrot the 
arguments put forward on this subject by Count Brock- 
dorff-Eantzau in his Note of May 29, 1919. But to such 
evil reasoning facts give answer. An imperialist solution 
of the problem of the Sarre? This would have perhaps 
meant re-annexation pure and simple to France. Instead 
of this re-annexation the Treaty pro\'ides for the plebiscite 
which will respect the rights of the inhabitants. Without 
it two things were possible: either annexation to France, 
thus depriving the German population of the right to 
choose its sovereignty ; or the maintenance of the statu quo 
whereby nearly 150,000 people of the Sarre, as French in 
their hearts and their aspirations as the Alsatians and 
Lorrainers, would remain forever under the German heel. 
The Peace Conference would have neither the first nor the 
second of these solutions; determined to have neither the 
one nor the other it was led by its very scruples to the solu- 
tion embodied in the Treaty. And let it not be said that 
in order to avoid this difficulty it was sufficient to organ- 
ize the plebiscite immediately : for beneath the weight of a 
century of Prussian oppression an immediate plebiscite 
would have been a vitiated plebiscite and the French of 
the Sarre would have been sacrificed. In their answer of 
June 16, 1919, to Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, the heads of 
the Allied Governments moreover rejected his pretensions 
in memorable terms: 

"For the first time," they said, ''since the annexation of this 
district to Prussia and to Bavaria, the people will live under a loc'al 
Government which will have no other interest or concern than the 



THE SARRE BASIN 279 

protection of their welfare. The Allied and Associated Powers 
have full confidence that the inhabitants will have no reason to 
regard the new administration as more remote than that of Berlin 
or Munich. Moreover, the system is temporary and at the end of 
fifteen years the inhabitants will have full and free right to choose 
the sovereignty under which they wish to live. ' ' 

« 

Such the solution furnished by the Treaty. Complex 
assuredly because the problem was complex — because 
France had to deal with Allies restrained by well-meaning 
hesitations and often incapable of grasping things from the 
same point of view as France, but just also because taking 
into account in this very complexity all the interests 
involved. At the beginning of July, 1919, the mayor of 
Sarrelouis accompanied by a delegation came to express to 
M. Clemenceau the gratitude of his fellow citizens. Janu- 
ary 10, 1920, our mining engineers took possession of the 
coal basin. Some days later, the Government Commission 
presided over by a Frenchman, was installed at Sarre- 
bruck and in several months did good and useful work for 
the inhabitants. It is this that should be retained by the 
opinion of our Allies who, to inform themselves, will attach 
more weight to the documents of which this chapter sub- 
mits the testimony than to the captious protests of men 
who, so long as they believed themselves conquerors, 
intended to annex Belgium and five French Departments. 



CHAPTER IX 



WHAT GERMANY MUST PAY 



To make certain her safety was the first duty of France. 
To secure reparation was her second. Duties common to 
all, it is true, but made peculiarly imperative to my country 
by the losses and suffering she had sustained. 

Here, again, the interests of France were in accord Avith 
the general interest and with justice. Germany was doubly 
responsible for the destruction caused by the war ; due first 
to her premeditated aggression and then made worse by 
her" systematic savagery. War is an atrocious thing. Ger- 
many knew what she was doing when she unloosed it. But 
by her methods she made it more atrocious still. Cruel war 
on civilians to win quick victory was the doctrine of the 
German General Staff, often expounded ex cathedra, before 
Louvain and so many other cities had seen its hideous 
application. But cruel war for greater profits in peace 
time ; cruel war that gold might be won by the sword was 
also the doctrine of German captains of industry in whose 
eyes the adversary of to-day was the competitor of to-mor- 
row. Much of the destruction was systematically wrought, 
far from the front, in order to ruin permanently the occu- 
pied districts to the future advantage of German industry. 
This conception of war, enhancing the responsibility of the 
beaten aggressor, doubly justified full and complete 
reparation. 

In the month of February, 1916, when Germany was 
expecting victory to result from her onslaught against Ver- 
dun, the Quartermaster General of the Imperial Armies 
sent to all the Chambers of Commerce, to all the financial, 
industrial and commercial associations of the Empire, a 

280 



WHAT GERMANY MUST PAY 281 

book of 482 pages, with maps and charts, entitled : Industry 
in Occupied France. This work, prepared by two hundred 
reserve officers, chosen for their technical qualifications, 
described the state of destruction of each of our industries, 
at the time of publication. This destruction was of two 
kinds. The first and less important resulting from battle 
and bombardment; the second more frequent and more 
serious resulting from the organized pillage of factories 
and from the removal into Germany not only of their stocks 
of manufactured goods and raw material contained, but 
also of their machinery, their equipment and often even 
essential parts of their plants. The purpose of the book? 
**To give an idea of the resultant effects for Germany of 
the destruction of certain branches of French industry." 
For what object? To give German industry advance infor- 
mation of the markets in which it could replace us after 
the war and also, by a refined cynicism, to supply profit- 
able customers in the persons of the factory o^vners robbed 
and despoiled by the German Army. Are examples 
wanted? Here are a few taken at random from this 
monstrous plan of brigandage. 

Foundries. Production (and therefore receipts) will fall off 
heavily in these foundries, owing to the removal of the machinery. 

This loss, which will be considerably increased by the cost of 
reconstruction, will so prejudice numerous enterprises, from the 
financial point of view, that it will be difficult for them to resume 
operation, or to restore this to its former level. 

As regards steel mills, an indirect effect upon Germany is pos- 
sible in this sense, that, owing to the considerable deterioration 
suffered by French locomotive works and car shops, French Rail- 
ways will probably be obliged to buy their rolling stock in Ger- 
many, and the resulting orders will go to German plants. 

Textile Mills. As all metals lacking in Germany, such as 
copper, brass, bronze, etc., have been seized and taken away from 
French factories .... resumption of work will encounter great diffi- 
culties. An enormous market, especially for German manufac- 
turers of textile machinery, will be found in the north of France. 

Bleaching and Dyeing. All copper parts and leather belts have 



282 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

been taken out and sent to Germany. An important outlet is thus 
made for German machine manufacturers. 

Woolen Mills. In the factories almost all the copper boiler 
parts have been removed, as well as all leather belting. Electric 
wiring has been taken out in many factories. The small electric 
motors will be removed between now and the end of the war. In 
the region of Avesnes and of Sedan, several factories have been so 
gutted that a certain number of their looms, abandoned to the 
weather, may be looked upon as scrap iron. 

To what extent will the continuation of economic war after 
peace is declared prevent France's recovering the advantage now 
possessed by Germany who has suffered practically no destruction 
from the war? This is a question that German industry will have 
to study. 

Germany should be in a position to resume her full productive 
capacity in the manufacture of yarn at least one or two years 
sooner than France. This result will be all the more satisfactory 
in that the sister industries of weaving and dyeing, as well as the 
export trade, will benefit equally thereby, and that this last, 
especially, will be in a position, not only to recapture the markets 
it has lost, but even to acquire new ones where France so far has 
been the only furnisher. 

Ceramic Industry. Attention is drawn to considerable war 
damages in the destruction and requisition on a large scale of elec- 
tric installations and wiring. 

The German machine makers should find in this field a good 
opportunity after the war of selling their wares. 

By properly directed effort, Germany should succeed in cap- 
turing the few French foreign markets, notably in Turkey and the 
Balkan States. The long stoppage of work in the French factories, 
and their inability to manufacture and export immediately after 
the war should contribute to this. 

Sugar Industry. The French refineries, with a few rare excep- 
tions, have suffered greatly from the war. None of them has 
escaped requisitions. Everywhere their stocks of sugar, of treacle, 
their provisions of coal, coke and petroleum, rubber and leather 
belting, live stock, consisting of horses, oxen, etc., carts, harness, 
implements, narrow gauge railways, patent trucks and electric 
wiring have been removed, and in only a few shops, four or six, 
now working for the Germans — ^has indispensable equipment been 
left. 



WHAT GERMANY MUST PAY 283 

But the damage done to the refineries themselves and their 
equipment is even more serious. 

Lack of superintendence, occupation by troops, removal of the 
above mentioned objects, have already caused great damage; but 
the refineries have suffered still more from the taking out of all 
copper, brass and bronze appliances. 

War wastage has caused such damage to whole series of refi- 
neries that their reconstruction would be impossible. Even those 
that survive, in a more or less damaged condition, will long feel the 
disastrous effects of the war. The French sugar industry should 
disappear as a competitor on the world market during the next 
two or three years. It will, at the start, scarcely suffice to supply 
the country's own needs and to replenish exhausted stocks. To a 
certain extent, it will be obliged to have recourse to special German 
factories for purposes of reconstruction; for the French machine 
shops situated for the most part in the North and reduced in their 
productive capacity by the war, will be inadequate for this task. 

Leather Industry. French competition will be unable to make 
itself felt for eighteen months. German industry can find a consid- 
erable market for several years in the North of France and assure 
itself, for the future, important outlet, formerly monopolized by 
French products in Asia Minor and European Turkey. 

Coal Mines. The districts will be unproductive for years to 
come, owing to the removal of the machinery and the flooding of 
the shafts. 

France will have to buy her machinery in Germany and, even 
if the rich beds in the French territory occupied by the German 
troops were to continue in the possession of France, it might be 
foreseen that Germany would have to deliver a higher percentage 
than in the past, owing to the deficit in French production. 

Breweries. Breweries have suffered heavy damages owing to 
the removal of all articles of brass and copper. Those only have 
been preserved which have made beer for the troops, and they have 
been operated by the Army as military breweries. Their number is 
not large. 

The brewing industry in the occupied territory may be re- 
garded, for the greater part, as annihilated. Certain brewers, who 
were among the most prosperous, will need at least two years to 
restore their plants, even if they replace in part the copper by iron. 

A large part of the orders will come to the German machine 
makers, if they can promise quicker delivery than their English 
and American competitors. 



284 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Taper Industry. The damage caused by the war to the plants 
and the buildings in the paper industry is considerable, as impor- 
tant copper piping has been removed, as well as brass forms and 
cylinders which it will be difficult to replace after the war. 

For example : In the paper mills of Bousbecque alone, nearly 
ninety tons of wrought copper have been taken out. 

German machine makers who, before the war, found in the 
paper industry a very important outlet for their product, must 
strive to secure the work of reconstructing these mills, in order to 
eliminate the inevitable competition, especially from America. 
American machines would otherwise easily install themselves in this 
industry, from which, afterwards, it would be difficult to drive 
them out. 

'""" The Cotton Industry. In the occupied territory the greater 
number of the spindles and bobbins will be able to operate only six 
or eight months after the corresponding German industry has 
started working again. 

These quotations are tragically enlightening. The 
damage sustained by French industry, object of this 
inquiry, interests German leaders only in the measure of 
its beneficial effects upon corresponding branches of Ger- 
man activity. To the Army — ^which does its work conscien- 
tiously — the task of destroying capital and throwing 
labour out of work ; to the business men the task of getting 
the most out of it either by the conquest of markets for- 
merly held by France, or by the sale to French pre-war 
competitors of machinery and implements which the Ger- 
man troops had stolen from them ! This confidential docu- 
ment, which M. Klotz laid before the Supreme Council in 
February, 1919, is not only indicative of an amazing 
psychology, it is the necessary preface to any study of 
reparations. In the case of Germany, we are confronted 
not only by the inevitable desolation and ruin of war, not 
only by the responsibilities of a war of aggression, but by 
intentional and methodical destruction. Germany killed 
not only to conquer, but for profit. Beaten, she has to 
pay. Such the verdict of Versailles. 

The verdict was known in advance and astonished no 
one. All the declarations of the Allies, all the votes of their 



WHAT GERMANY MUST PAY 285 

Parliaments, all the messages of President Wilson, all the 
speeches of M. Clemenceau and of Mr. Lloyd George, 
finally all the accepted bases of the peace, had laid down 
the Allied programme in perfect accord with the dictates of 
their conscience. On the principle, there was no disagree- 
ment ; but in its application this stupendous problem calling 
from destroyed towns and devastated fields for billions 
involved difficulties such as no political assembly had ever 
before met or solved. 

II 

At the end of January, 1919, a special Commission is 
created by the Supreme Council to study the problem. It 
comprises the highest financial authorities of the victorious 
countries. At its very first meeting, it frankly propounds 
the fundamental question: '^What is Germany to pay?" 

I recall the legal bases of the question. These bases 
were embodied not only in the general rules of international 
law, but also in the diplomatic correspondence which had 
preceded the Armistice of November 11, 1918. This cor- 
respondence had both defined the necessary conditions of 
an Armistice, the study and framing of which had been 
intrusted to Marshal Foch and the general bases of peace 
laid dowTi in President Wilson's message on January 8, 
1918, which in turn accorded with the declarations of the 
European Governments, dated December 31, 1916, and Jan- 
uary 10, 1917. Concerning reparations the important pas- 
sage is found in Mr. Lansing's telegram of November 5, 
1918. It is worded as follows: 

"When the President formulated his peace conditions in his 
address to Congress on January 8, last, he declared that the invaded 
territories must be not only evacuated and liberated, but restored. 
The Allies think that no doubt should be left as to what this stip- 
ulation means. They understand by it that compensation will be 
made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population 
of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by 
land, by sea, and from the air. The President is in agreement with 
this interpretation. 



286 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Furthermore during the meetings held on October 31 
and November 1, 2, and 4, 1918, by the Supreme Council 
of the Allies for the final drafting of the Armistice clauses, 
M. Klotz, Minister of Finance, had said : 

*'It would be prudent to preface the financial questions, 
in the Armistice itself, with an explicit reservation of all 
future claims of the Allies, and I propose the following 
text: 'With the reservation that any subsequent claims by 
the Allies and the United States of America remain unaf- 
fected, reparation for damage done.' " 

M. Klotz 's proposal was read a first time on November 2 
and on the fourth it was finally adopted. These were the 
two texts which might guide the Commission in its work. 

The meeting of February 10 showed that these texts 
had given rise to two contradictory interpretations. One 
was put forward by all the Powers represented, with a 
single exception; the other, by the delegate of the United 
States. The views of the majority found an admirable 
interpreter in Great Britain's principal delegate to the 
Commission, Mr. Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia, a 
little man, deaf, impetuous, clear-minded, a blunt and 
aggressive orator. This view was that Germany, without 
exception or reserve, should reimburse all the costs of the 
war, including damage to persons and property, and war 
expenditures. 

' ' The right to reparation, ' ' he declared, ' ' rests upon the 
principle of justice, pure and simple, in this sense that, 
where damage or harm has been done, the doer should 
make it good to the extreme limit of his resources. This 
principle is universally recognized by all laws. 

''This principle demands that the sum total of the cost 
of the war should be borne by the enemy nations .... From 
the points of view of both logic and justice, it is absolutely 
impossible to distinguish between the claim to the right for 
restoration in the devastated regions, and the claim for 

damages in general Those who have mortgaged all they 

possess in order to free Belgium, have suffered from Ger- 
many as much as Belgium herself. 



WHAT GERMANY MUST PAY 287 

*'Let us take the case of Australia. She has lost nearly 
60,000 killed, and about 190,000 mutilated or infirm for 
life. Her war debt is 300,000,000 pounds, or 7,500 million 
francs gold, a crushing burden for a nation of five million 
inhabitants. It may be that so far as civilian life and prop- 
erty are concerned, my countrymen have not endured actual 
sufferings ; but the sacrifices they have made and the dam- 
age they have suffered, are no less great. Full and com- 
plete compensation is due to them as to all other Allies. 

*'The house or the factory of the Belgian is in ruins. 
The Englishman's is mortgaged for war expenditure. The 
damage to him is quite as real, quite as great, quite as 
direct. Germany owes Great Britain reparation for war 
costs as unquestionably as she owes reparation to Belgium 
for the ravages she has committed." 

To these general arguments of equity, Lord Sumner, the 
second British delegate, added legal reasons borrowed from 
international custom and from the text of the Armistice. 
He recalled that war costs had been demanded by the 
Allied Powers from France in 1815 (700 millions) ; by 
Austria from Sardinia in 1849 (25 millions) ; by Prussia 
from Austria in 1866 (40 millions) ; by Prussia from France 
in 1871 (5,000 millions). He added: 

**The reimbursement of war costs is the constant prac- 
tice of international law No particular clause, either 

in the Fourteen Points or in the Armistice, excludes this 
reimbursement. ' ' 

The American Counsel, Mr. J. F. Dulles, a clear and 
forceful logician, did not of course deny any of Germany's 
responsibilities, but, as a lawyer, he declared that he was 
dealing mth a contract which, in his opinion, limited the 
right of the Allies to claim anything beyond reparation for 
all acts committed in violation of international laws and for 
direct damages suffered by the civilian population. He 
said: 

**The American delegation associates itself absolutely 
and without reserve mth all that has been said concerning 
the enormity of the crime committed by Germany. Besides, 
the United States have their war debt also, constituting a 



288 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

terrible burden. So as it is in accord with our inmost feel- 
ings that the principles of reparation should be severe, and 
with our national interest that these principles should be 
given the widest scope, why is it that we propose only a 
limited reparation? 

''It is because we are not facing a blank page, but a 
page covered with a document at the foot of which are the 
signatures of Mr. Wilson, M. Clemenceau, M. Orlando and 
Mr. Lloyd George. 

"The proposal of the United States is therefore that 
we demand from Germany full reparations, but only those 
stipulated in the contract with Germany concerning the 
conditions on which peace could be signed. 

''Accordingly, first comes reparation for acts which 
constitute an obvious violation of international law. This, 
therefore, implies complete reparation for Belgium. 

"Then, restoration of the invaded regions, and repara- 
tion for damage done to the civilian population and its 
property." 

To this argument, M. Klotz who, as President of the 
Commission, was the last to speak, forcefully opposed an 
argument of fact and of law which, without convincing Mr. 
Dulles, made a great impression upon all his colleagues. 

"You speak of a contract," he said. "For my part, I 
know only of one — signed by the Allies and by Germany — 
that is the Armistice. Well, I read in that: 'With the 
reservation that any subsequent claims of the Allies and 
the United States of America remain unaffected, repara- 
tion for damage done.' It was I who asked for the inser- 
tion of that clause. All the delegates accepted it. Its 
meaning is clear. 

"I conclude therefore, first, that there exists no con- 
tract under the terms of which reimbursement of war costs 
was renounced, and second, that there is in the Armistice 
a contract according to the terms of which the right to 
reimbursement has been expressly reserved." 

A long discussion brought additional arguments to 
strengthen M. Klotz 's contention. I will quote only the 



WHAT GERMANY MUST PAY 289 

principal ones. M. Chiesa, the Italian delegate, drew atten- 
tion to the fact that, inasmuch as Mr. Lansing's note 
referred to *'all" the damage caused the civilian popula- 
tion, this definition covered the war costs and indirect 
damage, as well as direct damages. M. Mori, the Japanese 
delegate, added: ''The question before us is the same as 
that of the costs in a lawsuit. The sum total of the costs 
of the war must be paid by the aggressor." M. Proutich, 
the Serbian delegate, drew attention to the fact that the 
Fourteen Points applied only to Germany, not to the other 
belligerents. M. Loucheur ended his summing up of the 
discussion with the words: "No indemnity" did not mean 
*'no reimbursement for war expenses." Mr. Hughes 
asserted that, since the violation of Belgian neutrality 
created, as the Americans themselves admitted, Belgium's 
right to total reparation, the same right existed for the 
guarantor Powers, obliged, under the Treaty of 1839, to 
defend Belgian neutrality. Mr. Dulles replied to each of 
these different arguments in turn. He insisted especially 
upon that of M. Klotz, asserting that the diplomatic corre- 
spondence of October, 1918, referred not to the bases of 
the Armistice but to those of the peace; that, accordingly, 
it bound the Conference, charged with the elaboration not 
of the Armistice, but of peace ; furthermore the Armistice, 
whatever its wording, could change nothing in the accepted 
bases of the peace .... As no agreement was reached, it was 
decided to ask the heads of the Governments for their inter- 
pretation, and the meeting was adjourned. 

After the legal aspect, so full of fine points, let us con- 
sider the facts which had also to be weighed. The demand 
for full and complete reparation presented by M. Klotz 
and Mr. Hughes had justice on its side. Moreover, it had 
held so large a place in the English elections of December, 
1918, that it was politically impossible for Mr. Lloyd 
George to abandon it; and so long as Great Britain sup- 
ported this claim all the other Governments — especially 
those of countries which had suffered most from the war — 
were bound to stand by her to avoid being overwhelmed by 



290 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

abuse. It is certain, however, that looking at the problem 
as a whole, this total demand led to actual figures, the very 
magnitude of which was absurd and in the special cases of 
some countries it also led to results contrary to what had 
been expected. 

The amounts to be demanded from Germany for dam- 
age done to persons and property, reached the sum of about 
350,000 million. For the Allies as a whole the war costs on 
the other hand amounted to 700,000 million francs. The 
following table gives an approximate estimate: 

In thousand of million francs 

Great Britain 190 27.1% 

United States 160 22.8% 

France 143 20.1% 

Russia 92 12.9% 

Italy 65 9.2% 

Belgium 



Serbia . . . 
Roumania 
Greece . . 



53 7.8% 



Total 703 99.9% 

The figures revealed that, if we were to insist upon the 
three claims — damage to property, damage to persons, war 
expenses — we would reach a total capital of 1,000 thousand 
millions, the payment of which over a period of fifty years 
would represent taking into account interest and sinking 
fund more than 3,000 thousand millions, a sum so great 
that it is unreal. If, faithful to this reasoning as logic 
demanded, we had demanded also on the ground of full and 
complete reparation and in accordance with full justice 
payment of indirect damages, loss in operation, loss of 

profits, etc we should perhaps have reached some such 

fabulous total as 7,000, 8,000 or 10,000 billions. It was 
clear that, if the Conference was to get practical results, it 
would have to move only with extreme prudence. 

At this time also certain delegates began to be worried 
by the thought of surprises awaiting the countries they rep- 



WHAT GERMANY MUST PAY 291 

resented. Belgium's first delegate to the Commission, M. 
Van den Heuvel, had not hesitated to show his uneasiness. 
He said: 

"Everybody recognizes Belgium's right to total repara- 
tion, because her neutrality was violated. But, as a matter 
of fact, what wdll this right amount to, if we accept the 
English view of full and complete reparation for everyone ? 
What will really happen? The total will inevitably be 
enormous. Consequently it mil be necessary to reduce all 
the debts proportionately, as is done in a case of bank- 
ruptcy. Then the claims of the small Powers will never 
be paid in full." 

Mr. Dulles, taking advantage of this remark, imme- 
diately added : 

"The American proposals are those which, if not in 
principle, at least in practice, mil ensure the maximum of 
reparations and their most equitable distribution. To 
demand the whole gigantic total of the war costs — I agree 
with M. Van den Heuvel — will endanger the accomplish- 
ment of the precise reparation to be fulfilled by Germany, 
and to which she is compelled to recognize that she must 
submit and which wdll absorb her resources to the utmost 
limit." 

The French representatives could but listen to these 
words with the most serious attention. For examination 
of the figures established the fact that, as far as France 
was concerned, they expressed an unquestionable truth. 
Among the claimants, France headed the list with respect 
to damages to persons and property. Out of every hundred 
francs paid by Germany under these two heads France 
considered that she had a right — proved by the actual 
figures — to sixty-five, the other Powers getting thirty-five. 
But under the head of war costs, out of every one hundred 
francs received, we had a right to only twenty and the 
others to eighty. Combine these two propositions, you will 
see that, if the war costs were not exacted, France could 
claim sixty-five per cent, of the sum paid by Germany, 
while if they were, she could get only forty-two and five- 



292 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

tenths per cent. Our interest — owing on the one hand to 
the danger of an excessive total, on the other to the play 
of percentages — was thus to demand, in opposition to the 
American point of view, damages for pensions in addition 
to property damages but, in accordance with that point 
of view, to leave aside war costs which ranked us lower 
among the Allies than the two other classifications. 

This was the solution urged by the French delegation 
during March upon the heads of the Governments, and this 
also was the solution decided upon at the end of the month. 
From then on the discussion was rather one of form than 
of substance, rather political than financial. The Ameri- 
cans had made a thoroughly just concession to Franco- 
British demands by adding pensions to damages to persons 
and property and agreeing that deaths and wounds should 
be considered as injuries suffered by families, whose 
resources were lessened by the loss or incapacity of their 
members. This done, they were ready to write purely and 
simply in the Treaty: ''Germany shall reimburse damages 
and pensions.*' The British and the French in fundamen- 
tal agreement with this asked, however, that for political 
and moral reasons something further be added. They 
wanted the Treaty to make clear in law Germany's total 
responsibility for all the expenses of the war. They wanted 
it to make clear by specific declaration that, if full and 
complete reparation were not demanded, it was only 
because of material impossibility. They wanted this impos- 
sibility to be set forth in such manner as not to shock public 
opinion, ill-informed, as one may imagine, as to the statisti- 
cal facts. Mr. Lloyd George insisted; 

"We must not take out of our draft some indication of 
the enemy's incapacity to pay all he owes. We must in 
some way justify the action of the British and French Gov- 
ernments, which find themselves obliged to accept less 
than the full payment of war costs. We must make it thor- 
oughly clear that, if we do not exact it, it is not because it 
would be unjust to claim it, but because it would be impos- 
sible to obtain it. 



WHAT GERMANY MUST PAY 293 

''Our public opinion requires reparation as complete as 
possible. I have communicated to M. Clemenceau a report 
of a debate upon this question in the House of Commons 
and it gave him some idea of the violence of the sentiments 
expressed there. Mr. Bonar Law wrote me after this 
debate that Parliament had shown itself ill satisfied with 
his statement." 

And M. Clemenceau added: 

*'It is a question of wording. But I agree with you 
that it is important to say that our right to compensation 
is not limited, and that it is we ourselves who, in view of 
what is possible, have fixed a limit." 

It was thus that agreement was reached, in the course 
of two meetings, on the text of Articles 231 and 232 of the 
Treaty.* These articles have often been misunderstood 
and their apparent contradiction has been bitterly criti- 
cized. The above should dispel all possible misconception. 

If it had been a question of principle only, it is abun- 
dantly clear that in equity neither France nor any of the 
Allies should have borne a cent of the war costs. But it 
was a question of political realities and possibilities, not 
a question of ideals. We were bound first to remember 
that the American delegation, whose approval was neces- 
sary, refused absolutely to claim the war costs; then that 
if war costs were claimed, we should arrive at a total of 
more than a thousand thousand millions, obviously irrecov- 
erable ; finally that pro-rata distribution would have given 
France only forty-two per cent, instead of the sixty-five 



*Artiele 231. The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Ger- 
many accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the 
loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their 
nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them 
by the aggression of Germany and her allies. 

Article 232. The Allied and Associated Governments recognize that the 
resources of Germany are not adequate, after taking into account permanent 
diminutions of such resources which wiJl result from other provisions of the 
present Treaty, to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage. 

The Allied and Associated Governments, however, require, and Germany 
undertakes, that she will make compensation for all damage done to the 
civilian population of the Allied and Associated Powers and to their property 
during the period of the belligerency of each as an Allied or Associated Power 
against Germany by such aggression by land, by sea and from the air, and in 
general all damage as defined in Annex I hereto. 



294 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

per cent, she had a right to demand under the head of 
damages and pensions. In the necessary and inevitable 
imperfection of solutions, the one wliich the French dele- 
gates put through was unquestionably the best, and we 
can say, as did M. Barthou in his report on the Treaty, that 
by exacting from Germany the full and complete repay- 
ment of damages and pensions, the ''Peace Conference, all 
things considered, handled the matter well." 

Ill 

"We now knew under what heads we could claim from 
Germany. It remained to fix the amounts we could claim. 
The damages subject to reparation had been defined. It 
was now necessary to calculate the amount of these dam- 
ages, a difficult task indeed for so soon after the Armistice 
an exact estimate of the devastation was virtually 
impossible. 

This impossibility, ;combined with the legitimate desire 
to make the Treaty as definite as possible, suggested as no 
exact estimate was forthcoming the statement of a lump 
sum. This solution at first sight offered attractive advan- 
tages. The creditors would know at once the sum total 
they were to receive. The debtors would know the sum 
total they were to pay. The credit bond, if all agreed to 
discount it, would be immediately negotiable. Such a sum 
once established there would be no further difficulties, 
either for the Governments or for the Reparations Commis- 
sion save that, which under this plan or under any other 
remained the essential difficulty — Germany, forced to 
accept a system of annuities, might some day refuse to pay. 

To these arguments of convenience, the French delega- 
tion without ever wavering, always opposed, throughout 
the six months the Peace Conference lasted, the arguments 
of law and justice which were finally embodied in the 
Treaty. It was its duty to take this stand, first to give 
effect to one of the most frequently declared war aims of 
France (Notes of December 30, 1916, and January 10, 1917, 



WHAT GERMANY MUST PAY 295 

resolutions of the Chamber and Senate of June 5 and 6 
following, meeting at Versailles of October 31, 1918, and 
finally the Armistice itself). It was its duty, because the 
lump sum by its very principal excluded that full and com- 
plete reparation for damages, the perfect right of France 
to which no one had ever contested. Again, it was its duty 
because the lump sum by its modalities, and everyone of 
them was minutely discussed, led to an inadmissible reduc- 
tion in our rights, and because this reduction once obtained 
Germany alone, and not France, would have benefited from 
the potentialities of economic improvement the future 
might hold. 

For these reasons, which are decisive, France, in 1919, 
refused the lump sum. She refused to fix the amount of 
Germany's debt summarily and at random. She refused 
to accept as the basis of this debt — the inevitable result of 
a lump sum — Germany's present capacity of payment. 
She refused to give up her right to full and complete repara- 
tion for all the destruction to life and property caused by 
Germany. She refused to choose for fixing the German 
debt the moment when Germany is at her lowest. She I 
wanted to reserve to the victims the future benefit that/ 
would accrue from the possible revival of the aggressor.| 
These principles permeate the. whole Treaty and it is right 
that they should. 

In January, 1919, the discussion had begun in the 
Technical Commissions. These latter hesitated before the 
heavy responsibilities to be incurred and reserved decision 
on all the essential points. In March and April, the matter 
passed to a smaller committee, upon which M. Klotz and 
M. Loucheur represented France, and to the Council of the 
heads of Governments. Several hundred meetings were 
held, both day and night. The question of the lump sum, 
with two or three others, absorbed the greater part of this 
effort. On March 26, at a meeting of the Council of Four, 
M. Loucheur presented the problem. Up to the very last 
our three representatives held together to obtain a settle- 
ment that did justice to France. M. Loucheur said : 



296 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

"I must repeat emphatically that the lump sum offered 
us is not sufficient to repair all the damage done to persons 
and property. Wliat becomes of the pledges we have 
given? "What will our people say? 

"France has a right — solemnly recognized even before 
the signing of the Armistice — to full reparation for her 
sufferings and her sacrifices. What I ask is that the 
Treaty shall record this right. If I acted otherwise, I 
should be acting against the interests and rights of my 
country. 

'*I do not fear a public discussion. No one to-day can 
make an absolutely certain estimate of the total of the 
reparations due. That is an easy matter for ships which 
have been sunk. It is much more difficult when dealing 
with a region entirely ruined and devastated." 

And, the same day, M. Clemenceau declared : 

**I cannot forget the document we signed on November 
4, 1918, and sent to President Wilson on the subject of 
reparation for war damages." 

On March 28, the discussion continues and in a long 
statement, our Minister of Finance defends the plan pre- 
sented by the French delegation. He summarizes it thus : 

**The Germans are obliged and have pledged them- 
selves to repair the damages. We do not know to-day 
what such reparation will cost. Improvised estimates 
would be imprudent. The only system is the following: 
The Reparations Commission mil fix the amount — when 
it has all the facts. Then according to the amount of the 
debt thus ascertained, it will settle the figure of the annui- 
ties and the length of payment." 

The French contention is so strong that, at this meet- 
ing, Mr. Lloyd George recognizes it is preferable not to fix 
any figure in the Treaty. But the American experts hold 
to the lump sum and repeat in its favour all the arguments 
that France had just refuted. On April 3, 4, 6, and 7, the 
two contentions continue to be opposed. It is objected that, 
under our system, the payments would extend over more 
than a generation. We reply that this is not certain and 



WHAT GERMANY MUST PAY 297 

that even if it were so, it is just to inflict this burden upon 
Germany rather than upon France. Minimum and maxi- 
mum amounts are suggested. We reply that our damages 
were not matters for bargaining, and that it is their real 
and not their approximate amount which must be reim- 
bursed us. M. Clemenceau brings the final argument : 

*'It must be made plain that Germany recognizes the 
full amount of her debt. It is not enough to say that we 
recognize it. 

*'I demand, in the name of the French Government, and 
after consultation with my colleagues, that the Treaty fix 
what Germany owes us, by specifying the damages for 
which reparation is due to us. 

"We will fix a period of thirty years, if you wish it, and 
we will give the Commission, after it has calculated the 
amount of the debt, the mission of obtaining payment in 
these thirty years of all that Germany owes. If that is 
found to be impossible, the Commission will have the right 
to prolong the payments beyond thirty years. 

*'In no case will I agree to allow either the Treaty or 
the Commission to fix an amount below what is due us. 
Such settlements are haphazard and the burden of them 
would fall upon France. I repeat in no case will I be able 
to subscribe to them." 

From that day on, our success takes shape and agree- 
ment is reached within a week. If it were necessary to add 
the justification of facts to the reasons of principle ad- 
vanced by the French delegation, it would suffice to recall 
the amount of the lump sums proposed by our opponents : 
125 thousand millions for the Allies as a whole. France 's 
share, under this system, would have been approximately 
sixty thousand millions. Now the minimum estimate of our 
damages was at least 125 thousand millions and the capital 
of our pensions represented fifty thousand millions.* If 

*The valuation, according to the terms of the Treaty, must be made in 
accordance with the cost of reconstruction, which, since the Armistice, has 
constantly increased. The French Government, in July, 1920, supplied the fol- 
lowing approximate values: damages one hundred and fifty-two thousand mil- 
lions; pensions fifty-eight thousand millions. See Chapter XII, page 396, for 
the evaluation of December, 1920. 



298 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

then we had yielded, we should have accepted less than half 
of our minimum rights. That is what M. Clemenceau would 
never consent to. 

On May 7, the Treaty was handed to the German dele- 
gation. Article 232 embodied the French contention 
accepted by the Allies. On May 29, Count von Brockdorff- 
Rantzau presented his answer. He, too, preferred the lump 
sum, but the figure he suggested was still inferior to those 
we had rejected ; 100 thousand million gold marks, of which 
twenty thousand millions, were to be paid before May 1, 
1926, the rest in annual installments calculated pro rata of 
the German budget, and payable, without interest, in fifty 
or sixty years, the actual value of which at six per cent, 
represented only about thirty thousand millions. 

I have told, in connection with the occupation of the 
left bank of the Rhine, the serious crisis through which the 
Conference passed at that time. On all sides the question 
was asked: *'Will they sign?" Yet as to how they were to 
be made to sign there was no agreement. Some, like Mr. 
Lloyd George, wanted to make concessions; others, like 
M. Clemenceau, insisted on adhering to the verdict ren- 
dered. Like all the great problems of the peace, that of the 
reparations came up again for re-examination. Like them, 
it led to further discussions, closer, more intense, more 
thrilling than the first. During the first days of June, Mr. 
Lloyd George said that the members of his Cabinet were all 
of the opinion that we were asking Germany for more than 
she could pay. He added that the sharpest criticism was 
directed against the unlimited and undefined character of 
the debt imposed upon the vanquished. So he asked for a 
thoroughgoing revision of the Reparations Clauses, and 
inclined under the influence of Mr. Keynes to the lump sum 
proposed in March by the American experts. M. Cle- 
menceau answered by a formal refusal. 

''Like you," he declared, ''I am advised as to public 
opinion in my country and I must take it into consideration. 
French opinion believes that the Treaty does not exact from 
Germany from the financial point of view all that it ought. 



WHAT GERMANY MUST PAY 299 

France is the country that has suffered most from the war 
and she is convicted to-day that we are not asking enough 
from Germany. This conviction finds expression in the 
speeches of eminent and moderate men, like M. Ribot and 
M. Millies-Lacroix. 

"You must understand tliis state of mind. British 
opinion does not complain because Germany has to give all 
her colonies and all her fleet. This is natural, for each 
nation sees the question from its own point of view. A 
feeling no less natural in France will be that British critics 
occupy themselves too exclusively with continental 
questions." 

This first effort was not sufficient. For although 
President Wilson, on all questions like disarmament and 
the left bank of the Rhine, shows himself in favour of the 
firm policy, advocated by M. Clemenceau, he was, on the 
contrary, influenced in the financial problem by his techni- 
cal advisers who were anxious, above all, to reach a quick 
solution. He recalls this by declaring: 

**You know that for practical reasons the American 
experts have always favoured a sum to be fixed 
immediately." 

So he finds himself in agreement with Mr. Lloyd George 
in believing that ''so long as the Germans remain in com- 
plete uncertainty as to their obligations, they will be unable 
to find any foreign credit." This objection is not so sound 
as it seemed, for according to the terms of the Treaty itself 
Germany's debt has to be completely established before 
May 1, 1921. So now M. Clemenceau is all alone, and not 
once, but several times he has to return to the attack. 

"The proposal of the American experts," he said, 
"would destroy the Treaty. We have in the very first 
lines of the chapter on reparations laid down the principle 
that the damages enumerated in the annex must be repaired. 
If we fix a lump sum to-day how can we tell whether it will 
suffice to pay us 1 France has suffered too much to allow 
this question to go by the board," 



300 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

The objection was so sound that President Wilson is 
brought around by it. He declares : 

"I must remind you that the United States has not the 
slightest intention of proposing concessions to Germany. 
We have simply endeavoured to do our share of the common 
work and to hasten the signing. If the proposals made dis- 
please you, they will be withdrawn." 

From that moment the case is won. Mr. Lloyd George 
himself loyally admits the manifest inadequacy of the lump 
sums proposed and fearing that a higher figure in the 
Treaty would prevent Germany from signing returns will- 
ingly to the original wording which at first he had regretted 
and shows less alarm at its lack of precision. It is decided 
to retain it. The only amendment introduced, not in the 
Treaty but in the answer to the Germans, consists in author- 
izing them to make proposals within two months after the 
Treaty comes in force, that without changing anything in 
the principle or in the consequences of Article 232, would 
tend to accelerate the settlement either of the amount due 
or the manner of its payment. On June 9, Mr. Keynes 
resigns as financial counsellor of the British delegation, 
which loses in him an abundant advocate of all the German 
contentions. On June 10, agreement is reached. On June 
16, the Allies' answer is handed to Count von Brockdorff- 
Rantzau. 

It is important, now that risky and improvised sugges- 
tions are being made for the revision of the Treaty, to read 
over this document drawn up by an Englishman, approved 
by all the Governments and signed by M. Clemenceau. The 
justification of the course decided upon is written all 
over it. 

The Allies' proposals confine the amount payable by Germany 
to what is clearly justifiable under the terms of Armistice in 
respect of damage caused to the civilian population of the Allies 
by German aggression. 

It is not possible to fix this sum to-day for the extent of damage 
and the cost of repair has not yet been ascertained. 

The Allied and Associated Governments, consistently with their 



:WHAT GERMANY MUST PAY 301 

policy already expressed, decline to enter into a discussion of the 
principles underlying the reparation clauses. 

The categories of damages and the reparation clauses must be 
accepted by the German authorities as matters settled beyond 
discussion. 

So far as the substance of the German counter-proposals 
is concerned, the answer was no less clear, no less firm: 

A sum of one hundred billion gold marks is indeed mentioned, 
and this is calculated to give the impression of an extensive offer, 
which upon examination it proves not to be. 

No interest is to be paid at all. 

The present value of this distant prospect is small, but it is all 
that Germany tenders to the victims of her aggression in satisfac- 
tion for their part suffering and their permanent burdens. 

Germany, unquestionably, will have a heavy burden to bear. 
But why ? The Allied, and Associated Governments wish Germany 
to be able to enjoy the prosperity like the rest of the world, though 
much of the fruit of it must necessarily go, for many years to come, 
in making reparation to her neighbors for the damage she has done. 

If the Treaty were different, if it were based upon a general 
condonation of the events of 1914-1918, it would not be a peace 
of justice. 

Repeated assertion of Germany's full and complete 
obligation with regard to all categories of damages enumer- 
ated in Article 232 and Annex 1; fixation of the total 
amount of the German debt on May 1, 1921, at the latest; 
maintenance of all the principles and of all the methods 
urged by the French delegation from the beginning of 
January until the end of June, — such was the final deci- 
sion, the strict justice of which cannot be disputed if refer- 
ence be had to the principles which inspired the peace. It 
is indeed objected that, if the solution is just, it is also 
unrealizable. It is said that Germany will not pay, and the 
Conference has been accused of never having concerned 
itself with Germany's capacity for payment. This is the 
second position taken up by Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau 
and is no better than the first. 



302 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

IV 

The Peace Conference did not merely make generous 
allowance for Germany's situation and her capacity of pay- 
ment by letting her off repayment of war costs at the 
suggestion of the American delegation, thus reducing her 
debt by 700 thousand millions, more than two-thirds of the 
total. It also made a careful study of the resources with 
which Germany could pay. 

At its first meeting, on February 3, 1919, the Commis- 
sion appointed by the Supreme Council to study the prob- 
lem of reparations, created three sub-commissions. One 
was to take up the amount of the damages; another, the 
financial guarantees of execution; the third, capacity and 
means of payment. The latter sub-commission held thirty- 
two meetings and minutely analyzed Germany's actual and 
potential resources. Its president. Lord Cunliffe, never 
ceased to express the opinion, shared by all who know and 
think that, for a payment distributed over a sufficient 
period — fifty years for instance — Germany will have 
resources infinitely superior to those that any examination 
of her situation immediately after the war would make it 
possible to declare or to anticipate. The war itself fur- 
nished the proof. Who would have foreseen that, either in 
the Allied camp or in the other, it would be possible for 
fifty-two long months to meet expenses exceeding 1,000 
thousand millions ? M. Loucheur, agreeing with Lord Cun- 
liffe, confirmed this proof by recalling Germany's prodig- 
ious development from 1871 to 1914 — her population 
increasing by fifty-two per cent., her production of coal 
increasing from forty million tons to 280 million. Other 
delegates showed that Germany, on the eve of war, was less 
1 burdened with taxes than any other country; Austria- 
Hungary paying 106 francs per head of her inhabitants; 
France, 100 ; England, 79 ; Italy, 62.50 ; Germany, only 54. 
Others again recalled that immediately after the Treaty of 
Frankfort, France in a few weeks had increased her taxes 
by nearly one billion and Lord Cunliffe, after a long dis- 
cussion, summed up the general opinion by saying: 



;WHAT GEEMANY MUST PAY 303 

"Germany's ability to pay exceeds anything shown by 
our study. What Germany does not pay, the Allies, 
attacked by her, mil have to pay." 

These principles once laid down, the means of payment 
were examined. Everyone was agreed that the medium 
should be gold marks. Every one agreed also with 
M. Loucheur that the only way of finding gold marks was, 
by means of the Treaty, to impose upon Germany the obliga- 
tion to export. Coal exports were naturally put in first 
place and it was estimated that they might attain sixty 
million tons a year. After a long discussion, the following 
means of payment were adopted by the sub-commission: 
gold and silver on hand, German investments in foreign 
countries, coal, potash, wood, colouring matters, ships 
already launched and those under construction, machinery, 
furniture, cattle, chemical products, submarine cables. 
Increased taxation and the creation of monopolies were also 
studied — a Frenchman, M. Eaphael Georges Levy, antici- 
pating from the former an increase of revenue amounting 
to five thousand million marks, while a Serbian expert 
thought the latter would give more than four billion. The 
sub-commission was of opinion, however, that it ought to 
enter upon this course with extreme prudence for two rea- 
sons : the first was that, if the Allies attempted to impose 
fiscal reforms upon Germany, the latter would always 
answer that these reforms were badly conceived; the 
second, that the increased revenues thus obtained would be 
in paper marks ; of greatly depreciated value as compared 
to gold marks. 

The report of the sub-commission, handed in on April 
18, was divided into two parts. The first presented figures. 
The second did not. The sub-commission declared that 
within eighteen months of the conclusion of peace Germany 
could pay twenty thousand million gold marks in money or 
in kind. For the rest, the sub-commission confined itself 
to formulating the means of payment it proposed to adopt 
especially exports to be imposed upon Germany in order to 
provide the gold payments which it thought ''ought to he 



304 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

very considerable and increase progressively.'* It recom- 
mended that, once the amomit of the debt was fixed, an 
Inter-allied Commission should determine each year the 
payments for that year, as annuities fixed in advance for 
a period of fifty years could only be arbitrary. Germany 
to meet these obligations would have to increase her pre- 
war exports, and for that to practise a policy of restriction, 
transforming herself into ''an exporting nation with a view 
to paying her debts of reparation." The sub-commission 
concluded : 

The sub-Commission deems it wiser to fix a figure which may 
appear somewhat excessive compared to the resources of the enemy 
countries rather than to run the risk of indicating a sum clearly 
inferior to what these countries can pay without any extraordinary 
effort. 

It is important to recall that the productive forces of a nation 
may, thanks to scientific progress, increase much more rapidly than 
can be thought possible. 

Figures which, to-day, may appear out of all proportion, will 
perhaps seem quite moderate in twenty or thirty years. During 
the last fifty years in Germany, the production of steel increased 
twelvefold ; the number of workmen employed in mechanical indus- 
tries has increased fivefold, the number of miles of railway has 
tripled, and exports have increased fivefold. 

It may not be amiss to add that the above report was 
drawn up by the late Lord Cunliffe, the British representa- 
tive and Governor of the Bank of England. 

The special committee appointed at the end of March to 
draft the reparation clauses tried first to do what the 
sub-commission had not done and to reduce Germany's 
payments to figures. But it did not succeed, first because 
the matter itself precluded mathematical certainties, and 
conflicting opinions were backed by no decisive proofs; 
because also whatever the results, some feared a figure so 
stupendous that it would encourage Germany not to sign; 
others one so moderate that it would rouse the indignation 
of the ruined populations. Everyone agreed that imme- 
diately after the coming into force of the Treaty Germany 



WHAT GERMANY MUST PAY 305 

could pay twenty-five thousand million gold francs. But 
unanimity ended there. 

As an instance, I will recall that the American experts 
considered the following as the maximum payments 
possible : 

Payments before 1921 20 thousand million gold marks 

Payments from 1922 to 1931 .... 60 

Payments from 1932 to 1941 80 

Payments from 1942 to 1951. .. .100 

Total 260 

The total of these payments, allowing for interest, rep- 
resented at current rates, a present value of 140 thousand 
million gold marks.* France and Great Britain deemed it 
impossible to go below 180 thousand million marks gold 
of the value mentioned, and this would require total install- 
ments of 367 thousand million marks gold, or, in fifty 
years, eighty-seven thousand million marks gold more 



*Iu connection with these figures I desire to make once for all two very 
important remarks. 

1° When discussing the annuities to be paid by Germany, it is most 
important always to bear in mind this idea of ' ' present value. ' ' The Allies 
have an immediate need of money. What interests them is the amount to be 
received or to be minted in the near future. Thus defined, the present value 
of a series of annuities is very inferior to the arithmetical sum of these annui- 
ties, and the longer the duration, the greater difference becomes. If, for 
example, we consider a series of annuities of ten thousand millions, their arith- 
metical calculation gives, for twenty-five years, 250 thousand millions. But 
their present value, on the basis of a rate of interest of five per cent, repre- 
sents only 140 thousand millions, because we must take into account the inter- 
est. For fifty years, the arithmetical total would be 500 thousand millions, but 
the present value would be only 182. For one hundred years, the difference is 
greater still. The arithmetical total is 1,000 thousand millions; the present 
value only 198. 

2° The fact that Allied claims are expressed in national currency at cur- 
rent rates and the German debt in marks gold should not be allowed to create 
any illusion as to the possibility of utilizing exchange fluctuations in order to 
reduce the German debt. As a matter of fact, the payment will be spread 
over a long period of forty or fifty years. On the one hand, the exchange 
difficulties (especially in the case of France whose commercial balance is 
improving from month to month) is only temporary. On the other hand, aiid 
this is even more important, the payment by Germany of even a part of her 
debt, say 30,000 millions in marks gold, would immediately result in bringing 
back exchange to par. The advantages which some seem to have expected, — 
especially at the Boulogne Conference of June, 1920 — from the fLxation of the 
amount of the debt in gold and of the amount of the claims in national paper 
currency, would thus be insignificant and do not need to be taken into account. 



306 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

tlian the American proposal contemplated. This was how 
the problem stood when it came before the Council of Four. 

The state of mind of our Allies was anxious and contra- 
dictory. Mr. Lloyd George declared: 

"We are going to throw Germany into the arms of the 
Bolsheviks. Besides, for her to pay the sum which we have 
in mind, and which it is just she should pay, she would 
have to occupy a still greater place in the markets than 
before the war. Is that to our interest?" 

President Wilson wanted Germany to pay all she owed. 
But he also felt an apprehension which was very wide- 
spread at that time and which retrospective criticism takes 
sufficiently into account. This was that the German Gov- 
ernment might fall and when the time came to sign there 
might be nobody in Germany to do so. Besides the Ameri- 
can experts, having been unable to obtain from the 
European Allies who had not yet estimated it, the total 
amount of damages, had reversed their efforts and sought 
to form an estimate of Germany's capacity for payment. 
Mr. Keynes encouraged them with his habitual spite and 
as, in March, 1919, this capacity naturally presented itself 
under the most sombre aspect, their conclusions tended to 
diverge from ours. 

M. Clemenceau protested vehemently. On no account 
would he allow — under pretext of estimating without any 
real basis whatsoever Germany's power of contribution for 
the next fifty years — France again to be deprived, — as she 
would have been in the case of a lump sum — of that absolute 
minimum reparation of damages to persons and property. 
M. Clemenceau protested and stated in these terms: 

"All is all very well, but we have made formal promises 
to our people about reparations. We must keep our word 
unless it is clearly proved that we cannot do so. But such 
is not the case. It is said that Germany will find the price 
high. But it has not been proved and it cannot be proved 
that she cannot pay if enough time is given her. What we 
must avoid is going from one extreme to the other, and 
through fear of asking too much, not asking enough. ' ' 



iWHAT GERMANY MUST PAYj 307 

M. Louclieur, again urging onr contention against an 
immediate and therefore inevitably too low evaluation of 
the German debt, called Helfferich's book to witness, — the 
thirteen thousand million annual excess of German produc- 
tion; the reduction in this production resulting from the 
war and the Treaty offset by a corresponding reduction in 
consumption ; the price of products to be exported by Ger- 
many rising higher in proportion than that of food sup- 
plies to be imported by her ; her coal production increasing 
before the war eight million tons a year; her exports in 
1914: amounting in this respect to forty million tons and 
capable by a policy of extraction and restriction of being 
further raised to sixty, since also the Treaty deprived her 
taking lignite into account of only a small part of her com- 
bustibles;* this exportation of sixty million tons, at one 
hundred francs per ton — a price which would be maintained 
for a long time — alone representing six thousand millions 
gold a year. Notwithstanding the force of these arguments, 
no agreement was reached. 

It was in these circumstances that the French Govern- 
ment, wishing above all to avoid an arbitrary sum which 
might in thirty years raise a Germany free from debt and 
prosperous at the doors of a France deeply involved, pro- 
posed the solution embodied in the Treaty which I have 
given above. From that time on agreement despite certain 
resistances, was definitely reached. Mr. Keynes, although 
acquiescing, asked finally that before a decision was 
reached, the question of their capacity for payment should 
be discussed with the Germans. The French representa- 
tives refused to be involved in this fool's game, and Mr. 
Lloyd George agreed with them. As for President Wilson, 

*Gcrmany's total production of coal and of lignite amounted in 1913, to 
280 million tons, of which the Sarre accounted for thirteen millions; Upper 
Silesia for forty-eight. But, on the one hand, the production of the Sarre was 
consumed nearly entirely in Alsace-Lorraine; on the other, the Silesian produc- 
tion was consumed to the extent of ten million tons by the local factories; 
nine million tons by Poland, and four millions by Austria, leaving but twenty- 
five millions for German consumption. Taking into account the reduction of 
coal consumption resulting for Germany from the cession of territories the net 
loss of combustibles to her amounts only to twenty-five million tons, or one- 
eleventh of the total production of 1913. 



308 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

lie did not follow liis advisers. The dangerous sophism of 
''capacity for payment" was finally discarded. Germany 
would pay what she had to pay; twenty thousand million 
marks gold before May 1, 1921; the remainder in thirty 
years if that were possible, or in a longer period if thirty 
years did not suffice. 

The Germans may declare and repeat as often as they 
like that the Peace Conference never gave a thought to 
their capacity for payment. What has just been read 
answers this. The truth is that the Conference, under the 
stubborn guidance of M. Clemenceau, M. Klotz and M. 
Loucheur, understood the peril involved in a method which 
consisted in first declaring not "Germany will pay what 
she owes," but "Germany can pay only a certain sum." 
Capacity for payment? On what date? Certainly not on 
that of the signing of the Treaty, after fifty-two months 
of war and six months of revolution, the immediate effect 
of which was only too easy to exploit. Capacity for pay- 
ment over a fixed number of years? Based upon what? 
Limited by what? Here again the risk was too great of 
liberating vanquished Germany before the victims of her 
aggression. France would have none of this risk and in 
accord with her Allies she rejected all solutions which 
directly or indirectly would have led to this result. France 's 
well justified determination to found the Treaty, not upon 
the arbitrary presumption of German capacity, opening the 
door to only too likely duplicity, but upon the definition of 
a positive obligation, never wavered for a single instant. 
For the adjustment of the annual pajanents, the Repara- 
tions Commission will take into fair account Germany's 
resources. But it will do so within the limits of a debt 
fixed at the latest by May 1, 1921, once and for all by the 
extent of the damages. 

That Germaliy is not able to pay all that she in justice 
owes is recognized by Article 232, dispensing Germany 
from the reimbursement of war cost's. For the rest — dam- 
age to persons and property and pensions — her obligation 
will be absolute and her capacity for payment will be taken 



WHAT GERMANY MUST PAY 309 

into consideration only in order to fix the number of annui- 
ties, the total amount having in any event to be fully and 
completely paid whether in thirty years or in a longer 
period. Nothing could be clearer ; nothing more just. For 
in this matter the question between the Allies and Ger- 
many presents itself clearly. It is ''Germany or the 
Allies." We do not demand that Germany should pay in 
full by a fixed date. We demand of her, once the damages 
for which she is liable have been computed, to arrange to 
pay for as long as may be necessary, the yearly installments 
for the acquittal of her debt. Under this system — what 
alone is fair — Germany's capacity for pa^anent is not 
gauged by her wealth at the time of the peace, but by her 
capacity for production and her will to work for a long 
period during which her renascent forces may expand. 
Time here is the essential factor and this is what destroys 
at their very base Germany's mendacious objections. 



There still remained a grave difficulty for the Allies. 
They had just seen that Germany by reason of the size of 
her debt could only pay it by annual installments. Yet 
they knew only too well that Germany's creditors by reason 
of the extent of their ruins needed prompt payment. There 
was but one method of reconciling these two conflicting 
needs: — the conversion of the debt by means of credits. 
With this in view, the lump sum had been proposed. I 
have shown why France rejected it. So it became necessary 
to find for the beneficiaries another way of negotiating the 
deed drawn up in their favour. 

I did not take part in the discussion of the financial 
clauses of the peace. But the close unity between M. Cle- 
menceau and his co-workers kept each of them informed 
as to the negotiations as a whole and enabled him to for- 
mulate suggestions concerning matters for which he was 
not directly responsible. It was under such conditions that, 
on April 5, 1919, 1 handed to the French Premier and to M, 
Klotz and M. Loucheur, a Note in which after dealing with 



310 THE TKUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

the question of the sum total of the debt, the manner of its 
payment and the guarantees — I approached the question 
which I called the ''materialization" of the debt due the 
Allies : 

' The better to figure the debt due the Allies and at the same time 
to permit the combination set out below, the preliminaries might 
impose upon the Germans the delivery of a single Treasury bond of 
**X" billion gold marks, payable on July 1, 1921, under agreement 
on the part of the Allies to exchange this bond on above date for a 
series of bonds of the same nature, payable at various dates deter- 
minable by the Inter-allied Commission entrusted with fixing the 
manner of payment. 

These bonds would serve to pay for German merchandise. 
Each year an inter-allied organization would fix the rate at which 
these bonds would be convertible into francs, pounds sterling, 
dollars, etc. 

These bonds would take precedence over all the German interior 
indebtedness. 

The Allies would have the right to sell them, even to Germans. 
They could be quoted, on the principal markets of the world, as 
commercial paper. 

It would be stipulated that they should never lapse and that in 
case of non-payment they should bear compound interest. 

On the other hand, it would be well to allow the Germans to 
liberate themselves at any time by anticipation at a favourable rate. 

In this way, the Allies would have in their hands international 
money as a medium of exchange between themselves, or with 
neutrals. 

When they would no longer buy German merchandise in the 
same quantities, they would sell these bonds to other purchasers. 
The Germans also under certain circumstances would have an 
interest in redeeming these bonds. 

Finally in case at the end of the thirtieth year the Germans had 
not redeemed the whole of their debt the Allies would still have in 
hand a medium of exchange which would always be valid and which 
could be sold to buyers of German merchandise in any country of 
the world. 

This brief and imperfect outline was adopted by my 
colleagues. About the same time one of the English finan- 
cial experts, Lord Sumner, had hit upon the same idea and 



WHAT GERMANY MUST PAY 311 

in the days following it was subjected to a minute examina- 
tion by the special committee which at the end of March 
had been appointed to deal with the financial solutions. 
The immediate issue of a single bond did not appear feas- 
ible and as a beginning a lower figure was taken to stand 
on account of the total amount of the debt. On April 7, 
the matter was taken up by the Council of Four. There 
was really no discussion as to the principle which was 
accepted by all. It was necessary, as M. Klotz pointed out, 
to obtain without delay from the enemy, so as to pave the 
way for the execution of the Treaty, some pledge which 
might well be in the shape of bonds. M. Klotz added : 

"These bonds to be at once exacted from Germany would 
be equivalent to the written acknowledgment which a cred- 
itor demands from a debtor who cannot pay cash. If the 
debtor is not insolvent, the paper is negotiable. It is by 
such means that we shall enable our countries to live while 
awaiting the final settlement. 

"Besides Germany must fully understand this obliga- 
tion when she signs the Treaty. We shall settle the amount 
of the bond issue. This must be submitted to the enemy 
and embodied in the Treaty." 

The question of the amount led to some discussion. Mr. 
Lloyd George seemed to fear that the announcement of the 
amount might mislead public opinion. The so-called "lump 
sum ' ' plan had been rejected. It had been decided to define 
Germany's debt by the list of specific damages for which 
she was responsible. If the Treaty without stipulating 
the amount of the debt contained that of the bonds would 
there not be confusion in the public mind which might 
mistake it for the sum total of the German obligation! M. 
Klotz answered immediately: 

"It is easy to avert this misunderstanding. This is 
merely a payment in bonds on account of the total amount 
of an outstanding indebtedness payable to the full in annual 
installments. Between private individuals when there are 
no mortgages the creditor asks his debtor to give him in 



312 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

acknowledgment of his debt a negotiable paper bearing his 
signature." 

And M. Clemenceau added: 

"I don't understand what difficulty there is in fixing 
the amount of a payment on account. My watch is stolen, 
my pictures, my furniture. The thief is caught. It is not 
difficult to make a preliminary estimate before the valua- 
tion of my total loss. This is done every day. It is the 
custom of our courts." 

An agreement was easily reached. But then President 
Wilson, analyzing the practical application of the plan, 
made certain very sound observations wMch threw an 
interesting light on the operation. 

"The important thing," he declared, "in fixing the 
amount, is to bear clearly in mind what we intend to do 
with the bonds once they are issued. 

"The object of this bond issue is to supply collateral 
for loans. An effort will doubtless be made to place a great 
substantial part of them in the United States. Suppose 
the amount of the bond issue is excessive; it will reduce 
the value of the collateral and produce a bad impression 
upon the prospective lenders. The amount of the issue 
will have an influence on world credit. 

"If the banks refuse to take an over-issue as collateral, 
the credit of your countries will fall. Therefore it is of 
capital importance that the issue be for a definite amount 
and it must not be excessive." 

The American expert, Mr. Norman Davis, betrayed the 
same concern by saying : 

"I do not dispute that Germany can within a very short 
time pay the interest of these bonds in gold. But if the 
bond issue is too large, she will be unable to do so and the 
bonds will be useless." 

This matter was of capital interest for France. It was 
obvious that the American Government had a perfectly 
clear conception of the financial aid that the United States 
would have to furnish their associates for the negotiation 
and the realization of the amount owing to them. At the 



WHAT GERMANY MUST PAY 313 

same time as lie showed anxiety that the call upon Ameri- 
can credit should be neither too sudden nor too heavy, the 
President acknowledged it to be both indispensable and 
justified. The British as well as the French immediately 
gave assurances which satisfied the United States 
representatives. 

''The Separations Commission," said M. Klotz, "will 
begin by keeping these bonds in its treasury. It would 
be very dangerous to put too large an amount of bonds 
upon the market in a limited length of time. ' ' 

And Mr. Lloyd George made the following point : 

"It is evident that if there are too many bonds on the 
market they will fall in value. But it is the country depend- 
ing upon them as collateral that will be the first to suffer. 
If France, Belgium, or Great Britain throw too great an 
amount of bonds upon the market it is these Powers them- 
selves that will suffer. You can therefore rely upon their 
common sense." 

A draft presented by Lord Sumner met with unanimous 
approval. It fixed at 100 thousand million marks gold on 
account the amount of the bond issue to be embodied in the 
Treaty, and divided it into three parts under the effective 
control of the Reparations Commission, as follows : 

(1) An immediate issue (as of January, 1920) of 
twenty thousand million marks gold in bearer bonds, pay- 
able on May 1, 1921, at the latest, 

(2) An issue, also immediate, of forty thousand mil- 
lion gold marks in bearer bonds. 

(3) A written undertaking to issue, whenever called 
for by the Reparations Commission, a third series of bearer 
bonds of forty thousand million marks gold. 

This system was during the debates on ratification the 
subject of erroneous intei-pretations which, I need hardly 
say, were not always involuntary. Mr. Lloyd George, who 
knows Parliaments well, feared that some would feign to 
believe that the total figure of these three series of bonds — 
100 thousand million gold marks — represented the whole 
amount of what Germany had to pay. I do not insist upon 



314 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

this misconception which does not even bear examination. 
Others mistook the bonds which are an acknowledgment 
and an instrument of credit for a means of payment and 
confused them with the one and only means of payment 
which the Treaty provides, namely annual payments in 
money and in kind that Germany must make until the settle- 
ment of her debt, to which interest on the deficit balance 
will be added each year. Here again the account I have 
just given re-establishes the truth and defines the nature 
of the bonds which represent neither the total of the debt 
nor a discharge, but a negotiable acknowledgment to be 
used when the Reparations Commission deems negotiation 
possible and proper. 

M. Loucheur and M. Klotz furnished in the course of 
the parliamentary debates, explanation which may well be 
repeated : 

* ' These bonds, ' ' explained the former, * ' are not a means of pay- 
ment. They are embodied in the Treaty as an acknowledgment 
and a guarantee of the debt. 

"Germany's account will be made up every year like any ordi- 
nary debit and credit account. The sum total which Germany 
owes will be registered on May 1, 1921. As an hypothesis, I take 
three hundred thousand million. On May, 1, 1922, a year later, 
Germany will be charged in addition to the three hundred thousand 
million with interest for the year 1921 at the rate of five per cent., 
that is with three hundred thousand millions plus fifteen thousand 
millions and she will be credited with the payments she has actually 
made. The bonds will play no part in the making up of this 
account. 

' ' But we needed to be able under certain conditions to discount 
Germany's debt. We needed a certain number of securities which 
we could eventually negotiate, if we so desired, and which at our 
option we could eventually use to discount in whole or in a part the 
annual installment that Germany must pay. 

' ' After admitting that the only practical means of payment was 
by means of yearly installments, we could not do otherwise, if we 
intended eventually to discount these annuities, than to take a cer- 
tain number of securities negotiable at our pleasure but which we 
are in no way obliged to accept in payment." 



WHAT GERMANY MUST PAY 315 

And then M. Klotz showed how these bonds would be 
employed and the manner in which they would be secured. 

"As a result," he said, "of the terms of the Treaty the action 
of the Reparations Commission wUl really give these bonds a real 
moral guarantee. 

"First, over and above the two first bond issues (twenty thou- 
sand million and forty thousand million marks gold) to be delivered 
by Germany, the Commission will call for other issues only when it 
is satisfied that Germany can pay the interest and sinking fund of 
the bonds. 

* ' Second guarantee : the sale and negotiation of the bonds deliv- 
ered by Germany will be subject to the unanimous decision of the 
Commission. In the spirit of the Treaty this very clearly means 
that such authorization will be given only when Germany's credit 
and the condition of the market permit their easy negotiation. 

"To this twofold moral guarantee, it may be necessary on occa- 
sion to add that which each country receiving bonds may wish to 
give, and also the very important guarantee implied in the sale of 
bonds in neutral countries after appropriate negotiations." 

The purpose of these bonds to be issued by Germany is 
thus clear. The Allies did not imagine when they included 
this obligation in the Treaty that they could negotiate these 
securities immediately. They nevertheless imposed the 
issue and the delivery of these bonds because in dealing 
with a reluctant debtor it is of no small importance to hold 
an acknowledgment of his debt, negotiable at pleasure and 
bearing interest, and because in view of Germany's all too 
probable duplicity it was well that securities covering an 
appreciable part of the debt should be in the hands of the 
creditors. 

Let us not in fact be deceived. Germany's game as 
played by Mr. Hugo Stinnes is to revive her economic activ- 
ity by freeing it from the mortgage of the Treaty of Ver- 
sailles. Do I need to insist on the absolute fairness of these 
safeguards without which an untouched Germany would 
in a few j'-ears gain an advantage over her devastated con- 
querors which it would be impossible to overcome! The 
bond system was the best of guarantees against such a plan. 



316 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

For as soon as German revival, of which all the essentials 
are midestroyed, makes itself felt in the world markets, the 
Reparations Cormnission by placing these bonds in circula- 
tion will associate Germany's creditors with her revival, 
and Germany to safeguard the progress made as well as 
not to compromise the future will, whether she wishes it or 
not, be obliged to honour her signature. In fact it will be 
in the very markets where she needs to develop her credit 
that she will meet the paper delivered to the Allies for nego- 
tiation and placed in circulation by the Reparations Com- 
mission. The bonds, in other words, are an elastic and 
safe-guaranteed security which can be made use of at once 
and to an ever-increasing extent as German resources grow. 

VI 

Such, in its general lines, is the system the Treaty of 
Versailles imposes on Germany for the settlement of her 
debt. The account of the discussion which led to its adop- 
tion shows how conscientiously it was studied and how its 
principle was arrived at: 

(1) Germany is responsible, as having caused them, 
for the total amount of the loss and damage suffered by the 
victors from the fact of her aggression. 

(2) Germany in view of the permanent diminution of 
her resources resulting from the Treaty is only bound — 
but bound mthout restrictions or reserves — to reimburse 
the sum total of damages and pensions as defined and 
specified in Annex 1, Part 8, of the Treaty. 

(3) Germany is to pay, before May 1, 1921, 20,000 mil- 
lion marks gold in money and in kind. 

(4) On May 1, 1921, at the latest, the Reparations Com- 
mission is to fix the total amount of Germany's debt. 

(5) This debt will be liquidated by annual install- 
ments, the amount of which will be fixed each year by the 
Reparations Commission. 

(6) The payments will continue for thirty years, and 
longer if at the end of thirty years the debt is not paid 
in full. 



WHAT GERMANY MUST PAY 317 

(7) Germany will issue 100,000 million marks gold in 
bearer bonds and later all bonds that the Reparations Com- 
mission calls for up to the total amount of the debt, this to 
permit its mobilization at the Allies' pleasure. 

(8) These payments will be effected in money and in 
kind. The payments in kind will be made in coal, cattle, 
chemical product, ships already launched or under construc- 
tion, machines, implements and furnishings. The pay- 
ments in money will be made in bullion, in German credits 
both public and private in foreign countries, and by first 
lien on all the property and revenues of the Empire and of 
the German States. 

(9) The Reparations Commission entrusted with the 
execution of these clauses, will have a right of supervision 
and decision. Called upon to decide *'and without being 
bound by any particular code or rules of law or by any 
particular rule of evidence or procedure, but guided by 
justice, equity and good faith" it obtained from Germany 
by the terms of the Treaty ^'the irrevocable recognition of 
its power and authority." Enjoying all diplomatic rights 
and immunities it will have until full payment of the debt 
to supervise Germany's situation, her "financial situation 
and operations, her property, productive capacity, and 
stocks and current production," and, at the same time, to 
investigate what she can pay annually, and also to see to 
it that these payments, added to her budgets, make her 
tax-payers liable for at least as much as those of the most 
heavily taxed of the Allied countries. Its decisions will be 
immediately enforceable and "will receive immediate appli- 
cation without other formalities." It mil have to initiate 
by its proposals all changes recognized as necessary in 
German laws and regulations, as well as all financial, 
economic or military penalties for violations of the clauses 
it has power to enforce. Germany pledges herself before- 
hand not to consider those penalties, no matter what they 
may be, as acts of hostility. 

These clauses are severe. If they were not, they would 
not be just. However, all the financial clauses of the Treaty 



318 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

are marked by an unquestionable spirit of moderation. 
Part of the payments made before May 1, 1921, is ear- 
marked to pay for German purchases abroad. The Repara- 
tions Commission, in fixing the debtor's annual payments, 
is to take into consideration Germany's internal needs with 
a view to maintaining its social and economic life. It will 
exact from Germany delivery of machinery, equipment, 
tools and the like only if no stock of these articles is for sale 
in the open market, and in no case in excess of thirty per 
cent, of the stocks of each article in any German establish- 
ment. The coal deliveries, wliich are imposed for a short 
period only and the annual maximum of which is below 
forty million tons, represent fourteen per cent, of the Ger- 
man coal and lignite production in 1913 and eighteen per 
cent, of this production minus that of Alsace-Lorraine, the 
Sarre and Upper Silesia. None of these clauses resembles 
the Draconian* conditions which Germany imposed in 1918 
on Russia by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk ; on Roumania by 
the Peace of Bucharest — conditions which their authors 
publicity declared were nothing compared to those that 
Germany intended to impose upon the Western Powers. 

Mr. Keynes was able, by criticizing certain articles of 
the peace separately and by means of misleading statistics, 
to argue that the problem of reparation was dealt with in 
an abusive manner. I have replaced the matter in its true 
light. I have shown how the question presented itself, and 
how it was solved. It could not in justice have been solved 
otherwise. The Allies, to whom the war has cost more 
than 1,000,000 millions demand from Germany only about 
350,000 millions. These two figures tell the whole story. 
They prove that the financial bases of the Treaty of Ver- 
sailles are fair and moderate. As for the assertion that 
they constitute a violation of the bases of the peace, or in 
Mr. Keynes' words, **an act comparable to the invasion of 

*The Treaty of Bucharest obliged Roumania from 1919 to 1926 to deliver 
to Germany her entire surplus, and to yield to a company controlled by the 
German Government, the right to operate, for ninety years, all her petroleum 
wells. The treaties of Geimany with Ukrainia, Poland and Finland contained 
analogous clauses. 



WHAT GERMANY MUST PAY 319 

Belgium," it only shows a curious inability to distinguish 
between right and wrong combined with absolute ignorance 
of the facts. As President Wilson declared on June 6, 
1919, *'the Treaty is in entire conformity with the Four- 
teen Points." The Germans are to make good the total 
amount of the damages suffered by the population. Surely 
death and the mutilation are the most obvious of these 
damages. The Germans, after thinking it over for seventy- 
two hours, signed the Armistice, which reads: "With the 
reservation that any subsequent claims of the Allies and 
the United States remain unaffected, reparation for dam- 
age done." Mr. Keynes answers, it is true, that this is a 
** casual protective phrase." The weakness of his argu- 
ment calls for no comment. 

Germany had premeditated not only the complete mili- 
tary defeat, but also the economical and financial ruin of 
her adversaries. The victorious Powers compel her to 
repay about thirty per cent, of the damage done by her. 
Such an obligation after such an aggression is neither abu- 
sive nor cruel. I add, passing from equity to facts, that it 
is far from unenforceable. 



CHAPTER X 

HOW THE ALLJES WILL BE PAID 

Everything that Germany did during the peace negotia- 
tions showed what her subsequent acts, since the Treaty 
entered into effect, have overwhelmingly proved: her 
determination not to pay. This determination is a settled 
policy, it is the policy of business, Germany striving to 
snatch economic victory from military defeat. 

This ambitious aspiration has its origin in the situation 
created by the war. On the one hand, victorious countries 
invaded, indebted and systematically ruined by the German 
invasion; on the other, Germany beaten but untouched, 
with an insignificant foreign debt, all her factories sound, 
her industry developed by the war itself. If victors and 
vanquished renew commercial competition at the same time 
and on equal terms, the triumph of Germany is assured. 
This is what the peace-makers at Versailles tried to avert : 
hence some of the reparations clauses; hence the general 
mortgages taken on the financial resources of Germany; 
hence certain non-reciprocal clauses concerning customs 
for five years; hence the obligation imposed upon the 
beaten foe to deliver up raw materials ; hence the power of 
supervision given to the Reparations Commission over 
Germany's economic and financial life. These are the 
clauses which German business men, headed by Herr Hugo 
Stinnes, have determined to overthrow. 

These captains of German industry know better than 
anyone that the state of German industry is not that 
described in their newspapers. They know that in many 
branches — automobiles, for example — German industry has 
since 1915 increased its capital by hundreds of millions 

320 



HOW THE ALLIES WILL BE PAID 321 

They know that in the month of March, 1920, alone, financial 
melons were cut to the amount of 163 million marks; that 
at the same time the munition factories distributed divi- 
dends of from twelve to sixteen per cent. They know that 
Germany is not suffering as much as France from lack of 
coal, either for industrial or domestic consumption, and 
that in Germany the production of pig iron in 1920 
amounted to one-half the 1913 output, while in France it 
amounted to scarcely one-fourth. But they know also that 
if Germany does not supply France during the next few 
years with the amount of coal she owes under the Treaty, 
French industry will not recover and will be outstripped 
by German industry. They know that, if the damage done 
to persons and property is not paid for by Germany in 
accordance with the Treaty, the French budget, heavily 
overburdened, will not be able to devote to the development 
of our national resources the means which circumstances 
call for and which Germany dreads. That is why by every 
possible means they strive to keep for an unhampered Ger- 
many, the means of economic supremacy which the Treaty 
makers at Versailles have rightly handicapped. 

Their aim is clear ; their method simple. With tearful 
pathos Germany is alleged to be incapable of working and 
producing. To make believe a few factories are closed here 
and there — sometimes in so obviously an arbitrary manner 
that protests are elicited, even from the German Press. 
Out-of-employment crises are trumpetted abroad. Europe 
is threatened with Bolshevism. Active propaganda is con- 
ducted in foreign countries ; Germany is gaining time. She 
is reorganizing. She is getting ready and to-morrow, if the 
Allies allow themselves to be duped by this camouflage, 
Germany, freed from supervision, mistress of her raw 
materials, rid on easy terms of her heavy debt, will again 
go forth to conquer the markets of the world with all the 
inestimable advantage of untouched means and hampered 
competitors. Meanwhile it is asserted that to pay in gold, 
exports are essential and that as Germany consumes more 
than she produces, exports are impossible. This plea, 



322 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

which blossomed in 1920, was that of the German technical 
experts in 1919, when summoned to the Chateau de Villette 
and to Versailles. If the Allied Governments had enter- 
tained it, they would not only have betrayed the sacred 
interest of their respective peoples ; they would have been 
victims of a colossal hoax. 

The wealth of Germany was before the war a favourite 
theme of German propaganda. The reader will remember 
Helffe rich's book in which he estimated at 10,000 milUon 
marks Germany's annual excess of production (43,000 mil- 
lion marks) over her consumption (33,000 million marks.) 
Other authors went still further. Alfred Lansburg reck- 
oned the consumption at 40,000 or 45,000 millions. Stein- 
mann-Bucher calculated production as amounting to 45,000 
or 50,000 millions, the consumption as 35,000 millions, and 
the surplus at 12,000 or 15,000 millions. Figures of such 
magnitude are necessarily approximate only, but even 
with this reservation they are useful as indications and it 
is as such and as such only that I quote them. Now the 
war is over and peace is declared, what has become of the 
elements of these statistics? Germany like all the belliger- 
ents saw her productive capacity lessened by the war. 
Having been beaten she has seen it still further lessened 
by the Treaty of Peace. "What does the reduction — to 
which Lord Cunliffe, as we have seen, refused to attach 
undue importance — amount to ? 

Germany lost during the war a part of her human 
capital: 1,800,000 killed and 4,000,000 wounded. The per- 
centage of invalidity of the wounded is generally reckoned 
at between thirty-three per cent, and forty per cent., so the 
total loss of available labour would be equal to the work of 
three to three and one-half million men. But it is a matter 
of common knowledge that the employment of women and 
children has greatly increased and the military clauses of 
the Treaty (100,000 soldiers instead of 880,000) leave a 
large number of men available for agricultural and indus- 
trial work; furthermore the increment of population in 
Germany should also be taken into consideration. From 



HOW THE ALLIES WILL BE PAID 323 

1895 to 1907, tlie yearly increment amounted to 774,000, of 
which the "active" population represented 500,000, or 
roughly sixty-five per cent, of the total. Even after deduct- 
ing from future estimates the territories which Germany 
has lost by the Treaty of Peace, the fact remains that the 
decrease in her man power will not be felt to any consider- 
able extent. No allowance need, therefore, be made on this 
score. 

On the other hand there has been loss of territory. The 
German Empire, built up by might, has been reduced by 
right. It has lost Alsace and Lorraine, the greater portion 
of its Eastern Polish provinces and Schleswig, — say, in 
round figures, a population of eight million inhabitants, or, 
in other words, about one-eighth of the total population 
according to the census of 1910. As the lost territories, 
according to their contributions to public expenditure, 
appear to be of average wealth, it may be deduced that the 
territorial clauses of the Treaty of Peace have reduced the 
productive power of Germany to the extent roughly speak- 
ing of one-eighth, or 43,000 millions divided by eight : 5,375 
millions. To purely German losses must be added German 
colonial losses. We shall make ample allowance for the 
latter by taking them to represent a yearly output loss 
equal to 125 millions, which would bring the total reduc- 
tion of Germany's productive capacity, directly due to the 
territorial clauses in the Treaty of Peace, to about 5,500 
millions. 

German capital has, also, suffered in others ways. In 
the first place by the reduction of assets in foreign coun- 
tries. Personal property to the amount of about 5,000 
millions has been realized. Property sequestrated by the 
Allied and Associated Governments amounts to between 
11,000 and 13,000 millions ; loans in foreign countries 2,000 
millions, or say a (maximum) total of 20,000 millions. 
Loans granted by Germany to her Allies (10,000 or 12,000 
millions) should not be deducted from this loss, inasmuch 
as Article 261 of the Treaty transfers them to the Allies. 
The reduction of capital under the head of assets in foreign 



324 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

countries, thus amounts to 20,000 millions. To these 20,000 
millions must be added certain losses which can be readily 
calculated, viz. : stocks which have disappeared, 20,000 mil- 
lions ; damage caused by the Russian invasion in Eastern 
Prussia 2,000 millions; lastly, according to the terms of 
Article 235, Germany is to deliver to the Allies before May 
1, 1921, either in cash or in kind (gold, ships, liquidation of 
German investments in foreign countries, cattle, machinery 
and tool equipment, cables, etc.), 20,000 millions marks 
gold. These four items, added together, show a capital 
loss of 62,000 millions. 

We now come to another item which is more difficult 
to estimate : capital loss by lack of maintenance. Some of 
this went to feeding the people — cattle, for instance — or to 
war manufactures — as in the case of copper. How can this 
loss be expressed in figures? German capital was estimated 
by Helfferich (whose figures I take because, as they are 
lower than Steinmann-Bucher's, they are less favourable 
to my argument) at 330,000 million marks. Wliat does 
capital loss by lack of maintenance of deterioration 
amount to? 

If we deduct urban sites (25 to 30,000 millions) which 
call for neither upkeep nor amortization ; then the amounts 
of capital we have already reckoned as definitively lost, 
there remains a maximum of 200,000 millions on which loss 
owing to depreciation, etc., may be calculated; let us take 
this depreciation at five per cent, per annum for four years 
and four months, say 43,000 millions. This is a liberal 
estimate. For on the one hand, rural lands and house 
property have certainly not suffered — one need only make 
a trip to Germany to ascertain this — a depreciation of five 
per cent, per annum; and, in the second place, new indus- 
trial constructions compensate, to a great extent, the 
depreciation of old ones. If to such depreciation be added 
to other capital loss the total amounts to (62,000+43,000^) 
105,000 millions. I do not think this figure can be criti- 
cized, especially as it exceeds the figures furnished hy the 
Germans themselves — ^by Lansburg, for instance, who, for 



HOW THE ALLIES WILL BE PAID 325 

the first two years of war estimated the total reduction of 
national capital at only 28,000 millions. As the average 
net revenue of German capital (according to the balance- 
sheet of industrial, agricultural and landed property) has 
generally been reckoned at six per cent., the yearly decrease 
of productive capacity, corresponding to this loss of 105,- 
000 millions in capital, amounts to 6,300 millions. By 
adding together this decrease of revenue and that charge- 
able to losses of territory, the total obtained is 11,800 mil- 
lions, as shown in the following: 

Diminution of Productive Capacity (in millions of marks) 

From losses of territories 5,500 

Revenue on capital loss of 105,000 millions as under 6,300 

Assets in foreign countries 20,000 

ilxhausted stocks 20,000 

Damage caused by war 2,000 

Immediate payments 20,000 

Depreciation and lack of up-keep 43,000 

105,000 
Total 11,800 

Based on German statistics and on the statistics most 
favourable to Germany, this table would indicate Ger- 
many's productive capacity as equal to 31,200 million 
marks, instead of 43,000 millions before the war. It is this 
or an approaching figure that the Germans take as a basis 
for their assertion that as their output will now forth be 
less than their consumption, 33,000 millions, they are unable 
to export anything and therefore cannot pay for anything 
in gold. But it is here that the fallacy is clearly shown. 
For if the war and the conditions of peace have reduced 
the productive capacity of Germany, they have likewise 
reduced its consumption, and it is precisely by German 
statistics that such a reduction can be proved. 

Taking no account, as in the preceding chapter, of losses 
in men, we shall first bear in mind that losses of territories 
represent one-eighth of the population and, consequently. 



326 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

of the consumption — that is to say in round figures 33,000 
millions divided by eight or 4,120 millions. But this is not 
the only decrease, there remains another to be considered 
which, though more difficult to estimate, is nevertheless 
certain ; that caused by the reduction in standard of living. 

In this connection, German economists are unanimous. 
Lansburg calculates this reduction at one-third of the con- 
sumption which as already stated, he reckons at 40,000 to 
45,000 millions; it would therefore be something between 
13,000 and 15,000 millions. On the other hand, the success 
of the war loans (151,000 millions) and the increase of 
deposits, both in savings-banks (15,000 millions) and in 
current accounts (13,500 millions) besides the capital 
increases of companies show us that the German people 
contrived to save 180,000 millions in four years, or say 
about 45,000 millions yearly. These figures are doubtless 
subject to certain reservations. There has been a rise in 
prices. There has been a considerable increase of currency 
circulation. The fact nevertheless remains that there has 
been a decrease in consumption. At what amount should 
it be estimated? Lansburg calculated it between 13,000 
and 15,000 millions. In order to be extremely conservative, 
I will reckon it at 6,000 millions. These 6,000 millions, 
added to the 4,120 millions chargeable to loss of territories, 
give a minimum total of 10,120 millions, which reduces the 
consumption amounting to 33,000 millions before the war, 
fo 21,880 millions, after the declaration of peace. 

"We are now in possession of two very important fac- 
tors (both bases for calculations.) The productive capacity 
would seem to have been reduced, by the war and by the 
peace, from 43,000 millions to 31,200 millions. The consump- 
tion on the other hand would seem to have been reduced 
from thirty-three billions to twenty-one billions, 880 mil- 
lions. The surplus which amounted to 10,000 millions 
before the war appears to be 8,320 millions since peace. 
For the sake of greater clearness, I give a synopsis of the 
foregoing analysis in the following table : 



HOW THE ALLIES WILL BE PAID 



327 





Yearly Con- 






sumption 






(public and 


Production in 


Yearly Production 


private) 


excess of consumption 




in Millions of 






Maries 




A.— Before the war 43,000 


33,000 


43,000—33,000^:10,000 


B.— Reduction owing to the war 






( 1 ) T^osaes of territories . . 5.5 1 


4,120 1 




• 11,800 






(2) Losses of capital 6.5 


[ 10,120 




(3) Restrictions of comforts . . 


6,000 1 




0,— After the war 31,200 


22,880 


31,200—22,880= 8,320 



These figures are significant in themselves, but they do 
not tell the whole truth for the two following reasons. 
Firstly, because the foregoing calculations, based on Ger- 
man statistics, have been worked out in marks and the sur- 
plus amounts, which they show, represent surplus quanti- 
ties of products. To reckon these surplus amounts at their 
real value, the increase in the price of such products in 
gold must therefore be added. The second reason was 
made remarkably clear by Lord Cunliffe, Governor of the 
Bank of England, in the report submitted by him in the 
name of the sub-commission of the Peace Conference 
appointed to investigate Germany's capacity to pay. Lord 
Cunliffe therein stated: ''Germany, responsible for the 
destruction caused by the war, must impose upon herself 
restrictions in order to repair it. She must by such restric- 
tions maintain herself as an exporting country to meet the 
payment of her reparation debts." "^hat does this mean 
except that — for so long as her debt remains unpaid — it is 
but right and necessary that Germany should stint herself 
in order to export, or in other words, to pay? A single 
example. On Sundays there are more suburban trains 
running from Berlin than from Paris. This state of things 
should be entirely reversed. The quantity of coal available 
for export — that is to say, one means of effecting payment, 
— would be thereby increased by just that much. Similar 
abuses — which the Reparation Commission would strictly 



328 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

forbid if it closely supervised the economic life of Ger- 
many — are noticeable in all directions. 

Remember also that in May, 1920, the exports of Ger- 
many exceeded her imports. And then notice that on every 
page of the German newspapers there are signs of an indus- 
trial and commercial revival to which the advertisements, 
if no other proof were forthcoming, would testify. Every- 
where there are advertisements for managers, department 
heads, travellers, engineers. Everywhere there are adver- 
tisements for goods, motors, glass, machinery, tires, trucks. 
The business advertising of the Frankfurter Zeitimg is 
double what it was before the war. Business which was 
slack during the year that followed the Armistice, is reviv- 
ing from one end of Germany to the other. The increase of 
output leaves no room for doubt. Restrictions are at pres- 
ent dependent upon the will of the consumer. Germany 
now has in hand and will continue to have in increasing 
degree the necessary means for the payment that she must 
make. The picture she drew of her position at the Inter- 
national Conferences of Spa and Brussels is a camouflage. 
It is the duty of the Allies to re-establish the truth. 

What conclusion are we to draw? I do not profess to 
be a political economist. When I quote statistics, I put 
forward no claim to infallibility of interpretation, indeed I 
am the first to call attention to the co-efficient of error 
they may contain. I say only that when a man goes so far 
as to assert that Germany cannot pay in thirty years more 
than 2,000,000,000 pounds (50,000 million francs at par, or 
120,000 milHon francs at the highest 1920 exchange) he over- 
steps the limits of permissible tomfoolery and is only mak- 
ing fun of Germany's victims. The war cost the Allies 
1,000,000 millions. Mr. Keynes would ask Germany to pay 
only 50,000 millions, or one-twentieth of the total cost. 
Count Brockdorff offered twice as much. That alone con- 
demns the pro-German scribe of Cambridge. As to M. 
Helfferich, busy in 1920 controverting the statistics he him- 
self published in 1913, he does not deserve that one should 
pay attention to his contradictory denials. I do not know 



HOW THE ALLIES WH^L BE PAID 329 

and nobody knows what Germany will be able to pay in each 
of the thirty or forty years that are to come. It it the duty 
of the Reparations Commission to fix the amount every 
year. But even now it is permissible to assert that in 
thirty or forty years Germany, which alone of all the 
European belligerents comes out of the war without any 
foreign debt, will be able approximately to pay enough 
(interest and sinking fund included) to about cover the 
actual amount of damages to persons and property and of 
pensions. This fact is the only thing that counts. The 
means are the work of to-morrow. The principle must even 
now be asserted. Germany must pay. Germany can pay. 
How can she be made to pay! How will what she pays 
be divided? These last two questions were ones which the 
peace-makers had to decide. 

II 

That Germany could pay had been proved by the pre- 
liminary studies I have analyzed above. That Germany 
would endeavour by every possible means not to pay, no one 
for a moment doubted and because they knew this to be so 
everybody was agreed that in order to get paid the Allies 
must adopt means of supervision and of guarantee. What 
land of supervision? What kind of guarantees? Here is 
where the difficulty began, owing both to the nature of 
the problem and to differences of opinion that manifested 
themselves. 

On February 24, 1919, the special sub-commission 
intrusted with this matter held its first meeting. It was 
presided over by the British delegate, Mr. Hughes, Prime 
Minister of Australia. France was represented by M. 
Klotz, Minister of Finance, assisted by MM. de Verneuil, 
de Lachaume, and Chevalier. The task was unprecedented. 
If former treaties had instituted for the supervision and 
guarantee of the financial obligations they imposed, condi- 
tions which proved efficacious, none of these precedents 
applied to the present case. When in 1871 Bismarck 



330 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

exacted 5,000 millions from us, all lie had to do was to 
occupy for a few months a certain number of French 
Departments. Thiers, with an energy for which France 
remains ever grateful, collected in the shortest possible 
time the iniquitous war indemnity exacted by the aggres- 
sor and freed French territory. In 1919 the situation was 
entirely different. It was no longer five or ten thousand 
millions. For damages to persons and property and for 
pensions alone Germany owed more than 350,000 millions. 
Such a sum could only be paid in numerous annuities. So 
it was clear that methods employed in the past to supervise 
and guarantee payments which were nearly a hundred 
times less could not be applied here. Besides this stupen- 
dous accounting was not between two Powers, one vic- 
torious and the other vanquished. There were more than 
twenty victorious Powers and not less than four van- 
quished. For these two reasons it was absolutely neces- 
sary, the usual methods being inadequate, to seek a new 
solution. 

The sub-commission — whose work was delayed by the 
necessity of awaiting the reports of two other sub-commis- 
sions, one intrusted with the evaluation of damages and 
the other with the estimation of means and capacity of 
payment — could not do more than examine suggestions, 
some of which, however, threw light upon the state of mind 
of the principal delegations. The British, American and 
Italian delegations were agreed in their opinion that mili- 
tary occupation could not be continued until the German 
debt had been paid in full. They had in mind a maximum 
occupation of two years. Mr. Hughes although fully deter- 
mined to make Germany pay, for he insisted that she should 
be made to pay not only damages to persons and property 
and pensions but all the costs of the war besides, said on 
March 11: 

"The Army of Occupation can only be a provisional 
expedient. It is a means of supervision which can only 
be counted upon for a relatively short period." 

So on this point there was a fundamental disagreement 



HOW THE ALLIES WILL BE PAID 331 

between France and her Allies.* On the other points, 
however, the Commission was unanimous. It was of the 
opinion that taking into consideration the magnitude of the 
debt and the necessity of its payment by installments, the 
principal measures to be taken, as suggested by Mr, 
Hughes, were the following: 

1. The creation of an International Commission whose 
duty it would be to receive the payments from Germany, 
to supervise her revenues and her expenditures, her capi- 
tal, her production and her exports, and also to distribute 
between the various creditors the amounts received in 
money or in kind. 

2. The emission by the German Government of a loan 
to cover the total amount due by it to the Allies, this to be 
a preferential loan taking precedence of all German war 
loans and to be made in successive issues. 

3. Germany to be forced to restrict its consumption 
and its expenditures, especially on luxuries. 

4. Control of all German imports so as to limit these 
imports to raw materials strictly necessary to her economic 
existence. 

This was a very mild and conservative progranune. Yet 
it is to be noted that certain delegates feared that even this 
degree of supervision would restrict the productive capa- 
city of Germany necessary to the payment of her debt. Such 
being the starting point, what was the result? 

At the time that this discussion was in progress, the 
ruling opinion in France was that the occupation of the 
left bank of the Rhine and of the bridgeheads would not 
only give the Allies military security, but also insure their 
being paid. This was the opinion expressed on May 6 at 
the plenary session of the Conference by Marshal Foch 
when he said: 

To force the enemy to fulfill his undertakings there is only 
one military means. It is to continue the occupation of the Rhine. 
When we find that we are paid and that we have suf f i- 

*See Chapter V. 



332 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

cient guarantees, we shall only have to withdraw the troops and 
go away. 

I have shown with what energy M. Clemenceau had to 
fight first to obtain and then to maintain as one of the 
terms of the Treaty, the occupation of the Rhine for fifteen 
years and the right to prolong this occupation in case of 
non-fulfillment of Germany's undertakings or of the inade- 
quacy of guarantees against a new aggression; the right 
even to renew occupation in case after evacuation these con- 
ditions were not fulfilled. Twice in April and June this 
demand of the French Premier came near to breaking up 
the Entente of the Allies and even the Conference itself. 
It was impossible to go any further. Is a proof needed? 
Every time that we had to cope with the bad faith of Ger- 
many — ^in February over disarmament; in July over the 
article of her constitution which in violation of the Treaty 
prepared the way for union with Austria ; a little later after 
the sinking of her fleet at Scapa Flow — every time that the 
French Government proposed to extend the occupation and 
to lay hands upon the Ruhr, the Allied Governments 
opposed an absolute refusal. 

Besides this extension of occupation, even if Allied 
opposition had not been so uncompromising, was subject 
to objections put forward by the very people who advo- 
cated it, or developed by events and the very nature of 
things. When in February, 1919, to force Germany to 
disarm, M. Loucheur, on instructions from M. Clemenceau, 
presented a plan for the occupation of the Ruhr, it was 
Marshal Foch himself who pointed out that the forces nec- 
essary for such an occupation — ^it was thought that ten 
divisions would be necessary — were out of proportion with 
the advantages it was hoped to derive. Also people are 
apt to forget how difficult at that time the problem of 
effectives was for all the Governments. The British, the 
Canadians, the Australians, the South Africans were all as 
anxious as the Americans to return home. In France itself 
not a week passed in which all parties in Parliament did not 



HOW THE ALLIES WILL BE PAID 333 

demand immediate demobilization, which moreover was 
justified by serious economic considerations. Was it pos- 
sible in these conditions to plan and carry out a policy 
w^hich, every time Germany failed in her financial under- 
takings, would have entailed an extension of occupation! 
Certainly not. 

Besides what would have been the good of such a policy 
from the financial point of view? I have quoted what 
Marshal Foch said on May 6 at the Peace Conference and 
I have said that the bulk of French opinion was with him : 
''Occupy the left bank and we shall be paid." But what 
has happened. Ever since the Armistice the left bank and 
the bridgeheads have been strongly held. We are in the 
very period to which the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied 
Armies referred when he said at that same meeting of May 
6, "during this period the Treaty gives us complete guar- 
antees." Has anyone noticed that Germany is more 
disposed to fulfil her financial undertakings any the better 1 
In March, 1920, our Armies occupied Frankfort and the 
cities of the Mein. Has any one noticed that this occupa- 
tion, fully justified under the Treaty, brought us a single 
additional mark? No. In other words occupation has a 
defensive value, and that is why M. Clemenceau made it a 
sine qua non. On the contrary its financial value, notwith- 
standing the illusions cherished in 1919 by the military 
authorities and by public opinion, is relative. In order 
to force Germany to pay by the occupation of her territory 
it would be necessary to occupy the whole of her territory 
for more than a generation. No one would have consented 
to that. No one even suggested it. Something different 
had to be found. What? 

This question has been answered by people who delight 
in foretelling the past. They assert that all obstacles would 
have been overcome if the Peace Conference had only 
thought to exact financial guarantees from Germany, for 
instance by the control and seizure of revenues from cus- 
toms, mines, railways or by the collection of taxes in the 
occupied parts of Germany. Thus in a moment the prob- 



334 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

lem of indemnity was solved. By paying one 's self, one was 
sure to be paid. ''Who knows," as Montaigne would have 
said. The question was carefully studied by the Confer- 
ence, and its examination led it to results which forced a 
contrary conviction., Control public utilities I That is 
easy to say. But who can fail to see that in order to do it 
an enormous personnel would have been necessary. Under 
the circumstances control would have meant operation, 
otherwise control would have been a sham. Who can fail 
to see that such a method adopted because of the debtor's 
refusal to pay, that is to say with the ever-present possi- 
bility of conflict, would have entailed in addition to the 
collecting and operating personnel, a personnel of protec- 
tion — ^which means an armed force — thus leading inevitably 
to that total and prolonged occupation of German territory 
that none of the Allies would consent to and which was out 
of the question because the necessary forces were not avail- 
able. To hold the ports, the customs, the railways, the 
mines, meant supplying custom officials, station masters, 
engineers, etc., and called for military police everywhere. 
No one would have risked such an adventure without the 
prospect of real advantage. But what advantage would 
there have been? That is precisely what the peace-makers 
inquired into, and what those who heap retrospective criti- 
cism upon them seem to ignore. 

If we take a good normal year, such as 1913, for the 
revenues in question, we find that the German customs pro- 
duced that year 800 million marks, and that the net profit 
of the operation of the mines was 375 million marks and 
of the railways 1,000 million marks, or altogether some- 
thing over 2,000 million marks. Let us suppose which is, of 
course, not the case,* that the war has not reduced any of 
these revenues and let us see what they give. These 2,000 
millions of revenue in paper marks are equal to 300 million 
marks gold at the present (1920) rate of exchange, — that 
is to say just enough under the most favourable conditions 
to pay six per cent, interest on 5,000 million marks gold 

*The German Railways are now being operated at very considerable losa. 



HOW THE ALLIES WILL BE PAID 335 

loan as against a reparations debt of about 350,000 million 
marks gold. As to the collection of taxes by the Allies in 
occupied territory it would have brought them an annual 
income of 500 million marks paper, sufficient to secure a 
loan of 1,600 million marks gold at six per cent. Here 
again the mountain gave birth to a mouse. The makers of 
the Treaty would have none of it. 

The system of guarantees which they adopted consists 
— in addition to occupation, which I will not deal with 
again — in the right recognized to them by Germany of 
supervising the economic and financial life of Germany 
and forcing her to make by priority either in money or 
kind the payments necessary to the liquidation of her debt. 
The Reparations Commission for this purpose is the agent 
of the Governments. I have already called attention to 
the breadth of its attributions.* I do not need to return to 
this subject. I note only that when a group of Powers has, 
as is here the case, in regard to another Power the right 
not only to supervise its revenues, its expenditures, its pro- 
duction, its consumption, its commerce, the right not only 
to be paid in priority to all interior debts, not only to claim 
a prior lien on all State resources but also to insist upon all 
legislative and administrative changes which may be 
deemed necessary, and the right to place in circulation 
interest bearing bonds representing the debt, — I note only 
that, when a group of victorious and formidably armed 
Powers has such means of pressure upon a beaten and con- 
senting foe, it requires some audacity to assert that guaran- 
tees are lacking. And the assertion that guarantees are 
lacking is no excuse for never having in any manner or at 
any time made any effort to enforce them. 

The Treaty goes even further and after having given 
the victors these many grips upon the financial life of the 
beaten foe, it gives them the right in every case of deliber- 
ate non-compliance by Germany to enforce "economic and 
financial prohibitions and reprisals and in general such 
other measures as the respective Governments may deter- 

*See Chapter IX, page 317. 



336 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TKEATY 

mine to be necessary." Germany further undertakes "not 
to regard such measures as acts of war." In other words 
by the Treaty itself the AUied Governments possess not 
only a system of financial guarantees such as no other 
Treaty has ever provided, but also entire freedom in the 
choice of military, economic or other methods of enforce- 
ment in case these guarantees are not sufficient. There is 
not in the whole history of diplomacy a single instance of 
terms so precise, so broad, and so decisive. The only 
thing is to make use of them. So that if in many things 
the Treaty of Versailles being a compromise is necessarily 
imperfect, it contains on the other hand, as far as guaran- 
tees and enforcements are concerned, everything that it 
ought to and could contain. 

•m ^ 

Besides the guarantees of payment taken directly from 
Germany, right and reason suggested others based upon 
the unity existing among the Allies. After unity in war, 
unity in peace. Could not sacrifices borne in common 
include, after the losses in lives and property, the costs of 
settlement — the richest helping the less rich to bear their 
share of the burden? A great and noble idea, the well 
ordered righteousness of which appealed to the French 
people more than to any other, not so much because of 
France's enormous obligations as because of her love of 
justice. On careful analysis of the problem which is often 
presented in confused form, it is seen that the financial 
settlement of the war entailed inescapable burdens and 
possible risks for the conquerors. An inescapable burden 
— the cost of victory (700,000 millions), repayment of 
which was not demanded by the Treaty. A possible risk — 
the non-payment by Germany of all or part of the repara- 
tions debt (about 350,000 millions), which she was called 
upon to pay. It was to these two factors — the one unavoid- 
able, the other uncertain — that the principle of unity could 
be applied if suitable agreement was forthcoming. 



^ 



HOW THE ALLIES WILL BE PAID 337 

Nothing more simple, it would seem, or more just and, 
without reference to prejudiced criticism which counts for 
nothing, many impartial minds have expressed surprise 
that such an agreement was not reached. Hence in a 
recent report to the League of Nations, Professor Charles 
Gide wrote: ''The favourable opportunity was allowed to 
slip by. ... ; the solution would probably have been easy if 
the Powers had taken it up between themselves during the 
war. When, in May, 1918, they resolved to have only one 
army and only one commander-in-chief, it would have been 
easy to persuade them that they should have only one 
purse." If M. Charles Gide had gone through the unheard- 
of difficulties of one and the other, he might not have 
written the foregoing lines. Unity of command? It took 
forty-five months of warfare and the menace of an impend- 
ing catastrophe for it to be theoretically entertained.* 
After it was once adopted, it was only by halting and 
laborious stages that it was put into practice, and I might 
quote certain instances, contemporaneous with the Armis- 
tice, to prove that, even after it had been justified by victory 
certain restrictions were still applied to it. If when he 
created it, M. Clemenceau did not think it wise to compli- 
cate the discussion by demanding unity of another kind; 
if, in the city hall of Doullens and during the days which 
followed the liistoric morning of March 26, 1918, he said 
nothing about unity of finances, it was because he knew 
too well, like all our w^ar Governments, that he would 
thereby have irremediably compromised the demand for 
unity of military command upon which the issue of the 
battle depended. It was because he knew that, while the 
Allies were individualist as regards military command, 
they were even more so as regards financial matters and 
that, until the end of hostilities, the treasuries of each 
country should remain the impregnable castles of national 
individualism. 

I cannot tell here the financial history of the war. At 
least I may, by a few facts, throw light upon my assertions. 

*See Chapter II, pages 37-42. 



338 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Consider France and the United States. I have often 
reminded my fellow countrymen as a striking example of 
American brotherhood of the 15,000 million francs (50,000 
millions at the 1920 rate of exchange) lent us by the Fed- 
eral Treasury. What difficulties had to be overcome, 
however, from day to day in order to secure this generous 
cooperation! Recollect first of all that at no time was a 
fixed credit opened in advance either to ourselves or to 
our European Allies. An advance of 100 million dollars 
was granted M. Viviani at the end of April, 1917, without 
promise of a renewal. On my arrival in Washington, on 
May 15, of the same year, this was the first thing I had 
to take up. Thereafter at intervals of a month, sometimes 
of a fortnight, my colleagues and I obtained the necessary 
credits. On each occasion long explanations had to be 
furnished as to how these credits were to be expended. As 
far as France was concerned part of these credits were to 
enable us to pay for the purchases by the French Govern- 
ment in the United States. To this, of course, no objection 
was raised. But we were obliged to make over part of the 
credits to England for payment in dollars which she was 
making for our account outside of the United States and to 
transfer part of the credits to the order of the Bank of 
France to cover the difference in exchange on private pur- 
chases. Until the end of the war, these transfers aroused 
uneasiness and called forth the protests of the Treasury. 
In January, 1918, the fact that our cash balance showed 
a surplus brought down severe reproaches upon us. A 
little later I met the most serious opposition to the repay- 
ment by means of the American dollars of some of our loans 
raised in 1915 and 1916, to renew which would have been 
absolute folly. On all these occasions the Treasury im- 
pressed by the immensity of its task and anxious not to 
exceed the appropriations voted by the Congress, hesitated 
for whole weeks to authorize on behalf of the Allies, opera- 
tions which were in the interests of all. We were working 
from hand to mouth, almost always obtaining what we 



HOW THE ALLIES WILL BE PAID 339 

needed but without being able to count upon this empiric 
and cordial assistance to build up a general plan. 

Then came another matter — the so-called "purchase 
question." America had purchased from us a certain 
quantity of war material. In addition, her troops becom- 
ing more and more numerous in France caused her to be 
in need of francs (over 800 millions in May, 1918,) which 
were provided by the French Treasury which thereby added 
heavily to its circulation against payment in dollars. Our 
Ministry of Finance considered that the dollars derived 
from these two sources were our property, and that for our 
purchases in the United States the Federal Treasury should 
continue to loan to us as to the other Allies without deduct- 
ing the dollars owing to us for purchases either of material 
or of francs. The American Secretary of the Treasury, on 
the other hand, contended in view of the overwhelming bur- 
den he was bearing that dollars, no matter from what source, 
should be applied wherever they were required without 
discrimination. He did not admit that France was entitled 
to reserve funds for future use and receive advances at 
one and the same time. He considered that such advances 
should be strictly limited to the difference between the 
amount of our purchases in America and the available 
funds representing the proceeds of sales. This disagree- 
ment gave birth to an extraordinary discussion. As in all 
cases where Americans were concerned we managed to 
effect a working compromise without ever reaching an 
agreement in principle. We obtained, in July, 1917, an 
additional credit of 200 million dollars and, in the follow- 
ing month of November the introduction of a bill into the 
American Congress authorizing certain advances for our 
reconstruction purchases. However, on the legal point — 
*' compensation" or "non-compensation" — both Treasuries 
invariably remained obdurate, each taking its stand on its 
own doctrines of financial autonomy, each doing its utmost 
to win the war, but unwilling to give up any of its cherished 
principles. The sincere desire on the part of the Federal 
Treasury, notwithstanding the splendid assistance which 



340 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

it kept giving to its associates, was to do nothing that 
might be construed either in war or in peace as a general 
undertaking. 

Now, let us make no mistake about this. Stripped of 
its disguise of words and transformed into plain figures, 
the idea of financial unity, as regards the settlement of 
the cost of the war, had but one meaning — an appeal to 
the American Treasury with a view to its acceptance of 
additional liability. The facts, whiph I have mentioned, 
prove that such an appeal befor^'the Armistice would 
have had no chance of being entertalmed ; afterwards it had 
still less. The war had just cost America^ .who claimed 
nothing in regard to reparations, over 24,000 million dol- 
lars. Congress thought the price high and did not want to 
go further. After the elections in November, 1918, the 
policy of non-participation in the affairs of Europe was 
prompted both by a spontaneous desire of a part of public 
opinion, and to the deliberate determination to oppose the 
President. Moreover any financial unity, and this was a 
mere matter of arithmetic, would have obliged the United 
States to pay not only for France, but for Great Britain as 
well, — a thing the Americans were not disposed to do. In 
short, although the principle of financial unity had justice 
andJiOgic in its favour, and although from an onlooker's 
point of view its failure is to be regretted, I venture to say 
without fear of being contradicted by any of those who, 
like myself, belonged to the Government during the strug- 
gle, that its mere enunciation would have led to a point- 
blank refusal which might have had disastrous conse- 
quences. Furthermore, if the confirmation of facts is 
desired for this opinion, the following will enlighten the 
reader. 

From the very start of the Conference, both among its 
members and outside, the question of unity was carefully 
studied in its various aspects. I can scarcely enter here 
into a detailed examination of these different proposals 
which, as will be seen hereafter, were all destined to meet 
the same fate. It must also be noted that none was free 



HOW THE ALLIES WILL BE PAID 341 

from serious shortcomings. In each case, whatever method 
was applied to the solution of the question of financial 
unity, those who were called upon to pay for the others or 
commit themselves in their stead, maintained the doctrine 
of financial autonomy so jealously adhered to during the 
war. Every nation must meet its own liabilities — such was 
the principle invariably maintained. It was soon to be 
asserted in peremptory manner. 

At the beginning of March, 1919, it was rumoured in 
Washington that the question of the pooling of liabilities 
had been approached in Paris and on the eighth I received 
from M. Edouard de Billy, who had succeeded me as High 
Commissioner of France, a cable in which he communicated 
a letter received by him the same day from Mr. Rathbone, 
Assistant Secretary of the United States Treasury. This 
letter, after recalling that at a meeting of the Commission 
M. Klotz had supported a suggestion to divide the whole 
of the war debt among the Allies, continued : 

I must inform you in the clearest manner that the United 
States Treasury which as you know has been invested by Congress 
with full power in the matter of advances made by it to Foreign 
Governments will not consent to any discussion in the Peace Con- 
ference or elsewhere of any project or agreement having for object 
the liquidation, consolidation or repartition on a new basis of the 
obligations of Foreign Governments towards the United States. 

You will also understand that the United States Treasury could 
not think of continuing advances to any Allied Government sup- 
porting a scheme which would result in making uncertain the pay- 
ment at maturity of advances already made by the United States 
Treasury. 

I shall be obliged if you will communicate this view of the 
Treasury to your Government and I await its early reply. 

As the Allied Governments were all in great need of 
further American advances and none of them was in a posi- 
tion immediately to repay former credits, they could not 
ignore this communication. In a very plain answer I 
asserted on behalf of the French Government the right, 
after the immense sacrifices France had made, to have and 



342 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

to hold any opinion we thought proper. Mr. Rathbone 
agreed with me, and the matter rested there. I only men- 
tion it to show how easily and to what extent, both before 
and after the Armistice, the susceptibilities of the Treas- 
uries were aroused whenever they feared that an interna- 
tional agreement might aggravate the already very heavy 
burdens assumed by their Parliaments. It was under these 
circumstances that the scheme for a financial section of the 
League of Nations, very properly presented by M. Klotz, 
was referred to the Executive Council in a somewhat 
vague form to which the Brussels Conference of 1920 did 
not succeed in giving definite shape.* The hour of financial 
unity had not struck. Any pressure designed to hasten it 
would have precipitated conflict instead of bringing about 
the desired unity. Long and prudent preparation was nec- 
essary especially with the Americans upon whom, as I have 
shown, success depended. Plans for this preparation occu- 
pied a goodly part of the time of President Wilson and his 
co-workers, who well knew our anxieties and our desires, 
before they left Paris. 

The undertaking was difficult. When Assistant Secre- 
tary of the Treasury Rathbone, a true and devoted friend 
of France as he had proved by his conduct during the war, 
wrote the letter of March 8, wliich I have quoted above, he 
was only somewhat harshly stating an impossibility. Let 
there be no mistake about that. If to share the burdens of 
Europe, the Wilson Administration had asked the Congress 
elected on the fifth of November, 1919, to vote credits, it 
would not have voted a cent ; first out of antagonism to the 
President, then from a feeling of Americanism, and finally 
because it was not possible under the circumstances. 
Before the war, Americans were not used to Government 
bonds; still less to the securities of foreign Governments. 
Government securities were in the hands of a very few 
men. In order to float the war loans tremendous advertis- 



*It 5s right to remark that a considerable portion of the powers conferred 
by the Klotz plan to the Financial Section of the League of Nations has been 
effectively conferred by the Treaty to the Reparations Commission. 



HOW THE ALLIES WILL BE PAID 343 

ing campaigns had been necessary. Furthermore the 
increase of taxation while making investors prefer tax-free 
securities, had depressed the market already glutted by 
these loans and restricted its purchasing capacity. An 
appeal for money to pay off European liabilities with the 
help of the United States would have been a dismal failure. 

President Wilson knew this better than anyone and that 
is why, anxious as he was to help his European associates, 
he was obliged to be extremely cautious. I have told the 
part he played in the discussion on the bonds to be issued 
by Germany.* There he had showed his desire to help 
Europe, to mobilize the German debt, and to associate his 
country with the financial enforcement of the peace. It 
was to facilitate the sale of German bonds in America that 
he asked that they should be issued only gradually. It was 
with his consent that the clause was inserted in the Treaty 
authorizing the allotment of these bonds to others than the 
Governments of countries which had suffered devastation. 
He had, in a word, as far as these bonds were concerned, 
foreseen and accepted the participation of the United 
States in two ways. First by discount and second by pur- 
chase. For the European Governments this was a valuable 
asset and it is difficult to understand why for so many 
months they never sought to avail themselves of it. In Mr. 
Wilson's mind, America, if properly approached, could do 
even more and better. 

In the beginning of May one of Mr. Wilson's financial 
advisers, Mr. Lamont, expressed his point of view to me as 
follows : 

''The President," he said to me, "understands perfectly 
that the United States must help in the economic reconstruc- 
tion of Europe. It is the interest of America as well as its 
duty to hasten the end of the financial crisis and to help 
Europe, especially France and Great Britain, to pass 
through it. 

''I have handed Mr. Wilson at his request a long memor- 
andum on this subject, but nothing practical can be done 

*See Chapter IX, page 312. 



344 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

until tHe problem has been thoroughly explained to the 
American people who have no conception of it, and as far 
as I can see the President is the only man who has suffi- 
cient authority to educate the country to it. But he will not 
be able to undertake this task until the Treaty is ratified. 

*'For the time being, we must have patience. If we go 
too fast, we shall only be giving an additional weapon to 
the opponents of the Treaty. The new taxes which are 
being introduced by M. Clemenceau's Cabinet will more- 
over be an indispensable factor in the campaign to be con- 
ducted in America. For they will give confidence to many 
Americans who when they see men like J. P. Morgan paying 
seventy-five per cent, of theix income in taxes since the 
beginning of the war, are astonished that France has not 
increased its taxation, without understanding that the 
devastation of your richest provinces has made such an 
increase more difficult for you than for other countries." 

During the month of June, I had several conversations 
on the same subject with Mr. House and Mr. Lament. We 
knew that we could not pass from theory to practice, but 
we were preparing possible solutions. It is thus that we 
considered the advantages and feasibility of a solution of 
which Mr. Keynes in his overweening pride has imagined 
that he is the author. I refer to the cancellation of all war 
debts. This cancellation would have been a first step 
towards thoroughgoing financial unity. Others would 
have followed. America unanimous in not demanding for 
the time being either the repayment of our debt of 
$3,000,000,000, or even the interest thereon, was quite capa- 
ble of taking such a step, if its consequences had been fully 
explained. That is what Mr. Wilson intended to undertake 
immediately after his campaign for the ratification of the 
Treaty of Versailles. We all know what happened. The 
illness of the President, stricken down for ten months ; the 
rejection of the Treaty by six votes; the triumph of an 
opposition which favours American isolation. The result 
is that in 1920 we are further from our goal than in 1919. 
The Allies are partly responsible for tliis by having omitted 



HOW THE ALLIES WILL BE PAID 345 

for ten montlis to enforce upon Germany the obligation to 
issue the bonds in their favour as provided for in the 
Treaty and by the right which they recognized to Germany 
at Spa to issue bonds in her own favour. Between France 
and Great Britain the situation is the same. The French 
Government having neglected to issue in London the French 
loan of which M. Clemenceau on the eve of his retirement 
had obtained the promise for March, 1920, each country 
works for itself. The idea of unity which the peace-makers 
were about to realize is in eclipse. Will men be fomid to 
restore it to life and light 1 

IV 

No financial unitj^ So there remained for the greatest 
sufferers — that is to say for France — the resource of 
priority. In truth this resource had lost its importance and 
its chances of success the day when the Council of Four 
had decided to claim from Germany damages to persons 
and property and pensions, but not the costs of war.* 

It had lost its importance for, with the exception of 
British tonnage sunk, the whole of the claims was henceforth 
identical with the French claims and even if sea losses were 
considered last — to which Great Britain would, of course, 
not consent — our country would have derived but little 
advantage. It had no chance of success because, however 
ready everyone was to recognize the immensity of the 
losses suffered by France, no Government would admit 
that for an indefinite number of years France alone should 
receive compensation, the others coming in only after she 
had been completely paid; because, furthermore, nations 
like Australia, which had suffered no devastations and 
could show only losses in men, would not admit that prop- 
erty losses should take precedence over losses of life. No 
matter what efforts the French delegation put forth, it was 
beaten in advance; for it was in a minority of one. In 
these circumstances it was clear that the basis of agreement 
would have to be percentages taking into account on a slid- 



*See Chapter IX, pages 286-294, 



346 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

ing scale the various degrees of losses sustained ; and that 
even on this basis agreement would be reached only after 
prolonged discussions. 

The discussion began in March before the Special Com- 
mittee appointed to deal with financial questions and before 
the Council of Four. It was a painful one. "Who was to 
have the largest share of the German payments? That 
really meant who had suffered most; who had worked 
hardest; who had contributed most to victory? This led 
to a discussion of respective estimates. As Mr. Lloyd 
George said on March 25, it was no longer a question of the 
coincidence but of the competition of Allied interests. Pub- 
lic opinion also had to be taken into account. The British 
Prime Minister dreaded this discussion, because he knew 
how imprudently the election campaign of 1918 had aroused 
the hopes of his countrymen. He dreaded it also because 
of the Dominions which had played an admirable part in 
the war and who, already obliged to forego the repayment 
of their war expenses, would never at any price have 
admitted that damages to property should be paid before 
their pensions. 

*'By what right," they asked, "should French chimneys 
be paid for before British lives?" 

Finally influenced by advisers like Mr. Keynes and also 
by French pre-w^ar publications put out by those very 
economists who had so learnedly proved that a European 
war could not last more than three months, Mr. Lloyd 
George was of opinion that the French claims were 
excessive. 

*' After all," he said, "the portion of your territory that 
has been devastated is very limited compared to your whole 
country. It contains no large towns. Lille and Valen- 
ciennes were occupied and more or less looted, but not 
destroyed. The total you arrive at is so large, that it nearly 
equals your whole national wealth, which was estimated at 
250,000 millions in 1908. If the amount you claim repre- 
sents the damages in so limited a portion of French terri- 
tory, France must be very much richer than we believed. 



HOW THE ALLIES WILL BE PAID 347 

**The value of all the coal mines in Great Britain was 
estimated before the war at 130,000,000 pounds (3,250,000,- 
000 francs) and according to you, your mines which are of 
secondary importance as compared to ours need 2,000,- 
000,000 francs for repairs.* How do you account for that? 

"If you had to spend the money which you ask for the 
reconstruction of the devastated regions of the North of 
France, I assert that you could not manage to spend it. 
Besides the land is still there. Although it has been badly 
upheaved in parts it has not disappeared. Even if you put 
the Chemin des Dames up to auction, you would find buyers. 
What France claims is not fair to her Allies." 

Refuting his opponents' arguments inch by inch M. 
Loucheur replied : 

''France has no intention of taking a dollar more than 
is her due. She is ready to accept any verification of the 
figures she puts forward. But you are very much mis- 
taken if you think that such verification will lead to any 
marked reduction. 

''You produce statistics of our estimated wealth in 
1908. I repudiate them. They are merely the individual 
opinions of economists, and are contradicted by the facts. 
Just think what real estate in Paris alone is worth. Bear 
in mind that after most careful investigation I am con- 
vinced that the repair of our coal mines in the North will 
cost at least 2,000 million francs. Bear in mind that it 
will take ten years and a million men to rebuild what has 
been destroyed. Bear in mind that in the Lens-Courrieres 
district there are 12,000 houses to rebuild which before the 
war were worth 5,000 francs apiece and are now worth 
15,000 francs. 

"You say that we exaggerate the rise in prices. That 
is not true. You would have us calculate reconstruction 
of buildings at one hundred per cent. ; and yet you are well 
aware that certain materials cost three or four times as 



*This French estimate, correct in March, 1919, had in December, 1920, 
revealed itself as less than half the actual cost of reconstruction. 



348 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

mucli in 1919 as they did in 1914. Anyhow, just take the 
raw material stolen or destroyed by the enemy. The wool 
taken by the Germans from Ronbaix cannot be replaced for 
less than five times its 1914 value. 

"France asks only the actual cost of repairs, neither 
more nor less. 

"Reference has been made to the drawbacks of a public 
discussion. We do not fear it and we fear still less the 
comparison between our figures and those proceeding from 
the arbitrary estimates of more or less competent 
economists." 

And so our fundamentally different points of view came 
into sharp conflict again when reduced to figures. To sim- 
plify matters Mr. Lloyd George said: 

"Representing what Germany will pay by one hundred, 
I suggest that France receive fifty, Great Britain thirty, 
and the other countries twenty. This proportion will give 
France a very marked preference. But I cannot, in view of 
British public opinion, go below the proportion I mean to 
reserve for Great Britain." 

At once M. Loucheur declared that this proposal was 
inacceptable. He recalled that France had already made a 
concession in not insisting upon priority, and after assert- 
ing that he would accept no other proportion than fifty- 
eight for France and twenty-five for Great Britain, he said 
his last word: fifty-six to twenty-five. The American 
experts suggested fifty-six to twenty-eight. M. Loucheur 
said no, and in agreement with M. Clemenceau declared : 

"On my conscience I cannot agree to what is not fair. 
I am sorry to seem uncompromising, but I have already 
gone further than my instruction, and further than what I 
honestly believe to be just and fair." 

The discussion ended without agreement. Eight months 
passed, during which France and Great Britain both 
refrained from widening this discussion, as it would neces- 
sarily have been complicated by the intervention of coun- 
tries which either had not taken part in the war from the 



HOW THE ALLIES WILL BE PAID 349 

beginning, or had been at war for a portion of the time 
only with but one of our four enemies. 

On December 12, 1919, in London, the conversation was 
resumed. M. Loucheur recalled its origin and on the 
ground of the continual rise in prices, asserted that to 
obtain a fair settlement, the ratio of sixty to twenty would 
be preferable to that of fifty-six to twenty-five, which he 
had been mlling to admit in March. He added, ''We are 
going to have to spend 125,000 millions in five years in 
order to rebuild what was the battlefield of all the Allies." 
M. Clemenceau also recalled that in the course of the debate 
on the ratification of the Treaty the French Parliament 
had complained of the inadequacy of the financial repara- 
tions given to France. He himself had admitted in the Sen- 
ate, on October 11, that he was not satisfied and returning 
to his first demand he said : 

"I have been told that British lives were worth more 
than chimneys destroyed in France. I know what your 
sacrifices have been, and no one respects them more than I 
do. But I ask you not to forget that beneath those chim- 
neys there lived French families which the war has broken 
and ruined. Ten departments, the richest in France, have 
been completely devastated and for many years will pro- 
duce nothing. That is the essential cause of our financial 
and economic crisis. So I demand priority, and I demand 
it frankly and clearly. Priority such as was given to Bel- 
gium. It will be just as fair in the case of France as it was 
in the case of Belgium. Priority is for us an urgent neces- 
sity. Above all you must safeguard the moral value of 
mutual good feeling between France and England." 

Mr. Lloyd George's answer was full of dignity and of 
feeling. He said: 

"The British Government cannot concede France's 
claim to priority. If it cannot, it is certainly not because 
the British people do not realize the unequalled sufferings 
of France. They know them fully. But Great Britain is 
beset by serious financial difficulties. Public opinion is 
overwrought by the burden of heavy taxes, and because it 



350 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

has not received a farthing from Germany. I ask the 
French Government to look at the matter in this light. 

''France has put in a claim for 125,000 milHons and 
Belgium for 25,000 millions. If priority for damages to 
persons and property is granted to France, it will have to 
be granted to Belgium, which amounts to saying that about 
175,000 millions will be paid before the British taxpayer 
obtains any relief, that is for at least thirty years. I can- 
not accept such a thing. 

''And the Australian Prime Minister will not accept it 
either. Australia with a population of less than four and 
a half million inhabitants has lost more men in the war 
than the United States. Australia has a heavy debt 
entirely due to war expenses and pensions. New Zealand, 
with a population of a million, had more men killed than 
Belgium and she also has a heavy debt. I ask you to take 
these brave young nations into consideration. 

"In the Reparations Commission we must not have dis- 
cussions between France and England on every question. 
France and Great Britain must hold together and act 
together. Our alliance must go on after having stood the 
test of the greatest war in history. 

' ' To settle, we accept a proportion of fifty-five to twen- 
ty-five. We believe this proportion is too low for us. 
However, to assert and safeguard the» cordial relations 
between our two countries, my colleagues and I are ready 
to accept it and we on the other hand ask that France do 
not insist upon priority. 

"I ask this of you above all so that, in the case of 
another conflict, the feehng of unity of the Dominions be 
not less keen than it was last time." 

It was necessary to settle and some of the English argu- 
ments were strong. M. Clemenceau accepted. To save the 
feelings of Allies who were not represented at the Confer- 
ence at London the proportion of eleven to five was 
substituted in the official minutes for the percentage of 
fifty-five to twenty-five which remained the basis of the 
agreement. Twenty per cent, was to be reserved for the 



HOW THE ALLIES WILL BE PAID 351 

other creditors in accordance with Mr. Lloyd George 's orig- 
inal suggestion. M. Clemenceau obtained in addition to this 
two other results from which his successors have not 
derived the benefit they might. First the attribution to 
France of the Chairmanship of the Eeparation Commis- 
sion (it is common knowledge that in less than six months 
the chairmanship of this all important Commission has 
been changed three times) and the issue in London in 
March, 1920, of a big French loan (it is common knowledge 
that this loan was not issued). So the financial problem 
as a whole was thus settled between France and Great 
Britain. Our country did not obtain that general priority 
which as the battleground of the nations it had a right to 
claim. But the percentage adopted assured it more than 
half the total of everything Germany was to pay. 

The very terms of the Treaty assured it of even more. 
First everything in our list of damages that could be recov- 
ered in its original state (money, cattle, machinery or mate- 
rials) did not enter into the reparations account and was 
not to be included in the percentage. Nine thousand mil- 
lion francs' worth of such stolen goods have been already 
recovered and have of course come back to us in full pri- 
ority. Well conducted search would increase this amount. 
On the other hand the immediate payment promised to 
Belgium must also in part be added to the percentage 
allotted to France by the agreement of London, for half of 
the amounts loaned to our friends were loaned by us. 
Finally the reimbursement before any other charges of the 
cost of the Armies of Occupation will still further increase 
the amounts we shall receive, for of the costs of occupation 
it is not fifty-five per cent, but more than eighty per cent, 
that we are entitled to. 

Since then at Spa the bases of the percentages have 
bg^en changed. In order to increase the share of other Pow- 
ers, France and Great Britain have consented to reduce 
their own each by three per cent., France's share falling 
from fifty-five per cent, to fifty-two per cent, and Great 
Britain's share ft-om twenty-five per cent, to twenty- two 



352 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TEEATY 

per cent. The origins and character of this agreement 
make comment of mine superfluous. France, after having 
given up the priority which her role as battlefield entitled 
her to claim and accepted the reduction of the share 
allotted to her of the total German payments, is doubly 
bound to insist that this total must remain exactly as 
defined by the Treaty. A reduced share of a full total? 
Yes. But a reduced share of a reduced total? No. That 
is the whole problem. After so many others, it is an addi- 
tional reason for France to refuse the onerous changes 
improvised and suggested in various quarters. 



CHAPTER XI 



GERMAN UNITY 



Since the signing of the Treaty strong criticism has 
been directed in France against the Government of Vic- 
tory. "You have," it is asserted, ''retaken Alsace-Lor- 
raine. You have freed the French of the Sarre. You have 
occupied the left bank of the Rhine. You have imposed 
rigorous military and financial clauses upon Germany. 
That is all very well, but it is nothing. Why! Because 
none of these guarantees has any permanent value so long 
as you have allowed German unity to remain untouched." 
Let me add that a very distinguished American writer, 
Mr. W. Morton FuUerton, asked some years ago and in the 
same spirit that "France be pemiitted in the name of civ- 
ilization to proceed to the vivisection of Germany,, i. e., to 
the dismemberment of the Germanic tribes." 

Before going back to the roots of the matter I must 
first present the answer which the French Government 
publicly made to this criticism in October, 1919. M. Cle- 
menceau, attacked in the Senate by two members of the 
Right, presented the French view, which was the same as 
that of the Allies. Here is what he said : — 

A great quarrel has been thrust upon this assembly, — the 
famous question of German unity. On that I do not agree with 
you, — not in the least. Therefore, it is a question on which we 
must have a clear explanation. 

On what was .this disagreement? Not, of course, on 
the interest France has in not having at her gates sixty 
million people who claim German nationality and whom 
history has taught us to know: but on the possibility of 

353 



354 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

destroying their unity by force. All Frenchmen would 
prefer not to be exposed to the risk of this proximity. But 
the proximity exists. It may be regretted. We all regret 
it, just as we regret that France has not the protection 
against Germany which the ocean affords England. But 
regret cannot alter a fact, and the one and only political 
question for Governments is whether or not this fact can 
be done away with. That is what the French Prime Min- 
ister proceeds to discuss, after brushing away the asinine 
criticism which a certain Press had levelled against him 
and his Cabinet of deliberately seeking to maintain Ger- 
man unity. 

"I think you do me the honour to believe that I am no advocate 

of German unity, that I desire to split up the German forces 

But, just what is it that we have to deal with ? 

* * Consider a minute ! There is a nation of sixty million people 
which only yesterday had seventy millions. People whose history 
goes back for centuries. By one of those contradictions which I am 
not called upon to explain, because it is the business of the 
Almighty, the Germans have gone from the one extreme of partic- 
ularism to the other extreme of centralization. I cannot help it. 
It is their nature. They are built that way ! 

"At certain moments in history attempts have been made to 
force their national conscience. Napoleon, for instance, at Leipzig, 
had Saxons with him. It is impossible to be more divided than the 
Germans were then; for they were using shot and shell on other 

Germans What did the Saxons do at Leipzig ? You are 

not without knowing ! (Cheers.) 

**The only true unity is that of the heart (Hear! hear!) and 
that no human hand can touch. 

"Unity, you see, is not a matter of diplomatic protocols. Unity 
is in the hearts of men. Men love those they love. Meu hate those 
they hate ; and in times of danger they know on which side to stand, 
and in times of battle too. (Hear! hear!) 

"What would you? There are there, whether we like it or not, 
sixty million people with whom we have to live. In olden days I 
don't know what would have been done with them. The Romans 
themselves broke their sword upon them. We are not going to 
throw ourselves into any such adventure. 



GERMAN UNITY 355 

"We want to respect their liberty, but we mean to take the 
necessary precautions to make them respect ours." {Cheers and 
applause.) 

And M. Clemenceau, appealing to the past, recalled how 
pregnant with disappointment for France had been the 
theory of the ''two Germanics. " 

"I remember when war was declared in 1870. One met journal- 
ists in the street — there are always journalists ready to say any- 
thing (laughter) — who said 'Bavaria will not join.' 

"What reasons I heard given! 'The Bavarians are Celts — 
Their heads are not the same shape as the Prussians — They hate 
the Prussians.' Two days later you know what happened. 

"And in 1914, was not Bavaria precisely in the position where 
she would be to-day according to your theory, had she signed the 
Treaty? Did she hesitate to join? No. 

"In peace time I used to believe that I should die without see- 
ing the war, but I knew it was coming and I made it my duty to go 
every year either to Austria or to Germany. There I talked with 
the people. I saw those who were dissatisfied. I went to Munich 
and talked with the Bavarians. When I said harsh things of the 
Prussians they approved. They even went farther than I did. 
But when a break was referred to, it was quite another matter. 

"And beaten do you think they are going to think differently 
than if they had won ? Quite the contrary ! ( Cheers. ) 

"Defeat has brought their scattered forces together. Never in 
this respect had the situation called for such an effort. ' ' 

If it be possible that some day, under the impulse of 
new interests and new ideas, this moral unity may disap- 
pear and give place to particularism, it is on the one con- 
dition that there be no forceful interference from without 
and that as in Austria-Hungary the evolution be a spon- 
taneous evolution which we can help along but which we 
cannot create. 

"You see, you must not believe that things will remain where 

the makers of the Treaty have left them The situation created 

by the Treaty will continue to develop. We shall see its results. 
We shall watch it. We shall take what advantage we may. 



356 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

''That will depend upon the Germans— which some are trying 
to convert and rightly so— but it will depend upon us also. 
(Cheers.) 

"If we hope that the Germans — I do not want to use a harsh 
■word — will disintegrate in the political sense of the word so that 
they may not all be led at some future time to make war upon us, 
it by no means follows that we wish this disintegration for pur- 
poses of dominating them as they dreamed they were going to 
dominate us. 

**As for going into Germany, as for conquering Germany as 
Napoleon conquered Spain, it is a waste of time even to think 
about it." 

In other words take advantage of political disintegra- 
tion in Germany, if it takes place spontaneously; but do 
not commit the mad imprudence of imposing this disinte- 
gration by force, — sucli a course would merely strengthen 
the spiritual bonds; for '*a nation," as Renan said, *'is a 
group of individuals who will to live together" and this 
will cannot be broken by force. This opinion, held in com- 
mon by all the Allied Governments, was sustained time 
and time again in the Senate by M. Clemenceau and in the 
Chamber by myself. It was an opinion so natural and so 
clear from the very facts that, as M. Clemenceau declared, 
in his speech of October 2, 1919: ''The question was set- 
tled at the Conference almost before it had been 
presented. ' ' 

II 

For this point of view history — often quoted against 
it — affords absolute justification. Much has been said in 
discussing the Treaty of Versailles about the Treaties of 
Westphalia of 1648, which have been extolled at the 
expense of the former. Only one thing has been forgotten, 
that from 1648 to 1919, Germany continued to live and was 
profoundly changed in the course of those two and a half 
centuries. Whereas in Austria historic evolution pre- 
pared and produced the divorce of subject nationalities, in 
Germany on the contrary the whole process of evolution 



GERMAN UNITY 357 

tended towards unity. Not the slightest tendency toward 
disintegration manifested itself during the war; and the 
overthrow of the dynasties has dispelled the last vestiges 
of constitutional particularism. "While in Austria the 
wills of the peoples tended to diverge, in Germany they 
constantly tended to converge. All German history, since 
the seventeenth century, illustrates and emphasizes this 
phenomenon. 

Bismarck created German unity — an achievement 
which gives the full measure of his genius. But Bismarck 
did not create it alone, and his genius does not account for 
all German unity. Bismarck worked not on an untouched 
canvas but upon one into which had been woven for more 
than a century a state of mind born of abject misery result- 
ing from the seventeenth century treaties — a state of 
mind nurtured and trained for one hundred and fifty years 
by all German writers, inflamed by the Napoleonic Avars, 
generalized by the events of 1848. Bismarck in other 
words utilized with marvelous ability an aspiration — a 
need — that existed before his time; a need that Prussia 
succeeded in satisfying and in exploiting; a need whence 
German unity even without Bismarck would sooner 
or later have sprung, without which Bismarck would have 
been unable to realize it. Destroy Bismarck's work? An 
easy thing to say, but a vain undertaking if what is the 
very soul of his work be not first destroyed. Is that 
destruction possible? That is the whole question. To that 
question two hundred and seventy years of history — too 
often ignored by those whose historical inquiries stop at 
the Treaty of Westphalia — give answer. 

Germany by the end of the seventeenth century had 
reached the extreme limit of disintegration. More than a 
hundred independent States side by side led a miserable 
existence under powerless princes — ^vassals of a phantom 
empire. Of public spirit there was none — only moral dis- 
union worse than material division, only economic stagna- 
tion aggravated by intellectual decadence, emphasized by 
boorish manners and general ignorance. Only the lower 



358 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TEEATY 

classes spoke German. This political system had a name, 
the ^* Germanic Liberties." In order to understand what 
modern Germany thinks of these liberties we must remem- 
ber what they stood for in the Germany of the past. 

A few spirits lost in this darkness retained, by personal 
effort, their individuality shorn however of all national 
influence. To them is due the origin of the movement 
whence after many evolutions was one day to come the 
then unsuspected notion of a German Fatherland. To tell 
the truth this notion in its modern form was foreign to 
these solitary thinkers. But in their struggle for the ad- 
vancement of literature and science they held the torch for 
future generations. Leibnitz was the first to extol intel- 
lectual activity mthout which, he said, 'Hhe downfall and 
decay of our nation will be irreparable for a long time to 
come." A few years later, appeared the first review pub- 
lished in German, to the scandal of its contemporaries. It 
was followed by another periodical, The Hamburg Patriot, 
the success of which astonished its readers and even its 
founders. Local awakenings of no political or national 
importance, but which showed the trend. 

The eighteenth century sees the growth and expansion 
of this renaissance whose results have so far surpassed all 
expectations. Wolf, ''the schoolmaster of the German 
mind," as Hegel called him later; the mediocre Gottsched 
ever reacting against foreign manners but stubborn and 
popular champion of German science; the University of 
Goettingen, first centre of culture for a middle class hith- 
erto non-existent, — pave the way for Klopstock and Les- 
sing, the earliest classical writers of Germany, Steeped 
in the philosophy of their century, they share its human- 
tarian and cosmopolitan spirit. But they write in German 
and for Germans, so their work is already national. The 
whole scene is dominated by the extraordinary figure of 
Frederick the Great, resourceful and unscrupulous, holding 
his own against Europe. Even those who do not love him 
are proud of this Prussian, — more Prussian than German. 
His victories awake echoes beyond his kingdom, all over 



GERMAN UNITY 359 

the Holy Empire. The young generation at Frankfort 
worships him. Patriotic writings that borrow their titles 
from the past increase in nmnber. The " Germanics" 
begin to discover a community of thought and feeling, they 
thrill with a new-born desire to foster it. 

Towards the end of the century the movement gains 
breadth and scope. It is the moment when Herder pro- 
claims the inward character of the German spirit and 
language. ** Awake," he cries, ''0 slumbering God! awake 
German People." Then there come Goethe, Schiller and 
Kant, initiators and masters of German thought. The 
Fatherland of which they speak is more ideal than mate- 
rial. It is an intellectual community whose body politic is 
as yet unformed. But under the influence of the French 
ideas of 1789, this Fatherland begins to crystallize in men 's 
minds and around the idea — thrilling indeed to this land of 
poverty and misery — of the rights of man and of the indi- 
vidual. The masses still remain indifferent. But the 
Napoleonic wars are going to awaken them. Eighteen hun- 
dred and six sees Jena. Kant had died two years before, 
bequeathing to his countrymen his philosophy of duty. 
Fichte takes hold of it and makes it the very soul of a 
frankly and exclusively national propaganda. He declares 
himself to be ''German and nothing but German." He 
speaks for ''all Germans without exception." He preaches 
that all their misfortunes arose from the "Germanic liber- 
ties" which made of Germany the battlefield of Europe. 
He denounces the princes of the Rhine Confederation as 
"the gilded slaves of Napoleon." His patriotism is no 
mere literary concept. It is a thought-power. He has a 
sense of national unity. He is not afraid of the word. The 
French Empire by its militarist policy helped to bring into 
the world the modern German Fatherland. And Fichte was 
its prophet. 

And then in the Prussian Government a minister — not 
a Prussian by birth — Stein, appropriates this idea and 
translates it into action. Particularism, there is the enemy ! 
jUnity, there is the need! Napoleon has Stein expelled 



360 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

from Prussia, and Stem's authority grows greater as a 
result. Against humanitarianism and cosmopolitanism, he 
clamours for the rights of patriotism. "I have but one 

country and its name is Germany My motto is unity 

Away with the fatal treaties of Westphalia." His voice 
carries far. On the retreat from Russia, he obliges his 
hesitating sovereign to launch the Appeal to My People of 
1813, which beyond Prussia is intended for all Germany. 
The second of the cards that Bismarck is to play fifty 
years later appears. The German idea is marching on! 
But besides, in 1813, it is Prussia which, — followed but lit- 
tle or not at all by the others, — fights for this idea, thereby 
gaining an unique prestige. Doubtless for many years yet, 
the policy of reaction expressed in the Holy Alliance is to 
retard evolution. Stein is in advance of his time. The 
princes do not support him. But he gives an impulse to the 
people, and his political testament is in the minds of all 
who think — ''To be strong, Germany must be united." 

From 1815 to 1848 the outward lines of politics remain 
rigid. But minds are in a ferment. The courts — even the 
Prussian Court draws back from the advantages that 
await it — repudiate unity as revolutionary. Professors 
and writers, however, think of nothing else. They seek its 
distant origin in the history of the Middle Ages. They show 
its present necessity by the risk Germany ran of being 
absorbed by Napoleon. All the elite helps. The university 
of Berlin becomes a centre of German patriotism. Theory 
is abandoned for practice. Heed is paid to frontiers. The 
Rhine is not enough, some demand the Meuse. The 
Treaties of 1815 are denounced as a spoliation, for which 
lack of unity is blamed. Hatred of France is already the 
favourite food of this raging patriotism. ''Unity, Unity," 
cries Arndt, "unity as energetic as possible is what Ger- 
many needs ; that is what is essential both to her security 
abroad and to her prosperity at home." And Gorres antic- 
ipating Bismarck, adds: "It must be realized, if need be, 
by blood and the iron." 

From this time with ever increasing force, the idea of 



GERMAN UNITY 361 

unity keeps marching on. Having suffered overlong from 
her disintegration and proudly confident of her future, 
Germany is ready to make good the words of the Prussian 
Treitschke, ""We have no German Fatherland, and the 
Hohenzollerns alone can give us one." In 1830, Bismarck, 
a Prussian junker, meets an American and makes a bet 
with him that before another generation unity Avill be an 
accomplished fact. The Parliament of Frankfort, under 
the illusion that it could realize this unity by vote, offers 
the crown to Frederick William, who refuses it. This is 
the last blunder before the battle is won. Bismarck comes 
into power and henceforth goes straight to his goal, which 
is not that of the German princes but that of the German 
people. All things are made to serve his purpose— the 
centuries of misery, the dreams of philosophers and of 
poets-; the memories of the trials of 1906; the avidity of the 
middle classes of the South and West — to whom by the 
ZoUverein he ensures larger revenues than those they get 
from their own customs ; universal suffrage established as 
a menace against Austria and the princes ; the war of the 
Duchies and the Bohemian campaign which excludes the 
Hapsburgs from Germany and reconciles them to this 
exclusion by leaving them their boundary; finally the 
absurdity of Napoleon III, who, by his policy of the "Three 
Germanics," supplies Prussia with the national pretext 
from which war is to come on the day of her choice. 

"From the moment the Confederation of the South is 
formed," said Bismarck on April 10, 1867, "and Germany 
has but two national Parliaments, no human force can keep 
them from uniting, any more than the waters of the Red 
Sea remained apart after the crossing of the people of 
Israel." The end is known. Another and inexcusable 
error on the part of Napoleon III in connection with the 
Spanish question; the cynical Ems forgery; the Franco- 
German war ; Versailles ; the King of Bavaria bulhed and 
brought to terms — and the Empire is founded. A result of 
opportunism which satisfies neither the Conservatives, who 
wanted Prussia to absorb Germany, nor the Liberals, who 



362 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

wanted Germany to absorb Prussia ; a patchwork construc- 
tion of give and take designed to overcome the resistance 
of the princes ; without standing in international law ; but 
the work of the past rather than the work of Bismarck; 
the tardy fruit of the combined efforts of poets and people 
whereby, for two hundred years, Germany has sought to 
free herself from those alleged "Liberties" — ^hated for 
more than a century — in which the pretentious verbiage of 
some contemporary historians seeks to find compensation 
for her defeat. The people — "that multitude of invisible 
souls" of which Bismarck speaks in one of his letters — is 
won over in advance to the end no matter what the means. 
It shows it by plunging. North and South alike, into the 
war against France, which is to cement its recent unity. 
Bismarck is the genius who directs this great adventure, but 
he is not its creator. Unity existed before him in the souls 
of the people ; he set it free rather than imposed it. Sooner 
or later, I repeat, even without him, it would have been 
achieved. Fashioned by him, its principle survived him 
just as its principle had preceded him. 

Then for nearly half a century, this Empire, born of 
blood and iron, succeeded in giving unequalled satisfactions 
to the whole of Germany — to the Germany of thinkers as 
well as to the Germany of doers. For the first, it makes 
German thought radiate through the world. Upon the sec- 
ond, it lavishes the material benefits of which these people 
for so many centuries have been deprived. Germany estab- 
lishes herself as the world 's school master and commercial 
traveller. She flaunts the prosperity of her factories, for 
her goods challenge those of England in all the world- 
markets; of her banks, for their net- work spreads over 
two hemispheres ; of her shipping, for the lines that furrow 
the seven seas. In his book of pride, The Welfare of the 
German People, Helfferich proclaims the results: popula- 
tion increased by sixty-three per cent., surplus of births 
over deaths as high as thirteen per thousand, deposits in 
banks and savings banks tripled, in twenty-five years 
reaching a total of 38,000 millions; wages doubled in 



GERMAN UNITY 363 

twenty years; wealth widely distributed; capital values 
increased fifty per cent, in fifteen years, compared to an 
increase in population of only twenty-eight per cent. ; aver- 
age production of wheat increased more than thirty per 
cent, per acre ; horse-power energy increased from two to 
eight millions; stock companies increased from 2,000 to 
4,700. A prodigious wealth in which all Germans shared 
and which after nearly a century justified Arndt's words, 
''Unity, and unity alone can assure our security abroad 
and our prosperity at home." 

"We are far from the philosophers of the eighteenth 
century. The moral unity which they had conceived 
flourishes — with what strength! — ^but is infected by its 
very success with the most odious materialism. It is the 
German patriotism of 1914, such as I attempted to describe 
in the opening pages of this book, with faith only in the 
brutal might of the mailed fist, cloaking its greed beneath 
the hypocritical pretenses of a mystical mission terrorizing 
Alsace-Lorraine captive; a slave to the sword; gloating 
bestially over the ignoble violence of its soldiery at Saverne. 
Nothing can be baser, nothing more depressing ; but again 
nothing could be more real. These people are no longer 
even capable of regretting the principles they had betrayed. 
Unity for them is no longer an ideal, but a source of profit. 
They have more to eat, they make more money than in the 
time of the "Germanic Liberties." For them that is 
enough. And because it is enough, the whole nation is 
ready for aggression without a qualm. Not a party hesi- 
tates, nor does a single State and this unity in crime is to 
last up to the end of the war. Some French writers have 
recently asked themselves whether Germany is really a 
nation. They are answered by our dead. A nation of 
prey, yes, but a nation which by its very crimes has 
proved its existence all too well. 

It is true defeat has come, and hopes have been built 
upon it. It has been thought that perhaps Germany over- 
whelmed by defeat would lose her attachment to unity. 
Events have proved the contrary. The imperial catas- 



364 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

trophe has broken the bonds between the share-holders in 
the German concern and their director. But the corporate 
relations among the share-holders themselves have only 
been strengthened as a result. Defeat has not revived the 
*' Germanics" of the past. It has inspired united Germany 
with the will to find in this unity the instrument of her own 
revival. The downfall of the dynasties swept away by the 
autumn gale of 1918 laid low the last pillars of particular- 
ism. The deputies at Weimar in framing a new constitu- 
tion had but one aim, — ^increased centralization. Does this 
mean that striking contrasts do not still persist in different 
parts of Germany? I do not say so and I shall show later 
the advantage to be derived therefrom. But I do say that 
the overwhelming majority of the German Nation, whose 
birth was so long and painful, is determined to live on as a 
nation, that force can avail nothing against tliis will, and 
that separated by the ax of the conqueror, its roots would 
soon have sought and joined each other for the prepara- 
tion of a new life to which war would be the preface, as it 
was fifty years ago. 

Ill 

This obvious fact, on w^hich so much discussion has been 
wasted since the signing of the peace, was never challenged 
during the war, and the disintegration of German unity 
was never one of the war aims of the Allies. Really it is 
hard to see how it could have been. Victory was late in 
crowning the flags of the Entente. In March, 1918, Gen- 
eral Gough's British Army was defeated. In May came 
the Chemin des Dames and Paris bombarded. To have 
announced at that moment or earlier what has been called 
the "vivisection of Germany," would have been a terrible 
imprudence, would have been playing into the hands of 
German propaganda. As it was not announced, the Allied 
Nations were unprepared for it. Moreover to them, 
grouped as I have shown around the idea of nationality and 
of the defense of national liberties, the disintegration of 
a nation — even of an enemy, even of a guilty nation — 



GERMAN UNITY 365 

would not have appealed as a war aim. Everybody wanted 
to destroy German domination. Nobody contemplated 
imitating the methods of that domination. The common 
sense of the people was quick to realize the existence, only 
too plain, of German nationality. To break up that nation- 
ality by forcibly reviving its former parts appeared to 
everyone impossible. In a war of peoples, which can be 
won only through the persistent support of the masses, 
certain cynical contradictions — common in the time of the 
old monarchies — become not only impossible but dangerous. 
The idea which gave heart to our soldiers, and led them to 
victory could not be repudiated without danger. You can- 
not tear up the things you stand for. The continuity of 
Allied war aims was, in large measure, the expression of 
this impossibility. 

However this may be, it is a fact that at no time during 
the war did the Governments, the Parliaments, or even the 
Press demand the destruction of German unity. On Decem- 
ber 30, 1916, and on January 10, 1917, the Powers of the 
Entente officially made known their views as to the condi- 
tions of a victorious peace. I have reproduced these docu- 
ments above. Not a word can be found in any of them that 
directly or indirectly makes allusion to Germany's disinte- 
gration. One ingenious spirit has thought to discover such 
an allusion in the phrase, ''The Allies repudiate any plan 
of exterminating 'the German peoples.' " But one has 
only to read the text over to see that this plural applies to 
Germany and to Austria. To this proof another even more 
decisive may be added. In January and February, 1917, 
M. Aristide Briand, the French Premier, had, in confiden- 
tial letters to our Ambassadors at Petrograd and London, 
expressed his views on peace. These were secret docu- 
ments in which the head of the Government was free to 
say anything — even things he might have deemed it dan- 
gerous to make public. Consult these two letters. They 
deal in turn, with the questions of Alsace-Lorraine, of the 
Sarre, of the demilitarization of the left bank of the Rhiiie, 
of its occupation, of the creation of an autonomous Rhine- 



366 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

land— all war aims which in 1919 were upheld by M. Cle- 
menceau at the Conference, as they were in 1916 and 1917 
by M. Aristide Briand. But of Germany's disintegration 
they contain not a word — ^not a word mentioning it or in 
any way even suggesting it. On the contrary, all the guar- 
antees demanded are demanded against a united Ger- 
many, because this unity is a fact and politicians have to 
deal with facts ; because — ^like M. Clemenceau — M. Aristide 
Briand evidently held that ''the only true unity is that of 
the heart, which no human hand can touch." 

So much for the French Government. Now for Parlia- 
ment. I have quoted the solemn resolutions passed on June 
5 and 6, 1917.* They contain no word either with regard to 
imposing disintegration upon Germany by the terms of a 
Treaty, or of any interference in her internal affairs what- 
soever. On the contrary, we find in them the assertion, 
twice repeated, that France is averse to the idea of ' ' enslav- 
ing foreign populations," and that she remains "faithful 
to her ideal of independence and freedom for all peoples." 
Fifteen months go by and, on December 2, 1918, three weeks 
after the Armistice, the Commission of Foreign Affairs 
of the Chamber of Deputies by the unanimous vote of its 
members, formulates the peace clauses it deems essential 
to France. We find among them, as in M. Briand 's letter 
of February 16, 1917, Alsace-Lorraine, the Sarre, the 
autonomous Rhineland, the reparations, but not a line, not 
a word about destruction of German unity, or refusal to 
negotiate with the Reich. And it is also against a united 
Germany that are directed all the guarantees demanded 
by Marshal Foch in his reports of November 27, 1918, Jan- 
uary 10 and March 31, 1919, as well as in his declarations 
at the plenary meeting of the Conference, May 6, 1918. He 
refers over and over again to the ''German population, 
naturally united by a common language and therefore by 
thought, as well as held together by common interest." It 
is against this community that he deems the occupation of 
the left bank of the Rhine indispensable. 

*See Chapter III, pages 81-82. 



GERMAN UNITY 367 

It was the same with all the Allies. Great Britain is so 
hostile to the disintegration of Germany that twice, in 
November and December, 1917, her Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. Balfour, speaks strongly against even the very 
limited dismemberment which would result from the crea- 
tion of an autonomous and neutral Rhineland. He 
declared : 

It is pure fancy. . . Never, at any moment, has such a scheme 
formed part of the policy of His Majesty's Government. The 
Government has never been aware that any such scheme was seri- 
ously considered by any French politician. 

In America, about the same time — December 14, 1917 — 
President Wilson had said without provoking a single criti- 
cism in Europe, where his speech was published the next 
day: 

We have no unjust designs against the German Empire. We 
do not wish to interfere with her internal affairs. Both courses 
would be absolutely contrary to our principles. 

On January 8, 1918, he read a message to Congress in 
which he laid down the Fourteen Points, the identity of 
which with the European war aims I have already shown. 
Nothing in it about the disintegration of Germany. On the 
contrary, it contained this clause, which also met no objec- 
tion in Europe : 

We do not pretend to suggest to Germany the alteration or 
modification of her institutions. 

From then on the only internal guarantee that the Presi- 
dent wishes to exact of Germany in addition to the 
European war aims is the suppression of the military and 
irresponsible autocracy of the Hohenzollerns and its 
replacement by a representative Government. He repeats 
this on April 6, 1918, at Baltimore, and on July 4, at Mount 
Vernon, insisting upon ''the necessity of not negotiating 
with an arbitrary Power which could independently. 



368 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

secretly and by its sole will disturb the peace of the world." 
But he speaks neither of destroying Germany's unity, nor 
of refusing to deal with the Reich, and no one in Europe 
differs with him. Finally when, on October 12, the Armis- 
tice correspondence begins, there is no question even of 
suppressing the Reich or of negotiating with the States 
composing it. Moreover, all this correspondence is pub- 
lished from day to day. The Parliaments are sitting. Two 
important additions to the bases of peace are suggested, 
demanded, obtained, by England and by France. And no 
one either in Paris or in London, in the High Command nor 
in the Governments, nor in the Chambers, says a single 
word of that disintegration which eight months later is to 
create a stir in the Parliaments and in the Press. 

So the Armistice is reached and its terms are read in 
Parliament the very day it is signed. It is with the ' ' rep- 
resentatives duly accredited by the German Government," 
that Marshal Foch was authorized to treat on November 
5; it is with the ''Secretary of State, Erzeberger, President 
of the German delegation acting in accord with the Ger- 
man Chancellor," that the Marshal on November 11 dis- 
cussed and signed the Armistice. The Armistice itself, in 
Articles 9, 6, 29, 30 and 32, mentions six times, as contract- 
ing party, not the States forming the Reich, but the '' Ger- 
man" Government, or "Germany.'' Remember that the 
Armistice is not only military — that it was discussed and 
reinforced at Versailles by the Governments — that it con- 
tains political and financial clauses. All this is public 
property, and proves conclusively that the Allies did not 
demand, and had no intention of demanding the destruction 
of German unity. Nobody protested, either in October or 
on November 11, even among those who a few months later 
were to denounce as criminal the action of the Allies in 
negotiating with the Reich. 

The Press itself, though its irresponsibility gave it 
greater freedom of expression, does not blame the Cham- 
bers for accepting what the Government brings to them. 
It had one very legitimate preoccupation, namely that what 



GERMAN UNITY 369 

was left of Austria-Hungary should not be allowed to unite 
with Germany. Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles pro- 
vided for this. But the disintegration of Germany — the 
forcible destruction of her unity — does not at all interest 
the papers. On October 28 we read : 

As for imaginary solutions, such as that which consists in 
believing that Southern Catholic Germany could hold Protestant 
Prussia in check, these have precisely the same value as the theory 
of the Three Germanics. M. Rouher, Napoleon III 's minister, also 
asserted that a Germany cut up into three pieces would never 
unite. 

On October 29 : 

"We cannot establish particularism and separatism to order in 
Germany. 

On November 4 : 

Let us not be deceived. The movement of Germany unity is 
not yet finished. However desirable a revival of particularism 
might be for Europe, it is not in that direction the German States 
as a whole are tending. 

On November 5 : 

The idea of a Southern Catholic Germany including Bavaria 
and German Austria, has not at all the attraction for us which it 
possesses in certain quarters. These combinations always possible 
on paper cannot be realized at will. We cannot laiead the German 
dough to suit our fancy. Besides people are fooling themselves with 
regard to Bavaria which has only seven million inhabitants, and 
with regard to the attractive force of the little provincial state of 
Munich. 

Finally, the same day, we find expressed almost word 
for word the contention put forward by me on September 2, 
1919, in the Chamber, and by M. Clemenceau, on October 11 
following, in the Senate, on the subject of possible particu- 
larism and the eventual influence to be exerted in that 
direction. 



370 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

In general, these things are either not done at all or are done 
badly from without. Events have a habit of presenting themselves 
in unexpected guises and, if we attempt to anticipate them, we run 
the risk of interpreting them wrongly and taking them at cross- 
purposes. 

I could give quotations of this sort indefinitely. I have 
chosen these in preference to others, because they cannot 
be suspected of democratic idealism ; for they are all taken 
from the articles of a Royalist writer, M. Jacques Bain- 
ville, whose party has made itself in 1920, the vehement 
advocate of the disintegration of Germany^ 

IV 

Such the conditions in which the Allies were placed at 
the Conference. Such the reasons for which they felt that 
they were faced by a practical impossibility, by a moral 
factor which, in M. Clemenceau's own words **no human 
hand can touch," because, as history has shown a hundred 
times, military force is powerless against spiritual force. 

The French Government, especially, was convinced 
that forcible interference with this state of affairs would 
be dangerous. How could we forget that the victories of 
Napoleon and his policy of the Confederation of the Rhine, 
inspired by that of Mazarin, did more to create a senti- 
ment of unity in Germany than even the preachings of 
Fichte! How could we forget that Napoleon III, with his 
policy of the *' Three Germanics," proclaimed on the mor- 
row of Sadowa, gave Bismarck the leaven whence four years 
later sprang the idea of Empire 1 How could we refuse to 
recognize, with the Royalist writer I have just quoted, that 
such things are generally badly done from without and 
that by thus attempting to destroy a nation, we are certain 
to strengthen the bonds that hold it together? 

Does this mean that there is no hope that a spontaneous 
awakening of the particularist spirit may some day oppose 
Prussian preponderance ? The French Government thought 
otherwise and has proved it by its acts. In this respect the 



GERMAN UNITY 371 

French Government was in accord with the views of an 
American writer, Mr. Baldwin: *'If the German Empire 
broke up into separate states (which is something quite 
different from the vivisection of the German Empire) it 
would be an incalculable gain from every point of view." 
M. Clemenceau and his colleagues felt that it was at once 
impossible and dangerous to impose this disintegration by 
force — to employ what M. Hanotaux, an advocate of this 
method, calls the "compelle intrare" — but whenever at any 
particular point, autonomous tendencies manifested them- 
selves spontaneously they loyally and openly tried to sup- 
port them. I may add that, on such occasions, the Allied 
Governments always showed the greatest hesitation — 
sometimes even the plainest opposition. 

One early instance of this is furnished by the affairs 
of Bavaria. Kurt Eisner had just fallen. The economic 
situation was critical. Relations with Berlin were strained. 
The French Government presents the facts and offers to 
send supply trains direct to Bavaria. Immediately Lord 
Robert Cecil, Mr. Hoover, and Mr. Lansing raise objections 
on the ground that arrangements have already been made 
to this effect, under the Armistice of November 11, mth 
the German Government which is responsible for the pay- 
ment. Mr. Lansing says: 

*'I have not the shghtest confidence in an expedient 
which involves interference in the affairs of any country 
whatsoever. ' ' 

It is decided to consult the Supreme Economic Council, 
which replies, "So far as the Council can judge, the pro- 
posed measures from the point of view of food supply and 
finance are neither desirable nor possible." So there was 
unanimous opposition to our proposal. 

On the left bank of the Rhine it has been seen how Great 
Britain's unswerving refusal, soon followed by that of the 
United States, had closed the door to the policy of auton- 
omy recommended by France in the only region where it 
might perhaps, have been immediately applicable,* A 

*See Chapter V. 



372 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

significant incident proved, a few weeks later, that onr 
Allies' apprehensions had not been allayed. On Sunday, 
June 1, 1919, Herr Dorten, a former magistrate, without 
political experience or authority, put up posters proclaim- 
ing himself President of the Rhenish Republic. The same 
day, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George received from the 
Commanders-in-Chief of the American and British forces 
two reports which corroborated each other and gave the 
impression that this ''comic opera incident" had been 
favourably viewed by the French military authorities. It 
was the moment when so many people in London and else- 
where were dominated by the fear that Germany would not 
sign. The next day, June 2, in the afternoon, Mr. Lloyd 
George began his earnest attempt to make M. Clemenceau 
give up the occupation of the left bank of the Rhine — a 
hotbed of intrigues, he declared, and a menace to the peace 
of Europe. For two weeks M. Clemenceau had to fight step 
by step to prevent any change in this occupation without 
which the most determined advocates of the "Rhenish 
pohcy" will admit that this policy would be, to say the least, 
difficult. Once again, anticipation of the future had come 
near costing us our hold upon the realities. What hap- 
pened in March, 1920, at the time of the occupation of 
Frankfort, throws light upon the history of the preceding 
year. 

Even where matters of pure form were involved a 
similar state of mind had revealed itself. On May 2, 1919, 
the French Government had proposed that Bavaria and 
those of the German States which had signed the Treaty 
of Frankfort, should be called upon to sign the Treaty of 
Versailles. On the fourth, the Committee to which this pro- 
posal had been referred, rejected it ; only the French repre- 
sentative voting in its favour. As a matter of fact, it is 
hard to see just how authority given to Count von Brock- 
dorff-Rantzau to obtain the signature of the Bavarian Gov- 
ernment could have altered the general constitution of 
Germany, or have lessened the German danger for France. 
So the refusal of the Allies was not a serious matter; but 



GERMAN UNITY 373 

nevertheless, it threw light upon their state of mind. All 
that France could obtain was the insertion in the preamble 
to the Treaty, of a sentence which, in spite of the Constitu- 
tion of Union adopted by the Assembly of Weimar, author- 
ized the resumption of diplomatic relations between the 
Governments of the Entente and the self-governing States 
forming part of the German Em.pire. In accordance with 
this clause, a French legation was re-established at Munich 
in 1920. 

It must be confessed moreover that, as the Conference 
progressed, the Allies found many additional reasons for 
adhering to the policy of non-interference defined in their 
war aims. Everywhere, from January 15 to June 28, there 
was anxiety that the victors might not find a German Gov- 
ernment to sign. Was this then the moment to reject the 
one which had come legally into existence as a result of 
the general elections, and could speak in the name of the 
Eeichstag? The financial clauses because of the enormous 
sums involved led to a long and difficult discussion. Was 
it possible without danger of giving Germany a chance to 
escape from the responsibilities contracted by her as a 
single nation, to treat, not with her, but with Bavaria, 
Saxony, Wurtemburg, as well as with all the smaller States 
composing the Reich — Hamburg, Anhalt, Saxe- Weimar and 
so many others besides! For the Allies to obtain payment 
it was necessary that Germany should again begin to pro- 
duce and to export ; but would this be possible, if the organi- 
zation which was the source of German prosperity were 
shattered? And again how can force prevail against a 
mental attitude? What can material power do against a 
*' unity which is of the heart." 

In other words, every aspect of the war which the peace 
was to bring to a conclusion showed Germany united by 
long and complex responsibilities, and therefore it was 
necessary — logically, legally and practically — for the 
Treaty to be applied to that Germany. May I be permitted 
to add to the recital of past events that when one sees the 
extremes of indulgence which at times such or such of the 



374 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TEEATY 

Allies have for the duplicity and infractions of a Germany 
surviving united in all her responsibilities, one wonders 
what would have happened if it could have been said, if 
one could say to-day, that by the very terms of the Treaty 
and by the will of the victors responsible, Germany has 
ceased to exist. 

Thus the Conference went on painfully and laboriously 
without anything ever arising to modify the broad vision 
of M. Clemenceau's wisdom: ''The only unity is that of the 
heart and that no human hand can touch." Had it been 
otherwise, had not this unity asserted itself as enduring, 
Germany — need I insist upon it? — ^would have suffered the 
same fate as Austria-Hungary. But Germany showing no 
desire for dissolution, the head of the French Government 
was determined, as were his colleagues, not to "break his 
sword" in a vain attempt to force it upon her, and he con- 
cluded in full agreement with Mr. Lloyd George : 

"We all know very well that the best way to work for 
Germany's disintegration if this be possible, is to take no 
hand in it." 

This was the truth yesterday. It is the truth to-day. 
It will be the truth to-morrow. Disintegration has not taken 
place from within. Therefore it would have been, as M. 
Bainville wrote in November, 1918, imprudent and useless 
to undertake it from without. If, under the influence of 
new interests, particularist movements some day arise, they 
will succeed all the better if their Prussian adversaries 
cannot point to foreign complicity. They will succeed only 
on that condition. For, in the matter of nationality, it is 
as impossible to create by force, as it is to destroy by 
force. Alsace-Lorraine, Poland and Bohemia have risen 
from their graves because their souls had never died. The 
Allies did not wish by the use of violence against a national- 
ity simply to build a fragile edifice upon sand, and so 
expose themselves to the tragic turn that has overwhelmed 
the Hapsburg Empire. 

The peace did not break Germany into bits, not only 
because an attempt to do this, which never had any place 



GERMAN UNITY 375 

in the Allied war aims, would have been the negation of all 
their principles, but also and above all because it would 
have been impossible. France would far rather not have 
at her very doors and bound together by a common will 
and consciousness of unity a people from which she has so 
often suffered. But the danger of this proximity residing 
precisely in the unity of these consciences and of these 
wills, the Peace Conference was powerless against it. If it 
had agreed to attempt to break it, it would have only 
strengthened it. If France had attempted this alone, and 
in spite of her Allies, there would have been no Peace 
Treaty. "We all hope some improvement may be looked for 
in the future, but it is on the one condition that neither 
force nor intrigue be brought to bear from without. As 
Marshal Foch wrote, speaking of the possibility of an evolu- 
tion of the German mind, in his Memorandum of January 
10, 1919: *'We shall see such an evolution only in time — 
a very long time, no doubt — determined as we are not to 
hasten persuasion hy force nor to interfere in the settle- 
ment of Germany's internal af fairs.'' 

This policy, the only one that can give results, will find 
its justification in the future. To reduce Germany and 
Prussia, the Allies preferred practical means to an artificial 
disintegration of a conscious and accepted unity — a disinte- 
gration pregnant with present hatreds and future revenge. 
They forbade that union of Germany and Austria which 
the Socialists of both countries were preparing to carry 
out by sleight of hand and which a third only of the Reichs- 
rath voted for in 1920. They took from her Poznan — the 
cradle of the junkers — which Bismarck described as the 
backbone of the Prussian body. They took from her the 
ore of Lorraine, which was the basis of her war industry 
— in all, 84,000 square kilometers, and 8,000,000 inhabitants. 
They deemed this solution more thoroughgoing than one 
which, violating their principles, would have given them 
the illusion of destroying German unity, while sacrificing 
to this illusion for the sole benefit of separate States, the 
whole or a part of our military and financial guarantees. 



CHAPTER XII 

KECONSTRUCTIOlSr AND THE FUTUEE OF FRANCE 

Germany attacked France to dominate, mutilate, and 
ruin her. I have given above some details of the plan of 
methodical devastation devised by Germany in February, 
1916.* Victory gave us back our frontiers and our secur- 
ity. But it left us impoverished to an extent unparalleled 
in history. 

Our man power had suffered terribly. Of a population 
of 37,797,000— of which 9,420,000 were men between nine- 
teen and fifty years — 8,410,000, or eighty-nine and five- 
tenths per cent, of our potential effectives, had been called 
to the colours and for nearly five years withdrawn from 
productive labour. Of these 8,410,000 men called to the 
colours, 5,564,000, or sixty-six per cent, met either death 
or injury; 1,364,000 killed; 740,000 mutilated; 3,000,000 
wounded; 490,000 prisoners. Nearly all of the latter 
returned from Germany ill and wasted, one man in ten 
tubercular for life. Compared to the total number of men 
called to the colours (8,410,000), the killed (1,364,000) rep- 
resent sixteen per cent. ; fifty-seven per cent, of all French- 
men called to the colours between the ages of eighteen and 
thirty-two — the young generation which is the chief 
strength of a country — were killed. In order to grasp the 
full significance of these figures, apply them to the popula- 
tion of the United States. Had American losses been on 
the French scale, it would have meant the raising by Amer- 
ica of about twenty-six and a half million soldiers, of whom 
four millions would have died. 

This decline in man power went hand in hand with a 
decline in financial power. The net cost of the war — 



See Chapter IX, page 281. 

376 



RECONSTEUCTION AND THE FUTURE 377 

deducting all that Germany has to reimburse (pensions 
and allowances) and all that France would have spent had 
there been no war — amounts to 150,000 millions. The 
grand total is 210,000 millions paid out of our Treasury 
from 1914 to 1919. For example our artillery and aviation 
cost us 46,000 millions ; the equipment of our troops, 30,000 
millions; separation allowances, 19,000 millions; food sup- 
plies for the Armies, 18,000 millions ; pay, 12,000 millions ; 
ocean freight, 12,000 millions; loans to our Allies, 11,000 
millions. As the taxes during the war brought in only 
34,000 millions, it is evident that 176,000 millions had to be 
found by other means for meeting the cost of the struggle. 
Deducting the 33,000 millions lent us by our Allies, this 
leaves a sum of 143,000 millions paid by France from her 
own resources, plus 34,000 millions in taxes, a total of 
177,000 millions in all. The national debt which, in 1914, 
amounted to 35,000 millions with no foreign debt, has risen 
to 176,000 internal debt, and 33,000 millions foreign debt, 
(68,000 millions at the October, 1920, rate of exchange.) 
The budget has risen from about 5,000 millions in 1914 to 
22,000 millions. 

But this new burden coincides with an enormous 
decrease in our capital. Lord Derby, Ambassador of Great 
Britain in Paris, addressing a meeting of his countrymen 
in Liverpool, in 1919, said: ''Suppose England were 
deprived of Lancashire by an earthquake; then you will 
understand what the ruins of war and German destruction 
mean to France. ' ' A few figures to illustrate this compari- 
son which though striking, is probably an understatement : 

Inhabitants driven from their homes 2,732,000 

Lands destroyed by battle 3,800,000 Hect. 

Villages devastated 4,022 

Houses completely or partly destroyed 594,616 

Schools destroyed 6,454 

Factories destroyed (completely or partly) 20,539 

Live stock carried off 1,360,000 head 

Kailway lines of general and local interest 

destroyed 4,789 km. 

Roads destroyed 53,398 km. 



378 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Canals destroyed , 948 km. 

Public works destroyed on roads and railroads. . . . 5,041 

Pre-war production of the devastated zone with regard to the total 
production of France. 

Coal 55% 

Woolen goods 94% 

Linen thread 90% 

Ore 90% 

Pig iron 80% 

Sugar 70% 

Cotton goods 60% 

Electric power 45% 

Sugar beets 25% 

Oats 10% 

"Wheat 9% 

Fodder beets 9% 

Percentage of taxes paid in 1913 by the 
devastated zone 18.5% 

The classification by departments of these total losses 
emphasizes the immensity of the disaster. It is given in 
the following tables: 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NORD 

Population of the war zone in 1914 1,862,000 

Population driven out by the war 758,000 

Villages devastated 501 

Schools destroyed 1,555 

Houses completely destroyed 50,010 

Houses partly destroyed 101,292 

Total surface ruined H=^ 500,000 

Arable lands ruined H^ 268,808 

Live stock carried off 244,000 

Factories destroyed completely or partly 11,814 

Roads destroyed K"^ 7,578 

Public works destroyed on roads 1,032 

Railway lines of local interest destroyed K"^ 540 

DEPARTMENT OF THE PAS-DE-CALAIS 

Population of the war zone in 1914 581,000 

Population driven out by the war 460,000 

Villages devastated 367 

Schools destroyed 554. 



RECONSTEUCTION AND THE FUTURE 379 

Houses completely destroyed 70,634 

Houses partly destroyed 36,480 

Total surface ruined H* 267,000 

Arable lands ruined H* 138,082 

Live stock carried off 124,000 

Factories destroyed completely or partly 1,560 

Roads destroyed K"^ 7,840 

Public works destroyed on roads 133 

Railway lines of local interest destroyed K"^ 147 

DEPARTMENT OF THE 80MME 

Population of the war zone in 1914 281,000 

Population driven out by the war 280,000 

Villages destroyed 448 

Schools destroyed 596 

Houses completely destroyed 40,335 

Houses partly destroyed 18,766 

Total surface ruined H^ 400,000 

Arable lands ruined H* 190,700 

Live stock carried off 140,000 

Factories destroyed completely or partly 1,099 

Roads destroyed K"^ 7,144 

Public works destroyed on roads 173 

Railway lines of local interest destroyed K"^ 220 

DEPARTMENT OF THE 0I8E 

Population in the war zone in 1914 112,398 

Population driven out by the war 96,000 

Villages destroyed 263 

Schools destroyed 260 

Houses completely destroj'ed 8,745 

Houses partly destroyed 15,650 

Total surface ruined H* 170,000 

Arable lands ruined H« 107,332 

Live stock carried off 78,000 

Factories destroyed completely or partly 283 

Roads destroyed K"^ 2,688 

Public works destroyed on roads 152 

Raihvay lines of local interest destroyed K™ 61 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AISNE 

Population in the war zone in 1914 530,000 

Population driven out by the war 290,000 

Villages destroyed 814 



380 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Schools destroyed 1,224 

Houses completely destroyed 55,268 

Houses partly destroyed 50,018 

Total surface ruined H^ 730,000 

Arable lands ruined H* 432,000 

Live stock carried off 251,000 

Factories destroyed completely or partly 1,966 

Koads destroyed K"^ 6,391 

Public works destroyed on roads 761 

Railway lines of local interest destroyed K"^ 609 

DEPARTMENT OF THE MARNE 

Population in the war zone in 1914 300,000 

Population driven out by the war 223,000 

Villages destroyed 320 

Schools destroyed 432 

Houses completely destroyed 30,612 

Houses partly destroyed 19,285 

Total surface ruined H* 293,000 

Arable lands ruined H* 136,639 

Live stock carried off 116,000 

Factories destroyed completely or partly 913 

Roads destroyed K"^ 6,183 

Public works destroyed on roads 132 

Railway lines of local interest destroyed K™- 204 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARDENNES 

Population in the war zone in 1914 324,000 

Population driven out by the war 180,000 

Villages destroyed 443 

Schools destroyed 789 

Houses completely destroyed 10,440 

Houses partly destroyed 14,205 

Total surface ruined H* 525,000 

Arable lands ruined H* 125,000 

Live stock carried off 185,000 

Factories destroyed completely or partly 1,528 

Roads destroyed K"^ 3,621 

Public works destroyed on roads 600 

Railway lines of local interest destroyed K"* 344 

DEPARTMENT OF THE MEUSE 

Population in the war zone in 1914 180,000 

Population driven out by the war 135,000 



RECONSTRUCTION AND THE FUTURE 381 

Villages devastated 398 

Schools destroyed 520 

Houses completely destroyed 24,229 

Houses partly destroyed 12,457 

Total surface ruined H* 320,000 

Arable lands ruined H* 168,816 

Live stock carried off 93,000 

Factories destroyed (Meuse, Meurthe-et-Moselle and 

Vosges) completely or partly 1,376 

Roads destroyed K™ 4,878 

Public works destroyed on roads 94 

Railway lines of local interest destroyed K"^ 129 

DEPARTMENT OF THE MEVRT HE -ET -MOSELLE 

Population in the war zone in 1914 424,000 

Population driven out by the war 292,000 

Villages devastated , 363 

Schools destroyed 395 

Houses completely destroyed 11,796 

Houses partly destroyed 16,609 

Total surface ruined H* 475,000 

Arable lands ruined H^ 185,700 

Live stock carried off 90,000 

Factories destroyed completely or partly (total for 

for Meuse, Meurthe-et-Moselle and Vosges) . . . 1,376 

Roads destroyed K™ 4,630 

Public works destroyed on roads 55 

Railway lines of local interest destroyed K™ 111 

DEPARTMENT OF THE VOSGES 

Population in the war zone in 1914 82,000 

Population driven out by the war 18,000 

Villages devastated 105 

Schools destroyed 129 

Houses completely destroyed 2,122 

Houses partly destroyed 5,663 

Total surface ruined H* 120,000 

Arable lands ruined H^ 4,500 

Live stock carried off 39,000 

Factories destroyed completely or partly (total for 

Meuse, Meurthe-et-Moselle and Vosges) 1,376 

Roads destroyed K"^ 2,445 

Public works destroyed on roads 36 

Railway lines of local interest destroyed K™ 20 





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382 



RECONSTRUCTION AND THE FUTURE 383 

A large part of this destruction, carried out in cold 
blood behind the battle lines, was so thorough as to ren- 
der reconstruction a matter of the utmost difficulty. Take 
the Lens coal mines with their sixteen mining centres ; their 
twenty-nine pits; their 16,000 workmen; their output of 
four million tons in 1913. As early as September, 1914, the 
Germans destroyed all the pits and mining apparatus, cut 
the cables, dumped the cages and cars into the pits, and 
systematically broke up all the machinery. In 1915 explo- 
sives are employed. Props, cylinders, boilers, even their 
linings are blown up by dynamite and the galleries are 
flooded. Water fills the mines to the surface level. Before 
any work of restoration can be begun, it will be necessary 
to pump out fifty million cubic meters of water. Take the 
Arbel plants at Douai, covering 5,600 square meters. In 
a report dated January 31, 1915, the German Schroter 
boasts of having destroyed or stolen everything they con- 
tained. There was a huge steam hammer weighing 1,200 
tons, the only one of its kind in the world. While the Ger- 
mans were removing it, they taunted the French manager 
who had stuck to his post : 

"It was with that press you got a Roumanian order for 
one hundred petroleum trucks away from us," they said. 
**We are going to carry it off to our own factories and 
we'll make the Arbel trucks ourselves now." 

For three months a German engineer ransacked the 
archives, documents and correspondence of the company 
to complete the theft of the machinery by that of the 
clientele. Take the Homecourt iron and steel works. All 
the plates, all the sheet iron, rolling bridges, motors and 
machinery are removed. A special destruction staff with 
headquarters at Metz directed these operations under the 
name of ''Administration for the Protection of French 
Factories." It would take a thousand pages to describe 
this vandalism in detail. Ruthlessly conducted, it achieved 
its purpose. No trace of industry left in these ten depart- 
ments, the most prosperous in France. No trace of agricul- 
tural life either. Fruit trees cut down, barns blown up, 



384 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

death everywhere. Take at random the Canton of Ribe- 
court in the Oise. Of its eighteen communes eight saw one 
hundred per cent, of their houses utterly wiped out. The 
proportion runs from eighty to ninety-five per cent, in 
seven other communes and there are only three where it 
falls below eighty per cent. Of nine hundred connnunes in 
the Department of the Aisne, only nineteen are untouched 
by war. In many regions after the Armistice it was pos- 
sible to drive thirty or forty miles without coming across a 
single house. It was so between Soissons and Saint- 
Quentin (sixty kilometers) ; between Armentieres and 
Peronne (ninety-five kilometers) ; between Soissons and 
Laon (forty kilometers). "The results of war," hypocriti- 
cally moans the beaten foe. No, this is not true, and take 
as a single instance the Pas-de-Calais, where only two dis- 
tricts were ruined by war but all the territory behind the 
lines occupied by the enemy suffered equally. 

So much for the ruin directly due to Germany. Heavy 
as it is, it is not the only burden borne by France as a 
result of the war. All our economic means have suffered. 
Not one of our resources is whole. Our railways, which for 
nearly five years carried all the Armies of the Allies, were 
worn out by the strain and showed in 1920 a deficit of 
2,400 millions. Our merchant marine, which amounted to 
three million tons before the war, lost a million tons by 
submarine warfare and they could not be replaced as all 
through the war our naval yards were busy producing 
artillery for all our Allies. Two-thirds of our investment 
in foreign countries, which represented 37,000 millions in 
1914, became unproductive. Our exports, less by 1,500 mil- 
lions in 1914 than our imports, show a deficit of 21,000 
millions in 1919. The pound sterling in 1920 has main- 
tained its up level at about fifty francs and the dollar at 
about fifteen. France, at the very moment when the great 
field of reconstruction opened before her, was in the situa- 
tion of a wounded man who has lost so much blood that he 
can scarcely move his limbs and can scarcely raise himself. 

France, convalescent France, summoned all the forces 



RECONSTRUCTION AND THE FUTURE 385 

of her will, and already results show what energy is hers. 
She is still indeed far from recovered and if she is to con- 
tinue as during the two years which have followed the 
Armistice, without execution of Treaty by Germany, with- 
out efficacious aid from her Allies, I shudder to think of 
the number of years it mil take her to recover. And yet 
without undue national pride, I have the right to say that 
France may justly be proud of what she has already done. 

Reconstruction of the devastated regions began without 
delay and has been carried on with method. To under- 
stand the extraordinary problem it presented, one must 
have seen and have felt it on the ground itself. Not a 
shelter, not an ordinary means of communication, not even 
a soil that could be cultivated — everything upheaved, 
pounded, ruined, killed, by four and a half years of destruc- 
tion. The pioneer who comes into a new land can set to 
w^ork to plow and to sow. The grain will grow. On the 
battlefields it is first necessary to remove projectiles, 
uproot wires, fill in shell-holes, level the ground. Where 
was a start to be made? Men, women and children rushed 
back to their recovered villages. But of these villages not 
one stone was left standing on another. Where were people 
to be housed? Houses or no houses, they stayed. How 
were they to be fed? How were they to be given tools? 
They answered the call of the soil and as clearing up began 
they tried to cultivate. How were live stock and seed to be 
moved? Where were they to be put? The French peasant 
solved the problem instinctively, for he thought of the land 
before he thought of himself and though he lacked labour, 
horses, everything in fact — even a roof over his head — he 
reaped, even in 1919, a harvest from the battlefield. Mean- 
while with the energetic cooperation of the Government, 
mines and factories were repaired and in less than eighteen 
months after the Armistice, the features of resurrected 
France begin to appear on the zone of death. 

Here again constructive effort must, like the work of 
destruction, be studied region by region. The accompany- 
ing tables give the relative percentages of restoration to 
September 1, 1920, 



52% 



386 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NOBD 

Trenches filled up M^ 11,300,000 = 94% 

Barbed wire removed M^ 9,000,000 = 90% 

Land cleared M^ 3,000,000 = 75% 

Population of the devastated region 

(October, 1920) 1,843,265 = 98% 

Municipalities functioning 457 =81% 

Schools open 1,539 = SQ% 

Houses repaired 79,000 1 

Temporary houses erected 11,000' 

Houses definitely rebuilt 18,000 =11.8% 

Total surface cleared of projectiles H^ 492,000 = 98% 

Total surface levelled H^ 490,000 = 98% 

Arable surface cultivated H^ 242,000 = 90% 

Live stock returned 127,828 := 52% 

Factories reconstructed and in operation 2,190 =18% 
Factories under reconstruction and in 

partial operation 2,927 = 24% 

Factories not yet operating 6,697 = 56% 

Roads rebuilt K'" 5,813 = 74% 

Public works rebuilt on roads 818 = 78% 

Railway lines of local interest recon- 
structed K"" 159 = 29% 

DEPARTMENT OF THE PA8-DE-CALAI8 

Trenches filled in M^ 58,147,800 = 79% 

Wire removed M^ 54,989,800 = 73% 

Localities cleared M^ 4,689,400 = 52% 

Population of the devastated zone (Octo- 
ber, 1920) 344,851 = 59% 

Municipalities in action 170 =81% 

Schools in action 492 = 88% 

Houses repaired 18,515 ] 

Temporary houses erected 18,924 ( 

Houses definitely rebuilt 2,000 = 1.8% 

Total surface cleared of projectiles H^ 249,000 = 93% 

Total surface levelled H^ 233,600 = 83% 

Arable surface cultivated H^ 56,868 = 41% 

Live stock returned 41,321 = 34% 

Factories reconstructed and in operation 324 = 20% 



21% 



= 24% 



KECONSTRUCTION AND THE FUTUEE 387 

Factories under reconstruction and in 

partial operation 255 = 16% 

Factories not yet operating 981 =62% 

Koads rebuilt K™ 2,411 = ZQ% 

Public works rebuilt on roads 30 = 22% 

Railway lines of local interest recon- 
structed K'" 48 = 32% 

DEPARTMENT OF THE SOMME 

Trenches filled in M^ 39,066,600 = 65% 

Wire removed M^ 16,076,000 = 73% 

Localities cleared M^ 1,909,500 = 42% 

Population of the devastated zone (Octo- 
ber, 1920) 120,294 = 42% 

Municipalities in action 381 =100% 

Schools in action 490 = 78% 

Houses repaired 8,401 , 

Temporary houses erected 6,0481 

Houses definitely rebuilt 1,647^ = 2.7% 

Total surface cleared of projectiles H^ 365,900 =91% 

Total surface levelled H* 298,500 = 74% 

Arable surface cultivated H*^ 127,000 =66% 

Live stock returned 31,886 = 22% 

Factories reconstructed and in operation 267 =24% 
Factories under construction and in par- 
tial operation 501 =45% 

Factories not yet operating 331 =30% 

Roads rebuilt K'^ 2,820 = 39% 

Public works rebuilt on roads 10 = 5% 

Railway lines of local interest recon- 
structed K'" 78 = 35% 

DEPARTMENT OF THE 0I8E 

Trenches filled in M^ 13,558,300 = 90% 

Wire removed M^ 14,601,600 = 91% 

Localities cleared M^ 1,081,300 = 54% 

Population of the devastated zone (Octo- 
ber, 1920) 88,917 = 78% 

Municipalities in action 201 =100% 

Schools in action 195 = 75% 

Houses repaired 10,025 ) ^^ 

Temporary houses erected 2,757 j 



388 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Houses definitely rebuilt 798 = 3.2% 

Total surface cleared of projectiles H* 124,150 = 73% 

Total surface levelled H^ 116,280 = 66% 

Arable surface cultivated H^ 80,468 = 74%, 

Live stock returned 56,466 = 12% 

Factories reconstructed and in operation 88 r=: 31% 
Factories under construction and in par- 
tial operation 137 = 49%, 

Factories not yet operating 58 = 20% 

Roads rebuilt K^ 1,263 = 46%, 

Public works rebuilt on roads 26 = 17% 

Railway lines of local interest recon- 
structed K™ 41 = 67%o 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AI8NE 

Trenches filled in M^ 23,300,000 = 64% 

Wire removed. . T M^ 26,200,000 = 65%o 

Localities cleared M^ 2,600,000 = 52% 

Population of the devastated zone (Octo- 
ber, 1920) 290,000 = 54%, 

Municipalities in action 214 = 33% 

Schools in action 1,107 

Houses repaired 40,620 

Temporary houses erected 12,582 

Houses definitely rebuilt = 0% 

Total surface cleared of projectiles H* 592,000 — 81 %o 

Total surface levelled H* 555,000 = 76%, 

Arable surface cultivated H* 325,000 = 54% 

Live stock returned 43,368 = 16%, 

Factories reconstructed and in operation 232 =: 11% 
Factories under construction and in par- 
tial operation 253 = 12% 

Factories not yet operating 1,481 =75% 

Roads rebuilt K"^ 4,978 = 77% 

Public works rebuilt on roads 367 =48% 

Railway lines of local interest recon- 
structed K™ 68 = 11% 

DEPARTMENT OF THE MARNE 

Trenches filled in M^ 23,177,000 = 79% 

Wire removed M^ 41,253,300 =95% 



= 53% 



49% 



RECONSTRUCTION AND THE FUTURE 389 

Localities cleared M^ 1,458,600 = 26% 

Population of the devastated zone (Octo- 
ber, 1920) 232,000 = 69% 

Municipalities in action 551 = 98% 

Schools in action 348 = 81% 

Houses repaired 16,356 1 

Temporary houses erected 4,363 \ 

Houses definitely rebuilt 825 = 1.6% 

Total surface cleared of projectiles H^ 246,740 = 84% 

Total surface levelled H^ 214,700 = 70% 

Arable surface cultivated H^ 68,118 =49% 

Live stock returned 18,989 = 16% 

Factories reconstructed and in operation 96 := 10% 
Factories under construction and in par- 
tial operation 420 = 46% 

Factories not yet operating 397 =: 43% 

Koads rebuilt K"^ 3,041 = 49% 

Public works rebuilt on roads 25 = 18% 

Railway lines of local interest recon- 
structed K"" 17 = 8% 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARDENNES 

Trenches filled in M^ 4,897,000 = 22% 

Wire removed M- 12,353,300 = 77% 

Localities cleared M^ 3,575,700 = 51% 

Population of the devastated zone (Octo- 
ber, 1920) 204,104 = 69% 

Municipalities in action 503 =100% 

Schools in action 782 = 99% 

Houses repaired 29,132 

Temporary hpuses erected 4,236 

Houses definitely rebuilt 3,016 '= 12.2% 

Total surface cleared of projectiles H^ 480,720 =91% 

Total surface levelled H^ 433,390 = 82% 

Arable surface cultivated H^ 90,000 =72% 

Live stock returned 53,455 = 28% 

Factories reconstructed and in operation 396 =25% 
Factories under reconstruction and in 

partial operation 798 = 53% 

Factories not yet operating 334 =21% 

Roads rebuilt K'" 1,373 = 46% 

Public works rebuilt on roads 332 =55% 



95% 



390 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Railway lines of local interest recon- 
structed K"" 30 = 8% 

DEPARTMENT OF THE MEU8E 

Trenches filled in M^ 4,348,900 = 28% 

Wire removed M^ 23,645,700 = 84% 

Localities cleared M^ 1,897,700 = 94% 

Population of the devastated zone (Octo- 
ber, 1920) 98,000 = 54% 

Municipalities in action 310 =100% 

Schools in action 486 = 93% 

Houses repaired 8,738| _ „ .^ 

Temporary houses erected 4,750 ( 

Houses definitely rebuilt 1,112= 3% 

Total surface cleared of projectiles H^ 264,800 =82% 

Total surface levelled H^ 264,800 = 82% 

Arable surface cultivated H^ 69,200 = 40% 

Live stock returned 29,710 = 31% 

Factories reconstructed and in operation, 
composing one sector with Meurthe-et- 

Moselle and Vosges, giving total of 224 = 16% 

Factories under construction and in par- 
tial operation 245 =17% 

Factories not yet operating 907 =65% 

Roads rebuilt K"^ 2,688 = 55% 

Public works rebuilt on roads 70 = 74% 

Railway lines of local interest recon- 
structed K"^ 43 = 34% 

DEPARTMENT OF THE MEVRT HE -ET -MOSELLE 

Trenches filled in M^ 10,643,300 = 95% 

Wire removed M^ 32,175,400 = 58% 

Localities cleared M^ 1,900,700 = 95% 

Population of the devastated zone (Octo- 
ber, 1920) 314,902 = 74% 

Municipalities in action 132 =43% 

Schools in action 386 = 97% 

Houses repaired 7,743) _ ^^ 

Temporary houses erected 4,363 C "~ 

Houses definitely rebuilt 3,995 = 14% 



EECONSTRUCTION AND THE FUTURE 391 

Total surface cleared of projectiles H^ 400,500 = 84% 

Total surface levelled H* 400,500 = 84% 

Arable surface cultivated H^ 135,750 =73% 

Live stock returned 37,245 = 41% 

Factories reconstructed and in operation, 
forming only one district with Meuse 

and Vosges, giving a total of 224 = 16% 

Factories under construction and in par- 
tial operation 245 = 17% 

Factories not yet operating 907 =65% 

Roads rebuilt K™ 2,867 = 60% 

Public works rebuilt on roads 17 = 30% 

Railway lines of local interest recon- 
structed K"* 92 = 82% 

DEPARTMENT OF TEE VOSGES 

Trenches fiUed in M^ 1,612,100 = 40% 

Wire removed M^ 4,379,900 = 62% 

Localities cleared M^ 372,000 = 37% 

Population of the devastated zone (Octo- 
ber, 1920) 68,901 = 84% 

Municipalities in action 73 =100% 

Schools in action 126 = 96% 

Houses repaired 3,149] 

Temporary houses erected 225 \ 

Houses definitely rebuilt 1,321 = 17% 

Total surface cleared of projectiles H* 85,440 = 74% 

Total surface levelled H^ 70,290 =58% 

Arable surface cultivated H* 3,300 =73% 

Live stock returned 4,343 = 11% 

Factories reconstructed and in operation, 
forming only one district with 
Meurthe-et-Moselle and Meuse giving 

a total of 224 = 16% 

Factories under reconstruction and in 

partial operation 245 = 17% 

Factories not yet operating 907 =65% 

Roads rebuilt K'" 367 = 15% 

Public works rebuilt on roads 36 =100% 

Railway lines of local interest recon- 
structed K"* 4 = 20% 



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234,675,000 M2 
22,484,900113 

3,605,234 
2,993 
5,951 
221,679-1 
69,248j 
32,714 

3,301,250 Ha 

3,077,060 Ha 

1,197,704 Ha 

444,610 

3,817 

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RECONSTRUCTION AND THE FUTURE 393 

This effort, improvised as our troops advanced, was 
carried on by the State mth the aid of private assistance 
as soon as the ground was freed. The Government services 
were powerfully organized. On January 1, 1920, there 
were 195,000 on their payroll, including 15,000 technical 
employees and 180,000 labourers. Transportation by them 
within the devastated regions represents eleven million 
kilometric tons per month. The cost to October 1, 1920, 
amounting to about 20,500 millions, divided as follows: 

Reparation in money and in kind for damages. .11,715,000,000 frs. 

Relief for refugees 1,015,000,000 " 

Labour and transportation for State account. . . 3,915,000,000 " 
Restoration of railways, roads, canals, tele- 
graphic lines, reorganization of public services 3,400,000,000 ** 
Cost of administration 375,000,000 " 



20,420,000,000 ** 



These 20,420 millions were supplied by the French 
Treasury alone. The German Press, which might show a 
more becoming reserve, has never ceased to denounce the 
bad organization of the reconstruction services, squander- 
ing of public funds — excess of officials, etc. For political 
reasons a certain number of French newspapers have 
echoed this criticism. It is therefore interesting to note 
that of the 20,420 millions spent up to October 1, 1920, by 
the French Government, salaries of officials have only 
amounted to 375 millions, or one and eight-tenths per 
cent, of the total. If, in work of this magnitude, delays, 
imperfections and even mistakes are inevitable, the fact 
remains that the results already attained are more than 
could have been expected. 

The above tables call for no comment in this respect. I 
would add to them the following facts. Agriculture, which 
in money and in kind received 3,500,000,000 francs in cash, 
loans and advances, produced in 1919 five million hundred- 
weights of cereals. In 1920, the cereal production of the 
devastated regions was 11,500,000 hundredweights, against 



394 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TEEATY 

20,500,000 In 1913, or fifty-six per cent, of the pre-war crop. 
The 1920 crop was sufficient to assure the bread supply 
for the entire population of the ten devastated depart- 
ments. We are justified in the expectation that with few 
exceptions the whole of the battlefields will be under culti- 
vation in 1921. 

There were in 1914, in the regions affected by the war, 
20,539 industrial plants of all kinds. The Ministry for the 
Liberated Regions made a thorough inquiry into 4,190 of 
these establishments selected from those employing in 1914 
more than twenty workmen. This investigation gave very 
interesting results, the meaning of which should be made 
clear. The figures given below and the percentages relat- 
ing thereto do not refer to the total number of factories 
ruined by the war, but only to one-fifth of them (4,190 out 
of 20,539.) In other words, they are of value as a partial 
indication — not as a complete result. They express propor- 
tions which — while absolutely correct for the 4,190 estab- 
lishments visited — may well be correct for the other 16,000, 
but which nevertheless as regards the latter may differ 
widely. Subject to this reservation which I ask the reader 
to bear in mind, here are the results of the investigation: 

Out of these 4,190 establishments, which employed over 
twenty people in 1914, 3,210 or seventy-six and six-tenths 
per cent, have resumed operations either entirely or in 
part as follows: 

July 1, 1919 ..:.....,...„.r..»x«.r.,. .,.:., 706 

October 1, 1919 :.:.:..... :.,..:...-..«x.:.. 1,278 

January 1, 1920. ........,«.:...:......... .1,806 

April 1, 1920 ,.:.:.... 2,412 

July 1, 1920 3,004 

August 1, 1920 3,106 

September 1, 1920 3,210 

These 4,190 establishments employed 768,678 workmen 
in 1914 ; on September 1, 1920, they employed 366,930, or 
forty-seven and seven-tenths per cent. 

The comparative percentages of reoperation and reem- 



RECONSTRUCTION AND THE FUTURE 395 

ployment in the ten departments based upon the 4,190 
plants is shown by the following table: 

Percentage Applying to the 4,190 Factories Investigated. 

Departments Reopening Returned Employees 

Nord 81.7 52.2 

Pas-de-Calais 73.7 18.3 

Somme 58.9 37.8 

Oise 88.1 43.9 

Aisne 60.7 20.9 

Marne 72.5 32.3 

Ardennes 83.4 43.2 

Meuse 67.6 33.2 

Meurthe-et-Moselle 82.06 48.9 

Vosges 74.2 61.5 

Average 74.2 39.2 

If we apply this same method of analysis to the other 
departments of industry, the following percentage will be 
established : 

Percentage Applying to the 4,190 Factories Investigated. 

Industries Reopening Returned Employeei 

Mines and ore 76.4 21.9 

Quarries 82.6 53.6 

Food supplies 59.04 23.7 

Chemical industries 75.9 53.04 

India rubber paper 73.3 53.5 

Wool 83.3 53.1 

Textiles 69.1 49.6 

Materials 86.2 57.5 

Feathers and horsehair 100. 40.2 

Leather and skins 83.3 51.7 

Wood 83.9 41.5 

Metal manufactures 72.5 35.6 

Ordinary metals 86.7 48. 

Precious metals 100. 51.2 

Cut stone for building 73.9 59.1 

Earthworks and constructions . . 92.5 47.3 

Brickyards 80.4 47.7 

Average 81.1 45.7 



396 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TEEATY 

The share of certain regions in these statistics deserves 
special mention. Thus in the district of Lille, which heads 
the list, the percentage of reoperation of factories investi- 
gated is eighty-six and two-tenths per cent., of the 
reemployment sixty-two per cent. If in this district a 
special table be drawn up for the textile industry, an excep- 
tionally favourable percentage of reoperation calculated 
on the same basis will be found. 

Personnel employed in the textile industry of Lille in the plants 
under investigation -. 

Woolen industry 93.8% 

Cotton industry 78.8% 

Dyeing and preparation 65.1% 

At Tourcoing, fifty-five factories out of fifty-seven are 
in operation ; at Eoubaix, forty-six out of forty-eight. At 
Tourcoing, ninety-one and nine-tenths per cent, of the 
workers have been reemployed ; at Roubaix ninety-nine and 
nine-tenths per cent. In the metal industries results are 
not so good owing to coal shortage. The percentage of 
reoperation for investigated factories is seventy-two and 
five-tenths per cent. ; of reemployment only thirty-five and 
six-tenths per cent. 

These results must be made known to our friends. It 
is the only answer we care to make to those who accuse 
France of sleeping on her victory. But it is essential that 
the enormous amount that still remains to be done should 
also be made quite clear. The approximate total cost of 
reconstruction of damages is 143,000 millions,* of which the 
chief items are the following: 

Eeal estate 72,738 millions 

Agriculture 16,419 millions 

Industry 34,000 millions 

The French Government alone has already spent 20,500 
millions. The difference of 120,000 millions in round fig- 

*Plus the peaaions, i e. 58 billions. 



EECONSTRUCTION AND THE FUTURE 397 

ures, indicates wliat remains to be done as opposed to what 
has already been accomplished. If Germany were not 
compelled by France and her Allies — all her Allies — to pay 
what the Treaty of Versailles demands of her, this would 
beyond a doubt mean our country 's living for half a century 
under the weight of an intolerable burden. 

The population of the devastated region in October, 
1920, was seventy-seven per cent, of the 1914 population. 
France has, by her own efforts, placed under cultivation 
sixty-eight per cent, of the arable lands in these regions. 
She has rebuilt all her most important railways and fifty- 
two per cent, of her roads. But she has only been able to 
restore to the farmers thirty-two per cent, of the live stock 
stolen by Germany. She has only been able to reoperate 
in factories to the extent of eighteen per cent in full, 
twenty-six per cent, in part ; this leaves fifty-four per cent. 
of her factories not yet in operation. Furthermore she has 
been able to replace destroyed houses by temporary con- 
structions and repairs only to the extent of forty-nine per 
cent. Complete reconstruction of buildings has only been 
effected to an extent of ten and seven-tenths per cent. And 
this very low percentage expresses in striking fashion the 
limitations imposed by lack of money ! 

Living conditions in houses hastily rebuilt and in tem- 
porary barracks are appalling in some districts. Reculti- 
vation — ^in the absence of that slow and age-old upgrowth 
which had carried its yield to the maximum — ^meets with 
countless difficulties and the crops suffer. Industries — 
except in the important northern centers — ^have only had 
very hmited means with which to start again; and their 
productive capacity will for months to come represent only 
a very small portion of pre-war output. I would add that 
in many communes the moral situation is affected by the 
material conditions. Health has an influence upon charac- 
ter. The promiscuity of improvised living conditions has 
a bad effect on children, which further aggravates the con- 
sequences of invasion and enemy occupation. "Whatever 
one may try to do to better it, this environment is favour- 



398 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TEEATY 

able to physical and mental deviations. If this state of 
things were to continue, it would be in every way dangerous. 
Yet it will last until Germany pays what she owes. Then 
and only then will France cease to bear alone the burden 
of reparation for German crimes. 

Let me sum up. The France of the devastated regions 
and the other France behind the lines have put forward- 
alone and unaided— an immense effort of reconstruction. 
Farmers have tilled their fields and work has been started 
again without waiting to build a roof over their heads. All 
honour to them ! But such a condition cannot last, 

II 

To restore the ruins was our first duty, it was not 
our only one. I have shown that the war had worn out 
the national tools of France. These have to be replaced. 
Reconstruction costs thousands of millions. To make it suc- 
cessful — possible even — all the resources of the country 
necessary to it — finances, transport, commerce — must be 
renovated and revived. Our means are reduced, our bur- 
dens are heavy ; yet national reorganization cannot wait. 

France has courageously begun financial reorganiza- 
tion. I insist upon this because of the criticism so often 
heard in America and elsewhere: ''You have military 
courage, but you lack fiscal courage. You gave your all on 
the battlefield, but you are unwilling to submit to taxa- 
tion." That this criticism is justified for the first two 
years of the war I admit, yet invasion represented for 
France a burden equal or greater to the excess taxes that 
other uninvaded countries imposed upon themselves. And 
it was believed that the war would be brief. How many 
errors military as well as financial resulted from this fun- 
damental illusion. At least it must be acknowledged that 
France was not slow to readjust herself. During the last 
year of peace, she had paid less than 5,000 million francs 
in taxes. In 1919 she paid more than 9,000 millions. In 1920 
thanks to new taxes introduced by the Clemenceau Cabi- 



RECONSTRUCTION AND THE FUTURE 399 

net and voted under the Millerand Cabinet, she paid 22,000 
millions. This enormous increase is quite unprecedented. 
Remember the conditions under which it has been achieved 
and you will better understand what it means. The France 
of 1914, which paid less than 5,000 millions in taxes, had 
all her resources untouched of which the ten departments 
now devastated represented nearly one-fifth. The France 
of 1920, which paid 22,000 millions, cannot count upon 
revenues from the war zone. This means that the seventy- 
six untouched departments with their capacity very con- 
siderably limited by shortages of fuel, labour and trans- 
portation and by the unfavourable exchange, will have to 
bear the whole burden, paying in 1920 five times more than 
in 1914. 

France faced the situation boldly and made the effort 
that was needed to place her finances on a sound basis. 
Her budget is balanced, permanent expenditures being 
henceforth covered by equally permanent revenues. The 
rest of our expenditures for 1920 are exceptional, partly 
on account of war liquidation properly met by loans, partly 
on account of reparations which in equity and by law of 
victory are justly chargeable to Germany. It is scanda- 
lously unfair that these last should still burden France. 

France's debt on October 1, 1920, consists of: 

Consolidated debt (nominal value) 113,250 millions 

Floating debt 82,500 *' 

Foreign debt (normal rate of exchange) 34,125 " 



229,875 millions 

If Germany in defiance of justice and right does not 
fulfil the conditions of the Treaty and pay what she owes, 
France, in order to continue reconstruction in the devastat- 
ed regions and to pay the pensions in fuU, would be 
obliged to borrow about 170,000 millions the interest on 
which would represent 9,500 millions or an increase in tax- 
ation of 250 francs per head of her population over and 
above the 416 francs now levied by the National Govern- 



400 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

ment wMcli of course does not include the taxes raised by 
the departments and connnunes. These figures should be 
borne in mind by our Allies. They throw light on how 
Frenchmen (no matter what their party) feel when they 
say that the Treaty of Versailles must be enforced to the 
full. 

On its enforcement our industrial revival largely 
depends, for we lack coal and under the Treaty it is Ger- 
many who must deliver it. Here again it is the attacked and 
victorious country that suffers while the beaten aggressor 
goes free. In 1920 Germany had sixty-five per cent, of her 
blast furnaces working. France had forty per cent, of hers. 
Yet Germany planned and carried out the destruction of 
the mines which suppHed us annually with 22 milhon tons 
of coal — a quarter of the total French production. Ger- 
many under the Treaty was to deliver to France during 
the seven years following its coming into force 2,200,000 
tons per month, something less than one-tenth of her 1913 
output. At Spa in July, 1920, she obtained the reduction of 
this monthly figure to 1,500,000 tons. This obliges France — 
even if the 1,500,000 tons be delivered regularly — to import 
30,000,000 tons a year. It is only with great difficulty — and 
at what a price — that England supplies us with 10,000,000 
tons. So 20,000,000 tons must be procured elsewhere. The 
rigorous enforcement of the Treaty would lessen these 
forced imports by 8,400,000 tons. The security of French 
industry really depends upon such enforcement. If it is 
not insisted upon, our factories will continue to run on half 
time; our output will remain low; our exports will not 
increase ; our exchange will keep on falling. 

If the Treaty is not enforced as justice demands that 
it be, dark years await us. But if it is enforced, we can 
confidently look forward to the brightest future. France 
has in her soil prodigious potentialities of wealth. Prop- 
erly cultivated with the means supplied by victory it 
could not only feed her people, but furnish exports also. 
Our crops fell off during the war. Already they are increas- 
ing again and we have the wherewithal to grow them greater 



EECONSTEUCTION AND THE FUTURE 401 

than ever. Since we have ceased to manufacture artillery, 
we can devote to agriculture the nitrogenized fertilizer it 
has lacked since 1914. Besides we now have the potash of 
Alsace. Equal in tonnage to the German deposits there is 
enough potash in Alsace to supply the whole world. It will 
permit France before long to increase her crops from the 
eighty million cwts. of pre-war days to 125 million cwts. 
and to sell abroad the wheat she is buying from foreign 
nations. Our colonies too will share in this prosperity. 
Morocco alone sent us 100,000 cwts. of corn in 1915 and 
235,000 the following year. All Northern Africa is one vast 
grain field. If here as at home fundamental improvements 
and scientific methods are introduced, then France, seller 
of corn, will build up economic independence upon the 
soundest of bases. 

This independence in industrial activity has a further 
certain guarantee in the very clauses of the peace. Alsace- 
Lorraine doubles our potential production in ore and pig 
iron. One of the reasons of German aggression was the 
greed of the manufacturers across the Rhine who lusted for 
the iron ore of our Briey Basin. Victory leaves us Briey and 
gives us back the basin of Lorraine which is its comple- 
ment. So we are masters of the situation. For twenty years 
our metallurgists have shown that they can face difficult 
conditions with both science and daring. Thanks to them, 
our production from 1903 to 1913 showed an increase of 
eighty-seven per cent, for pig iron; of 152 per cent, for 
steel ingots and 130 per cent, for steel plates. During the 
same period France came second in the world develop- 
ment of the steel industry with an advance of 152 per cent, 
against 154 per cent, in Belgium, 118 per cent, in Germany, 
115 per cent, in the United States. To-day we rank second 
among the ore nations of the world. The most splendid 
results are certain on two conditions. The first I repeat is 
that Germany deliver the coal she owes us and, in accord- 
ance with the Treaty of Versailles, we are freed from the 
pre-war extortion practised upon us by Westphalian coal 
dealers w^hose interests were the same as those of our Essen 



402 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

competitors. The second is that by efficient organization 
we secure the foreign markets monopolized by Germany in 
the past. These conditions are both feasible. 

Thus favoured by exceptional mineral wealth, French 
industry possesses other valuable industrial resources. I 
merely mention in passing bauxite and nickel and come at 
once to the most important of all our future assets — our 
water-power which at average flow represents eight million 
horse-power. By the end of 1921 we shall have developed 
twice our pre-war horse-power. By continuing this de- 
velopment and by utilizing all power of the Rhone and the 
Rhine; by electrifying our railways, we shall be able to 
save many millions of tons of coal every year and free 
ourselves from a heavy bondage. Such an economic policy 
calls for the whole-hearted cooperation of our great 
industries and associations of manufacturers, not only of 
those providing similar goods but of those making comple- 
mentary articles as well. It calls for that centralization 
which Germany so splendidly achieved and which Helf- 
ferich called in 1913, ''the systematic cooperation of the 
great masses." Everything permits the hope that equally 
eflBcient organization will in less than twenty years place 
us in the front ranks of the exporting countries. 

Our friends across the seas must not forget that the 
unlimited resources of our colonial empire are also avail- 
able to increase the wealth of our metropolis. Western and 
Northern Africa will furnish cereals, fruits, vegetables 
and meat in abundance. Tonkin possesses coal, zinc, lead, 
tin and antimony. Madagascar has graphite; New Cale- 
donia nickel; Guiana, gold; East Africa, ore and copper. 
The equatorial forests of the Congo and the Cameroons 
harbour in their 140,000 square kilometers vast quanti- 
ties of rare wood and essential oils. Indo-China can 
export rice, jute and hemp. Every year 100,000 acres of 
land are placed under new cultivation. Among French 
ports, Saigon ranks immediately after Bordeaux. In 1920 
the foreign commerce of Indo-China attained 4,000 million 
francs. Doubtless just before the war our colonial com- 



EECONSTEUCTION AND THE FUTURE 403 

merce had not yet reached its full expansion. Our colonial 
produce amounted to only ten per cent, of our total 
imports ; but the hard years of war have strengthened the 
virtue of initiative in the French business world. The 
moment reconstruction is finished and the enormous sums 
it now absorbs can be devoted to developing new enter- 
prises, the colonial Empire of France will assume its 
rightful place among the producers of the world. 

Our railways, not satisfied with re-establishing in less 
than a year the main trunk lines destroyed by war, have 
completed the repair of their locomotives and rolling stock. 
Our commercial fleet, very inadequate before the war as 
it amounted only to 5.20 per cent, of the world's shipping, 
is gradually developing. A bank has been created with 
State assistance to promote foreign trade. Exports in 
1920 already show an appreciable advance over those in 
1919. France — unless she is allowed to be crushed beneath 
the weight of the burden which the Peace Treaty justly 
imposed upon Germany — ^is able to take a prominent part 
in that intensive production which Mr. Herbert C. Hoover 
declared in 1919 must be *■ ' the first and fundamental effort 
of Europeans." 

ni 

And yet another reason for faith in the future of 
France : the virtues of her race — ^virtues that showed in the 
war and are just as clear in peace. 

I know full well that it is not always the best that strikes 
the eye ! The stranger within our gates sees first the out- 
ward aspects of our politics. Here as elsewhere they too 
often lack elegance and grace. I know full well for 
instance the harm done to France by the French Parlia- 
ment when, six days after the Treaty came into force, it 
drove from office the man without whom the war would 
have been lost. Mr. Lloyd George's words still ring in 
my ears: *'It is Frenchmen now who are burning Joan of 
Arc." I still have before my eyes the scathing comment 
of the American Press. On January 17, the New York 



404 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Times said: **The representatives of the Freneh people 
have made a mistake that will do them more harm than 
it will M. Clemencean;" and the New York Herald: 
*' Because he thought only of the good of the State, M. 
Clemenceau incurred political hatreds to which he suc- 
cumbs." The New York Post: *'In his unexpected defeat 
M. Clemenceau remains the greatest figure of the war." 
The New York World: **The old Tiger is struck down at 
the very moment when France would have added to her 
own glory by calling him to the Presidency. The defeat 
of Clemenceau does not honour France." The Philadel- 
phia Public Ledger: *'A11 the reasons given will not excuse 
the French Parliament for having acted with the blackest 
ingratitude." After the Eastern Press let us glance at 
the most influential local papers. The Springfield Repub- 
lican: *' Americans are astonished." The Charleston 
Gazette: ** Clemenceau did not need to be president to 
remain immortal." The Cleveland Plain Dealer: **Ameri- 
ica refuses to admit that the sentiments which animated 
the Congress of Versailles can faithfully reflect the opin- 
ion of the French people. Clemenceau 's defeat is a blot 
on French history." The Des Moines Capital: *'The 
defeat of the old Tiger has filled most Americans with 
amazement." The Columbus Despatch: **The Tiger's 
downfall has done away with some of the esteem felt for 
France." Fair enough applied to the few hundred men 
who in both Chambers gave so sad a display of ingratitude 
and inability, but not fair to the country as a whole which 
sees things as they are. The parliamentary system, essen- 
tial safeguard of our liberties, has its weaknesses, not the 
least of which is the premium it places upon mere words. 
Our political world counts more spell-binders than states- 
men. Some of these orators gave the full measure of their 
inability during the first three years of the war. To save 
the situation it was necessary to scrap them and to seek 
a man of another generation, a man of another kind, 
of another temperament and character, a man who in less 
than a year succeeded in squelching treason at home, in 



RECONSTRUCTION AND THE FUTURE 405 

creating unity of command at the front and in bringing 
victory to our banners. Tbis work done and well done, the 
angry jealousy of those the Great Old Man had cast aside, 
sounded the hour of revenge. This was the unsavoury 
and dishonourable work of a lobby. France has the right 
to expect her friends not to judge her by the manoeuvres 
of a few politicians seeking the spoils of a victory they 
had not been able to mn. 

France is something very different. France is first 
and foremost the land of order and restraint. A few 
months ago in the early part of 1920, Americans arriving 
in France asked: *'What about Bolshevism?" Fifteen 
days spent in travel along French roads was enough to con- 
vince them. On their return they no longer asked the 
question and one of them, Judge Gary, president of the 
United States Steel Corporation, coined a phrase that 
will endure: ''France leads the world because she leads 
in order." France is what she is for many reasons, the 
first being the material and moral health of her peasant 
class. In Russia the only hold the Soviets had on the 
peasants was the promise of land. Land ! The French pea- 
sant has owned it for more than a century. He owns it 
and he loves it. I might even say that he is of it. No- 
where is landed property more thoroughly divided or more 
equally distributed than in France. Nowhere has this 
division of property more happily contributed to the for- 
mation of national character. The French peasant was 
the vital factor of our victory. He forms fifty per cent, 
of our population. In 1916 he supplied over sixty-five 
per cent, of the fighting troops. I have seen him at work 
in the trenches for months when I led a company of chas- 
seurs. His physical stamina is almost without limit; his 
moral stamina is equal to his physical endurance. These 
peasants, being of the soil, fought for their soil like lions, — 
might I say like patient lions ? They gave their lives with 
simple faith for they had understood that the future of 
the race demanded this sacrifice. Peace won, finds them 
true to themselves, ready for any effort, hardy sons of toil. 



406 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TEEATY 

These men, who proved so well their common faith and 
their common sacrifice, are extreme individualists, and 
this individualism is the very basis of our stability. I 
know that this is a trait of our French character which 
British and Americans often fail to understand and to 
appreciate. There is no doubt that it hampers somewhat 
the rapidity and extent of our economic development. But 
as a political and moral safety valve it is unequalled. If 
revolutionary madness was able to make headway in back- 
ward Eussia, it is because individualism was totally lack- 
ing among the masses. A Eussian village or a Eussian 
factory was a flock. The flock followed without thinking. 
It may even have believed, poor docile herd, that in revo- 
lution it would find happiness. As in the old day, even 
more than in the old day, it moves beneath the knout. 
Between Plehve and Lenine there is not much to choose. To 
such an appeal the men of our French fields would never 
respond. They would remain unmoved for they have a 
deep sense of what individual effort has achieved through 
the centuries — for they know what long and patient labour 
has won for them. The French peasant is distrustful and 
hard to persuade, he has no faith in revolutionary rhet- 
oric. His own experience guards him against the illusions 
by which the human cattle of Eussia were deceived. He has 
faith in the conquests of brain and brawn, protected by 
laws safeguarding persons and property. There is where 
he looks for and sees possible progress — and not in com- 
munism — ^because ordered progress — ^material and moral — 
is taught him by the story of his own life, the story of his 
family, the story of his village. He knows that he eats 
meat oftener than his grandfather, and that he is better 
educated and wealthier than his father — better equipped 
against the surprises of nature and the snares of men. He 
knows too that much of these advantages has come to him 
as a result of the general progress of the nation. So he 
is patriotic and conservative by instinct and by reason. 
He willingly shed his blood in a war of self-defense. He 
would begin again to-morrow, if it were necessary, because 



RECONSTRUCTION AND THE FUTURE 407 

every fiber of his being is in constant communion with 
the voice of the soil, he hears the great call for common 
effort, he knows that the strength and prosperity of the 
nation are essential to the strong and prosperous individ- 
ual he feels himself to be and is determined to remain. 

The industrial worker is less protected than the peas- 
ant against certain poisons. The prisoner of his factory 
during working hours, badly lodged, exposed to the temp- 
tations of cities, he falls an easy prey in all countries to 
the poison of the body and of the mind. I believe, however, 
that no other country in Europe has a working class as 
wise and as intelligent as ours. At the beginning of the 
war, one of Germany's most cherished hopes was the 
revolt of our industrial proletariat. The facts gave answer. 
All workers were called to the colours. All responded to 
the call. Many fell at Charleroi and on the Marne. Later 
when they were needed for the manufacture of munitions 
they were called back to the factories. There they worked 
with a will and the figures I have given* tell how 
great the effort they put forth. Not a strike, not a disturb- 
ance, not the slightest response to all kinds of incitements 
some of which had their origin outside of France. Peace 
came and with it a general relaxing of energies, an out- 
burst of desires prompted by the belief that an Armistice 
written on a sheet of paper could transform the lot of 
humanity, Soviet propaganda developed. With what 
results? On May 1, 1919, there was a small amount of 
rioting in the streets of Paris. Read the list of arrests and 
you will see that they are nearly all of foreigners brought 
from all over the world by the great upheaval of war, but 
whose abortive violence cannot be laid to the French nation. 
In 1920 there was a railway strike. Only a minority took 
part in it and after a few weeks the extremists who had 
called it were replaced at the head of the Federation by 
moderate unionists whose place they had taken on the eve 
of the movement. A little later in September, 1920, the 
Congress of the General Confederation of Labour, at 



*See Chapter II, pages 31-35. 



408 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Orleans, supporting a policy of production and democratic 
reforms, scored a victory for French syndicalism over the 
champions of Muscovite Sovietism and the Third 
International. 

For the French workman as well as the French peasant, 
though perhaps with less constancy and consciousness and 
less reflection, displays that wealth of sound sense and bal- 
ance which is the soul of our national genius. *'Vive 
Lenine" may be heard in a public meeting. Lenine will 
find few followers in our midst, for we are neither so mis- 
erable nor so credulous. An old farmer of my district once 
told of his optimism in these simple and lofty words : ''Here 
we have faith, for both soil and men are sound." This is 
true of all of France. The stranger within our gates may 
be led astray, for he sees mostly the scum which some widely 
circulated papers (less interested in truth than in sensa- 
tion) show him: for he listens to parliamentary debates 
which the absence of organized leadership too often lowers 
to the level of personal disputes. This is pohtics. This 
is not France. France is the child of thirteen who, when her 
father left for the Army, made and sold nearly half a ton of 
bread a day. France is the woman who drove the plough 
or who was blacksmith, carpenter or mason or who made 
shells as 664,000 of them did. France is the miners of the 
Pas-de-Calais working their mines under shell fire in the 
midst of battle, falling at their posts but in one year pro- 
ducing at Bruay alone four million tons. That was the 
France of war-time. And the France of peace is no other. 
Her qualities are the same now as they were then. To see 
the rest of France, you must have vision. France is 
wounded, but her wounds are healing. France is a land 
of boundless resources, material and moral; a land that 
loves its liberties, and respects the liberties of others; a 
land that has suffered, but is determined to live; a land 
that has faith in the future, because it has faith in its work. 



CHAPTER XIII 

HOW THE PEACE IS BEING ENFORCED 

The Treaty of Versailles came into force on January 
10, 1920. Since then the Allied Governments have on sev- 
eral occasions declared their common determination to 
enforce it absolutely. I reproduce here the most important 
of these declarations : 

1. Ministerial Statement hy Millerand's Cabinet {January 22, 
1920). 

2. Speech hy Mr. Lloyd George {March 25, 1920) -. 

My right honourable friend, Mr, Asquith, stated that the time 
had come to revise the terms of peace. These terms need no revi- 
sion whatever First of all, Germany must clearly prove that 

she intends to carry out the Treaty to the full limit of her resources. 

3. Resolution passed in the French Chamber of Deputies hy 518 
votes to seventy {March 27, 1920) -. 

The Chamber, approving the statements of the Government, and 
relying upon them to secure, in agreement with the Allied and 
Associated Powers, the strict enforcement of the Treaty of 
Versailles 

4. Declaration of the Allied Governments at San Remo {April 
26, 1920) : 

The Allied Governments have unanimously decided fully to 
maintain the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. 

5. Speech hy M. Millerand {April 28, 1920) : 

The first condition for the Spa Conference is that any idea of 
revising the Treaty of Versailles should be formally excluded. It 
is not a matter of revising the Treaty, but of applying it. 

6. Notes sent from Boidogne hy the Allied Governments to the 
German Government {June 22, 1920) : 

The Allied Governments surely and simply confirm their 
former decisions. The military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles 
are fully maintained. They must be strictly carried out. 

409 



410 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

These very firm declarations have been persistently 
belied by subsequent events. The Treaty of Versailles con- 
tained clauses of two kinds. Some were enforceable forth- 
with and they were all enforced absolutely and without 
delay, thanks to the preliminary steps taken in 1919 by M. 
Clemenceau. Other clauses on the contrary by their very 
nature entailed a certain delay and their enforcement was 
to begin in January, 1920. The most important of these 
clauses dealt mth surrender of war criminals, disarma- 
ment of Germany and reparations. 

The first capitulation of the Allies which prepared and 
made way for others occurred on January 13, 1920. It was 
in connection with the delivery to the Allies of the war 
criminals guilty of offenses committed in violation of inter- 
national law and of the rules of warfare. To this provision 
which gave to the Treaty of Versailles the character of a 
verdict against Germany for her crimes, no Government had 
attached greater importance than the British. It was Mr. 
Lloyd George who in 1918, in a series of impassioned 
addresses, had rallied his fellow-citizens to the cry of 
*'Hang the Kaiser!" a fit reply to the German "Gott 
strafe England!'' It was the representative of Great Bri- 
tain, Sir Ernest Pollock, who, in the eleven meetings of 
the Commission on Responsibilities, from February 3 to 
March 29, 1919, had uncompromisingly maintained the full 
demand for the surrender of the war criminals which was 
opposed by the American delegates. It was the British 
Prime Minister who, at seven meetings of the Council of 
Four from April 1 to May 5, demanded and obtained the 
strengthening of the proposals submitted by the Commis- 
sion. It was Mr. Philip Kerr, Secretary to Mr. Lloyd 
George, who on June 16, 1919, wrote the letter in reply to 
Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau's protests stating that the 
Allies maintained their decisions. These documents ought 
to be quoted. On May 29, 1919, Count von Brockdorff- 
Rantzau wrote as follows: 

The German Government cannot agree to a German being 



HOW THE PEACE IS BEING ENFORCED 411 

brought before a special foreign court of law.... Nor can the 
German Government give its assent to a request being sent to the 
Government of the Netherlands requesting the surrender of a Ger- 
man to a foreign Power, with a view to unwarranted proceedings 
being taken against him. ... If there be grounds for satisfaction 
by the punishment of certain persons individually culpable, the 
injured State should not inflict such punishment itself. It can 
merely demand such punishment from the State responsible for 
the guilty party. Germany has never refused and declares herself 
entirely ready to take such steps as to ensure all violations of the 
law of nations being prosecuted with the utmost rigour. 

On June 16, 1919, the Allied Governments replied as 
follows : 

The Powers consider that it is inadmissible to entrust the 
trial of those directly responsible for offenses against humanity 
and international right to their accomplices in their crimes 

On June 28, 1919, Messrs. Hermann Muller and Bell 
signed the Treaty which, in accordance with the text handed 
on the seventh of May to Count von Brockdorff, provided 
for the trial of the ex-Emperor and the other criminals by 
an international court of law. On February 13, 1920, the 
Allied Powers gave up their demand for the surrender of 
the Kaiser and authorized the Government of the Reich to 
bring the other criminals to trial before the Court of Leip- 
zig — that is to say, to allow them to be tried by those who, 
on June 16, 1919, they had called ''their accomplices in 
their crimes." Everybody knows that at the end of 1920 
not a single one of these criminals had been tried. Germany 
with the assent of the Allies had torn up an essential clause 
of the Treaty. This was the reward of her resistance and 
an encouragement to renew it. On February 21, 1920, I 
wrote: ''The same thing is going to be repeated either 
against the Military Control Commission or the Repara- 
tions Commission." This is precisely what happened. 

March 10, 1920, marked a time limit of capital impor- 
tance for disarmament. Not only on this date was the sup- 
ply of munitions to be limited to 1,500 and 500 rounds per 



412 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

gun, according to caliber, in the few strongholds still 
retained; the disarmament of all fortresses in the demili- 
tarized zone east of the Rhine; the suppression of mili- 
tary schools. But also and above all, March 10 was the 
date on which, under Article 169, Germany was to have 
delivered up to the Allies for destruction all arms, muni- 
tions and material of war in excess of the quantities 
authorized, besides all machinery and tools used in their 
production. On the same date she was to have given up all 
captures effected by her during the war. April 10 marked 
the expiration of a second time limit. On that date Germany 
under Article 163 was to have reduced the total of her effec- 
tives to 200,000 men. The meaning of this obligation was 
clearly defined in a note from the Supreme Council, dated 
December 1, 1919, signed by M. Clemenceau, in which Ger- 
many was called upon to suppress immediately on the com- 
ing into force of the Treaty all auxiliary corps {Einwohner- 
wehren, Nothilfe, Sicherheitspolisei, etc.) which Noske h?cd 
for four months been perfidiously forming. The Allies 
intended that at the expiration of the time limit there should 
remain in Germany only 200,000 men in all, without camou- 
flage. Even this figure under Article 160 was to bo still 
further reduced three months later to 100,000. 

History will ever be amazed at the fact that for four 
months nothing was done by the Allies either to demand 
the execution of these two measures or to enforce them 
when the time came. For four months the Council of the 
Allies met uninterruptedly at London. On two occasions 
all the heads of the Governments were present together. 
Not once, however, did these meetings result in a reminder 
to Germany either by word or deed that the Allies insisted 
upon her disarmament and would not permit her to elude 
it. Not once was she solemnly and publicly summoned to 
fulfill the undertakings to which she had subscribed. 
Things were allowed to drift. To be sure the Military 
Commission which M. Clemenceau had sent to Germany as 
far back as November, 1919, was still at Berlin. But it is 
clear that, alone and unsupported by those who sent it, the 



HOW THE PEACE IS BEING ENP^ORCED 413 

Commission was inevitably powerless. It is clear that, 
forced to confine itself to technical discussions which the 
Prime Ministers never once raised to the level of politics, 
it was condemned in advance to be sterile. The Govern- 
ments did not bring to bear the united pressure which they 
alone had power to exert. 

When at the end of July, 1920, the Spa Conference met, 
the Allies were able to see the effects of their policy. Ger- 
man military legislation had not been changed. No law 
had been passed either to abolish conscription or com- 
ply with the obligation concerning reserves. Under guise 
of ReicJiswehr and other auxiliary formations, the Army 
still numbered nearly a million men, instead of 100,000. As 
to artillery, more than 15,000 guns remained to be delivered 
and destroyed. As to aviation, only 900 aeroplanes out of 
10,000 had been delivered. Allied officers assaulted in 
several German cities in March had received neither 
apology nor satisfaction. Four months later, in November, 
1920, some progress had been made with the destruction of 
artillery but the Einwohnerwehren and Sicherheitspolitsei 
were neither disarmed nor dissolved. 

II 

This also encouraged Germany in the great financial 
offensive she was preparing to launch. In eluding the dis- 
armament clauses she was prompted mainly by sentiment ; 
for she could not possibly hope that her shortcomings, no 
matter how numerous, could enable her to begin war anew. 
But on the contrary in regard to reparation, every breach 
of the Treaty, every month gained, every clause eluded, was 
a positive asset in the great economic struggle by which 
Germany, her means of production untouched, hoped to 
achieve future victory.* By non-payment, by non-deliv- 
ery of raw materials, Germany was sharpening her eco- 
nomic sword. By urging acceptance of a lump-sum, that 
is to say the arbitrary reduction of her debt — she lightened 

(1) See Chapter X, pages 320-321. 



414 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

her liabilities and increased her assets. By concentra- 
ting her efforts against the Reparation Commission which 
was to force upon her a system that would enable her to 
pay, she was destroying the Allies' means of action. This 
plan was vast and obvious. At nearly every point Ger- 
many, in 1920, won the game. 

Although by the nature of things time limits for Repa- 
rations were longer than for disarmament, certain things 
(and not the least important) were to have been done by 
Germany either immediately the Treaty came into force or 
within a time limit of three months, i. e., before April 10, 
1920. Here, as in the case of disarmament, it is clear that 
performance could be counted upon only if Germany were 
made to understand that she would not be permitted escape. 
In these all important matters the Allies displayed the 
same weakness as in the case of the war criminals and of 
disarmament. For months nothing was done or even 
attempted. Nothing by the Governments, nothing by the 
Reparations Commission. And yet the Powers in 1919 had 
made known their will in the most forceful and clearest pos- 
sible manner. They had replied to the German counter pro- 
posals as follows : 

The proposals of the Allies confine the amount payable by 
Germany to what is clearly justifiable under the terms of the 
Armistice 

The Allied and Associated Powers, consistent with their policy 
already expressed, decline to enter into a discussion of the princi- 
ples underlying the reparation clauses. 

The categories of damages and the clauses concerning repara- 
tion must be accepted by the German authorities as matters settled 
beyond all discussion 

The Allied and Associated Powers will not entertain argu- 
ments or appeals directed to any alteration 

Beyond this, the Allied and Associated Powers cannot be 
asked to go. The draft Treaty must be accepted as definitive and 
must be signed. . . . 

On June 28, 1919, Messrs. Hermann Muller and Bell 
signed the Treaty which, by Article 232, binds Germany 



HOW THE PEACE IS BEING ENFORCED 415 

without limitation or reservation, either as to amounts or 
duration of the payments, to make full reparation for all 
damages to persons and property and to pay the total 
amount of pensions — that is to say, for France alone 
according to the estimates put forward in May, 1920, by M. 
Millerand, about 200,000 million francs. Despite this, on 
May 15, 1920, it was announced that the British and 
French Governments had agreed to consider a lump sum 
which made impossible the full payment of damages and 
pensions imposed upon Germany, both by the Armistice 
and by the Treaty of Peace itself. Again Count von Brock- 
dorff-Rantzau had his revenge! At the end of 1920 the 
same vacillation in principle marked the Brussels Confer- 
ence. 

And what has been done on the other hand towards the 
future enforcement of the financial terms of peace ? Here 
again the evidence is plain. To make this clear I repro- 
duce the articles of the Treaty which the Reparation Com- 
mission is bound to apply to force Germany to pay. 

Art. 236. Germany further agrees to the direct appHcation of 
her economic resources to reparation. 

Art. 248. A first charge upon all the assets and revenues of the 
German Empire and its constituent States shall be the cost of repa- 
ration, etc. 

Para. B. Art. 12, Annex IT. The sums for reparation which 
Germany is required to pay shall become a charge upon all her 
revenues prior to that for the service or discharge of any domestic 
loan. 

Art. 260. The Reparation Commission may within one year 
from the coming into force of the present Treaty demand that the 
German Government become possessed of any rights and interests 
of the German nationals in any public utility undertaking or in any 
concession, operating in Rouraania, China, Turkey, Austria-Hun- 
gary and Bulgaria. 

Art. 12. Paragraph B., Annex IT. The German scheme of tax- 
ation shall be fully as heavy proportionately as that of any of the 
Powers represented on the Commission. 

Annex II, Art. 12. The Commission shall have all the powers 



416 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

conferred upon it, and sliall exercise all the functions assigned to 
it by the present Treaty. 

Art. 240. The German Government will supply to the Commis- 
sion all the information which the Commission may require relative 
to the financial situation and operations, and to the property, pro- 
ductive capacity, and stocks and current production of raw 
materials and manufactured articles. 

Art. 241. Germany undertakes to pass, issue and maintain in 
force any legislation, orders and decrees that may be necessary to 
give complete effect to these provisions. 

Art. 18, Annex H. The measures which the Allied and Asso- 
ciated Powers shall have the right to take, in case of voluntary 
default by Germany, and which Germany agrees not to regard as 
acts of war, may include economic and financial prohibitions and 
reprisals and in general such other measures as the respective 
Governments may determine to be necessary in the circumstances. 

"What has the Reparation Commission done with all 
these means of action in eleven months ? Nothing or almost 
nothing. 

1. Making up Germany's account., This essential func- 
tion of the Reparation Commission has not been fulfilled 
and despite reiterated demands of our Parliament the 
Reparation Commission has declared itself incapable of 
furnishing this account. 

2. Means of payment, (a) CoaL I shall show below* 
that as a result of the Spa agreement coal has lost its value 
as a means of payment because for the 24,000,000 tons to 
be delivered a year the Allies have to disburse 4,170 mil- 
lions in premiums and advances, (b) Live stock.. The 
French Minister of the Liberated Regions informed the 
Senate on December 16, 1920, that for the deliveries under 
Paragraph 2 of Annex 4 to Chapter 8 of the Treaty he had 
forwarded his demands to the Reparations Commission in 
March, 1920. It was in December, 1920, that the Reparations 
Commission ''laid down the conditions under which these 
deliveries would be made.'' This delay is all the more 
extraordinary in that the immediate deliveries under 



*See pages 418-421. 



HOW THE PEACE IS BEING ENFORCED 417 

ArticlG 6 of Annex 4 had been regularly made, (c) Tonnage. 
The Finance Commission of the Chamber wrote in its report 
of Jmie 14, 1920, "as far as we are aware the Reparations 
Commission has not yet notified the German Government 
of the amount of tonnage to be laid down in the first two 
years following the coming into force of the Treaty." 
(Paragraph 5 of Annex 3). (d) German assets abroad. 
These assets estimated at 12,000 millions at least are a val- 
uable means of payment. The Finance Commission in its 
report quoted above wrote, "Germany's capacity to pay 
by means of assets abroad ought to be immediately inves- 
tigated by the experts of the Reparations Commission. ' ' 

3. Supervision and modification of Germany's econom- 
ic and financial systems. This — as I have said and as I 
repeat — was the fundamental task of the Reparations 
Commission. To accomplish it, it was given the fullest 
powers as evidenced by the text I have quoted above. It 
was armed to force Germany in the words of Lord Cunliff e. 
Governor of the Bank of England and British Delegate to 
the Peace Conference, to "organize herself as an exporting 
nation for the payment of her reparation debts." It was 
the only way in which Germany could possibly pay a debt 
of more than 300,000 millions. To this end the Reparations 
Commission was given the right and entrusted with the 
duty of supervising Germany's budget, her revenues, her 
expenditures, her production, her exports, her imports; 
the right and the duty to institute all measures of a nature 
to assure payment. What has it done with this right, what 
has it done to fulfill this duty? 

Statistics drawn up last summer by the League of 
Nations proved that the individual German is less burdened 
by taxation than the individual Englishman or Frenchman. 
German interior loans continue to draw interest — money 
that belongs to the Reparations Commission. The prior 
lien on all property and assets of the German States has 
never been foreclosed. No change has been insisted upon 
in the German legislation to give effect to this privilege. 
Germany has even been allowed to lend money to neutrals. 



418 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Quite recently M. Guy de Wendel, a member of the French 
Parliament, startled the Chamber by showing how the Ger- 
man Government by subsidizing its industries managed 
instead of paying its debts to compete with its creditors by 
dumping exports. 

Not an initiative. Not even the least firmness, for firm- 
ness presupposes some effort — and no effort has been 
made. If things are thus : if the Reparations Commission 
which is composed of very distinguished men, which is pro- 
vided with a numerous staff, liberally paid, and is sup- 
plied with enormous credits has displayed such impotence 
it is because, expecting the revision of the Treaty from 
day to day, it has had no heart to enforce it. Here again 
politics whose present results I have described prepares the 
same evil consequences for the future. 

To these concessions by omission, further concessions 
by commission were added. The coal problem furnished the 
pretext, Spa the occasion. The quantities of coal to be 
delivered by Germany had been fixed by the Treaty at an 
average of 3,500,000 tons per month. The Reparations Com- 
mission taking Germany's difficulties into consideration 
had agreed to reduce this quantity to 2,400,000 tons. The 
Spa agreement still further reduced it to 2,000,000 — about 
to what (within about 300,000 tons) had been proposed by 
Count Brockdorff-Rantzau on May 19, 1919. The reduc- 
tion thus granted is forty-three per cent, of the amount 
written in the Treaty. At the same time to the stipulation 
that the coal delivered by Germany should be valued at 
German pit mouth prices the Spa agreement substituted 
a price increased by fixed premiums and variable advances 
— both equally unwarranted. The premium of five marks 
(gold) per ton (francs 13.75) was granted in exchange for 
an alleged right given the Allies' demand ''coals of spe- 
cific classified qualities." Now they were already enti- 
tled to this under Paragraph 10, Schedule 5, of Chap- 
ter 8 of the Treaty, giving the Reparations Commission 
power to decide all disputes concerning qualities. Under 
this paragraph the Allies had from the very beginning 



HOW THE PEACE IS BEING ENFORCED 419 

paid the sliding scale applied to the various qualities of 
coal and did that according to the German interior price 
scale. Under the Spa agreement, they are to pay a yearly 
increase of (francs 13.75 x twenty-four milUons tons) or 330 
million francs, 266 millions of which is France 's share. The 
advances granted were still more onerous and had more 
far-reaching effects. The Spa Conference decided that 
the Allies would grant Germany ''advances the amount 
of which shall be equal to the difference between the Ger- 
man inland market price plus the premium of five marks 
(gold) and the export price F. 0. B. German port, or 
F. 0. B. English port, and in any case the lower of these two 
prices. ' ' The cost of the operation was as follows : 

English export price Frs. 240. 

German pit mouth price Frs. 70. 

Premium fixed at Spa Frs. 13.75 

Total inland price after Spa Conference Frs. 83.75 

Difference between the two prices Frs. 156.25 

The advances therefore represented (francs 156.25x2,000,- 
000 tons) or 312,500,000 francs a month. As under the Spa 
agreement, France was to furnish sixty-one per cent, of 
these advances she was obliged to appropriate 190,625,000 
francs a month or about 2,287 million francs a year. In all 
taking France alone into consideration she found herself 
charged for the 1,600,000 tons she was to receive monthly 
with: 

German inland market price .. . 1,600,000x70 =112,000,000 

Premiums 1,600,000 X 13.75= 22,000,000 

Advances 61% of 2,000,000x156.25=190,625,000 

So to obtain valuable consideration to the amount of 
112,000,000 francs which under the Treaty of Versailles she 
was to receive without having any payment to make, France 
was thenceforward to pay 22,000,000 francs in premiums 
and 190,625,000 francs in advances every month. 

This revision of the Treaty, onerous as are its imme- 
diate consequences, has an even more serious effect. In 



420 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

the first place it runs counter to one of the essential prin- 
ciples of the Treaty of Peace, that reparations take prec- 
edence over German needs and that especially in the case 
of coal Germany is bound up to twenty million tons yearly 
to make good in absolute priority the French shortage 
caused by the systematic destruction of French mines in 
the North by the German Army. On the contrary the Spa 
agreement gave Germany, which in 1920 was satisfying her 
own coal needs to a greater extent than those of France 
(sixty-eight per cent, as against fifty-five per cent.), the 
right to special assistance to increase her industrial pro- 
duction. In other words, whereas the Treaty specified 
that deliveries to the Allies should be made before Ger- 
many's needs were attended to, the Spa Conference author- 
ized Germany to serve herself first. In the second place 
coal has ceased to benefit the Reparation Fund as a means 
of payment; for either in the form of premiums or of 
advances, the AlKes are obliged to make for every ton a 
cash disbursement exceeding the value of the coal received. 
Finally the increase granted to Germany has resulted 
in the consolidation of British export prices. During the 
Paris Conference the French delegates had two main 
objects in view in regard to coal. The first was to put an 
end to the pre-war situation which permitted German 
industry controlKng both coal and coal prices to blackmail 
French industry. That is why after long discussions they 
had obtained that the coal to be delivered by Germany 
under the Treaty should be reckoned at German inland 
prices. The second was to protect France against the rise 
in English export prices, which had just begun and has gone 
on increasing ever since. These guarantees were provided 
and agreed to after much opposition, but the Spa Conven- 
tion reversed the situation. The premium of five marks 
(gold) per ton has handicapped French industry as com- 
pared with German industry to the extent of ninety per 
cent. The advances calculated on the English export price 
have strengthened the latter which is so high that Great 
Britain is able to supply her domestic consumers at less 



HOW THE PEACE IS BEING ENFORCED 421 

than cost price. The Spa agreement not only deprived 
France of the right to pay for German coal at the same rate 
as German industry, it bereft her also of all means of reduc- 
ing the price of English coal by competition. 

So revision — unmistakable revision — revision demanded 
not only by Germany but by one of our Allies — a revision 
at first implicitly tolerated and afterwards explicitly ac- 
cepted has been the policy of the Allies in 1920 notwith- 
standing official talk about enforcement. The only clauses 
of the Treaty which have been enforced are those wliich 
went into effect prior to its coming into force on January 
10, 1920, or those whose application in every little detail 
had been prepared by the Supreme Council of the Allies in 
1919 (Schleswig, Upper Silesia, etc.). For the rest, care- 
lessness, party spirit and lack of unity have played into 
Germany's hands, encouraged Pan-Germanist forces and 
delayed the coming of the new order of which the Treaty of 
Versailles had laid the foundations. 



Ill 



To excuse this failure two arguments are in turn em- 
ployed. At times it is said that the peace is impossible of 
execution ; at times that it is an unjust peace. This doctrine 
has its Bible and its Priests — let us see what it is worth. 

An impossible peace? It was enforced in 1919 in its 
essential clauses. The reduction of German territory by 
84,000 square kilometers? Enforced. The return of 
Alsace and Lorraine to France free of all charges; the 
return to Poznan to Poland; the return of the Walloon 
cantons to Belgium? Enforced. Enforced also the rup- 
ture of governmental ties between the Sarre and Prussia: 
the plebiscite of Schleswig ; the installation of the Plebiscite 
Commission in Upper Silesia. 

Enforced also the occupation by Allied troops and the 
control by an Inter-allied High Commission presided over 
by a Frenchman of the left bank of the Ehine and the 



422 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TEEATY 

bridgeheads; the dismantlement of the fortresses of the 
neutral zone; the surrender of the fleet. 

Other clauses, it was true, could only by their very 
nature be enforced progressively and within a certain lapse 
of time. But what do we see ? At the very time when Ger- 
many was declaring these clauses impossible of execution, 
she was nevertheless obliged to execute them despite the 
weakness of the Allies. Let us take the period of the finan- 
cial application of the peace which opened on January 10. 
1920, when it came into force and will end on May 1, 1921. 
What were during the period the essential obligations of 
Germany? 

1. To return the money, securities, live stock and goods 
of all nature carried off, seized, or sequestrated which could 
be identified, this restitution not being credited to Ger- 
many in the reparations account. (Articles 238-239 and 
243 of the Treaty.) 

2. To pay to the Allies on account of reparations 
20,000 million marks gold either in gold, in goods, in ton- 
nage, in securities or otherwise. (Article 235 of the Treaty.) 

What has become of these two obligations? 

1. Restitutions. The amount of securities, moneys and 
valuable assets identified and recovered from Germany 
totalled 8,300 million francs on May 31, 1920, to which were 
to be added 500,000 tons of machinery and raw material. 
(Eeport of the Finance Commission of the French Cham- 
ber, June 14, 1920.) 

2. Reparations. On July 20, 1920, before the same 
commission Mr. Frangois Marsal, French Minister of 
Finance, questioned on the total amount of payments made 
by Germany on account of reparations, declared that he did 
not have the exact figure. He added, however, that in his 
opinion Germany had already paid about 10,000 millions. 
Since then the Finance Commission, despite reiterated 
demands, has been unable to obtain an accounting of Ger- 
man payments. The most competent of its members esti- 
mate the total at about 12,000 or 14,000 millions as of 
December 31, 1920. 



HOW THE PEACE IS BEING ENFORCED 423 

"What conclusions are we to draw from this ? Germany, 
with grace that is bad and faith that is worse, has been 
obliged by the mere existence of a Treaty enforced mthout 
conviction by its beneficiaries to comply with her under- 
takings to an extent that makes it extremely probable that 
on May 1, 1921, she will have fulfilled for the most part 
the financial obligations imposed upon her up to that date. 
Yet this is the very time that Germany chooses to declare 
the Treaty impossible of execution. How can one fail to 
see that the fear of having to execute the Treaty is respon- 
sible for this attitude 1 If Germany clamours so loudly that 
the financial clauses of the Treaty are impossible of execu- 
tion, it is because she knows that, if they are enforced, they 
will be efficacious. If Germany asks that the Treaty be 
changed, it is because she knows that, in its present form, 
it obliges her to pay. If Germany decoys us to revision, it 
is because she feels that without revision she will have to 
pay sooner or later. A hypothetical statement? No — 
although our experience of GeiTQany fully warrants it — but 
a fact based upon figures which the Allied peoples have not 
the right to ignore. The intent is clear. No one has a right 
to be duped by it. And yet the Allies have allowed them- 
selves to be taken in by it, and they have meekly followed 
Germany to the various revision meetings in which she 
ensnares them. Better still Parliaments and Press echo 
with the assertion — sweet music to German ears — that Ger- 
many will not pay. Instead of proclaiming that she can 
pay, that present events prove that for the future it is 
enough to insist that she can pay — she has been allowed to 
have her way. Facts and figures which upset her conten- 
tions and confirm ours have been hidden. 

We went to Brussels in December, 1920, as we had been 
to Spa, lured by an axiom, ''made in Germany," — and alas 
echoed in France for the satisfaction of political spite — 
that the Treaty was impossible of execution. And yet 
what happened? For the time being, that is to say for the 
period between January 10, 1920, and May 1, 1921, there 
is every probability that it will be carried out almost to the 



424 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

letter, for up to June 30, 1920, Germany had already paid 
more than half of the 20,000 millions. That for to-morrow, 
that is to say for the payment to be made after May 1, 1921, 
none of the means of action which the Treaty provides has 
been either utilized or even prepared. During all the year 
1920, the givers of advice have flocked to Government and 
newspaper offices, each bringing his own little ''plan of 
reparations." The only plan that counts is in the Treaty 
of Versailles. Facts prove both that this plan is possible 
of execution and that little indeed is being done to execute 
it. But let us stick to it. It is a plan which, however spine- 
lessly applied, has already made Germany give back 9,000 
millions of loot to France alone and pay some 12,000 mil- 
lions of reparations to the Allies as a whole. It is better 
than the other plan under which, by the Spa agreement, 
the Allies are obliged to pay Germany more than 4,000 mil- 
lions a year. 

So much for the first criticism that the peace is an 
impossible one. What shall we say of the second: that it is 
an unjust peace which violates all the principles of the 
Allies 1 Here again answer is easy. A peace imposed upon 
aggressor nations by nations attacked ; a peace which places 
reparations to the account of the guilty, whose responsibil- 
ity it proclaims; a peace which liberates Alsace and Lor- 
raine, restores Belgium, brings Bohemia and Poland to 
life, and emancipates the oppressed populations of Tran- 
sylvania, Croatia, Slovenia, the Trentino, Istria and 
Schleswig: a peace which conclusively proves that mili- 
tarism does not pay, — such a peace is a sound peace, such 
a peace is a just peace. 

However, let us not be deceived. These contentions 
whether put forward on political or on economic grounds 
are always pro-German arguments. "Capacity of pay- 
ment," put forward to give the oppressor the benefits of 
his recovery; "economic solidarity," all the benefits of 
which go to the beaten foe; and "the reorganization of 
Europe" which makes European prosperity dependent 
upon German prosperity — these are the prize pro-German 



HOW THE PEACE IS BEING ENFORCED 425 

argnments. A German argument, too, that relating to the 
uselessness of small states and the "law of concentra- 
tion!" An argument we used to read over the signatures 
of von Billow and Bernhardi, before meeting it again over 
Mr. Keynes' name in connection with Dantzig, Upper Sile- 
sia, the Germans of Bohemia or the Hungarians of Tran- 
sylvania. An argument that is merely the German motto : 
*'Woe to the weak!" Millions of Allied soldiers fell fight- 
ing against it. Should the makers of the peace become its 
converts after victory? Feigned indignation over alleged 
violations of principles will dupe those only who wish to 
be duped, it v/ill not bear investigation. It is quite true 
that there are Germans in Dantzig, Upper Silesia and 
Bohemia, but who did not know beforehand that there 
would be? Who does not know that this is the necessary 
consequence of two centuries of German oppression and 
colonization? Who does not know of the mingling of races 
throughout Central Europe, due not only to long centuries 
of war, but also to the systematic policy of the Prussian 
Government ? 

And so there have been established by force and by ruse 
in Polish or Czech territory those German colonies which 
in time and by method have in certain places passed from 
minorities to majorities. What then was the position of 
the victorious Powers? They had promised in solemn 
declarations which in November, 1918, became the very 
bases of the Treaty of Peace to establish an independent 
Poland with access to the sea; an independent Bohemia 
mthin her historic frontiers. These promises had been 
approved by the Parliaments and by the peoples. They 
had to be kept and there was nothing to do but to leave a 
certain number of Germans or Magyars in Poland, 
Bohemia, Roumania and Jugo-Slavia. This had to be, for 
if the territories in which these Germans lived had been 
cut off from either Poland or Bohemia, neither of these 
nations could have formed a state. If Dantzig had 
remained German, Poland would have had no seaport. If 
the Germans of Bohemia had been separated from the 



426 THE TEUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

Czeclio-Slovakian that state would have had no frontiers. 
So unless the most solemn promises were to be repudiated, 
German minorities had to be included within the boun- 
daries of the emancipated countries. Were these minorities 
to be excluded? Then there would be no Poland and no 
Bohemia. The promise would have been broken and to 
whose detriment? To the detriment of those who forcibly 
deprived of their liberty had for centuries awaited the just 
redress of their wrongs. And who would have profited 
thereby? Those who for centuries had professed that 
might makes right. 

So the principle was unassailable. Fault has, it is true, 
been found with its application, and it is said: ''In all such 
cases there ought to have been a plebiscite." In many 
cases that is exactly what was done. In other cases it 
could not be done. Why? Because the plebiscite — while 
confirming what was already known without it — would not 
have altered the dilemma I have just defined. No plebiscite 
was required to prove the existence of German minorities 
either in Poland or in Bohemia. But with or without a 
plebiscite the same difficulty remained, i. e., — the impossi- 
bility of recreating without these minorities a Bohemia or 
a Poland likely to last. With or without a plebiscite 
nations long-enthralled whose emancipation had been 
sworn would have been annihilated, and annihilated with 
refined hypocrisy by refusing them the means of existence 
just when they were being given a new life. This the Con- 
ference refused to do and it was right in so refusing. 
Nothing was left undone to limit an evil which could not be 
entirely avoided. First by careful inquiry the frontiers of 
the liberated nations were so defined as to comprise the 
smallest possible number of alien peoples. Then w^henever 
the inclusion of districts peopled mostly by Germans was 
not vital, recourse was always had to a plebiscite. This 
was the case in Schleswig, Upper Silesia, Marienwerder 
and AUenstein, where as events have proved insufficient 
precautions were taken against German fraud. Finally, 
when ethnic minorities were placed under the sovereignty 



HOW THE PEACE IS BEING ENFOECED 427 

of another race their rights were surrounded by guaran- 
tees so far-reaching that the interested Governments 
denounced them as a violation of their rights. Such the 
bases of the Treaty. What others could have been sug- 
gested without betraying the war aims of the Allies, with- 
out sacrificing the victims of centuries of German might to 
the Germans themselves, without strengthening the bond- 
age of these victims to their tyrants ? 

How can it be denied moreover that after a war which 
for five years had raised national aspirations to the high- 
est pitch, the Treaty of Versailles makes a praiseworthy 
effort to conciliate the appeals of the future with the 
demands of the past ? For the first time the need of inter- 
national cooperation is recognized whether for Colonial 
administration, communications by land and water, labour 
legislation or means of preventing war. For the first time 
also instead of attempting like the Holy Alliance to build 
for all time, an agency was created by the Treaty itself 
for future evolution and improvement. I shall have some- 
thing to say later, with special reference to the ratification 
of the Treaty by the United States, about the League of 
Nations.* How from a higher standpoint can one ignore 
the fact that the whole world looked to victory not only to 
end the war but also to organize peace! How would it be 
organized? There were many who, without even suspect- 
ing it, felt the necessity for such an organization. As Mr. 
Lloyd George said after visiting the battlefields: "In 
presence of so many ruins one understands that after all 
some other way must be found to settle disputes between 
nations." That was precisely the feeling of struggling 
humanity — the aspiration of all who having waged war did 
not wish it to begin again. It was President Wilson's sym- 
pathy with this aspiration of the conscience of mankind 
that accounted for the immense popularity he enjoyed after 
the Armistice. Whatever one may think of the enactments 
embodied in Chapter I of the Treaty of Versailles ; what- 



*See Chapter XIV, pages 462-463. 



428 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

ever one may think of the terms of the Covenant, no one 
can deny the universal aspiration echoed therein. 

What does the result amount to? France though often 
accused of systematic hostility to the League of Nations has 
proved by her acts that she wanted something more and 
something better than the Conference gave. France it was 
who persistently demanded the creation of an international 
military force, the organization of permanent supervision 
over national Armies. France it was who from first to 
last urged the logical and clear solution without which the 
influence of any League of Nations is necessarily restricted. 
The French proposals were rejected by the very Powers 
who were supposed to champion the idea to which France 
was represented as being opposed. To tell the truth the 
reception accorded by the United States Senate to a milder 
Covenant than that proposed by the French representa- 
tives, relieves me from dwelling upon the reasons of par- 
liamentary prudence which led Mr. Wilson to oppose M. 
Leon Bourgeois' amendments. 

The Covenant is a timid effort — though thought by some 
to be too daring — towards an improved organization of 
international relations. However imperfect, it may still 
serve as a basis for future solutions. In the Sarre, for 
instance, it has already given positive results. To be sure, 
the decision of the United States Senate deprived the 
League of Nations of an essential element of authority; 
and the limitation of its powers justifies M. Clemenceau in 
having refused to look upon it for the present as an ade- 
quate guarantee. But the way is clear for further progress. 
In what direction will the evolution made possible by 
Article 26 of the Covenant proceed? It would be rash to 
form a judgment in advance. But, no matter how real the 
difficulty, so strongly emphasized by the policy of the 
United States, of conciliating a supreme international law 
mth the sovereignty of nations, the fact remains that who- 
ever is not deaf to the demands of the future must by 
patient labour prepare for the coming of such a law. 

The Treaty of Versailles furnished a plan which though 



HOW THE PEACE IS BEING ENFORCED 429 

incomplete and imperfect, nevertheless constitutes the first 
united step towards world legislation taken by Govern- 
ments. This also emphasizes the liberal tendency which 
marks the Treaty of Peace. It has been said that this ten- 
dency was repudiated at the very moment of its assertion 
by the fact that Germany is not a member of the League. 
Who does not feel that following an international crime 
like that of 1914, a probationary period was the least that 
could be demanded of its perpetrator? Not one of the 
Powers that signed the Treaty of Versailles but hopes to 
see Germany grow worthy by reform of her institutions 
and of her mentality to become a member of the league of 
the Nations she once dreamed of enslaving. But that time 
is not yet come. Two years after the Armistice Germany 
showed no signs of repentance. Read and listen. What 
do we find ? 

Public opinion in full unrest, dominated by skilfully 
nourished hate which obstinately hides from her her san- 
guinary responsibilities and the nobility and value of vol- 
untary amends. There are doubtless a few men here and 
there who discern the abyss of disappointment and ruin 
into which Germany will be plunged by the survival of her 
detestable warlike spirit. But such men are rare exceptions. 
Doubtless one may read now and then in the Sozialistichen 
Monatshefte that "the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France 
is by no means an outrage but an historic act of justice," 
or even that ''it is only right to call upon German intellect- 
uals to retract the famous manifesto of the ninety-three, as 
irreconcilable with a spirit of sincerity." But such opinions 
are lost in an ocean of disappointed ambitions, passionate 
incomprehension, and bitter jealousy. Germany is in the 
state of mind of a gambler who is a bad loser. She blames 
the whole world for the fault that is hers alone. France 
naturally comes in for a goodly portion of her hate, cen- 
turies of history are behind it. Instead of trying to under- 
stand, she is satisfied to accuse. There is no place in such 
a national spirit for any of that progress which might be 
hoped for, if a little light could penetrate the German con- 



430 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

science. This nation wliich in 1914 believed only in force 
now believes only in fraud. 

The Treaty recorded this and was framed accordingly. 
Before welcoming Germany those who, at the price of their 
blood, averted the impending danger of her domination 
now have the right to insist upon certainty. And in such 
things certainty can only come as the result of a long series 
of acts. The key to Germany's redemption is in her own 
hands. It is only fair that tliis should be so. The justice 
of the peace is in nowise lessened thereby. 

IV 

Such are the political, economic and social bases of new 
Prance — of that France who, after the merciless war 
waged mainly upon her soil, wants peace and work. With 
these she is sure of her future — a future of reconstruction, 
of production and of liberty. But it is not enough for her 
that that future be assured, she needs it to be near. And 
so she must have the support in peace of those who stood 
shoulder to shoulder mth her in war. I add that the unity 
she demands is not for herself alone, but is essential to all. 

We have seen for months, in books and papers published 
in English — which although representing only a minority 
in their respective countries form nevertheless a noisy 
minority — an accusation against France, an accusation 
of imperialism, so vague, so indefinite, so venomous and 
so utterly foolish, that I blush to reply to it. Imperialism? 
Where? When? Why? France is the oldest of European 
.nations — the nation whose moral unity is strongest and 
most coherent. And so she has no need of artificial stimu- 
lants, misused by others. For forty-three years she pro- 
tested against the mutilation of 1871. Never in war nor in 
peace has she dreamed of inflicting such mutilation upon 
her enemies. France victorious — I ask my British and 
American friends never to forget it — has placed under her 
sovereignty no single human being who was not French 
body and soul. Within the frontiers of new Europe ethnic 



HOW THE PEACE IS BEING ENFORCED 431 

minorities have here and there been included for reasons 
of necessity I have already stated. France consented to 
forego any such thing and in a district like the Sarre, con- 
siderable parts of which had been French for centuries, she 
accepted a plebiscite. France has taken no undue advan- 
tage of her power. France has claimed only her rights. 
She issues from war bleeding and weakened, but true to 
her high ideals. 

Imperialism? The threat of war? France more than 
any other country aspires to permanent peace. Those who 
say the contrary are either agents of Germany or, if they 
speak in good faith, know nothing of what France has suf- 
fered. They should see our ruined towns; our devastated 
fields ; our pillaged factories ; they should visit our French 
families mourning 1,400,000 of their dead. Then they will 
understand that a nation which has suffered thus from 
war is for all time the enemy of war. 

Imperialism? People say this because French troops 
are to be seen in the four corners of Europe — not only on 
the Rhine, but in Schleswig, Upper Silesia and Carinthia. 
Let those who make this reproach in England and in Amer- 
ica consult their own consciences ! The Treaty, because it 
had to, provided an international police force for those ter- 
ritories, the future of which was to be decided by popular 
vote, an international force to be supplied by all the Powers. 
The United States did not ratify it. Great Britain shirked, 
as in Upper Silesia, the duty she had undertaken. France 
was left alone, or almost alone with Italy, to perform the 
ungrateful task of policeman of justice, thus setting an 
example of perfect loyalty to their pledged faith. To 
reproach them for this would in some cases be even more 
thoughtless than unjust. France has taken the Treaty of 
Peace seriously, just as she took the war. If others have 
done otherwise is France to blame? 

Imperialism? In the last analysis it means that the 
French people demand the enforcement of the Treaty which 
put an end to the war. That is the real complaint against 
France ! To this charge of Imperialism France can proudly 



432 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

plead ''Not guilty;" for it is France who here stands for 
justice and truth. When after six months of discussion an 
agreement has been signed in which each party to secure 
essential unanimity sacrificed some of its demands, it 
would be doubly immoral to go back on the pledged word ; 
immoral because when millions of men have died to insure 
respect of Treaties, Governments, for whom victory was 
won by these fallen heroes, cannot adopt the ''scrap of 
paper" attitude without dishonour; inunoral because sac- 
rifices made to the principle of unanimity would be worth- 
less if, once the Treaty came into force, its clauses were to 
be open to discussion. Two instances: Great Britain and 
the United States on June 28, 1919, promised France their 
military assistance in the event of aggression by Germany. 
Neither of these undertakings has, for reasons that are 
known, come into force. Is France to be accused of Impe- 
rialism because she now declares, on the strength of Article 
429 of the Treaty of Versailles,* that under this circum- 
stance; she will not evacuate the left bank of the Rhine? 
All the Allies have promised each other full and complete 
support for the enforcement of the financial clauses of the 
Treaty of Peace. One of them by its failure to ratify the 
Treaty is not officially represented on the Reparations 
Commission and another from month to month suggests 
subversion of France 's rights. Is France to be accused of 
Imperialism if, holding to the Treaty, she insists by every 
means at her disposal, that Germany shall make good what 
she has destroyed? 

France and her people, which some of our Press for 
political reasons depict as embittered and discouraged, are 
at work ! Since 1914, the real France has been made clear 
in the eyes of men. Alone, almost unaided, she halted the 
Germans at the Marne; she lost 1,364,000 killed, 740,000 
mutilated, 3,000,000 wounded and 490,000 prisoners; she 
had at the front in the fifty-second month of the war, 
350,000 more men than in 1914; she contrived despite the 
loss of eighty-five per cent, of the metallurgic resources 



'See Chapter VI, pages 209-212. 



HOW THE PEACE IS BEING ENFORCED 433 

of the country, to increase the output of war material by 
nearly 1,500 per cent.; in two years since the Armistice, 
despite the burden of a debt increased from 35,000 millions 
to 255,000 millions, she has spent 20,000 millions on recon- 
struction and returned to their homes seventy-five per cent, 
of the people driven away by invasion. That in ten lines is 
what France has done. To lack faith in themselves the 
French would have to forget what they have done. So 
there can be no question of their recovery. France will 
recover. But she is determined to recover quickly and 
not to bend for tiitj years beneath the burden which a just 
peace has placed upon other shoulders. It is of vital 
importance to France in her present revival to gain thirty 
or forty years. It is this vital importance which makes 
essential the enforcement of the peace ; the placing of Ger- 
many in a position in which she can do no further harm; 
the payment by Geraaany for what she has destroyed. It is 
this vital importance which in honour binds the Allies of 
France to aid her in these things. "Will it be difficult? 
Yes, doubtless, but life is a struggle. There will be resist- 
ance by the Germans! Yes, again. But is the past so 
quickly forgotten 1 Is the last fortnight of June, 1919, for- 
gotten?* Is Count von Brockdorff 's resistance forgotten 
with its accompaniment of loud protest ? Is that monstrous 
bluff forgotten which, but for M. Clemenceau, would have 
been entirely successful? Forgotten also in presence of 
the firmness of the Allies, first the hesitation, then the 
lowered tone ; and soon the change of teams, the arrival of 
MM. Muller and Bell and finally the signing? Germany 
will always be ready to change teams if the Allies do not 
change principles. 

Addressing the French Parliament, M. Clemenceau 
made a statement on this subject which all the victors should 
read, learn and digest. 

"A cataclysm," he said, **has overtaken the world You 

must not think that after such an upheaval we are going to bring 



*See Chapter III, pnges 120-122. 



434 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

you pages of writing, which one after the other will be voted, 
approved and ratified by the Chambers and that that will be the 
end of it and we shall all be able to go home ; all wrongs in process 
of being righted, all precautions taken against a new outbreak and 
everybody able to say: Verily we have a paper! Now we can 
sleep ! Well ! Nothing of the kind ! The life of mankind is not a 
life of sleep ! 

* ' Life is but a struggle. That struggle you can never get rid of. 
My idea of life is a perpetual conflict whether in war or in peace. 
I think it was Bernhardi who said : 'War is but politics pursued in 
another manner. ' We can reverse the aphorism and say : ' Peace is 
but war pursued in another manner. ' 

"Wlien a treaty comes before you, a treaty which has I don't 
know how many hundred clauses dealing with all kinds of ques- 
tions, you must not forget that these so complex provisions will be 
of worth only by what you do. The Treaty will be what you make it. 

"If you go to peace joyfullj^ as our men went to war, you will 
give it life ; you will make it worth while, you will make it of serv- 
ice to mankind. 

' ' If you waste time thinking of things which may never happen, 
of things that men of law love to write books about, what will hap- 
pen ? You wiU discredit the Treaty, you will discourage those who 
won the victory ; you will make them believe that you are incapable 
of realizing a peace that insures safety. 

"When you will have done this fine thing, you will be able to 
praise yourselves — nobody else will. The Treaty will be voted or 
will not be voted. But you will have given your country a thing of 
death instead of a thing of life. And if you have thought for a 
moment that we have been able to make a peace which will do away 
with the need for watchfulness between the nations of Europe 
which only yesterday were shedding their blood without stint upon 
every front, well then it means that you are unable to under- 
stand us ! " 

The fundamental truth dwells in these strong words. 
We have no choice, nor have our Allies. If we want the war 
and the victory to bear fruit, we must cleave to the soul 
of the Alliance. This is not alone a moral duty; it is an 
essential fact. Those unmeldy bodies at which it is the 
fashion to scoff, League of Nations, Reparations Commis- 
sion, Military Supervisory Commission, are the means to 



HOW THE PEACE IS BEING ENFORCED 435 

achieve our end. They are the concrete expression of 
essential unity. It is their duty to bring it to pass. If they 
do not, the Treaty will not be enforced and, as time goes 
on and Germany after a half century recovers from her 
defeat, all the old perils of before the war will arise again 
for all of us, ^vith bankruptcy into the bargain. I say all the 
old perils and I mean it. For France it would again be the 
direct threat to her national independence. But for Italy 
also, and Belgium and Great Britian — even for the United 
States — the German danger in all its insidious and pene- 
trating forms would soon reappear in economics, politics 
and morals. If the unity of the Allies be broken, Germany 
mil begin again. It is on the continent that Great Britain 
must defend herself against the German danger. It is in 
Europe that the United States finds its safeguard against 
the same danger. Isolated from the others no one of the 
victors would be certain to overcome the resistance wliich 
Germany is already preparing. Doubtless, as Roosevelt 
said, it is simpler for each to live at home, like a small 
tradesman in a little shop, than to work together. But the 
obligations of the war survive our military triumph and 
impose the same duties. 

Consider France in all her glorious and bloodstained 
history. It was France who taught the world justice. And 
to justice she remains faithful. Her conception of the rules 
governing the relations of individuals is that which the 
masses aspire to see extended in the future to relations 
between nations. Fralice it was who proclaimed the 
higher ideals of freedom of thought, equality of citizens, 
abolition of privileges and respect of human dignity. Con- 
sider France in 1914, taken unawares by sudden invasion, 
fighting for her life sans peur et sans reproche. Con- 
sider her people standing together more than four years in 
the most desperate struggle of all history; a people mild 
and strong, unselfish to excess, capable of mistakes costly 
to itself alone ; industrious as none other ; liberal, wise and 
free, above all loving justice. Foreigners too often judge 
France by the excesses of isolated individuals who do not 



436 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

represent the nation. The nation lives on — eternal in its 
pure and noble spirit. France is a democracy which has 
not forgotten what autocracy cost it, in 1815 as in 1871. 
France is a democracy which conscious of itself is deter- 
mined to be true to itself and often — as very truly said by 
an American, Mr. Morton Fullerton — expresses as French 
ideals, those general ideals which civilization could not 
repudiate without danger. 

France asks one thing only — that the pledged word be 
kept. While demanding it and refusing to abandon hope of 
obtaining it, is she idle and mourning, a prey to despair? 
No ! She is working, mthout outside aid, to rebuild and to 
reorganize after the unheard-of ordeal through which she 
has passed ; to rebuild and to reorganize for her own safety 
and for the safety of the whole world. This country is my 
country. Like all Frenchmen, I have the right to be proud 
of her, lovingly proud. But in this book I have confined 
myself to facts, to figures, to documents, the stern evidence 
of which I place before the consciences of the British and 
American peoples. 



CHAPTER XIV 

FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 

France and Great Britain were the two pillars of vic- 
tory. But for the French Army and the British Fleet, Ger- 
many would have won the war. That is the dominant fact 
of the age in which we live. If our two countries ever came 
to forget it they would be pulling down with their own 
hands the structure cemented by their blood. 

This friendship, so strong and true, is at times difficult 
of practice. The past accounts for that. History has now 
and then recorded Franco-British agreements. But as a 
rule they have had no morrow. In 1801 the people of Lon- 
don cheered Bonaparte 's envoy. Colonel de Lauriston, come 
to ratify peace, but a few months later, war broke out again 
and lasted until Waterloo. In 1838 the city enthusiastically 
welcomed Marechal Soult, the Ambassador of Louis-Phil- 
ippe at Queen Victoria's coronation; but, less than two 
years later came the crisis of 1840. Under Napoleon III 
English and French troops together won the Crimean war, 
but this alliance did not last and, in 1860, Queen Victoria 
advised **a regular crusade against France." One of our 
historians, Albert Sorel, wrote thirty years ago: "There 
may be — there have been — understandings between France 
and England to preserve the existing order; but England 
never has been and never can be an ally of France so long 
as France does not renounce expansion." Lord Chatham, 
a century earlier had expressed the same idea in another 
form when he said: '^The only thing England has to fear 
here below is to see France become a commercial and colo^ 
nial maritime power." For a century and a half, from 
1688 to 1815, sixty-one years of war — the war of the Augs- 

437 



438 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

burg League (1688-1697), the war of the Spanish Succes- 
sion (1701-1711), the war of the Austrian Succession (1742- 
1748), the Seven Years "War (1756-1763), the American 
War (1778-1783), the wars of the Revolution and of the 
Empire, (1793-1815) — spitted France and England against 
each other. Wars separated by periods of precarious 
peace, and in peace deep and mutual distrust. Such was 
the law of the past. 

Circumstances on the one hand, the mil of a man of 
genius on the other, modified this situation which seemed 
destined by historical fates to last forever. After a cen- 
tury in which Algeria, Tunis, Western and Central Africa, 
the Niger, the Congo, Madagascar, Oceania, Indo-China, 
Egypt, Morocco, had in swift succession brought the two 
countries into conflict, less than ten years sufficed to estab- 
lish, consolidate and seal their entente on the field of bat- 
tle. For after 1870, Great Britain understood that Germany, 
not France, threatened the British Empire ; for Queen Vic- 
toria, ever respectful of insular traditions, had been suc- 
ceeded in the person of Edward VII, by a sovereign who 
had direct experience, and personal information of mod- 
ern political developments. Bismarck after his victory had 
tried to bolster up Anglo-German friendship, the neces- 
sary complement of the Treaty of Frankfort. He had suc- 
ceeded. *'I am English in Egypt," he said one day. And 
a few months later, he added : ' ' England is worth more to 
us than Zanzibar and the whole East Coast of Africa." 

William II and Prince von Biilow were less prudent. 
Europe was too small for their ambitions and not content 
with territorial gains and political supremacy there, they 
were determined that Germany's future should be upon 
the sea. In a few years under their impulse cousin "land- 
rat" began to navigate, to trade, to conquer. Germany's 
foreign commerce rose from 7,000 millions in 1892 to 15,000 
milhons in 1906 ; her naval fleet from 9 battle-ships in 1898 
to 70 battle-ships and cruisers in 1913. Thus, as her Chan- 
cellor said, Germany prepared to "go forth into the world, 
sword in one hand, spade and trowel in the other. ' ' Thus, 



FRANCE, BRITAIN AND THE U. S. A. 439 

she asserted her intention to create a ''Greater Germany." 
In all respects and with extraordinary rapidity she became 
a world power, justifying Treitsclike 's proud prophecy: 
''When the German flag protects a vast Empire, to whom 
will the scepter of the universe belong? Will it not be 
Germany's mission to assure the peace of the world?" 
England, which in 1870 had had no premonition of this 
peril, now saw it arising at her doors. German expansion 
changed the fundamental conditions of world politics. A 
new era was opened by it. 

This new era called for a new policy, and to this policy 
England came but mth hesitation and in a roundabout man- 
ner. It was in 1885 that her merchants, then little heeded, 
for the first time called attention to the economic menace 
of Germany. It was only fifteen years later that seeing 
this menace invade the whole world, besiege the markets, 
cut the sea-lanes and add political pretensions to commer- 
cial ambition. Great Britian or more accurately her king, 
felt the necessity of reversing her alliance. 

"We cannot," said Edward VII, "remain indefinitely 
at the mercy of the German hold-up." 

This phrase is the birth-certificate of what has come 
to be known as the Entente Cordiale. For, once it was 
decided to oppose German plans for supremacy, an under- 
standing with France was obligatory. Paradoxical from 
the point of view of past habits, this rapprochement was 
unassailable from that of practical politics. The Repub- 
lic, it is true, had given our country an immense colonial 
empire. But, in 1904 any alarm felt over this expansion in 
England was a thing of the past and France's peaceful 
intentions had too often been proved by her acts, to per- 
mit London to have a misgiving as to the future. Eco- 
nomically, Anglo-French relations had always been active 
and cordial. They were susceptible of still further develop- 
ment on the basis of complementary exchanges. Politically 
the object was the same — the peaceful organization of a 
well-balanced Europe, freed from German hegemony. 
Despite numerous objections, Edward VTI had the courage 



440 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

to play his cards. In May, 1903, he came to Paris — an 
imprudent visit, some thought. He was welcomed and in 
the following August the conversations began. It was not 
attempted at this first meeting to formulate any general 
policy but merely to settle outstanding controversies. In 
April, 1904, this settlement was accomplished; Morocco, 
Egypt and Newfoundland supplied its main features. 

For France this agreement, no matter how limited in 
general effectiveness, came at the right time. It was on the 
eve of the Russian defeat in Manchuria. English friend- 
ship thus asserted itself at a time of semi-isolation. There 
was of course no question of political alliance, still less of 
military undertakings. All that was done was to show the 
world that we could converse and eliminate local points 
of friction. But this in itself changed the essential fac- 
tors of the European problem. Bismarck's hope some 
day to see a collision between the ''English and French 
engines," was dashed. The principal instrument of Ger- 
man domination was broken. By the Anglo-French rap- 
prochement Europe eager for peace could turn in peace 
towards equality and equilibrium. If Germany had been 
mlling to cooperate, a long stability would have ensued. 
But Germany was not willing to cooperate. First in 1905, 
in Morocco, then in the Orient she began her threats and 
her bluster which by pressure and counter-pressure led to 
the war of 1914. I have given at the beginning of this 
book the logical sequence of events and will not go over this 
ground again here. I will confine myself to the evolution 
and strengthening of the Anglo-French relations under 
this German influence. Another link was formed in 1908 
after the Casablanca incident. Another in 1909 after the 
Bosnian affair. Still a third in 1911 after Agadir. Then 
occurred the first conferences between the two General 
Staffs, which as I have already sho^^^l still avoided any 
positive engagement. The two countries, fully conscious of 
the necessity of an agreement but keeping free from all 
promises, continued thus to feel their way do^vn to 1914. 
On the evening of the very day when the first Germans 



FEANCE, BRITAIN AND THE U. S. A. 441 

crossed the French frontier, Great Britain still reserved 
her decision. The next day she merely promised to bar 
the Channel to any attack by the German fleet against 
the French coast. The day following, however, the viola- 
tion of Belgium brought the British Empire to the rescue 
of the scrap of paper and for fifty-two months was forged 
between the two countries that complete unity whose tri- 
umph was cro^vned by the Treaty of Versailles. 

Such are the remote origins of our present relations. 
They shed light to some extent on the difficulties which 
beset both in war and in peace this indispensable friend- 
ship. ''England is an island," said Michelet, ''and that 
explains her whole history." England is an island and 
that island for centuries has accustomed itself to fear 
everything from the isthmus to the shores of which are held 
by France. Eoyal jealousies, Napoleonic wars, colonial con- 
flicts have since the Middle Ages poisoned the atmosphere 
in which, for the salvation of the world, trust and friend- 
ship were henceforth to flourish. There was friction. 
There were collisions. But yet together and for five and 
a half years France and Great Britain bore the brunt of 
the hardest of wars and the most exacting of peaces. 
Together they defended the land and held the seas. 
Together they beat Germany. That makes it worth while to 
continue, and when incidents arise to search our souls 
together, for that alone will make continuance possible. It 
is as necessary to-day in peace as it was yesterday in time 
of war. What would this peace amount to in the present 
state of Europe if France and Great Britain, forgetting 
the work they had accomplished in conunon, were no 
longer to stand, shoulder to shoulder, to assure its main- 
tenance and enforcement? 

Great Britain 's role in the war was enormous. Without 
speaking of the courage of her soldiers who from month to 
month made magnificent strides both in quantity and qual- 
ity, her fleet which bottled up the German Navy in its 
ports, enabled the Allies to live, to arm, to gather strength 
and to win. This inestimable service Great Britain 



442 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

crowned by transporting in her vessels, during the last 
eight months of the war, seventy per cent, of the American 
Army. Throughout the war France and Great Britain 
adhered loyally to the declaration of September, 1914, and 
were always united as to the end to be attained. But as to 
means to be employed what disagreements arose! I took 
part in most of those discussions and I remember especially 
those at Versailles and in London in the summer of 1918. 
If I recall them here, it is to throw light upon more recent 
discussion; to show public opinion in both countries that 
these discussions were in no way unprecedented or unex- 
pected; drive home into English and French brain alike 
this fundamental idea that relations will never be easy 
between the two peoples because we neither think nor feel 
in the same way and also because the difficulty in reaching 
agreements lies much less in the nature of the problems to 
be solved than in the diversity of national temperaments. 
The history of the war proved this. And how much more 
the history of peace? 

The preceding chapters have hidden nothing of the heat 
of our discussions. What caused this heat? Opposition of 
principles? No. But over the application of every princi- 
ple arose difficulties due to differences of mental pro- 
cess and to divergent traditions. Do you want an extreme, 
coarse and even distorted expression of these divergences? 
Then read Mr. Keynes' book. But when you read it, do 
not forget that the contradictions he exaggerates to such an 
absurd extent really existed, though in much less degree. 
The Englishman in his island behind his walls of water is 
incapable, whatever he does, of grasping the point of view 
of the French with the open frontier twice violated in fifty 
years; and there you have — in its essential causes — the 
long discussion over the left bank of the Rhine. The Eng- 
lishman who has not like France had to defend himself for 
fifteen centuries against German attacks, treats war as a 
sport and is inclined to say when it is over, **Let's shake 
hands and make it up. ' ' Hence the serious misunderstand- 
ing over the conditions necessary to the admission of Ger- 



FRANCE, BRITAIN AND THE U. S. A. 443 

many into the League of Nations. The Englishman who 
has suffered little in the course of his history from the 
troubles brought upon Europe by German ambitions, hates 
the Slavs who have been his rivals both in the Balkans and 
in Asia : the Englishman understands nothing of the instinc- 
tive policy of France which, from Louis XV to M. de Frey- 
cinet, has sought in Eastern Europe a counter-weight to 
German power: and there we have the great quarrel over 
Dantzig and Upper Silesia which Mr. Lloyd George, deaf 
to the arguments of M. Clemenceau and of Mr. Wilson, 
grudges to Poland. The Englishman despite the heav}^ 
taxes he imposed upon himself during the war, despite the 
election promises of 1913 — ''Germany vdW pay to the last 
farthing" — did not attach the same supreme importance to 
reparations as did devastated France. British shipping 
sunk has been replaced by new construction and paid for, 
in large part, by Allied or neutral cargoes. Not a foot of 
English soil served as a battlefield. So to settle a monot- 
onous controversy England is ready for lump sum solutions 
and debt reductions which represent a tolerable bur- 
den for her but mean bankruptcy for France ; and here w^e 
have the whole gist of the financial discussion which I have 
outlined above and which, beginning before the Treaty was 
signed, has continued to grow once it came into force. I 
might give other instances but the result would always be 
the same. 

These problems so lengthily discussed in 1919 were set- 
tled in almost every instance as France suggested. I have 
told in detail of the two great Franco-British crises at the 
Conference — the first in March before the Treaty was 
handed to the Germans, the second in June after that event. 
I have quoted in full the French Note of April 2, in which 
M. Clemenceau said to Mr. Lloyd George: "If you find the 
peace too harsh, let us give Germany back her colonies and 
her fleet, and let us not impose upon the continental nations 
alone — France, Belgium, Bohemia and Poland — the terri- 
torial concessions required to appease the beaten aggres- 
sor. ' ' I have shown that a fortnight later France received 



444 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

full satisfaction on all these points. Why? Because 
instead of entering into endless bargainings, she had 
appealed on the principle itself to the inner conscience and 
honour of the British delegates. To preserve towards Ger- 
many the authority of the Allies by continuity of their 
common policy; to enforce a Treaty which appeals to all 
the Allies and not to Germany only as a just peace; to 
remember that the Treaty being a compromise no one of 
its clauses can be modified without jeopardizing the whole 
structure — such were yesterday the essential conditions of 
the re-establishment of order in the world ; to-morrow they 
will be just as essential. 

It was thus and thus only that maintaining Franco- 
British friendship and even sealing it by an agreement 
unparalleled in British history M. Clemenceau made our 
French contentions prevail. He did this by moral influ- 
ence to which Mr. Lloyd George never remained insen- 
sible. The British Minister, so impulsive and at times so 
quick to take offense, was often swayed by his French col- 
league to whom he bore real affection and respect. In the 
most trying days of the Peace Conference it was never in 
vain that M. Clemenceau reminded him of the trying days 
of the war. M. Clemenceau 's appeals were made not in 
official discussion rendered formal by the necessary pres- 
ence of an interpreter, but man to man, in personal talks 
where plain truths forcefully stated mingled with appeals 
that swayed the heart, where the fire of the old Celt melted 
the stubborn Welshman out of his British prejudices and, 
if I may use the expression, ^'disinsularized" him. Besides 
a French atmosphere pervaded the discussion, the atmos- 
phere of the near-by battlefields which Mr. Lloyd George 
frequently visited. Our contact with our Allies was direct 
and permanent. The familiarity of long effort in common 
permitted us to approach them at all hours, to prepare at 
dawn the work of the day and in the evening to consolidate 
the results. 

Laborious and difficult, this peace was made and, 
despite so many disagreements. Great Britain and France 



FRANCE, BRITAIN AND THE U. S. A. 445 

both placed their signatures to the Treaty in a neutral 
spirit of abiding and warm friendship. Since the coming 
into force of the Treaty what has become of tliis cordial 
unity? The history of 1920 must answer that question! 

II 

This history is all contained in two facts. France, 
though armed with the Treaty, accepted in 1920 the Eng- 
lish contentions she had rejected in 1919; and in spite of 
these concessions, repugnant to her interest and to her 
right, she has not retained the cordial intimacy which M. 
Clemenceau had succeeded in giving to Franco-British 
relations in 1919 while firmly refusing the things his suc- 
cessors have consented to. Surrender of war criminals; 
economic memorandum; occupation of Frankfort; repa- 
rations; conferences at San Remo, Hythe, Boulogne, and 
Spa; nearly always France gives way but every time 
confidence dwindles, French delegates returning from 
these meetings bitterly exclaiming: **We were undone! Yet 
we had to give way in order to save the Entente." And 
the Entente itself for which so much had been sacrificed 
seemed less cordial and less certain after each meeting! 

The development of such a state of mind is a dangerous 
thing! Let me say with all the emphasis at my command 
that it is unfair to France, unfair to Great Britain and 
harmful to both. It is unfair to France. The splendour 
of her war effort; the moderation of her peace demands; 
the magnitude of her sacrifices entitled France to make 
her voice heard especially when she is in the right. It is 
unfair to Great Britain. Obdurate as she may be in busi- 
ness matters, selfish as she often is. Great Britain for five 
long and tragic years was deaf neither to the appeals of 
sentiment nor of reason. But for Great Britain to hear 
she must be spoken to in a way she understands. If we 
speak to her face to face — as friend to friend — ^we can 
speak strongly, we can speak ''after the manner of the 
English, in straight flung words and few." If we speak 



446 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

rightly and at the right time we are certain to make our 
point and to overcome prejudice and egotism. But speak 
we must. Four and a half years of war and fifteen months 
of peace ne^-otiations warrant this assertion. Those who, 
like myself, have lived through those six eventful years 
refuse to admit that in a few short weeks the respective 
situations of either of the two great nations or of their 
Governments can have undergone the complete change 
which the events of 1920 would seem to indicate. 

Difficulties and disagreements between France and Eng- 
land? There have been many; there are some to-day and 
there always will be some. But there was a time when these 
differences were composed by reason, far from the enemy 's 
sight and without any sacrifice of prestige by either of the 
principals. When in 1917 England contemplated the evac- 
uation of Salonica ; when, in 1918, she advocated the short- 
sighted policy of reducing the number of her divisions in 
France from sixty to forty ; when, at the beginning of 1919, 
Mr. Lloyd George said: ''To make Germany sign, let us 
humour her," and M. Clemenceau replied: "It is not for us 
in the presence of a defeated aggressor to ask pardon for 
our victory;" when IJngland would agree neither to the 
occupation of the Rhine nor to the wresting of Upper Si- 
lesia and Dantzig from Germany; when after having 
declared "Germany shall pay for everything," she sug- 
gested in the following month of June the fixing of a cer- 
tain lump sum which would have crippled the claim for 
reparations; or when she proposed meeting Lenine's dele- 
gates in Paris, was it at such times — ^I ask — another Eng- 
land? Was it another Lloyd George? No, they were the 
same. France managed to make her view prevail, because 
France was in the right. 

If this situation has been changed, I do not hesitate to 
place the initial blame upon England. Mr. Lloyd George 
worked very hard for our common victory. No Frenchman 
has the right to forget that, nor to doubt the sincerity of 
his admiration and affection for France. And no French- 
man can take exception to the fact that his first thought is 



FRANCE, BRITAIN AND THE U. S. A. 447 

always of England. But his policy in 1920 was marked by 
many errors. To placate British labour, he countenanced 
too many concessions both to the Soviets and to Germany. 
To placate British trade, he mated business greed with 
political idealism. Many Frenchmen believe that in 1920 
— quite unconsciously, perhaps — ^he adopted the very policy 
he had repudiated in 1919, — the policy of Mr. Keynes. 
Commercial interests have everywhere been put first. 
The hankering after immediate advantage has blurred the 
prospect of the future. Too many Englishmen have for- 
gotten that — ^however great and decisive the part played 
by England in the war — her territory was neither invaded 
nor devastated. Too many Englishmen have failed to rec- 
ognize that France, bleeding and plundered, is entitled to 
something better than daily advice to renounce her rights. 
The vast majority of English people have not changed, 
nor have their truly fraternal feelings for the French 
people varied. But they have been told so often that 
France, and France alone, has retarded the coming of real 
peace by insisting on the literal execution of a Treaty 
devised to bind the victors together as it binds the van- 
quished to them, that moral misunderstanding has ensued. 
So little has been done to explain to the English people 
our absolute need for full reparation — to make them see 
that if France is not to be bowed down for half a century 
under the crushing weight of an unjust burden, she must 
have full reparation — that a political cleavage has arisen 
which irritates men's nerves without enlightening their 
minds. But reduced to its basic elements the problem is 
a simple one. If the responsible leaders of Great Britain, 
if those who control British policy have already come to the 
conclusion that the financial clauses of the Treaty of Peace 
— which they solemnly signed in 1919 — cannot be executed, 
it is their duty at least to offer France a guarantee for the 
minimum they would have her accept when urging her to 
abate her just demands. This they have not done. It is 
a serious mistake, fraught with danger to both countries 
^alike. Thus the campaign for the revision of the Treaty 



448 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

has risen from lower levels to the highest Government 
spheres. The surprise and sorrow of Frenchmen are as 
great as the esteem and friendship which, after our com- 
mon victory, they entertain for our Great Ally across the 
Channel. 

This is the truth, but it is not the whole truth. British 
efforts against the Treaty of Versailles have had a disas- 
trous effect and yet, by an unheard-of paradox, these efforts 
have found supporters in France. What supporters? The 
very men who, when the Treaty was signed, complained 
that it was not drastic enough. Complex as their motives 
have been, their efforts have been convergent. Some have 
striven to show that the Republic is incapable of negotiat- 
ing a sound Treaty; others that the bourgeoisie is incapa- 
ble of establishing a lasting peace ; others again that a peace 
negotiated by M. Clemenceau must necessarily be detest- 
able. All, however, have worked hand in hand to assail a 
Treaty already subjected to many foreign attacks; all have 
worked to weaken a contract wliich they had previously 
proclaimed inadequate. These critics, whether they in- 
tended it or not, have shaken public confidence and weak- 
ened the Treaty of Peace. Their action has been exerted in 
successive waves. It began in the spring of 1919. It con- 
tinued throughout the summer and its manifestations have 
grown increasingly frequent. Look at the American papers 
and you will see how unjust and unbridled attacks in the 
French Parliament furnished ready weapons to those 
opposed to the ratification of the Treaty. Read the Eng- 
lish papers of more recent date and you will see how these 
same continental criticisms have been used to support 
the growing demand for the revision of the Treaty. Exam- 
ine the German papers and you will see how Germany — 
interpreting so many and such violent attacks as an indi- 
cation of adverse public opinion in France, has conceived 
hopes of defeating the document in which its downfall is 
recorded. When undermining the Treaty, in the interest 
of parties and of individuals in our internal politics, 
French critics have not stopped to consider that they were 



FRANCE, BRITAIN AND THE U. S. A. 449 

also undermining it in the interest and to the advantage of 
Germany as well. Their game of vying with one another 
to find fault has been Germany's game. They have not 
seen the encouragement they were giving to Pan-German- 
ism and this blindness, I regret to say, has been met with 
even in the highest Government circles. 

Simultaneously M. Clemenceau's defeat in the presi- 
dential election altered the arrangements which had been 
made, in December, 1919, for the future of the Conference 
and, reversing these arrangements, caused the inter-allied 
headquarters for the execution of the peace to be trans- 
ferred from Paris to London. It was no longer the French 
Prime Minister but the British Prime Minister who pre- 
sided over and directed them. Mr. Lloyd George had to 
confer with M. Millerand through an interpreter; and 
intimate understanding was impossible in brief meetings. 
The ''diplomatic channel" with its Notes and Counter- 
Notes, its delay and quibbling, again became paramount. 
Never in 1920 did Mr. Lloyd George have that direct view, 
that physical sensation of France and of Europe, which 
M. Clemenceau gave him in a few words at decisive 
moments. Those few Frenchmen whose long collaboration 
enabled them to discuss things freely with the British 
Prime Minister likewise disappeared, following M. Cle- 
menceau into retirement. No one was left who could speak 
with that directness — may I say that sharpness — which was 
so often necessary; none who could reduce to right pro- 
portions the personal attacks of certain political writers 
who unintentionally have done France so much harm dur- 
ing the past few months. 

At the same time France employed the worst possible 
method of negotiation — weakness in discussion followed by 
resounding reactions after agreement had been reached — 
that is, the thing most repugnant to British and American 
minds. Tell them beforehand what you are going to do, 
even if it is most disagreeable to them, they will acknow- 
ledge your right to do as you please. Do it without tell- 
ing them and the displeasure they would feel in any event 



450 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

will be deepened by annoyance at being treated without 
candour, and this feeling will endure.* I remember one day 
during the war having warned an American Minister, who 
in perfect good faith absolutely refused to entertain a 
request made by the French Goverimient, that I intended 
in a public speech to appeal to the people to decide between 
us. Because I myself told him what I was going to do, he 
regarded as correct and ''fair" a step which would have 
exasperated him if he had first heard of it through the 
papers, and when he saw three weeks later that the public 
was on our side he gave way with the best grace in the 
world. In dealing with Anglo-Saxons, direct hits are the 
ones that count. Indirect methods are dangerous and more 
dangerous still when before surprising these same Anglo- 
Saxons by a brusk initiative you have allowed them to 
think for months that you do not dare to withstand them. 
Insular isolation has been thus re-estabhshed — commercial 
insularity, electoral insularity, political insularity — and 
the movement for the revision of the Treaty has grown. And 
if it be objected that in saying this, I attach too great 
importance to the personal equation in politics, I would 
answer that politics imply actions and actions imply 
individuals. 

These things must be recalled if it is to be understood 
why every decision arrived at in 1920 lent itself to bitter 
controversy ; why certain solutions repugnant to the Treaty 
put forward and rejected during the original negotiations, 
so frequently prevailed ; why in the absence of the United 
States, held aloof by the failure of the U. S. Senate to ratify 
the Treaty, France and Great Britain have so often as- 
sumed antagonistic attitudes and jeopardized their mutual 
good understanding by useless haggling. An unhealthy 
atmosphere created by malevolent criticism of the only law 



*At least twice in 1920, the French Government violated this rule. It 
was by the French papers that Mr. Lloyd George learned of the occupation of 
Frankfort. As to the recognition of Wrangel, M. Millerand's Government 
informed Great Britain on a Wednesday when on the Sunday and Monday 
preceding a conference had taken place at Hythe between the two Premiers in 
which not a word was said about it. In both cases telegraphic debys were 
blamed which merely added ridicule to lack of tact. 



FRANCE, BRITAIN AND THE U. S. A. 451 

that should be respected by all alike; a faulty method of 
negotiation — due on the British side to a serious error of 
psychology, and on the French side to a sudden change of 
administration — such is the story of 1920. A British Gov- 
ernment which forgetful of our past sufferings urges us 
to pay for the success of questionable combinations by the 
sacrifice of our rights ; a French Government which in Par- 
liament for purposes of internal politics ridicules the very 
document on which a few days later it had to rely in dip- 
lomatic conferences.* On the one hand unreasonable 
demands harshly formulated; on the other concessions 
granted only to be followed by vain recrimination. Mutual 
misunderstanding aggravated by the difference of language, 
by the impossibility of direct contact ; a series of recipro- 
cal lackings of consideration producing ever-increasing 
exasperation — such are the characteristic features of the 
story. 

Thus a great deal of harm has been done and unless both 
parties change their tactics, this harm will increase. I say 
what I think and I hope I shall be believed. Those who 
helped M. Clemenceau to conduct the affairs of France dur- 
ing the last fifteen months of the war and the twelve months 
of peace negotiations cannot be suspected of under-estimat- 
ing either the material power or the moral value of Great 
Britain. They never lost sight and they never will lose sight 
of the immense services rendered by England during the 
war, of the fact that Franco-British friendship is essential 
to the safety of both countries and to the peace of the world. 
So they have the right to recall that when conflicting inter- 
ests brought the police of these two nations into opposition 
they succeeded in settling their differences by equitable 
agreements which did not place the burden of all the sacri- 
fices upon the shoulders of only one nation and that in this 
manner they safeguarded the intimacy of the two coun- 



*M. Millerand, the French Premier, told the Chamber of Deputies on 
May 28, 1920: "The Treaty of Versailles contains more promises than real- 
ities. " ' He added on July 20, " It is a diplomatic instrument in which 

all things are asserted and nothing is settled. So it is necessary to interpret 
it iu order to obtain tangible results. ' ' 



452 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

tries. France, it is only too evident, cannot break with 
Great Britain. But neither can Great Britain break with 
France. 

Ill 

This difficulty must be overcome. But how? First by 
disregarding resolutely the methods followed on both sides 
in 1920, and returning to the franker, broader and clearer 
methods which enabled the two countries to win the war 
and make peace in common. This is the first but not the 
only thing. During the war France and England viewed 
their relations plainly and practically. France knew that, 
if England had lost control of the seas, the Allies would 
have had no more supplies or munitions. England knew 
that, if the French had given way on the Marne or at Ver- 
dun, the English coast would have been uncovered. Is it 
possible in peace — ^more complex, it is true, than war — to 
apply to Anglo-French relations a similar formula and thus 
set up above contingent considerations a permanent goal 
for the minds and wills of the two nations! I should like 
to try to answer tliis question. 

France knows very well what she expects of England. 
"What she expects of England is first of all political — that 
is to say — moral support. We are face to face with a 
beaten neighbor who prefers hatred to repentance and 
whose population is twenty millions greater than ours. 
NotAvithstanding the folly of certain Frenchmen intox- 
icated with the idea of solitude, we need friends. What 
form should this friendship take ? I know but one basis for 
friendship for nations as for individuals — loyalty and 
unity. Loyalty, that is to say scrupulous respect for all en- 
gagements entered into after free discussion. Unity, that 
is to say the desire to understand and to share each other's 
aspirations. In the present state of Europe and of the 
world a criterion: if France is not to doubt England, she 
must feel that England does not attach less importance to 
the enforcement of the peace than she herself. Will it be 
said that this enforcement is less directly indispensable to 



FEANCE, BRITAIN AND THE U. S. A. 453 

Great Britain than to France? It is for this reason that 
Great Britain, precisely because she values France's 
friendship, must be as vigilant as France herself with 
regard to it. Even if she believes that France is making a 
mistake in exacting all that she has a right to, she is bound 
as a friend to support her. 

A single example. "When England publicly disavowed 
in March, 1920, the occupation of Frankfort by French and 
Belgian troops, she violated this fundamental principle of 
friendship. And I quite agree that there might well be a 
difference of opinion as to this step which I myself looked 
upon as both justified and utterly useless. But on no 
account should the enemy of yesterday have been permitted 
to see that there was a division; above all, an attempt 
should have been made to reach an understanding. Sup- 
pose that on the pretext of policing German fishermen what 
is left of the German fleet had cruised about the mouth of 
the Thames and fired its guns. Do you believe that the 
British Admiralty would not immediately and on its own 
responsibility have taken measures of reprisal! This is 
precisely what France did at Frankfort when on pretext 
of strikes the Reichwehr invaded the neutral zone which 
the Treaty of Versailles had forbidden it to enter. France 
on this occasion would have liked Great Britain to feel as 
she felt, as Great Britain indeed would have felt in her 
place. France would have liked also in other matters, 
reparations, Poland, etc., to have Great Britain make an 
effort to agree to policies which have always been in strict 
accordance with the solemn undertakings entered into on 
June 28, 1919. That is what I call moral support. 

France also needs the material support of Great Brit- 
ain. She needs coal — coal at reasonable prices and with 
priority of delivery at least to the amount which France 
lost defending, over her destroyed mines, the coast of Eng- 
land. It is not fair that France should pay more for that 
coal than the English pay for it and that France should pay 
for it at the same prices as the neutrals of yesterday. 
Lord Northcliff e asserted this in an interview in November, 



454 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TEEATY 

1920 — I in turn say the same thing. It is unfair also that 
in order to maintain her export prices, England should 
force us, as she did at Spa, to pay more for German coal 
than the price fixed by the Treaty of Versailles. France 
needs shipping and here I am not one of those who under- 
rate the immense sacrifices made by Great Britain for vic- 
tory, but I ask her to take France's sacrifices also into 
account. I know full well that submarine warfare de- 
stroyed seventeen million tons, nine millions of which were 
British; that the German and Austrian fleets together 
amounted to only five and a half million tons and that Great 
Britain replaced only thirty per cent, of her losses by enemy 
ships. But Great Britain should remember that our arse- 
nals and shipyards were busy making war material for all 
the Allies and that France did not build a ship for five 
years. Great Britain should remember that France during 
the war, because of lack of tonnage, paid British, American 
and neutral carriers 12,000 million francs in freight 
charges. Great Britain should remember France's lack of 
passenger ships and that she is not even able to run the 
regular pre-war services to her own colonies. 

I say that here, as in all other things, mere commercial 
fair play is not enough, that what is needed is whole-heart- 
ed support, the kind of support France gave in the tragic 
days of 1918 when Petain's twenty-four divisions were 
rushed in a few hours to replace Gough's Army. Last but 
not least France needs financial support and here again I 
am far from underrating the enormous financial sacrifices 
made by Great Britain in the war and the thousands of 
millions she lent us. But I ask her not to forget Lord 
Derby's words already quoted that ''her Lancashire has 
not been destroyed. ' ' In France, this destruction was com- 
plete and gave to the Armies of Liberty their common field 
of battle on which Allied victory saved English soil from 
the horrors of invasion. What can be done for France? 
Financial unity, the difficulties of which I have already 
explained? A French loan in England — ^promised to M. 
Clemenceau, but never floated? This is not the place to 



FRANCE, BRITAIN AND THE U. S, A. 455 

discuss ways and means. It is sufficient to raise the ques- 
tions and to add that, no matter what happens, France 
must be able to count on Great Britain for full support 
when she demands of Germany the reparations written 
in the Treaty which England signed. During the war we 
bought much wheat, steel, coal, explosives, freights; in 
return we freely gave the best of French soil, and 1,400,000 
French lives. That is an argument which tells on the Eng- 
lish heart. 

That is what France expects of England and I have no 
reason to hold any of it back. But England also needs 
France and I want to say how, with equal frankness. Eng- 
land first of all needs France for her safety. The last 
war convinced the most incredulous of this fact. If some 
day either a renewal of German aggression or the obscure 
development of Russian forces were to threaten France and 
Belgium in the East, then and for the same reasons Great 
Britain would be threatened too. Without Belgium and 
without France, Great Britain has no battlefield on the 
Continent to deploy her forces and protect her coast. When 
the road to Paris is open to invasion neither Calais nor 
Dover is safe. Every thinking Briton knows that and is 
not likely to forget it. But Great Britain not only needs 
France to be safe, in order to feel safe herself, she also 
needs France to be prosperous. It is to England's own 
interest that France should rise from her ruins because the 
twenty million bushels of wheat which cannot longer be 
grown in our devastated regions force us to compete with 
British buyers in the grain markets of the world ; because 
the ruin of our mines, no matter how high the price of Eng- 
lish coal, must weigh in the long run upon the reduced pro- 
duction of English mines; because throughout the whole 
world our colonial Empires in contact are affected by each 
other's crisis. 

And I go further still. Great Britain needs France as 
an element of stability and restraint in world politics, espe- 
cially — and I say it plainly — in. Anglo-American relations. 
The war revolutionized these relations. It created ties 



456 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

which I trust may never be broken. Yet how can we over- 
look that often the past weighing upon the present makes 
difficult the most essential collaborations? How can we 
overlook that friction which may arise between Dominions 
and the United States? How can we overlook that in the 
modern world material and moral effects of economic strug- 
gles cannot be foreseen? And an economic struggle is even 
now engaged in between the two great branches of the An- 
glo-Saxon race. British and American shipyards are racing 
to see which can build most. In the markets of South 
America and of the Far East, British and American firms 
are struggling for supremacy. For this healthy competi- 
tion to remain a healthy stimulus and not become a dan- 
ger, Great Britain and America both need France as con- 
necting-link and compensator. And how can I avoid the 
Irish question? I remember a day in the very midst of the 
war when my colleague, the British High Commissioner in 
the United States, asked me to place at his disposal to speak 
at Catholic meetings one of the military priests attached 
to my service. America will need to be informed to-morrow 
— as yesterday. America will need to be told — to-morrow 
as yesterday — and to be told by others than the British 
themselves without reference to possible solutions of the 
Irish problem — that during the war the Sinn-Feiners har- 
boured and supplied German submarines and took German 
gold to pay for Casement's treason. Here too Great Bri- 
tain needs France — needs France on whose soil was sealed 
in blood the Anglo-American brotherhood of arms, France 
best qualified and most authorized to recall the higher in- 
terests of democratic unity which demand of the three 
nations ever greater faith and ever greater harmony. 

For this to be, a loyal effort of mutual understanding 
is essential. I have the consciousness of having always 
worked with whatsoever ability is mine to inform my coun- 
trymen of the permanent factors of British politics. Offi- 
cial Great Britain must also learn to know France better. 
The Foreign Office is a great stronghold of traditions. Of 
these traditions there is one whose possible danger I would 



FRANCE, BRITAIN AND THE U. S. A. 457 

point out. It is that which has always led Great Britain 
to look with favour upon the second-rate European Powers 
and with distrust upon the first-rate Powers. The tra- 
dition fifteen years ago led to the Entente Cordiale against 
a Germany of domination and so this tradition is sacred to 
us. Let us fear, however, that ill-interpreted it may now be 
turned against the very achievement which is its greatest 
honour. France is to-day the principal Power of Conti- 
nental Europe. That is enough for some to accuse her of 
Imperialism. I should like at certain moments to feel sure 
that it is not enough to induce similar reflexes in the 
splendid old institution which in Downing Street clings 
to the ways of bygone days. Such reflexes if they were 
possible would constitute an injustice and an error. For 
France is not Geraiany and her victory — I think I have 
shown it — ^is a victory a la Frangaise which does not deserve 
to be insulted by comparison with Bismarckian conquests. 
** Germany," said M. Clemenceau, "enslaved herself to 
enslave others. France frees herself to set others free." 
A great lesson in political psychology is contained in those 
few words. May the Foreign Office and all its representa- 
tives, in all parts of the world, take it loyally to heart and 
understand that Great Britain will always have more to 
fear from Germany even defeated than from France 
victorious ! 

The subject is vast. I do not flatter myself that I have 
exhausted it, I have tried — with a freedom of language 
to which twenty years of political activity in the cause 
of Franco-British friendship entitled me — to show the dan- 
ger spots and to point out lines of action. Between British 
and French let us avoid haggling. Let us speak with the 
heart and appeal to plain honest principles. I have seen 
M. Clemenceau succeed by this method, other methods have 
since been tried out with unhappy results. I am deeply con- 
vinced that by returning to it the two peoples will make 
their union more enduring to their own good and to the 
good of mankind. 



158 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

IV 

The problem of Franco-American relations is no less 
important than that of Franco-British relations with which 
I have just dealt with great frankness. I want to be equally- 
frank about Franco-American relations because democ- 
racies ought to be told the truth; and also because having 
myself been one with the American nation in thought, in 
heart and in action I venture to believe they will look upon 
my frankness as a proof of affection and of respect. 

The basis of Franco- American friendship is indestruct- 
ible; for it rests on the memory of service rendered and 
received without thought of self. This friendship has lasted 
for one hundred and fifty years. The statues of LaFayette 
and Rochambeau standing before the White House; their 
portraits hanging in the Capitol at the right and left of the 
Speaker, are the symbols of a living force. But before the 
war, each country was blissfully ignorant of the other. The 
two countries loved each other without knowing why. They 
knew little of each other. What America, to speak but of 
the United States, admired in us was our charm rather 
than our energy, our accomplishments rather than our 
virtues. It was neither our political genius, nor our prac- 
tical capacity, nor our faculty for expansion that she 
admired ; but our elegance, our taste, our fashions, our lit- 
erature, our art. And this admiration was directed more 
to the past than to the present. We were in a way to become 
like unto a work of art in a Museum. We suffered, in the 
eyes of America as of the rest of the world, from the dread 
fact that in Europe we were the last of the vanquished. 
Sedan dominated our modem history, as Jena had long 
dominated that of Prussia. We ourselves were in a way 
responsible for this situation. When Frenchmen went to 
America to talk of France, they seldom spoke of modem 
France, her ideas, her resources, or her industries. When 
Americans, like Barrett Wendell, spoke of France as a coun- 
try capable of action and by no wise stricken with national 
anemia, their words were received with a certain skepti- 



FRANCE, BRITAIN AND THE U. S. A. 459 

cism. "We were looked upon as an old nation resigned to 
secondary rank. The clear-sighted continuity of our for- 
eign policy and the breadth of our colonial policy were alike 
unkno^vn. Our religious conflicts angered the Catholics 
and astonished the rest of America incapable of conceiving 
normal relations between Church and State other than 
those of cordial separation. Our charm was felt, but we 
had Httle prestige or authority. 

The war came. In the United States as elsewhere every- 
one at first believed in German victory. The overwhelm- 
ing majority of the United States favoured neutrality. In 
July, 1914, Democrats and Republicans, Roosevelt and Wil- 
son, were agreed about that. A few understood from the 
very start the enormous importance of this fight which was 
just beginning and came to join our ranlcs, — these men 
were exceptions. The great mass did not know, did not 
move. As late as 1917, I met educated people in New 
York who were smilingly skeptic about German atrocities. 
Inquiry into the responsibility for the war was avoided, 
and it was not only in his own party that the President won 
that expression of prudent gratitude: "He kept us out of 
war. ' ' The Marne came as a shock to this apathy and shat- 
tered the belief that Germany was invincible. Then as the 
war went on and fighting settled down in earnest, another 
belief received its death-blow: the belief in French light- 
ness, capable of sudden effort but not of patient endur- 
ance. Months went by. America was making much money 
by selling raw materials to the Allies. But war profits all 
went into a few hands and everyone was feeling the rising 
cost of living. In 1916, people began to wonder if it would 
not be wise to stop the European war by cutting off sup- 
plies. As the presidential election drew near the question 
of entering the war became an issue between opposing par- 
ties. The great majority of the people, however, still fav- 
oured neutrality and a ''peace without victory." 

Germany it was that, under pressure of circumstances 
and with her usual lack of psychology, forced war upon 
America. At an early stage she had worked towards this 



460 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

end by attacks on American sliipping ; but that did not sat- 
isfy her. By a series of provocations which grew worse 
month by month, by obstinate persistence in unheard-of 
absurdities, by blind contempt for the clearest warnings, 
the Imperial German Government dug its grave with its 
own hands. Tirpitz got the upper hand of Bemstorff, and 
Bernstorff being beaten proceeded like a true German to 
go Tirpitz one better. While the logical development of 
diplomatic correspondence was daily making it more and 
more inevitable for the United States to pick up the gaunt- 
let, the German Embassy in Washington was organizing a 
vast conspiracy on the very soil of America. The Ameri- 
cans, who are naturally confiding, unraveled the threads 
of this intrigue with stupefaction. The general sympathy 
which German immigrants had enjoyed gave way to alarm 
and suspicion. The United States had borne the first tor- 
pedo attacks without severing relations. But the last, com- 
bined with this interior plot which was felt at work every- 
where, awoke the war spirit which for thirty months had 
slumbered. It was recognized that the danger against 
which Western Europe was fighting might also reach the 
New World. The protection of the ocean began to appear 
doubtful. On April 6, 1917, the United States, directly 
threatened, declared war on Germany. 

This war which it entered for purely American reasons 
was fought by the United States in a splendid spirit of 
union with Europe. They put into it all their power, all 
their will, all their heart. The United States lent its Alhes 
— when in April, 1917, they could get no more money in 
New York — the sum of 15,000 million dollars. They raised 
five million men, nearly half of whom were in France on 
the day of the Armistice. By voluntary and self-imposed 
restrictions they were able to feed Europe. They subor- 
dinated all individual interests to the general interest by 
adopting a policy of production and distribution which set 
a standard. Their soldiers fought bravely, and France 
holds their memory sacred. The part played by the United 
States in the war, though short, was tremendous. With- 



FRANCE, BRITAIN AND THE U. S. A. 4G1 

out France whicli saved the world at the battle of the Marne, 
the United States could not have fought. But mthout the 
United States the Allies could not have conquered. It was 
the presence of American troops that enabled them to 
establish their numerical supremacy. And it was the pres- 
ence of American troops that enabled Marshal Foch to 
plan and carry out the final offensive of victory. America 
came into the war late. But she came in time. France 
knows what her aid was worth and will be forever grateful. 
The hour of defeat sounds for the Germans at the end 
of 1918. Peace sued for at the same time as the Armistice 
finds the Allies in accord on general principles. I have told 
above the story of the frank exchange of views which 
efforts have at times been made to misrepresent, but about 
which neither then or now, the slightest shadow of ambigu- 
ity exists.* The Conference began. After so many 
distorted versions this book tells the truth about the peace. 
At the Conference the United States proved its disinterest- 
edness by asking nothing for herself but the right to pay 
for and keep the 700,000 tons of German shipping interned 
in her own ports. Like all the Allies she defended her con- 
tentions vigorously but not in the overbearing manner 
sometimes ascribed to her representatives. Some of these 
contentions France did not accept. To reach agreement 
the United States, like other nations, had to accept amend- 
ments. It was the law of the four-nation peace, as it had 
been the law of a four-nation war. But it is equally unjust 
to assert either that the United States ^'put it over" on the 
Allies, or that the Allies ''put it over" on the United States. 
The Conference was laborious; at times painful. I have 
explained why. But from first to last all discussions were 
marked by a sincerity and restraint which do them honour. 
The irreconcilables of the two extremist parties, the Ger- 
manists and the Imperialists — must bear the responsibility 
for fables with which they slandered the makers of the 
Treaty in order to discredit the Treaty itself. Wlien signed 
the peace appeared to its makers an imperfect but honest 



*See Chapter II, pages 43-76. 



462 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

compromise — an unprecedented attempt to regulate the 
future relations of peoples on a basis of security and justice. 

The Treaty thus drafted was not ratified by the United 
States Senate. The Treaty of Guarantee with France 
although favourably reported by the Commission was not 
even discussed. I shall not refer to the details of the ten 
months' battle that ended thus. The vote of the Senate 
pained France. Painful in itself, for like all the Allies we 
had made sacrifices for the sake of agreement and the final 
abstention of America robbed these sacrifices of their 
counter-benefits. Painful too in its consequences, for 
beyond a doubt it encouraged Germany in her policy of 
non-execution of the Peace Treaty. I say frankly that 
France did not consider the Treaty clauses as justifying 
the angry struggle to which they gave rise. Senator Lodge 's 
reservations seemed to France neither indispensable nor 
inacceptable. She felt that no Treaty could possibly affect 
parliamentary prerogatives which are the very basis of 
democratic institutions and that there was no need of so 
many glosses to reserve what in practise and in theory are 
inalienable rights, for war cannot be waged without money, 
and money is in the hands of legislatures and war cannot 
be waged without the support of public opinion and public 
opinion is free. The French remembered that, no matter 
how formal the Franco-Russian Alliance, a vote of the 
French Parliament on August 3, 1914, would have sufficed 
to make it inoperative ; and they concluded that no matter 
what the wording of the Covenant — a wording easily 
amended — the Congress of the United States would have 
retained all its rights. 

My country has maintained a fitting reserve in dealing 
with these events. It could not, however, refrain from 
noting their consequences. In the spring of 1920, M. Alex- 
ander Redlich, editor of the Gazette de Voss, said to me : 

''Germany is not complying with the Treaty; that is 
true. But if she does not comply with it, the chief cause is 
the vote by which the United States Senate refused to 
ratify it." 



FRANCE, BRITAIN AND THE U. S. A. 463 

Germany readily believes what she wishes to he true, 
and she has never wished for anything more than for di\d- 
sion among the Allies. She flattered herself that she could 
bring it about during the war by the Czernir offer and the 
Lancken proposals. She thought she had achieved it in 
1919 and Count Brockdorff on his arrival at Versailles 
made no attempt to hide the fact. How could the secession 
of the United States have failed to encourage her hopes and 
illusions — have failed to strengthen her determination not 
to give up the w^ar criminals, not to disarm, and not to pay? 
And I know full well that none of the men who rejected the 
Treaty sought such a result, nor desired to precipitate it. 
But at times results outstrip intentions, and this was here 
the case. The legal controversies to which the Treaty of 
Versailles led in the Capitol, the party struggles it revived, 
and the personal antagonisms it engendered are expressed 
in Europe by greater difficulty in enforcing the Treaty. 
We must in the mutual interests of France and of the 
United States face the facts of this situation and seek to 
remedy it. 

V 

It calls for serious effort, not for displays of temper. 
Our mutual affection is not endangered. The hearts of the 
two peoples still beat together. The American Government 
has not so far called upon France to pay back the thou- 
sands of millions it lent her, nor even the interest thereon. 
Everyone feels that the situation is difficult and calls for 
careful handling. Everyone has the same aim: peace and 
friendship. 

We cannot, however, blind ourselves to the fact that, 
if it is to endure and develop, Franco-American friendship 
must be given more care than in the past. During the last 
century we loved each other at a distance, ^\ithout much 
knowledge of each other, and absence of contact made fric- 
tion impossible. Our relations were pleasant but of life in 
common we knew naught. War has changed all this. More 
than two million American soldiers came to France. They 



464 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

lived there in times of great stress. Nearly eighty thou- 
sand of them now sleep their last sleep in her soil. Those 
who returned learned to know something of French courage. 
But many of them did not know or did not understand how 
awful was France's plight after four years of war. Some 
complained of living conditions and of profiteering, forget- 
ting that the French soldiers had the same troubles and 
that profiteering was not unknown in America. Others 
were over-impressed by the comforts and flattery they 
found in occupied Germany, forgetful that the miserable 
condition of our poor villages and the weariness of our 
people were but an added reason for their sympathy. All 
were at times taken in by absurd tales, such for instance 
as that France made America pay rent for the trenches ! In 
vain we denied this again and again. In vain we showed 
that the so-called renting was merely the taking over of the 
material of the trenches which was done in every sector of 
the front whenever a new relief arrived, not only between 
one Allied Army and another, but also between the various 
units of the same Army. I should not be surprised if many 
a doughboy went home with the idea firmly tucked away in 
the back of his head that he paid for the privilege of fight- 
ing. Finally, the warmth of appreciation rightly shown by 
the grateful French made many an American forget that, 
even if it did save the Allies, the United States entered the 
war to defend the rights and liberties of America. S • 

I do not want to be charged with dotting every * ' i " and 
crossing every ''t" — ^yet we must be plain if we are to 
understand each other. The war brought us into direct 
contact. This contact must be maintained. Let us neglect 
nothing that touches the souls of our two peoples — ^let us 
never grow tired of explaining ourselves to each other. 
For three years I have acted on this principle. Though my 
first duty, as French High Commissioner, was to obtain 
material results, in the shape of money, steel, wheat, ships, 
powder, explosives and countless other things, I constantly 
strove to develop in each country an understanding of and 
love for the customs and character of the other. Thou- 



FRANCE, BRITAIN AND THE U. S. A. 465 

sands of times with the vahiable help of the Committee on 
Public Information, my fellow-workers and I talked to 
Americans about France. We furnished facts and figures 
to the efficient Association of American National Lec- 
turers. We created enduring ties between the similar 
social, religious and professional groups in the two coun- 
tries. By our efforts, the Catholics, Protestants, Jews, his- 
torians, scholars and business men of America and France 
were brought into close relations which continue' despite 
the non-ratification of the Peace Treaty. Thanks to the 
cordial cooperation of General Pershing, I succeeded in 
1918 in giving seven thousand officers and soldiers of the 
American Army a six months' course in our Universities 
and Technical Schools. To every American soldier, when 
he left, we gave a little booklet which in a few pages 
expressed the gratitude of France and told her position and 
the part she played in winning the war. M. Clemenceau 
sent a memorial souvenir signed by the President of the 
French Republic to the family of every dead soldier. 
Trifling incidents perhaps, but not without interest in the 
moral history of the two nations. Now that the war is won 
we must continue and as it has proved feasible to pave the 
way for complete union by bringing together correspond- 
ing elements, the same policy should be pursued. It is the 
best way of killing in America the many untrue stories con- 
cocted against France by cunning hands we know only too 
well: the story that France pays no taxes: the story that 
France is not reconstructing : the story that she is militar- 
ist, that she is rich and discontented. 

So much for the general conditions by which we may 
reach a good understanding based not upon propaganda — 
I hate the word; the thing — but upon exact information. 
How can our political and economic relations be adjusted 
for the greatest good of the two countries? One's first 
impulse is to speak of material aid which America could 
furnish to France ; but however valuable this aid might be, 
it is not the most essential thing. Besides, up to now, with 
the exception of private and philanthropic initiative, it has 



466 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

been non-existent. Immediately after the Armistice a num- 
ber of American business men came over to offer us their 
help. At the same time at my request Mr. McAdoo, Secre- 
tary of the Treasury, asked Congress for authority to open 
us credits which would have enabled us to take advantage 
of these offers. Notliing came of it. The endeavours to 
keep French workmen employed and to provide work for 
our war factories created a protectionist policy of recon- 
struction which reduced foreign participation to almost 
nothing. Even if this was a mistake, it was a very natural 
one. Since then many American banks have established 
branches in France. Corporations for developing interna- 
tional commerce have been founded. Special short time 
credits have been negotiated. But the great current of 
Franco-American business has not yet begun. Burdened 
with war loans and income taxes, America has no liquid 
funds available. Even if her condition were normal, her 
aid would not suffice to solve the problem France must 
face to-day. 

I have already given figures. We have a debt of 255,000 
million francs, at the exchange rate of October, 1920, or 
227,000 millions at par. "We have to pay pensions repre- 
senting a capital of 55,000 millions. We have spent 22,000 
millions on reconstruction and must spend at least 120,000 
millions more. No material aid from America can meet 
such a need. The only possible way out is for the Treaty 
of Versailles to be enforced and Germany made to pay 
what she owes. The only real help therefore that can be 
of definite assistance to France is that which will enable 
her to enforce the Peace Treaty and obtain payment of 
Germany's debt. In other words what France needs is 
political support. Pohtical support that may entail finan- 
cial aid later ; if Germany pays and issues bonds the United 
States could buy or discount them, but now the only pos- 
sible aid they can give is political and moral, by backing 
France when she makes her just demands. Here we have 
the problem in all its complexity, for it is not easy for 
America to demand the enforcement of a contract which 



FRANCE, BRITAIN AND THE U. S. A. 467 

she has not even ratified. Again I am dotting my '4" and 
calling a spade a spade. 

I know that in saying this I am contradicting an opinion 
which great American business men have often expressed. 
I know for example that in a booklet published by Mr. Otto 
Kahn in 1920 he maintained that the help America could 
give Europe and especially France was not political but 
economic. I think my statistics have proved that at least 
as far as France is concerned this is a fundamental error. 
America will not and cannot bear the cost of our reconstruc- 
tion. The only way she can be of real help to us therefore 
is to unite with us politically and morally in forcing Ger- 
many to pay. The offer of economic support to the exclu- 
sion of political support carries with it a clear implication 
of iniquity, for in the form in which it has been proposed it 
would profit as much to the vanquished but uninjured 
aggressor as to the victors, victims not only of aggression 
but of systematic destruction as well. Worse still, to secure 
payment from Germany for her purchases, all her liquid 
assets which should go to reparations would be earmarked 
for the sellers. In discussing this purely business ques- 
tion people lose sight of the fact that Germany in order to 
pay must, as Lord Cunliffe pointed out, subject herself for 
purposes of reparation to a special system of production, 
restriction and exports. Financiers like Mr. Otto Kahn, 
who deal with the reconstruction of Europe en bloc, forget 
that the ruins to be rebuilt are not alike either in origin, or 
extent, or location. Their location: — all the ruins are in 
Allied countries — none in Germany. Their extent: — how 
can Germany's economic crisis be compared with those in 
France or Belgium which are aggravated by the loss of 
one-fourth of the national capital? Their origin: — who 
does not know that Germany alone is responsible for the 
disaster, from which she also suffers, though less than the 
others? The plan of Mr. Otto Kahn, whose friendship for 
France no one appreciates better than I, unfortunately 
comes back to the system of Mr. Keynes, — ^much, I feel 
certain, against its author's intentions. As a plan it is 
not only impractical but unjust. 



466 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

And I return to my conclusion : if America wishes — and 
I know she does wish — to give France material help, let 
her begin by helping her politically, for that is the key to 
everything. How can this political aid be given? That is 
hardly for a foreigner to say. By a majority of six the 
United States Senate refused to ratify the Peace Treaty 
because the Covenant alarmed it. That is the Senate 's own 
affair and I do not question its motives. But I venture to 
say that when they voted thus, the United States Senate 
had no intention of repudiating the principles for which 
America fought. The United States Senate had no inten- 
tion of repudiating the right of self-determination of peo- 
ples, the right that freed Alsace-Lorraine, the Walloon 
districts, Schleswig, Bohemia, Transylvania, Trente and 
Trieste, the Croats, the Slovenes, and the Greeks of Thrace 
and Asia Minor. The United States Senate had no inten- 
tion of repudiating the right of those attacked to be paid 
damages for losses inflicted by the aggressor — a right 
under which the victors who had been unjustly attacked 
confined themselves to demanding from the vanquished 
merely actual damages sustained and pensions, but remitted 
the whole of the 700,000 millions the war had cost them. 
Certainly the United States Senate and all America recog- 
nize the justice of this to-day as they recognized it in the 
past. If they do, if they really wish to see justice done, I 
insist that it is their duty to find some way to make Ger- 
many understand their wish and their will; for just now 
Germany with her usual treachery affects to believe that 
the United States Senate and the American people think 
otherwise, Germany is using the political controversy, the 
meaning of which she cunningly distorts, to make it appear 
that the United States disapproves not only of a part of 
the Covenant but of the entire Treaty. America owes it to 
itself to answer this perfidy by an act that will prove to 
the world that the United States is faithful in peace to the 
immortal principles which guided her in war. 

And what is this act to bef That is for America herself 
to decide. It goes without saying that pure and simple 



FRANCE, BRITAIN AND THE U. S. A. 469 

re-establishment of peace, — according to the resolution of 
Senator Knox, would have just the opposite effect of that 
for which France hopes. But between the Knox resolution 
and ratification there are other ways. America may ratify 
the Peace Treaty either with Senator Lodge's reservations 
or after asking the Allies to amend the Covenant. America 
may declare the changes she desires. There are a thou- 
sand means of reaching a satisfactory conclusion. There 
are a thousand means, but there is only one end. That end 
is to help re-establish order in Europe by helping to enforce 
the peace. Without law there can be no order, and the only 
possible law is the Treaty which Germany has signed. The 
United States by the part it played in the war made vic- 
tory possible. By the part it will play in enforcing the 
peace, the United States will remain true to her war aims. 
American support is essential to force Germany to respect 
the Peace Treaty. Nothing else can make a conquered 
and rebellious Germany understand the necessity of ful- 
filling what she has signed. Nothing else can bring about 
the financial settlements, without which France cannot 
live. Nothing else can confirm the military guarantee 
which the United States promised to France, the far- 
sighted justice of which no one disputes. American sup- 
port now can as nothing else ever will, ensure that future 
peaceful cooperation between France and America about 
which everyone is enthusiastic in principle but for which 
no one furnishes the means. For this to be possible Ger- 
many must pay, she must pay in every sense of the word. 
She must pay. She can pay. She will pay — as soon as she 
sees that all her conquerors — ^without exception — are deter- 
mined that she shall pay. 

Let there be no mistake; such a policy though of pri- 
mary interest to France is the only one which can be of 
real and lasting service to Germany. Germany is untouched 
and will recover quickly — but on one condition. That essen- 
tial condition is that she does not fall back into the hands 
of the militarists who would drag her and the rest of the 
world into a new war. German militarism lives in the 



470 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

spirit. Ludendorff and Hugo Stinnes are the leaders of 
one and the same party. If this party prevails, Germany 
instead of working in peace will waste herself preparing 
for revenge. Germany will know peace and she will give 
peace to others only if she mends her ways, and she will 
not mend her ways unless she is forced to by a firm hand. 
The policy of renunciation bred by the Allies in 1920 was 
of no benefit to anyone except the German reactionaries, 
Fehrenbach replaced Muller. Spa marked the arrogant 
return of Stinnes. The more we yield, the bolder these 
men will become and the less mil be our chances of peace. 
Germany will not turn towards fresh ideals until she knows 
that the Allies are determined to prevent her doing to-mor- 
row that which she did yesterday. The first proof of this 
determination must be enforcement of the peace. For this 
determination to be effective it must be unanimous. The 
United States has here a duty to fulfill to save humanity 
and Germany herself from danger of another war, a war 
which will be sought by the Pan-Germanists all the more 
eagerly as they discern indecision and lack of unity in our 
ranks. 

I can understand how after the storm many Americans 
weary of the intricacies of European affairs, may well ask 
themselves whether after all it would not be the part of 
wisdom for the United States to reduce its relations with 
the Old World to a minimum. That is an instinctive move- 
ment. In the spring of 1908, Roosevelt said to me : 

"What the United States lacks most is an understand- 
ing of the fact that we have interests all over the world. I 
wish every American felt that American policy is a world 
policy and that we are and shall be identified in the future 
with all great questions. Some of us are aware of this. 
But the American people as a whole must be accustomed 
to the idea, they must learn to understand the meaning 
of our world interests." 

Two days later Mr. Lodge, to whom I had mentioned 
this conversation, made a reservation. 

*'Let us understand each other," he said. ''Our policy 



FRANCE, BRITAIN AND THE U. S. A. 471 

is a world policy in so far as commerce is concerned. But 
I hold that we should not intervene in purely political 
questions outside of America. It is neither our interest 
nor our tradition. My policy and, I think I may say, the 
policy of our Senate, is the policy of George Washington." 

And Senator Lodge added with a smile: 

*' You see, we support our President. We like him. But 
we are more constitutionalistic than he and more 
conservative. ' ' 

I have recalled these old memories because they shed 
light on the present. Events stronger than principles or 
traditions threw the United States into a European war. 
But the war over, the conservative spirit of the Senate has 
re-asserted itself and throughout the country some regret 
has been felt for the old isolation. ''Keep off!" Experi- 
ence itself, that proved how impossible such pleasant 
ataraxia is at times, could not overcome force of habit. 
Americanism, in its negative and self-sufficient form, 
found many converts. 

It is to these that my words are addressed. I quite 
understand their aversion to undertakings binding the 
United States to intervene in every Balkan or Eastern con- 
flict. The generalized and abstract character of the Cove- 
nant explains many of the objections raised on this point. 
But the events of yesterday proved that there are European 
situations from which America cannot, whether she wishes 
it or not, remain aloof. The events of yesterday prove that 
no doctrine or principle of isolation can keep apart those 
who are united by common ideals and common interests. 
So just as long as the American people hope never to live 
again through an emergency such as led two million of their 
soldiers to the Marne and the Meuse, there is only one 
policy worth while, a policy that will prevent its recur- 
rence. Now, whence comes the danger? Not from France 
certainly, who has suffered too much from the war not to 
have an earnest desire for peace. From Germany then? 
And the name of the danger is German militarism. To 
defend ourselves against militarism and its consequences 



472 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TREATY 

we waged war and we made peace. If we want the peace 
to last — Germany must be made to miderstand that peace 
is a sacred thing. If Germany does not miderstand this, if 
we do not force her to miderstand it, sooner or later we 
shall see the same causes produce the same effects, and 
once more the ''doughboy" will have to cross the ocean. 
To avert this, the united action of the Allies of yesterday 
is necessary. To avert this, the United States — ^now^ and 
not later — must take her stand against Germany. Every 
weakness that encourages German Imperialism stimulates 
complications. Every division among the Allies sows the 
seed of future war. And as France and America both want 
peace, America must help us to enforce it — there is no other 
way of making the world safe. So long as America remains 
aloof, her power, whether she wills it or not, will play into 
the hands of those she fought against in the war. 

Was I wrong when I said that the problem is political, 
and that the economic plans of financiers cannot solve it? 
To make war impossible we must all join in strengthening 
the Peace Treaty, which has too long been a "scrap of 
paper." And if the United States hesitates and seeks her 
way, let her thoughts turn to the valley of the Argonne, 
where thirty thousand white crosses bear witness to what 
America stood for in times of danger. America has not 
changed. America must make good the things she stood 
for, and she is free to choose her means. That is the prob- 
lem of to-day. If it is not solved, peace of any kind will 
be unsafe. The dead will have died in vain. 

The union of the three democracies — France, Great 
Britain and the United States — is the fundamental guaran- 
tee of world peace. That is reason enough for each of them 
to make all necessary sacrifices to maintain this union. At 
times England or America find France too uncompromising 
in her demands for her rights! Let them ask themselves 
what they would do if they were placed in her position. 
Then they will understand our state of mind. At times they 
accuse us of Imperialism. If France obtains the repara- 
tions which are her due — and she can obtain them only by 



FRANCE, BEITAIN AND THE U. S. A. 473 

the support of her Allies — she will devote herself wholly 
to work and to progress in peace. It is only if she feels 
that she is abandoned by those who are pledged to support 
her that she might in her disappointment become the prey 
of extremists. Peace has not settled all problems. Peace 
to be finally established calls for the means which war and 
victory demanded. France, Great Britain and the United 
States still have duties to fulfill. These duties cannot be 
fulfilled unless the union of the three nations endures. 



Note : — The events of the first three months of 1921 have not modified this con- 
clusion. The Conference of Paris of January, 1921, agreed on a reduction of 
Germany's debt to France of sixty-five per cent. The refusal of Germany at 
the London Conference in the following month of March to sign this agreement 
fortunately prevented the coming into force of this unjust reduction. In spite 
of the economic sanctions taken at that time by the Allies, the mutilation 
inflicted in January upon the clauses of the Versailles Treaty has aot been 
rectified. Miscomprehension continues. 

The End 



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